[EAI Special Report] What the New Administration Should Do at the ROK-US Summit

I. What the New Administration Should Do at the ROK-US Summit

The ROK-US Summit on May 21, 2022, will be the first significant opportunity to showcase not only the Yoon Suk-yeol administration's foreign policy but also its philosophy, values, and capabilities. Foreign policy debates during the presidential election were insufficient, and campaign pledges for the foreign policy sector were not fully elaborated. Therefore, some concerns exist that it will be difficult to hold a well-prepared summit regarding the vision and specific policies for ROK-US relations and the alliance, given that the summit is being held just 11 days after the new administration's inauguration.

It might be prudent to postpone specific discussions and commitments that could bind future ROK policy toward the US and instead focus on presenting the general direction of ROK-US relations. Alternatively, given that South Korea is the first stop on President Joe Biden's inaugural trip to Asia, it presents a golden opportunity for in-depth discussions and agreements to strengthen ROK-US relations. However, more importantly, the new administration must be prepared to establish the core principles of its foreign policy beyond bilateral ROK-US relations and apply them to individual policies.

At the ROK-US Summit in May last year, the two countries agreed on various policies across a wide range of sectors, including security, economy, technology, health, climate, energy, space, and people-to-people exchanges. This summit should serve as an opportunity to accurately assess the progress of these policies over the past year and to make further advancements that maximize common values and interests under a strategic consensus between the ROK and the US.

The Yoon Suk-yeol administration emphasizes a global and regional role commensurate with South Korea's increased national power. It seeks to reflect universal values based on Korean identity in its foreign policy. In its North Korea policy, it advocates for a stronger, principle-based approach compared to the Moon Jae-in administration. While acknowledging the strategic dilemma in ROK-China relations, it has discussed the need for clarity beyond strategic ambiguity. Although the Moon Jae-in administration's expansion of cooperation in ROK-US relations was significant, it is assessed that there were differences in views between the two countries regarding North Korea policy. It is believed that the value of the alliance was undervalued in ROK-China relations, weakening the strategic bond between the ROK and the US. According to the concept of the Yoon Suk-yeol administration's pledges, it aims to center its foreign policy on a comprehensive strategic alliance between the ROK and the US under the banner of a global pivotal state.

The United States has reacted positively to the new administration's foreign policy direction revealed thus far. It holds significant expectations for the overall bilateral relationship and alliance. The fundamental approach toward complete denuclearization of North Korea, the necessity of strengthening economic sanctions and military deterrence, South Korea's clearer value-based approach in its China policy, an active stance on the Indo-Pacific strategy advocated by the US, the improvement of ROK-Japan relations crucial for ROK-US-Japan security cooperation, and South Korea's position on participating in various aspects of the US-led Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) are all policies that the US would welcome.

To ensure that these fundamental policies adequately contribute to national interests, it is imperative to meticulously calculate and prepare preventive and remedial measures for the risks posed by China and North Korea, which may arise concurrently. If South Korea shows increased proactivity in the US-led Indo-Pacific strategy, China will become more concerned about South Korea's participation in containment efforts against China. If the ROK and the US adopt a firm stance on strengthening military deterrence against North Korea and pursuing complete denuclearization, there is a risk that North Korea may enhance its nuclear and missile capabilities or create tensions. The domestic political landscape will become volatile when the backlash from China and North Korea triggers economic and security issues domestically. There have been instances in past administrations where conflicting foreign policy directions and messages were conveyed during summits with China following summits with the US, leading to confusion and controversy. The ROK must approach the ROK-US Summit with a comprehensive foreign policy strategy that considers policies toward the US, China, and North Korea as an integrated package.

At this summit, it is desirable for South Korea to prioritize efforts to project an image of strengthened ROK-U.S. relations, but it must avoid implying that these efforts will automatically worsen relations with China and North Korea. It is important to harmonize the general and specific by firmly presenting South Korea's core values and national interests, strengthening ROK-U.S. relations accordingly, considering ROK-China relations, and presenting a vision for inter-Korean relations.

