[EAI Special Report] What the New Government Should Do at the ROK-US Summit

I. What the New Government Should Do at the ROK-US Summit

The ROK-US Summit on May 21, 2022, will be the first significant opportunity to demonstrate not only the foreign policy of the Yoon Suk-yeol administration but also the new government's philosophy, values, and capabilities. Foreign policy debates were insufficient during the presidential election campaign, and specific policy pledges for foreign affairs were not materialized. Therefore, some concerns exist that it will be difficult to hold a well-prepared summit regarding the vision and specific policies for ROK-US relations and the alliance, given that the summit is being held just 11 days after the inauguration of the new government.

It might be prudent to postpone specific discussions and commitments that could bind future ROK foreign policy towards the US, and instead focus on presenting the general direction of ROK-US relations at this summit. Alternatively, as President Joe Biden's first Asian trip includes a summit in Seoul as the first stop, it presents a golden opportunity to strengthen ROK-US relations, allowing for in-depth discussions and agreements. However, more importantly, the new government must establish the core principles of its foreign policy beyond bilateral ROK-US relations and be prepared to apply them to individual policies.

At the ROK-US Summit in May last year, the ROK and the US agreed on various policies across a wide range of sectors, including security, economy, technology, health, climate, energy, space, and people-to-people exchanges. This summit should serve as an opportunity to accurately assess the progress of these policies over the past year and to create a further stepping stone to maximize common values and interests under a strategic consensus between the ROK and the US.

The Yoon Suk-yeol administration emphasizes a global and regional role commensurate with South Korea's increased national power. It seeks to reflect universal values based on Korean identity in its foreign policy. In its North Korea policy, it advocates for a stronger, principles-based approach compared to the Moon Jae-in administration. While acknowledging the strategic dilemma in ROK-China relations, it has discussed the need for clarity beyond strategic ambiguity. Although the Moon Jae-in administration's expansion of cooperation in ROK-US relations was significant, it is assessed that there were differences in views between the ROK and the US regarding North Korea policy. It is also seen as having undervalued the value of the alliance in ROK-China relations and weakened strategic ties between the ROK and the US. According to the Yoon Suk-yeol administration's pledges, it intends to make the comprehensive ROK-US strategic alliance the central axis of its foreign policy under the banner of a "global pivotal state."

The US views the new administration's foreign policy direction positively so far and has considerable expectations for overall bilateral relations and alliance cooperation. The fundamental stance towards the complete denuclearization of North Korea, the necessity of strengthening economic sanctions and military deterrence, a clearer value-based approach by South Korea in its China policy, an active stance on the Indo-Pacific strategy advocated by the US, improvement in ROK-Japan relations crucial for ROK-US-Japan security cooperation, and South Korea's participation in various aspects of the US-led Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) are all policies that the US would welcome.

For this fundamental direction to sufficiently contribute to national interests, it is imperative to meticulously calculate and prepare preventive and remedial measures for the risks posed by China and North Korea, which may arise concurrently. If South Korea shows proactivity in the US-led Indo-Pacific strategy, China will become increasingly concerned about South Korea's participation in a strategy to contain China. If the ROK and the US adopt a firm stance towards strengthening deterrence and achieving complete denuclearization of North Korea, there is a risk that North Korea may enhance its nuclear-missile capabilities or create tensions. The domestic political landscape will likely become volatile when the backlash from China and North Korea leads to economic and security issues domestically. Past administrations have, in some cases, caused confusion and controversy by conveying conflicting foreign policy directions and messages during summits with China following summits with the US. The ROK-US summit should be approached with a comprehensive foreign policy strategy that considers ROK-US, ROK-China, and ROK-North Korea policies as an integrated package.

At this summit, it is desirable for South Korea to prioritize efforts to project an image of strengthened ROK-US relations, but without implying that this will automatically worsen relations with China and North Korea. It is crucial to present South Korea's core values and national interests firmly, strengthen ROK-US relations accordingly, consider ROK-China relations, and present a vision for inter-Korean relations, thereby achieving harmony between the general principles and specific measures.

