Smart Q&A: Park Young-jun on Japan's Pursuit of Collective Self-Defense and South Korea's Response Strategy

YouTube Link: video.eai.or.kr/131113_Sqa.flv

Professor Park Young-jun holds a Ph.D. in International Politics from the University of Tokyo and is currently a professor at the Graduate School of National Security, Korea National Defense University.

Following the Japan-U.S. Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting (2+2) on October 3rd, where the United States welcomed Japan's efforts to strengthen its defense capabilities, including collective self-defense, and agreed to revise the Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation Guidelines concerning the division of roles between the Self-Defense Forces and U.S. forces in Japan and the surrounding region during contingencies, Japan's collective self-defense issue has become a subject of considerable debate among regional countries. In response, the East Asia Institute (EAI) invited Professor Park Young-jun of the Graduate School of National Security, Korea National Defense University, on November 13th, for an interview regarding the direction of security policies pursued by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's administration, its ripple effects on East Asia, and South Korea's future response strategy. The main points are as follows.

Background and Progress of the Abe Administration's Pursuit of Collective Self-Defense

“All UN member states possess individual and collective self-defense rights, but the Japanese Constitution stipulates that Japan renounces the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes.”

“Prime Minister Abe holds the firm belief that Japan, as a sovereign nation, should not only possess but also exercise the right to collective self-defense.”

Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations (UN) stipulates that UN member states may exercise the "right of self-defense" individually or collectively in case of an armed attack. Therefore, Japan, as a UN member state, possesses the right to individual and collective self-defense.

Concurrently, under Article 9, Paragraph 1 of its Constitution, Japan "forever renounces war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes." For a long time, the Japanese government has maintained the principle, based on this provision, that while Japan possesses the right to collective self-defense, it does not exercise it.

However, Prime Minister Abe holds the firm belief that Japan, as a sovereign nation, should not only possess but also exercise the right to collective self-defense. During his first term as Prime Minister in 2006, he attempted to pursue the exercise of collective self-defense in a limited scope, restricted to four types of situations: first, responding to attacks on U.S. warships on the high seas; second, intercepting ballistic missiles targeting the United States; third, escorting other countries' forces participating in international peacekeeping operations; and fourth, providing rear support to other countries participating in international peacekeeping operations. However, these plans were not fully realized as he stepped down from the Prime Ministership in 2007.

Upon beginning his second term at the end of 2012, Prime Minister Abe established the "Panel of Experts on the Reconstruction of the Legal Basis for Security" (hereinafter referred to as the Security Panel) in February 2013 as a private advisory body to the Prime Minister, and is once again attempting to formulate measures for exercising collective self-defense. The discussions held by the Security Panel to date are posted on the Prime Minister's Official Residence website in the form of meeting minutes. Examining these records reveals that the scope of collective self-defense currently being considered by the Abe administration extends beyond exercising it for the allied nation of the United States, as defined in existing types, to potentially include Southeast Asian countries, Australia, South Korea, and India.

Changes in Japan's Defense Policy Under the Abe Administration

“The Abe administration's defense policy is pursuing comprehensive changes at the strategic, institutional, and military capability levels, thus it is necessary to grasp the overall picture rather than focusing solely on the issue of collective self-defense.”

The changes in defense policy currently being attempted by the Abe administration are not confined to individual issues such as the exercise of collective self-defense, but rather involve a broad range of reforms encompassing strategies, institutions, and military capabilities. Therefore, a comprehensive analysis that considers all these aspects is necessary.

At the strategic level, the Abe administration is pursuing the formulation of a National Security Strategy and the revision of the National Defense Program Guidelines. The formulation of a National Security Strategy signifies an intention to produce a strategic document equivalent to the United States' "National Security Strategy," establishing a new framework of strategic documents where the existing National Defense Program Guidelines would be placed under the National Security Strategy. Second, it proposes "Proactive Pacifism based on International Cooperation" as a core concept of its security policy. Third, it identifies China's potential threat and North Korea's nuclear and ballistic missile provocations as key security threats to Japan. Fourth, it emphasizes increasing Japan's own role and capabilities, strengthening the Japan-U.S. alliance, and enhancing cooperation with the Asia-Pacific region and the international community to counter these security threats.