II. Indo-Pacific Strategy Based on Principles of Competition and Coexistence

The most significant challenge in ROK-US relations is to strengthen a shared vision for the Indo-Pacific regional strategy. South Korea and the United States must cooperate closely in the Indo-Pacific region to pursue policies toward China while seeking a path of coexistence, rather than mutual destruction, with China. President Biden will present a more concrete vision of the Indo-Pacific strategy at the ROK-US Summit in Seoul during his Asian tour, which includes attending the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) summit in Tokyo. Facing new security challenges such as the Afghanistan withdrawal, the Ukraine crisis, and the strengthening of NATO in Europe, the QUAD, ROK-US relations, and relations with Asian partners are critical for the US to counter China, its primary strategic competitor in the Indo-Pacific. Therefore, the US will seek to understand the Yoon Suk-yeol administration's fundamental stance and philosophy on the Indo-Pacific region, as well as its policy ideas regarding China. The biggest challenge for the new administration, with less than two weeks until the ROK-US Summit, is to sufficiently elaborate on the principles and vision of its new foreign policy that will capture the attention of the US, China, and other relevant parties.

The fundamental strategic direction that South Korea has articulated thus far does not entirely align with that of the United States. The US, in its "Indo-Pacific Strategy" released in February, has clarified its policy of containing China. It has presented five major policy objectives: promoting a free and open Indo-Pacific, strengthening ties with allies and partners, ensuring shared prosperity, enhancing security, and responding to transnational threats. Of particular note is the US vision for the Indo-Pacific as a region that is "free and open, connected, prosperous, secure, and resilient." Meanwhile, the joint statements from the ROK-US Summit a year ago and the ROK-US-Japan Foreign Ministers' Meeting on February 13 included the term "inclusive" in the vision for the Indo-Pacific. Although it is just one word, it indicates a subtle difference in the ROK-US strategic vision for the Indo-Pacific. South Korea has maintained a stance aimed at preventing the Indo-Pacific strategy from becoming a strategy to contain and exclude China, which has shown some divergence from the US strategy toward China. Through the vision of an inclusive Indo-Pacific, South Korea has maintained a certain distance from the US Indo-Pacific strategy, and the Yoon Suk-yeol administration's stance will be closely watched.

South Korea needs to clearly articulate its commitment to pursuing foreign policy principles based on the liberal international order, including democracy, free trade, the rule of law, human rights, and open multilateralism. Furthermore, rather than unilaterally choosing sides between the US and China, South Korea should present a vision of competition and coexistence for a desirable order in Asia and assume a role as a co-architect of norms and rules alongside major powers.

Framing the Asian order solely through the lens of US-China strategic competition will significantly diminish South Korea's space for maneuver. On the 21st-century Indo-Pacific stage, efforts must be made for mutual evolution toward a future order, values, and interests where all protagonists can compete healthily while simultaneously pursuing coexistence and prosperity. To achieve this, a dual approach is essential: participating in institutions designed by both the US and China, whether competitive or exclusive, and effectively advocating for rules and issues that sufficiently reflect South Korea's core interests.

First, at the ROK-US Summit, South Korea should actively cooperate with the US-led order and expand common values and interests between the two nations, while striving not to be overly confined by the framework of great power competition known as US-China competition. Given that South Korea has presented its identity as an advanced middle power or a global pivotal state in terms of systems and values, the new administration's stance on value diplomacy is already known. As President Biden's Asian tour is centered around the QUAD issue, expressing active cooperation with the QUAD, based on South Korea's national interests, can help address China-related risks. Simultaneously, it is necessary to avoid directly mentioning issues that China claims as 'internal affairs,' such as those concerning Xinjiang, Tibet, and Hong Kong. In the current context of the war in Ukraine, a sophisticated approach is needed, involving active expression of principled stances on peace, universal human rights, and democracy.

