[Smart Q&A: Kim Sung-bae] First Secretary Kim Jong-un's Choice and South Korea's North Korea Strategy

YouTube Link: video.eai.or.kr/120419_smartksb_k.flv

Dr. Kim Sung-bae received his Ph.D. in Political Science from Seoul National University and is currently a Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for National Security Strategy.

Results and Implications of the North Korean Workers' Party Conference and Supreme People's Assembly

“Kim Jong-un Ascends to Top Policy Decision-Making Positions in Party, Military, and Government Much Faster Than Kim Jong-il”

“Successfully Consolidated Domestic Power Base Through Major Personnel Reshuffle in Key Positions, Maintaining Regime Stability in the Short Term”

Kim Jong-un, who had already assumed the position of Supreme Commander of the military on December 30th of last year in accordance with the <December 8th> last will and testament, was elected First Secretary of the Workers' Party at the 4th Party Conference on April 11th and Chairman of the National Defense Commission at the 1st session of the 12th Supreme People's Assembly on the 13th, thus ascending to the position of top policy decision-maker in the party, military, and government. In any system, institutional inertia operates, making it crucial to control the chain of command for power consolidation. This Party Conference and Supreme People's Assembly hold significant meaning in terms of Kim Jong-un's completion of power succession. What is particularly noteworthy is the remarkable speed at which this occurred compared to Kim Jong-il's succession process. After Kim Il-sung's death in 1994, Kim Jong-il exercised succession power as General Secretary and Chairman of the National Defense Commission, but he did not officially ascend to the highest position of state power until the 1998 constitutional amendment, which defined the Chairman of the National Defense Commission as the highest state power, and Kim Jong-il was re-elected to this post. In contrast, Kim Jong-un reached the pinnacle of power within three months of Kim Jong-il's death.

The personnel changes made at the Party Conference and the Supreme People's Assembly, which involved a generational shift, are interpreted as further strengthening the power base of Kim Jong-un and the Jang Song-thaek faction supporting him. Among the eight individuals who escorted the hearse during Kim Jong-il's funeral, former People's Armed Forces Minister Kim Yong-chun recently handed over his position to Kim Jong-gak, and Kim Won-hong was appointed Minister of State Security, a position vacant for 20 years, surpassing First Deputy Minister of State Security O Kuk-ryol. On the other hand, Jang Song-thaek's confidant, Choe Ryong-hae, was appointed Director of the General Political Bureau of the Korean People's Army and promoted to the Presidium of the Political Bureau, the highest leadership body of the party, and Vice Chairman of the Party Central Military Commission. Ri Myong-su, appointed Minister of People's Security, is also part of the Jang Song-thaek faction. These personnel appointments in the party and military signify the advancement of the Jang Song-thaek faction, and thus the strengthening of the Kim Jong-un support system, ultimately leading to the consolidation of Kim Jong-un's power base.

Despite the failure of the long-range rocket launch and deepening isolation from the international community, the Kim Jong-un regime has succeeded in strengthening its power base through the recent Party Conference and Supreme People's Assembly, and is therefore expected to remain stable at least in the short term.

Prospects for North Korea's Domestic and Foreign Policy Directions in the Kim Jong-un Era

“Domestic Policy: Songun (Military-First) Legacy Rule in the Short Term, Transition to Songyeong (Economy-First) Unavoidable in the Long Term”

In terms of domestic policy, the Kim Jong-un regime, by the nature of a hereditary succession, is compelled to front the legacy of Kim Jong-il's rule. Furthermore, given the transitional period of power transfer, it is difficult to pursue radical changes immediately. However, changes appear unavoidable in the medium to long term.

First, this is due to the domestic economic situation in North Korea. The reason the North Korean economy was able to achieve positive growth, albeit modest, from 2003 to 2008 was not due to the Songun (military-first) economic strategy, but rather due to the expansion of market elements following the <July 1st Measures> in 2002 and the permission of general markets in 2003. The North Korean economy already exists in a state where planning and markets coexist, and the more this is suppressed, the stronger the backlash from the North Korean populace will become.

Second, even to complete Kim Jong-il's legacy of building a strong nation, Kim Jong-un will inevitably have to focus on building a strong economy. North Korea has shown signs of a slight shift from its previous Songun economic strategy, which prioritized defense industries, by publishing New Year's joint editorials in 2010, 2011, and even in 2012 after Kim Jong-il's death, emphasizing light industry and the improvement of people's livelihoods. Notably, the 2012 New Year's joint editorial highlights the economy alongside Songun as Kim Jong-il's achievements and emphasizes knowledge-based and technology-intensive economies under the banner of the "New Century Industrial Revolution." Therefore, the Kim Jong-un regime is expected to gradually shift its emphasis towards the economy while simultaneously pursuing the Songun line and the "New Century Industrial Revolution line" for the time being.