At the institutional level, first, it is preparing institutional mechanisms, such as establishing a "National Security Council" (NSC) similar to those in the United States and South Korea, to enable key ministers, including the Prime Minister, Chief Cabinet Secretary, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Minister of Defense, and Minister of Finance, to regularly discuss national security issues and make policy decisions. Second, it is pursuing the establishment of a "Cabinet Intelligence Bureau," analogous to the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) or South Korea's National Intelligence Service (NIS), to enhance intelligence gathering and analysis functions within the Prime Minister's Official Residence. Third, it is reforming institutions by establishing an "Agency for Defense Equipment" equivalent to South Korea's Defense Acquisition Program Administration (DAPA) to exclusively handle weapons procurement.

At the military capability level, Japan is accelerating the enhancement of its conventional capabilities in the Maritime Self-Defense Force (ranked 2nd globally) and Air Self-Defense Force (ranked 4th globally), which are already world-class, through the expansion of its escort ship and submarine fleets and the procurement of F-35 next-generation fighter jets. Of particular note is the preparation for the establishment of a Marine Corps, a type of "offensive capability" that has been taboo to possess. As funds for the procurement of amphibious vehicles have already been allocated, it is necessary to closely observe the impact that the establishment of the Japanese Marine Corps will have on future Sino-Japanese disputes over the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands in Chinese).

Considering the overall trend of these security policy changes under the Abe administration, it is difficult to conclude that Japan is aiming for militarization or militarism. The militarization of Japan in the 1930s was characterized by: first, the military seizing real power by exploiting the Emperor and pursuing expansionist policies; second, the adoption of a preemptive strike doctrine against potential enemies such as the United States, Russia, and China; third, accelerating military buildup to secure preemptive strike capabilities; and fourth, deviating from international norms like the League of Nations and the Washington Naval Treaty, behaving like a "rogue state" of today. In contemporary Japan, the alliance with the United States is maintained, UN norms are observed, and the possession of capabilities for long-range power projection, such as nuclear weapons, aircraft carriers, and strategic bombers, is being refrained from. Therefore, it cannot be said that militarism is being revived as in the 1930s. The current Abe administration can be seen as seeking to achieve the status of a "normal military state," similar to Germany or Italy, which, despite their past as wartime aggressors, are now actively participating in international security issues and cooperating with other nations.

Reactions from the U.S. and China and the Impact on the Future East Asian Order

“United States: Generally positive, but concerned about provoking China.”

“China: Wary of Japan's defense policy changes amidst a security dilemma, responding with naval and air force expansion and ballistic missile capability enhancement.”

“The arms race between China and Japan will threaten peace in East Asia and place a significant burden on South Korea's security.”

The United States, as stated in the joint communiqué of the Japan-U.S. 2+2 meeting last October, generally views the Abe administration's security policy positively. However, as former Assistant Secretary of State James B. Steinberg emphasized in an interview with the Asahi Shimbun in February, stating that Japan's defense buildup should not target China, it can be inferred that the U.S. feels a burden regarding the Abe administration's defense policy provoking China. Currently, the United States is employing a strategy that combines competition and cooperation rather than simply trying to contain China. This is also true in the military dimension. For instance, the Chinese navy fleet is scheduled to participate for the first time in the Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) exercise, a biennial multinational naval exercise led by the U.S., in 2014. The United States is maintaining a cooperative stance in broad terms to foster a peaceful relationship with the rising China. Therefore, while welcoming Japan's defense buildup within the framework of the U.S.'s "Pivot to Asia" policy, the U.S. is simultaneously concerned about Japan excessively confronting China.

In China's case, given the ongoing clashes with Japan in the East China Sea, it is wary of the Abe administration's defense policy changes. As a consequence of the intense territorial dispute, China and Japan are currently caught in a "security dilemma" (a phenomenon where one state's defensive actions are mistakenly perceived by another state as having aggressive intentions). Even if Japan attempts strategic changes and military buildup for defensive purposes to counter potential threats, China perceives these as offensive and expansionist policies. Indeed, China is responding to the Abe administration's defense policy changes by taking measures such as expanding its navy, strengthening the functions of the State Oceanic Administration, enhancing its air force capabilities, and bolstering its ballistic missile capabilities and the Second Artillery Corps of the People's Liberation Army.

This security dilemma situation between China and Japan is bound to have a significant negative impact on the East Asian security order and the security situation on the Korean Peninsula. The fact that China and Japan, the major powers in the Asia-Pacific region, perceive each other as potential threats and are engaging in an arms race will not only cause considerable instability throughout the region but will also inevitably have a negative impact on the security situation on the Korean Peninsula, where South Korea and North Korea are in confrontation.