III. ROK-US Economic Security Cooperation Aiming for Open Multilateralism

In the economic sector, the ROK and the US need to discuss concrete measures to expand and deepen the scope and level of cooperation, based on a review of the status of agreements from last May's summit. The previous summit was a significant opportunity for both countries to expand and strengthen cooperation on supply chain resilience and reshoring. If the previous agreement focused on production cooperation, which is a pressing issue, this summit should explore ways to upgrade ROK-US cooperation to encompass production and technological innovation comprehensively. In particular, an upgrade in cooperation is required to proactively enhance innovation capabilities in advanced technology sectors by securing channels for South Korea's participation in the US technological innovation ecosystem.

The ROK and the US need to activate bilateral mechanisms for identifying and discussing specific cooperation agendas. The new trade consultation channel, which the two countries agreed to establish in November 2021 to cooperate in areas such as supply chains, new technologies, and digital matters, should be promptly launched. Furthermore, the possibility of establishing a comprehensive mechanism for consultations on trade and industry, new technologies, climate change, and economic security should be concretized.

This summit should seek ways for the ROK and the US to cooperate organically not only at the bilateral level but also at the regional and global levels. It will be an opportunity to confirm and coordinate the positions of both countries on common perceptions and areas of cooperation regarding the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework. The Indo-Pacific Economic Framework holds significant meaning in that it restores an institutional means for the US to connect with the Asian region. As the Indo-Pacific Framework represents the US's attempt at institutional engagement differentiated from the past, focusing on new issues such as fair trade, supply chain resilience, infrastructure, clean energy and decarbonization, taxation, and anti-corruption, a creative approach is needed to establish the framework's design and implementation mechanisms.

Some Southeast Asian countries and India are reportedly feeling considerable pressure from the Biden administration's plans. Due to the diversion of US foreign policy resources caused by the Ukraine crisis, various obstacles lie in the way of deriving concrete measures that guarantee the feasibility of the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework. South Korea must identify potential obstacles in the process of launching the Indo-Pacific Framework, seek solutions together, and proactively propose areas of contribution. By doing so, it should pursue a position as a co-architect in the future restructuring of the regional economic order. South Korea should solidify its position by playing a bridging role to encourage the participation of ASEAN countries, which the US is diligently pursuing, while simultaneously making efforts to inclusively embrace China based on market economy principles, without excluding it.

IV. Reaffirming a Comprehensive Strategy Toward North Korea

North Korea's increasingly advanced nuclear and missile capabilities are a core issue for the ROK-US alliance. Regarding deterrence strategy, the Biden administration has introduced a new concept called "integrated deterrence" as a key element of its US defense strategy. This aims to enhance US deterrence capabilities in all aspects—technology, operational concepts, and capabilities—to prevent potential adversaries from launching military offensives. It encompasses a multi-dimensional integrated vision, including the adoption of new technologies such as artificial intelligence and quantum computing, enhancement of deterrence capabilities across domains like land, sea, air, cyber, and space, strengthening deterrence by combining nuclear and conventional strategies, bolstering deterrence by employing non-military means alongside military ones, and executing deterrence strategies in conjunction with allies and partner nations.

Therefore, with North Korea's intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capabilities rapidly progressing toward completion, and with the rapid enhancement of its nuclear attack capabilities targeting South Korea, Japan, Guam, and other regions, particularly its capabilities for low-yield nuclear attacks against South Korea, it is an urgent task to re-examine the deterrence capabilities of the ROK-US alliance from the perspective of integrated deterrence. It is a time to reorganize the alliance's deterrence strategy, including the US's integrated deterrence strategy, the ROK-US alliance's military deterrence strategy against North Korea, and the US's continued assurance of extended deterrence. The Yoon Suk-yeol administration has proposed the revitalization of the ROK-US Extended Deterrence Strategy and Consultation Group (EDSCG) as a policy, and a general consensus on upgrading deterrence capabilities is needed at this summit.