II. Indo-Pacific Strategy Based on Principles of Competition and Coexistence

The most significant challenge in ROK-US relations is strengthening a shared vision for the Indo-Pacific regional strategy. The ROK and the US must cooperate closely in the Indo-Pacific region to pursue policies towards China while simultaneously seeking a path of coexistence rather than mutual destruction with China. President Biden will present a more concrete vision of the Indo-Pacific strategy during the ROK-US summit in Seoul, on his way to the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) summit in Tokyo. Facing new security challenges such as the withdrawal from Afghanistan, the situation in Ukraine, and the strengthening of NATO in Europe, the QUAD, ROK-US relations, and relations with Asian partners are critical for the Biden administration to counter China, its primary strategic competitor in the Indo-Pacific. Therefore, the US will seek to hear the new government's fundamental stance, philosophy, and policy ideas regarding the Indo-Pacific region and its approach to China. The most pressing issue for the new government, with less than a month until the ROK-US summit, is to sufficiently concretize the principles and vision of its new foreign policy that will attract the attention of the US, China, and other relevant parties.

The basic strategic direction that South Korea has articulated so far does not entirely align with that of the US. The US, in its "Indo-Pacific Strategy" released in February, has clarified its containment policy towards China. It presented five policy objectives: promoting a free and open Indo-Pacific, strengthening ties with allies and partners, ensuring shared prosperity, enhancing security, and responding to transnational threats. Of particular note is the US vision of the Indo-Pacific as a region that is "free and open, connected, prosperous, secure, and resilient." Meanwhile, the joint statements from the ROK-US summit a year ago and the ROK-US-Japan foreign ministers' meeting on February 13th of this year include the term "inclusive" in the vision for the Indo-Pacific. This single word indicates a subtle difference in the ROK-US strategic vision for the Indo-Pacific. South Korea has maintained a stance aimed at preventing the Indo-Pacific strategy from becoming a strategy to contain and exclude China, which has shown a certain divergence from the US strategy towards China. Through the vision of an "inclusive Indo-Pacific," South Korea has maintained a significant distance from the US Indo-Pacific strategy, and the Yoon Suk-yeol administration's stance will be closely watched.

South Korea needs to clearly articulate its principle of pursuing a foreign policy based on the liberal international order, encompassing democracy, free trade, the rule of law, human rights, and open multilateralism. Furthermore, rather than unilaterally choosing sides between the US and China, South Korea should present a vision of competition and coexistence for a desirable order in Asia and assume the role of a co-architect of norms and rules alongside major powers.

Framing the Asian order solely through the lens of bipolar US-China strategic competition will significantly diminish South Korea's space for maneuver. On the 21st-century Indo-Pacific stage, efforts must be made to jointly evolve towards a future order, vision, values, and interests where all protagonists can compete healthily while simultaneously pursuing coexistence and prosperity. To achieve this, a dual approach is essential: participating in institutions designed by both the US and China, whether competitive or exclusive, to ensure that South Korea's core interests are adequately reflected in the rules and issues pursued.

Firstly, at the ROK-US summit, South Korea should strive to actively cooperate with the US-led order and expand common values and interests between the two countries, while avoiding being excessively confined within the framework of great power competition between the US and China. Given that South Korea has presented itself as an advanced middle power or a "global pivotal state" in terms of system and values, the new government's stance on value diplomacy is already known. As President Biden's Asian trip revolves around the QUAD issue, expressing active cooperation with the QUAD, based on South Korea's national interests, can also help manage the risks associated with China. Concurrently, it is advisable to avoid directly mentioning issues that China claims as 'internal affairs,' such as those concerning Xinjiang, Tibet, and Hong Kong. In the current context of the war in Ukraine, a sophisticated approach is needed, expressing active opinions from a principled standpoint of peace, universal human rights, and democracy.

