Smart Q&A: Jeon Bong-geun on the North Korean Nuclear Crisis and Prospects for Renegotiating the ROK-U.S. Atomic Energy Agreement

YouTube Link: video.eai.or.kr/130416_Sqa.flv

Professor Jeon Bong-geun holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Oregon and is currently the Director of the Security and Unification Studies Division at the Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security, Korea National Diplomatic Academy.

Key Issues and Background of the ROK-U.S. Atomic Energy Agreement Renegotiation

“The gap between South Korea's demand for enrichment and reprocessing and the U.S. opposition remains unresolved.”

“South Korea: 1) Secure a stable supply of nuclear fuel for power reactors to enhance energy security and competitiveness in nuclear power exports. 2) Establish a final disposal plan for spent nuclear fuel to ensure the sustainability of nuclear power plants. 3) Acquire pyro-processing reprocessing technology to develop future fast reactor-based nuclear systems.”

“United States: The threat of weapons of mass destruction from rogue states or terrorist groups constitutes the greatest security threat to the U.S. in the post-Cold War era, thus strongly opposing the emergence of new states with enrichment and reprocessing capabilities from a non-proliferation perspective.”

“South Korea's Exceptional Position: It has emerged as one of the four major nuclear powers, yet it is the only one among them without reprocessing rights.”

Given the stark differences in the positions of South Korea and the United States, it is unlikely that the renegotiation of the ROK-U.S. Atomic Energy Agreement will reach a consensus. The core of the divergence lies in South Korea's demand for enrichment and reprocessing capabilities and the U.S. opposition to it.

Over the past two to three decades, South Korea's nuclear industry has experienced rapid development, elevating it to the status of one of the world's four major nuclear power nations. Consequently, the enrichment and reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel have become critical issues. Firstly, for South Korea, which relies on imports for 97 percent of its energy, securing a stable and affordable supply of nuclear power, a quasi-domestic energy source, is crucial for energy security. Furthermore, to overcome the significant disadvantage South Korea faces compared to other exporting nations like Russia and Canada in ensuring nuclear fuel supply for its exported reactors, it is necessary to complete the nuclear fuel cycle by securing enrichment and reprocessing rights. Secondly, regarding the management of spent nuclear fuel, current interim storage facilities are projected to reach saturation within 5-10 years. Even if interim storage facilities are constructed, persuading local communities without a finalized disposal plan presents a significant challenge. Ensuring the sustainability of nuclear power in South Korea necessitates the establishment of a final disposal plan for spent nuclear fuel. Thirdly, for future energy security, acquiring pyro-processing technology is essential for developing fast reactor-based nuclear systems.

In the case of the United States, it has approached nuclear cooperation issues from a non-proliferation perspective since India's nuclear test in 1974, and has therefore strongly opposed the emergence of new states with enrichment and reprocessing capabilities. The U.S. has made considerable efforts over the past three to four decades to strengthen the non-proliferation regime, even to the extent of voluntarily relinquishing its own enrichment and reprocessing rights. As a result, no new states with such capabilities have emerged, with the exceptions of Iran and North Korea. Following the 9.11 terrorist attacks,

rogue states or terrorist groups posing a threat of weapons of mass destruction to global peace or the United States has become the greatest national security threat imaginable, leading to even more critical efforts to strengthen the non-proliferation regime. U.S. initiatives such as the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540, and leadership in the Nuclear Security Summit are all extensions of its non-proliferation policy. Notably, at the Nuclear Security Summit, the U.S. has consistently emphasized preventing the production of additional fissile material and the secure management of existing fissile material, implying that an expansion of enrichment and reprocessing facilities is viewed as equivalent to an expansion of fissile material production. Consequently, the U.S. cannot help but react sensitively to South Korea's demand for enrichment and reprocessing rights.

However, South Korea is not only unique in its rapid development of the nuclear industry over the past two to three decades but is also the only nation among the four major nuclear power exporting countries—including France, Canada, and Russia—that lacks reprocessing rights. Therefore, South Korea is in a difficult position, striving to find a special method to grant it reprocessing rights without undermining the U.S. efforts to expand non-proliferation.

Prospects for Renegotiating the ROK-U.S. Atomic Energy Agreement Amidst the North Korean Nuclear Crisis

“Domestic nuclear armament discourse and claims of potential nuclear weapon development through enrichment and reprocessing negatively impact the renegotiation of the Atomic Energy Agreement.”

