[Smart Q&A: Choi Myung-hae] The Third Nuclear Test and Cooperation Measures for South Korea's North Korea Policy

YouTube Link: video.eai.or.kr/130319_Sqa.flv

Choi Myung-hae, Senior Research Fellow, holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from Korea University and is currently a Senior Research Fellow at the Global Research Division of the Samsung Economic Research Institute (SERI).

The Third Nuclear Test and Strategic Interests between North Korea and China

"North Korea-China Relations Have Many Instances of Extreme Swings: Attention Should Be Paid to the Differences in Strategic Thinking Between the Two Countries"

"China: Pursuing the Establishment of a '2+2 Format' Crisis Management System for the Korean Peninsula from the Perspective of 'Status Quo Plus'"

"North Korea: 1) Maintaining Nuclear Deterrence Limited to the Korean Peninsula to Prevent Absorption Unification by South Korea 2) Enhancing its Strategic Position Amidst US-China Confrontation"

"The More North Korea Explicitly Strengthens its Nuclear Capabilities, the More Difficult it Will Be for China to Prepare Alternatives"

Following the third nuclear test, expectations are high among the United States and other relevant countries regarding China's proactive actions. However, it is important to remember that North Korea-China relations have historically experienced extreme fluctuations between cold and hot phases. For instance, from 1964 to 1970, during the intensification of Sino-Soviet conflicts after the Cultural Revolution, Kim Il-sung did not visit China even once. Furthermore, after the establishment of diplomatic relations between South Korea and China in 1992 and the death of Kim Il-sung in 1994, the channels between North Korea and China at the party and government levels were completely severed until 1999. Conversely, from 2010 onwards, Kim Jong-il visited China four times in less than two years, showcasing the friendly relations between the two countries. The crucial point is not to be swayed by short-term fluctuations in North Korea-China behavior, but to closely observe the differences in their strategic thinking.

China views the Korean Peninsula issue from a crisis management perspective, considering the uncertainties in its development. Crisis management here does not merely mean preventing war, but rather maximizing 'strategic interests' (maintaining exclusive influence over the Korean Peninsula) and minimizing 'strategic losses' (North Korean sudden collapse and absorption by South Korea, marginalization in discussions on the Korean Peninsula issue) by striking a balance. Realistically, China prioritizes peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula, while pursuing a 'status quo plus' scenario of gradual improvement, maintaining friendly relations with both North and South Korea. To this end, it prefers discussions on the Korean Peninsula issue to take place in a '2 (North and South Korea) + 2 (US and China)' format. In other words, tension reduction should first be achieved through inter-Korean reconciliation, followed by the US and China seeking long-term solutions.

However, the 'status quo plus' format may be another expression of the strategic dilemma China faces. It implies a focus on cautious management rather than the ultimate resolution of the Korean Peninsula issue, which can lead to seemingly contradictory policies depending on the unfolding situation. In other words, China's strategy towards the Korean Peninsula has structural issues that compel it to adopt an ambiguous stance, as it blends the liberal objective of actively demonstrating a willingness to resolve issues for peace and stability on the peninsula with the realist objective of controlling the actions of relevant parties to prevent its own geopolitical interests from being compromised.

A prime example of this can be found in China's stance on the North Korean nuclear issue. During the second term of the George W. Bush administration, China assumed the role of a 'stakeholder' and demonstrated proactive engagement. However, after the first North Korean nuclear test in 2006, it experienced a situation where negotiations became entrenched in a '2 (North Korea-US) + 0' framework, weakening its influence over North Korea. Consequently, after the second nuclear test in 2009, the prevailing opinion was that the mistake of losing balance should not be repeated. North Korea-China relations, which had been restored about a year after the first nuclear test, were rapidly restored just four months after the second nuclear test with the visit of Wen Jiabao to Pyongyang. Since then, China has emphasized its role as a balancer in Korean Peninsula affairs, strengthening diplomatic communication and normal economic cooperation with North Korea under the banner of 'traditional friendship,' while simultaneously continuing to stress the utility of the Six-Party Talks as a mechanism for managing the situation to relevant neighboring countries.