III. ROK-US Economic Security Cooperation Aiming for Open Multilateralism

In the economic sector, the ROK and the US need to discuss concrete measures to expand and deepen the scope and level of cooperation, based on a review of the progress made since the summit agreement in May last year. The previous summit was a proactive occasion for the ROK and the US to expand and strengthen cooperation on supply chain resilience and reshoring. If the previous agreement focused on production cooperation, which is the immediate challenge, this summit should seek ways to upgrade ROK-US cooperation into comprehensive cooperation encompassing both production and technological innovation. In particular, an upgrade in cooperation is required to preemptively enhance innovation capabilities in advanced technology fields by securing pathways for South Korea to participate in the US's technological innovation ecosystem.

The ROK and the US need to activate bilateral mechanisms for identifying and discussing specific cooperation agendas. The new trade consultation channel, which the ROK and the US agreed to establish in November 2021 to cooperate in areas such as supply chains, new technologies, and digital matters, should be promptly operationalized. Furthermore, the possibility of establishing a comprehensive mechanism for consultations on trade and industry, new technologies, climate change, and economic security should be concretized.

This summit needs to explore ways for the ROK and the US to cooperate organically not only at the bilateral level but also at the regional and global levels. It will be an opportunity to confirm and coordinate the positions of both countries on common perceptions and areas of cooperation regarding the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework. The Indo-Pacific Economic Framework holds significant meaning in that it restores an institutional means for the US to connect with the Asian region. As the Indo-Pacific Framework represents an attempt by the US to engage institutionally in new issues such as fair trade, supply chain resilience, infrastructure, clean energy and decarbonization, taxation, and anti-corruption in a manner distinct from the past, creative approaches are needed to establish its design and implementation mechanisms.

Some Southeast Asian countries and India are reportedly feeling considerable pressure from the Biden administration's plans. Due to the diversion of US foreign policy resources caused by the situation in Ukraine, various obstacles lie ahead in deriving concrete measures that guarantee the feasibility of the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework. South Korea must identify potential obstacles in the process of launching the Indo-Pacific Framework, seek solutions collaboratively, and proactively propose areas of contribution. By doing so, it should pursue a position as a co-architect in the process of reorganizing the regional economic order. South Korea should solidify its position by playing a bridging role to encourage the participation of ASEAN countries, which the US is diligently pursuing, while simultaneously striving for an inclusive approach based on market economy principles, without excluding China.

IV. Reaffirming a Comprehensive Strategy Towards North Korea

North Korea's increasingly advanced nuclear and missile capabilities are a core issue for the ROK-US alliance. In terms of deterrence strategy, the Biden administration has introduced the new concept of "integrated deterrence" as a key element of its National Defense Strategy. This aims to enhance US deterrence across all dimensions – technology, operational concepts, and capabilities – to prevent adversaries from launching military offensives. It encompasses a multi-dimensional vision of deterrence, including the adoption of new technologies like artificial intelligence and quantum computing, enhancement of deterrence capabilities across domains such as land, sea, air, cyber, and space, strengthening deterrence through the combined use of nuclear and conventional strategies, bolstering deterrence with non-military means alongside military ones, and executing deterrence strategies in conjunction with allies and partner nations.

Therefore, with North Korea's intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capabilities rapidly progressing towards completion, and with the increasing threat of nuclear attacks targeting South Korea, Japan, Guam, and other regions, particularly the rapid enhancement of capabilities for low-yield nuclear attacks against South Korea, it is an urgent task to re-examine the deterrence capabilities of the ROK-US alliance from the perspective of integrated deterrence. It is a time when the alliance's deterrence strategy needs to be refined, including the US's integrated deterrence strategy, the ROK-US alliance's military deterrence strategy against North Korea, and the US's continued assurance of nuclear extended deterrence. The Yoon Suk-yeol administration has proposed the revitalization of the ROK-US Extended Deterrence Strategy and Consultation Group (EDSCG) as a policy objective, and a general consensus on upgrading deterrence capabilities is needed at this summit.