“The current negotiations are likely to conclude with a deferral of decision: possible conditions include the presentation of new compromise proposals, resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue, or the termination of joint research on pyro-processing.”

The series of escalating tensions on the Korean Peninsula following North Korea's third nuclear test is exacerbating the situation, particularly given the divergent positions of South Korea and the United States. The U.S. is concerned that permitting South Korea enrichment and reprocessing capabilities would negatively impact efforts toward North Korean denuclearization. Furthermore, domestic discourse on nuclear armament or the acquisition of potential nuclear weapon development capabilities through enrichment and reprocessing technologies, which has emerged since the North Korean nuclear crisis, causes the U.S. to doubt South Korea's commitment to denuclearization, further complicating negotiations.

Consequently, the current negotiations are highly likely to conclude with a deferral of decision. It is anticipated that the renegotiation of the ROK-U.S. Atomic Energy Agreement will be postponed under conditions such as the presentation of new compromise proposals, the resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue, or the completion of joint research on pyro-processing. Of course, if the U.S. adopts a more forward-looking stance from its current standard negotiation framework for atomic energy cooperation, which strongly reflects non-proliferation concerns, and if a compromise is reached without unilaterally conceding to South Korea's demands, a resolution might be possible. In such a scenario, the issue of enrichment and reprocessing could be deferred for future negotiations, with an agreement to add a supplementary protocol. However, regardless of the format, it is clear that the outcome will not be one that either party can unequivocally declare a 'success'.

South Korea's Challenges

“A vision for a ROK-U.S. nuclear-nonproliferation partnership should be created through a summit between the leaders of the two countries.”

“A comprehensive diplomatic effort involving industry, research and development, politicians, and the media is necessary.”

“A robust organization within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs dedicated to non-proliferation and various nuclear-related issues needs to be established.”

“The establishment of an expert network for nuclear policy research and a nuclear policy research center is urgently needed.”

The "Joint Vision for the Alliance of the Republic of Korea and the United States of America," adopted in 2009, stipulates that the ROK-U.S. alliance will expand beyond its traditional focus on the Korean Peninsula and military affairs to become a "comprehensive strategic alliance of global scope." However, this vision for a ROK-U.S. strategic alliance has not been adequately reflected in the area of nuclear cooperation. Although South Korea has emerged as a global leader in nuclear power and non-proliferation, the U.S. perception appears to remain influenced by South Korea's past attempts to develop nuclear weapons.

Therefore, the most urgent task is to foster the perception that South Korea is a partner with the U.S. in working towards common international interests in the realms of nuclear power and non-proliferation. It is thus imperative to create a future-oriented vision for a ROK-U.S. nuclear-nonproliferation partnership during the upcoming ROK-U.S. summit in May. The renegotiation of the ROK-U.S. Atomic Energy Agreement should ideally proceed on the foundation of this new vision.

Second, as evidenced by the case of Japan, the renegotiation of the Atomic Energy Agreement is not an issue that can be resolved solely by diplomats; it requires a comprehensive and all-out diplomatic effort. The industrial sector, research and development community, politicians, and the media must all engage in efforts to protect the national interests in the field of nuclear power.

Third, currently, the nuclear energy negotiations are handled by the Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Division within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and an ad-hoc ROK-U.S. negotiation team. However, given that nuclear energy issues encompass a broad range of national interests, including nuclear power exports, reprocessing, and non-proliferation, there is a need to establish a more robust organization within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs dedicated to nuclear-nonproliferation matters.

Fourth, the establishment of expert organizations and networks for in-depth research on various South Korean nuclear policy issues, as well as a nuclear policy research center to serve as a hub for building these networks, is urgently needed. Expert organizations can provide recommendations on the overall nuclear policy of the South Korean government, and if these networks evolve into a permanent expert network between South Korea and the U.S., they can contribute to achieving more favorable negotiation outcomes for South Korea in the long term.■

The East Asia Institute (EAI) is financially supported by the MacArthur Foundation. EAI conducts Smart Q&A video interviews with domestic and international experts to provide timely and in-depth analysis of current issues through question-and-answer sessions with specialists in relevant fields. This manuscript was compiled by Researcher Kim Yang-gyu (EAI Center for Asian Security Studies) from interview content and represents the personal opinions of the expert, not the official stance of the East Asia Institute. Please cite the source when quoting from Smart Q&A.