However, from North Korea's perspective, China's 'status quo plus' format essentially means a 'containment management system for North Korea.' The most ideal Northeast Asian geopolitical structure for North Korea is to enhance its geostrategic value amidst a balance of power confrontation between the US and China. Therefore, North Korea cannot help but harbor suspicions about China's strategic intentions, evidenced by North Korea's consistent undermining of all multilateral formats (three-party, four-party, six-party talks) pursued by China since the 1980s. North Korea believes that establishing a strategic relationship with the United States through bilateral dialogue is more aligned with its strategic objectives than pursuing 'encompassing multilateralism.' Consequently, North Korea has opted for 'adventurous provocative actions' to highlight its geopolitical standing or self-reliant measures such as nuclear armament, rather than relying on China.

Therefore, North Korea is likely to focus all its efforts on securing the capability to deploy nuclear weapons in practice to enhance its negotiating leverage with the United States. Based on its nuclear capabilities, it aims to instantly reverse the military imbalance with South Korea, prevent absorption unification, and enhance its strategic standing amidst US-China confrontation to secure a 'political and psychological safety valve for survival.' In terms of specific negotiation strategies, it is likely to engage in negotiations with the US not on denuclearization, but on nuclear arms reduction. It may offer a negotiating card that involves resolving US concerns such as medium- and long-range missiles and nuclear proliferation, tolerating the presence of US forces in South Korea to maintain US superiority in the future Northeast Asian strategic structure, and cooperating in containing China, in exchange for recognition of its nuclear capabilities limited to the Korean Peninsula.

The more North Korea strengthens its status as a nuclear-weapon state, the more difficult it will become for China to formulate policy alternatives. Although China possesses various means of imposing sanctions on North Korea, it does not wish to bear all the responsibility for potential instability in the North Korean regime or strained North Korea-China relations that could result from such sanctions. Above all, visible sanctions against North Korea could lead to a reduction in China's influence over North Korea, and it is difficult to discuss the North Korean issue from the perspective of unification without forming strategic consensus with the US and Japan on future Korean Peninsula situations. If the vicious cycle of 'North Korea's nuclear capability enhancement → strengthened US-Japan-South Korea sanctions against North Korea → increased North Korean threat escalation' continues, China's strategic space to continue its role as a manager of the Korean Peninsula issue will progressively shrink.

The Direction of Xi Jinping's China's North Korea Policy

"Distinguish Between Public Discourse and Perceptions at the National Policy Level"

"China Decides Policies in Advance Before the New Leadership Takes Office: The Approach of Separating the Nuclear Issue from the North Korean Issue Will Be Maintained"

"It Will Attempt to Enhance Both its Negotiating Leverage with North Korea and the US Through Appropriate and Flexible Sanctions and Engagement"

There are high expectations from neighboring countries regarding the Korean Peninsula policy of the Xi Jinping leadership. Indeed, significant changes can be observed in the discourse surrounding North Korea policy at the public opinion level. Voices are rising, arguing that China should not merely play a mediating role but should take the initiative in bilateral relations with North Korea and strive to normalize the country. Opinions are also being presented that China's North Korea policy should be approached from the perspective of Korean Peninsula unification; some suggest that if China needs a buffer zone, it would be advantageous to make the entire Korean Peninsula a buffer zone. To this end, the perception is expanding that it is necessary to promote relations not only with North Korea but also with South Korea, and to strengthen strategic communication with the United States. Some even propose the radical idea that the current Kim Jong-un regime should be abandoned, whether by supporting absorption unification by South Korea or by fostering pro-China forces within North Korea.

However, it is cautious to assume that these public discourse-level discussions will translate into actual policy-level deliberations. Examining the statements made by China in response to the first, second, and third nuclear tests reveals a decrease in the degree of condemnation. During the first nuclear test, China issued a statement with the strongest possible condemnation in diplomatic terms, stating that the test was conducted "recklessly" (悍然). However, such language is absent in the statement regarding the third test. Regarding the point that North Korea must comply with international obligations, the expression used was "strongly demand" (강하게 요구한다) for the first and second tests, but this was downgraded to "urge" (촉구한다) for the third test. This clearly demonstrates that the discourse of the Chinese government at the official rhetoric level does not reflect changes in public opinion.