South Korea's Response Strategy

“Current South Korean Government Position: The exercise of collective self-defense by Japan within South Korean territory and territorial waters requires the permission of the South Korean government.”

“Policy Recommendations: ① Avoid an overly sensitive reaction to Japan's defense policy changes aimed at becoming a normal country. ② Maintain diverse dialogue channels to reduce factors of instability between South Korea and Japan and build minimal trust. ③ South Korea should lead various multilateral security dialogues and cooperation within East Asia, such as ROK-U.S.-Japan and ROK-China-Japan, to strengthen deterrence against North Korea and mitigate the risk of an arms race between China and Japan.”

Regarding Japan's pursuit of collective self-defense, the South Korean government already declared in 1998, at the time of the enactment of the Law Concerning Security and Peace Activities in Situations Arising in the Neighborhood of Japan, that any operations by the Self-Defense Forces within South Korean territory and territorial waters (rear support for the U.S.) would require the permission of the South Korean government. The South Korean government currently maintains this existing position, which is considered an appropriate response in broad terms.

Regarding South Korea's future response strategy, first, it is crucial to strive to understand Japan's security policy changes objectively and calmly. As emphasized earlier, what the Abe administration is currently aiming for is not militarism but a normal country. An overly sensitive reaction, as if South Korean sovereignty would be immediately violated if Japan exercises collective self-defense, is not an appropriate response method.

Second, there is a need to resume security and strategic dialogues between South Korea and Japan. Due to the outrageous remarks made by Japanese officials on historical issues and the unreasonable claims made by the Japanese government regarding the Dokdo issue, bilateral relations have deteriorated to a point that can be described as the worst in history. In this situation, the South Korean government is not pursuing summit meetings or ministerial-level talks with Japan. However, precisely in such circumstances, it is necessary to keep diverse dialogue channels open to quell factors of instability and build minimal trust. To confirm the veracity of Japan's security policies and to dispel the suspicions that the general public holds about Japan, efforts to operate dialogue channels and exchange information between South Korea and Japan must continue. Furthermore, Japan is emphasizing security cooperation with South Korea to counter the threats from China and North Korea, and discussions are underway within the Abe administration's Security Panel regarding the resumption of the bilateral General Security of Military Information Agreement and Mutual Logistics Support Agreement, which were canceled last year. The Abe administration hopes to enhance security cooperation between South Korea and Japan. Of course, considering public sentiment, even if the Japanese government were to propose discussions on even basic levels of military cooperation, the South Korean government must consider it prudently. However, efforts to manage bilateral relations through dialogue at a certain level are always necessary to prevent further deterioration of South Korea-Japan relations.

Third, in the medium to long term, South Korea must lead efforts to establish various multilateral security cooperation frameworks, including Japan. First, the establishment of a ROK-U.S.-Japan security cooperation framework is necessary to strengthen deterrence against North Korea. While the ROK-U.S. alliance will inevitably be the main pillar of response in the event of contingencies on the Korean Peninsula, the rear support role of the Japan-U.S. alliance will be indispensable in such situations. Given that all United Nations Command rear bases are located in Japan, it is necessary to further complement the ROK-U.S.-Japan security cooperation framework to smoothly utilize air and naval bases in Japan. Additionally, in a situation where an arms race between Japan and China could escalate and cause regional instability, South Korea must take the lead in efforts to build multilateral trust within the East Asian region. In this context, existing frameworks such as the ROK-China-Japan Summit and the Trilateral Cooperation Secretariat can be very useful, thus requiring proactive efforts from South Korea to reactivate trilateral dialogue channels. South Korea can also take the lead in presenting policy agendas at forums such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) to prevent military tensions between Japan and China from escalating. Leading Japan and China toward reconciliation through various multilateral security dialogue channels in the region will be a key task of the Park Geun-hye administration's Northeast Asia Peace and Cooperation Initiative. ■

The East Asia Institute (EAI) receives financial support for its research on middle power diplomacy from The John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation. EAI conducts Smart Q&A interviews with experts both domestically and internationally, aiming to provide timely and in-depth analysis of current issues through question-and-answer sessions with experts in relevant fields. This manuscript was compiled by Kim Yang-gyu, a researcher at EAI's Center for Asian Security Studies, based on the interview content. The opinions expressed are those of the individual expert and do not necessarily reflect the views of the East Asia Institute. Please cite the source when quoting from Smart Q&A.