South Korea's strategy toward North Korea must be a comprehensive strategy that includes military integrated deterrence, effective economic sanctions, active engagement for the regime security and economic prosperity of a denuclearized North Korea, and encouraging North Korea to develop new calculations for 21st-century denuclearization. While it is a time to reorganize military deterrence, efforts for engagement with North Korea should not be neglected. As North Korea's nuclear and missile capabilities advance, and the limitations of military deterrence become clearer following the Ukraine crisis, efforts toward denuclearization and confidence-building and negotiations between the two Koreas and between North Korea and the US are crucial.

At a time when the priority of North Korea policy in the Biden administration's foreign affairs agenda continues to decline, a hardline-only approach by the new administration toward North Korea will lead to a sharp decrease in strategic stability and minimize the space for engagement. At the ROK-US Summit, the Yoon Suk-yeol administration must agree on the necessity of establishing a concrete integrated deterrence strategy between the ROK and the US concerning military deterrence, the need to prioritize the North Korean issue, and the necessity of ROK-US strategic dialogue and policy coordination for feasible denuclearization and engagement policies toward North Korea. At this summit, the two countries could discuss regularizing the ROK-US Foreign and Defense Ministers' (2+2) meeting, holding it at least once a year. Furthermore, the US could pursue the reorganization and strengthening of its North Korea diplomatic and negotiation teams, such as appointing a Special Representative for North Korea Policy and a Special Envoy for North Korean Human Rights.

If ROK-US alliance deterrence against North Korea is strengthened and risks emanating from North Korea escalate, strategic alignment between North Korea and China may intensify, potentially re-emphasizing China's role in the North Korean nuclear issue. In fact, past conservative governments, when pursuing pressure strategies against North Korea, ultimately found themselves relying on China's cooperation and thus persuaded or pressured China more actively than progressive governments. Considering that the US also always takes China into account when developing its North Korea strategy, it is necessary to prepare for the summit by considering the "China variable" in the medium to long term.

V. Restoring and Expanding ROK-US-Japan Cooperation

One of the issues the US is focusing on at this ROK-US Summit is ROK-Japan relations. This is because there is a growing perception that the conflict between the two key US allies is hindering the promotion of the Indo-Pacific strategy. ROK-US-Japan cooperation, one of the ten key tasks of the Indo-Pacific strategy, is expanding its role beyond cooperation on North Korea to trilateral cooperation for regional stability, peace, and prosperity. ROK-US-Japan cooperation is crucial for economic security, including supply chains and cooperation in key and emerging technologies, health security, and climate crisis response, as well as for promoting the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework and the QUAD (plus).

The need to restore ROK-Japan relations, a prerequisite for ROK-US-Japan cooperation, is rising not only in the US but also within South Korea. The prolonged deterioration of relations has led to increasing economic and security costs, limited diplomatic maneuverability, and growing pressure for expanded cultural exchange. Cautious efforts toward improving relations are also emerging within Japan. At this summit, South Korea should articulate its stance of cautiously pursuing future-oriented cooperation with Japan while simultaneously working to ease conflicts over historical issues, and the US should express its active support for these efforts. ■

■ Lead Author: Jae-sung Lee_Director of the National Security Research Center at EAI; Professor at Seoul National University. He holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from Northwestern University and has served as a policy advisor to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Unification. His main research areas include international political theory, history of international relations, ROK-US alliance, and Korean Peninsula studies. His major works include "Threats of War and Peace on the Korean Peninsula" (co-authored), "Is Politics Moral?", and "East Asian International Politics: From History to Theory."

■ Author: Won Gon Park_Professor of North Korean Studies at Ewha Womans University. He earned his Ph.D. in Diplomacy from Seoul National University and has served as a policy advisor to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a member of the North Korean Human Rights Advisory Committee of the Ministry of Unification, and Deputy Director of the Korea Peninsula Peace Research Institute (KPI). He conducted research on the ROK-US alliance and North Korea at the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses for 18 years and previously served as a professor of International Studies at Handong Global University. His main research areas include the ROK-US alliance, North Korean diplomacy and military affairs, and Northeast Asian international relations (history).