China maintains political stability by deciding its future policy direction in advance, in cooperation with the outgoing leadership, before the new leadership takes office. In the case of North Korea policy, it is known that the fourth- and fifth-generation leaderships jointly determined the direction of North Korea policy after reviewing the North Korean issue around July 2009. Therefore, even with the advent of the Xi Jinping leadership, the basic framework of China's existing North Korea policy, which separates the nuclear issue from the North Korean issue, is expected to remain unchanged.

While adhering to the principle of denuclearization because the North Korean nuclear issue hinders stability on the Korean Peninsula, China emphasizes 'management' through the Six-Party Talks, judging that North Korea's possibility of abandoning nuclear weapons is low. Regarding the North Korean issue, China strengthens normal relations with North Korea, judging that North Korea's geopolitical value remains important.

In this context, China is expected to faithfully implement the commitments made to the international community regarding UN Security Council resolutions on North Korea, and is particularly expected to show a proactive stance on sanctions against North Korea's illicit transactions. However, it is highly unlikely that China will participate in comprehensive financial sanctions against North Korea that could rupture relations with Pyongyang, or strictly enforce cargo inspections of vessels and aircraft that could lead to physical conflict. Furthermore, it is expected to maintain its medium- to long-term engagement policy toward North Korea by continuing normal trade and economic cooperation projects not excluded from sanctions against North Korea. In other words, the Xi Jinping leadership is expected to attempt to enhance both its negotiating leverage with North Korea and the US through appropriate and flexible sanctions and engagement.

South Korea's Task

"Diplomatic Fatigue Among Neighboring Countries Regarding the North Korean Nuclear Issue is High"

"South Korea's Role is Crucial: It Must Express its Situation Management Capabilities and Willingness to Resolve Issues Through Concrete Proposals"

Observing the reactions of neighboring major powers following the third nuclear test, one can sense considerable diplomatic fatigue. Even in China, while numerous discussions are underway at the public opinion level, it is difficult to find a proactive response at the government level. Therefore, it is unlikely that China will make separate, independent efforts beyond its responsibilities to the international community.

South Korea's role is crucial. South Korea must express its own situation management capabilities and willingness to resolve issues through concrete proposals. First, it is necessary to understand China's strategic calculations. Considering China's intention to strengthen various network orders, such as the Six-Party Talks, efforts are needed to engage in ways that alleviate China's concerns about uncertainties on the Korean Peninsula. However, it is also necessary to clarify that even if peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula are common interests of both South Korea and China, this does not preclude South Korea's minimum self-defense or the use of force against deliberate provocations by North Korea. From South Korea's perspective, it must persuade others of the inevitability of possessing deterrence capabilities commensurate with the North Korean nuclear threat.

China is currently in a difficult position regarding alternatives in its North Korea strategy. Therefore, South Korea must proactively lead efforts to prepare for uncertainties regarding North Korea's future changes by discovering concrete projects within various multilateral cooperation frameworks such as South-North-China, South-North-Russia, and South-China-Russia, while instilling confidence in China that future Korean Peninsula situations will not necessarily have a negative impact on China. Now is the time for diplomacy that emphasizes specifics rather than generalities. It is essential to discover diverse projects that align with future visions and possess practical feasibility, and to proactively lead efforts to prepare for the uncertainties of how North Korea will change in the future.■

The East Asia Institute (EAI) is financially supported by the MacArthur Foundation of the United States. EAI conducts Smart Q&A interviews with domestic and international experts in video format, aiming to provide timely and in-depth analysis of current issues through question-and-answer sessions with experts in relevant fields. This manuscript was compiled by Researcher Kim Yang-gyu (EAI Center for Asian Security Studies) from the interview content and represents the personal opinions of the expert, not the official stance of the East Asia Institute. Please cite the source when quoting from Smart Q&A.