South Korea's strategy towards North Korea should be a comprehensive one that includes military integrated deterrence, effective economic sanctions, active engagement for the denuclearized North Korea's regime security and economic prosperity, and encouraging North Korea to develop new calculations for 21st-century denuclearization. While it is a time to newly refine military deterrence, efforts for engagement with North Korea should not be neglected. As North Korea's nuclear and missile capabilities advance, and the limitations of military deterrence become more apparent after the Ukraine conflict, efforts towards denuclearization, trust-building, and negotiations between the ROK and North Korea, and between the US and North Korea, are crucial.

At a time when the priority of North Korea policy in the Biden administration's foreign agenda continues to decline, a hardline approach by the new administration towards North Korea would drastically reduce strategic stability and minimize opportunities for engagement. At the ROK-US summit, the Yoon Suk-yeol administration should agree on the necessity of establishing concrete integrated deterrence strategies between the ROK and the US concerning military deterrence against North Korea, the need to elevate the priority of the North Korean issue, and the necessity of ROK-US strategic dialogue and policy coordination for feasible denuclearization and engagement policies towards North Korea. At this summit, the ROK and the US could discuss the possibility of regularizing ROK-US defense and foreign ministers' (2+2) meetings, holding them at least once a year. Furthermore, the US could pursue the reorganization and strengthening of its North Korea diplomatic and negotiation teams, such as appointing a Special Representative for North Korea Policy and a Special Envoy for North Korean Human Rights.

As ROK-US alliance deterrence against North Korea is strengthened and risks emanating from North Korea escalate, strategic alignment between China and North Korea may intensify, potentially re-emphasizing China's role in the North Korean nuclear issue. Indeed, past conservative governments, when pursuing pressure strategies against North Korea, ultimately found themselves relying on "China's back door" and consequently persuaded or pressured China more actively than progressive governments to elicit its cooperation. Considering that the US also always takes into account the China variable when pursuing its North Korea strategy, it is necessary to prepare for the summit with the "China variable" in mind for the medium and long term.

V. Restoring and Expanding ROK-US-Japan Cooperation

One of the issues the US is paying close attention to at this ROK-US summit is ROK-Japan relations. This is because the conflict between these two key US allies is increasingly perceived as an obstacle to advancing the Indo-Pacific strategy. ROK-US-Japan cooperation, one of the ten core tasks of the Indo-Pacific strategy, is expanding its role beyond cooperation on North Korea to trilateral cooperation for regional stability, peace, and prosperity. ROK-US-Japan cooperation is crucial for economic security, including global supply chains and cooperation in critical and emerging technologies, as well as for health security, climate crisis response, the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework, and the promotion of QUAD (plus).

The need to restore ROK-Japan relations, a prerequisite for ROK-US-Japan cooperation, is growing not only in the US but also within South Korea. The prolonged deterioration of relations has led to increasing economic and security costs, limited diplomatic maneuverability, and growing pressure for expanded cultural exchange. Cautious efforts towards improving relations are also emerging within Japan. At this summit, South Korea should articulate a policy of carefully pursuing future-oriented cooperation with Japan while simultaneously seeking to alleviate conflicts surrounding historical issues, and the US should express its active support for these efforts. ■

■ Lead Author: Jun Sung-chul_Director, EAI National Security Research Center; Professor, Seoul National University. He holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from Northwestern University and has served as a policy advisor to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Unification. His main research areas include international political theory, history of international relations, ROK-US alliance, and Korean Peninsula studies. His major works include "Threats of War and Peace on the Korean Peninsula" (co-authored), "Is Politics Moral?", and "East Asian International Politics: From History to Theory."

■ Author: Park Won-gon_Professor, Department of North Korean Studies, Ewha Womans University. He holds a Ph.D. in Diplomacy from Seoul National University and has served as a policy advisor to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a North Korean human rights advisory member for the Ministry of Unification, and Deputy Director of the Korean Peninsula Peace Research Institute (KPI). He conducted research on the ROK-US alliance and North Korea for 18 years at the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses and previously served as a professor of International Studies at Handong Global University. His main research areas include the ROK-US alliance, North Korean diplomacy and military affairs, and East Asian international relations (history).