■ Author: Yeol Sun_President of EAI; Professor at the Graduate School of International Studies, Yonsei University. He holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Chicago. He has served as Dean of the Graduate School of International Studies, Head of the Underwood International College, Director of the Institute for Sustainable Development, and Director of the Institute for International Studies at Yonsei University. He was also a Visiting Professor at the University of Tokyo, a Visiting Scholar at the University of North Carolina (Chapel Hill), and the University of California (Berkeley). He served as President of the Korean Political Science Association (2019) and President of the Association for Modern Japanese Studies (2012). He has been a Senior Fellow at Fulbright, MacArthur, the Japan Foundation, and Waseda University's Advanced Research Center. He has also served as a consultant for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Korea National Diplomatic Academy, the Northeast Asian History Foundation, and the Korea Foundation, and as a specialist committee member of the Northeast Asian Cooperation Committee. His areas of expertise include Japanese foreign policy, international political economy, East Asian international politics, and public diplomacy. His recent publications include Japan and Asia's Contested Order (2019, with T. J. Pempel), "South Korea under US-China Rivalry: the Dynamics of the Economic-Security Nexus in the Trade Policymaking," The Pacific Review (2019), 32, 6, "South Korea's Choices After the Crisis" (2020), and "South Korea's Middle Power Diplomacy" (2017, co-edited).

■ Author: Dongryul Lee_Director of the China Research Center at EAI; Professor at Dongduk Women's University. He earned his Ph.D. in Political Science from Peking University's School of International Studies and served as President of the Association for Modern Chinese Studies. He is currently a policy advisor to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. His main research areas include China's foreign relations, Chinese nationalism, and minority issues. His recent research includes "China's Strategy and Role in the Denuclearization and Peace Process on the Korean Peninsula," "The Evolution and Current Implications of China's Foreign Policy Discourse Since the 1990s," "A Geoeconomic Approach and Geopolitical Dilemma of Xi Jinping's 'Maritime Power' Initiative," and "Deciphering China’s Security Intentions in Northeast Asia: A View from South Korea" (co-authored in "China's Territorial Disputes").

■ Author: Seungjoo Lee_Director of the Trade, Technology, and Transformation Center at EAI; Professor of Political Science and International Relations at Chung-Ang University. He holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of California, Berkeley. His main research areas include international political economy, the politics of trade, and global digital governance. His major works and edited volumes include "US-China Competition and Global Digital Governance" (edited by Seungjoo Lee), "The Political Economy of International Relations in Cyberspace" (edited by Seungjoo Lee), "Institutional Balancing and the Politics of Mega FTAs in East Asia" (co-edited in "Northeast Asia: Ripe for Integration?"), and "Trade Policy in the Asia-Pacific: The Role of Ideas, Interests, and Domestic Institutions" (co-edited).

■ Author: Young-Sun Ha_Chairman of EAI; Professor Emeritus at Seoul National University. He earned his Ph.D. in International Politics from the University of Washington and has served as Professor of Diplomacy at Seoul National University, Visiting Fellow at Princeton University's Center for International Studies, Visiting Fellow at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Director of the Institute for International Affairs at Seoul National University, Director of the Institute for American Studies, President of the Korean Peace Studies Association, Co-Chair of the Korean side for the Joint Research Committee for a New Era of ROK-Japan Relations, member of the Presidential National Security Advisory Council, and member of the Senior Advisory Group for the Inter-Korean Summit Preparatory Committee. He is currently Chairman of EAI and Professor Emeritus at Seoul National University. His recent works and edited volumes include "World Politics of Love: War and Peace," "A Correct View of Korean Diplomatic History: Tradition and Modernity," "The Competition for Order Building in the Asia-Pacific between the US and China," and "International Politics of Four Tributaries: Analysis of Joseon Tongsinsa and Yeonhaengrok Records from the 16th to 19th Centuries." He also wrote a column titled "Ha Young-sun's Column" for the Chosun Ilbo and JoongAng Ilbo for seven years.

■ Managed and Edited by: Seungyeon Lee _Researcher at EAI

Contact: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 205) | slee@eai.or.kr