“Foreign Policy: Hardline Stance in the Short Term, Shift to Negotiations in the Medium to Long Term”

The foreign policy line of the Kim Jong-un regime will inevitably lean towards negotiations in the medium to long term. The early Kim Jong-un administration exhibited somewhat confusing behavior, such as reaching the <February 29th> agreement with the United States and subsequently attempting the launch of the 'Kwangmyongsong-3' satellite. This dual signaling from North Korea has been interpreted as the Kim Jong-un regime's inability to yet determine a clear direction in its foreign policy. However, the launch of 'Kwangmyongsong-3' was originally planned as part of Kim Jong-il's legacy and was driven by domestic political demands rather than external signaling, and thus cannot be seen as foreshadowing the adoption of a hardline foreign policy by the Kim Jong-un regime. The reasons why the Kim Jong-un administration will inevitably choose a negotiation strategy in the medium to long term are as follows:

First, stable management of the external environment is necessary to consolidate the power base of the new regime. In particular, nuclear negotiations with major powers such as the United States have the effect of diplomatic recognition for the new North Korean regime.

Second, the Kim Jong-un administration cannot ignore its relationship with China, its most important trading partner and supplier of food and oil. The "peaceful development" and "economy-first" approach of China has been in a state of continuous dissonance with North Korea's "military-first" policy. China's surprisingly swift agreement to adopt the UN Security Council presidential statement this time appears to be a strong warning that China will find it difficult to continue providing unconditional support to North Korea while tolerating this state of dissonance. China will further intensify pressure on the Kim Jong-un regime to prevent additional provocations, and Kim Jong-un will find it difficult to ignore this.

Third, the Kim Jong-un regime is pursuing a leadership style more akin to Kim Il-sung than Kim Jong-il. Therefore, it is likely to emphasize "Juche" in its foreign policy and attempt a Kim Il-sung-style equidistant diplomacy. Realistically, North Korea needs to overcome its excessive dependence on China, which will naturally lead to approaches towards the U.S. and Russia. Kim Jong-un can pursue equidistant diplomacy among the U.S.-China, China-Russia, and furthermore, South Korea-China relations by using the North Korean nuclear issue as leverage.

Fourth, external support is essential for the success of the Kim Jong-un regime's economy-focused policy. To develop light industry and improve people's livelihoods, stable supply of critically needed food and energy, and capital investment are necessary. For this reason, North Korea must trade nuclear and missile freezes for external support, even if it does not completely abandon its nuclear weapons, and thus will have no choice but to sit at the negotiating table.

Tasks for the South Korean Government

“Relations Will Remain Strained for the Time Being; It Should Be Used as an Opportunity to Manage the Situation Stably and Strengthen Policy Coordination with Neighboring Countries”

“Efforts Should Be Made to Avoid Policy Delays During the Key Leadership Transitions in Northeast Asia in 2012”

Inter-Korean relations will remain strained for the time being. From a domestic political perspective, the new leader cannot afford to appear weak, at least in relations with South Korea, thus Kim Jong-un's hardline policy towards the South is expected to continue for the time being. Furthermore, given that a UN Security Council presidential statement has already been adopted regarding North Korea's 'Kwangmyongsong-3' launch and additional sanctions are being pursued, it will be difficult for the Six-Party Talks to resume for some time.

It is important for the current government to manage the situation to prevent further deterioration rather than pursuing ambitious goals in its North Korea policy. At the same time, efforts to coordinate policies with neighboring countries must be strengthened. There is a consensus among all neighboring countries, including the U.S., China, Japan, and Russia, that North Korea must transition from its Songun (military-first) line to a non-nuclear, economy-first approach, making policy coordination entirely feasible. Furthermore, if North Korean nuclear negotiations resume in the future, comprehensive agenda items, including not only the nuclear issue but also the Korean Peninsula peace regime and the normalization of North Korea-U.S. and North Korea-Japan relations, will be discussed simultaneously. Therefore, it is necessary to engage in sufficient policy coordination with neighboring countries in advance regarding the future of North Korea and the Korean Peninsula. The current atmosphere of international joint response following the 'Kwangmyongsong-3' launch presents a golden opportunity for policy coordination, and this should be remembered.

2012 marks leadership transitions in major Northeast Asian countries. During such leadership transition periods, policy delays are likely to occur. Therefore, starting now, close cooperation with neighboring countries is necessary to ensure a smooth policy transition from the current administration to the next, and to minimize policy delays or policy vacuums.

The East Asia Institute (EAI) has been selected as a core research institution for the MacArthur Foundation's "Asia Security Initiative" program and is receiving financial support. EAI has been conducting Smart Q&A, a video interview format, with domestic and international experts, aiming to provide timely and in-depth analysis of current issues through question-and-answer sessions with experts in related fields. This manuscript was compiled from interviews by Researcher Kim Yang-gyu (EAI Center for Asian Security Studies) and Team Leader Kim Ha-jeong (EAI Center for Asian Security Studies), and represents the personal opinions of the experts, not the stance of the East Asia Institute. Please cite the source when quoting Smart Q&A.