■ Author: Son Yeol_President, EAI; Professor, Graduate School of International Studies, Yonsei University. He holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Chicago. He has served as Dean of the Graduate School of International Studies, Head of the Underwood International College, Director of the Institute for Sustainable Development, and Director of the Institute for International Studies at Yonsei University. He was also a Visiting Professor at the University of Tokyo, a visiting scholar at the University of North Carolina (Chapel Hill), and the University of California (Berkeley). He served as President of the Korean Political Science Association (2019) and President of the Association for Japanese Studies (2012). He has been a senior fellow at Fulbright, MacArthur, Japan Foundation, and Waseda University’s Advanced Research Center, and has served as an advisor to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Korea National Diplomatic Academy, the Northeast Asian History Foundation, and the Korea Foundation, as well as a specialist committee member of the Northeast Asian Cooperation Committee. His areas of expertise include Japanese foreign policy, international political economy, East Asian international politics, and public diplomacy. His recent publications include Japan and Asia's Contested Order (2019, with T. J. Pempel), “South Korea under US-China Rivalry: the Dynamics of the Economic-Security Nexus in the Trade Policymaking,” The Pacific Review (2019), 32, 6, "South Korea's Choices After the Crisis" (2020), and "South Korea's Middle Power Diplomacy" (2017, co-edited).

■ Author: Lee Dong-ryul_Director, EAI China Research Center; Professor, Dongduk Women's University. He holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the School of International Studies, Peking University, and has served as President of the Association for Contemporary Chinese Studies and is currently a policy advisor to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. His main research areas include China's foreign relations, Chinese nationalism, and minority issues. His recent research includes "China's Strategy and Role in the Denuclearization and Peace Process on the Korean Peninsula," "Evolution and Current Implications of Chinese Foreign Policy Discourse Since the 1990s," "A Geoeconomic Approach and Geopolitical Dilemmas of the Xi Jinping Administration's 'Maritime Power' Vision," and "Deciphering China’s Security Intentions in Northeast Asia: A View from South Korea," "China's Territorial Disputes" (co-authored).

■ Author: Lee Seung-ju_EAI 무역•기술•변환센터 소장 • 중앙대학교 정치국제학과 교수. 미국 캘리포니아 버클리대학교에서 정치학 박사학위를 취득했다. 주요 연구분야는 국제정치경제, 통상의 국제정치, 글로벌 디지털 거버넌스 등이다. 주요 저서 및 편저로는 《미중경쟁과 디지털 글로벌 거버넌스》(이승주 편), 《사이버 공간의 국제정치경제》(이승주 편), “Institutional Balancing and the Politics of Mega FTAs in East Asia,” 《Northeast Asia: Ripe for Integration?》(공편),《Trade Policy in the Asia-Pacific: the Role of Ideas, Interests, and Domestic Institutions》(공편) 등이 있다.

■ Author: Ha Young-sun_Chairman, EAI; Professor Emeritus, Seoul National University. He holds a Ph.D. in International Politics from the University of Washington and has served as a professor in the Department of Diplomacy at Seoul National University, a visiting research fellow at Princeton University's Center for International Studies, a visiting scholar at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Director of the Institute for International Affairs at Seoul National University, Director of the Center for American Studies, President of the Korean Peace Studies Association, Co-chair of the Korean side for the Joint Research Committee for a New Era of Korea-Japan Relations, a member of the Presidential National Security Advisory Council, and a senior advisor to the Inter-Korean Summit Preparation Committee. He is currently Chairman of EAI and Professor Emeritus at Seoul National University. His recent books and edited volumes include "World Politics of Love: War and Peace," "A Correct View of Korean Diplomatic History: Tradition and Modernity," "The US-China Competition for the Asia-Pacific Order," and "International Politics of Four Kingdoms: Analysis of Joseon Tongsinsa and Yeonhaengrok from the 16th to 19th Centuries." He also wrote a column titled "Ha Young-sun's Column" for the "Chosun Ilbo" and "JoongAng Ilbo" for seven years.

■ Management and Editing: Lee Seung-yeon_EAI 연구원

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