[EAI Special Report] Special Feature on Taiwan ④_The Triangular Relationship of China, the US, and Japan Surrounding Taiwan: The Mention of ‘Taiwan’ in the US-Japan Joint Statement from a Japanese Perspective

[Editor's Note]

In this Special Report, Professor Yoshiyuki Ogasawara of Tokyo University of Foreign Studies explains how the US-China Joint Communiqué and the Japan-China Joint Communiqué have altered US-China-Japan relations and Japan's subsequent stance in discussing the Taiwan issue. As Xi Jinping has intensified military threats against Taiwan since 2019, the US has moved to strengthen its ties with Taiwan while containing China. The author emphasizes that Japan should not be intimidated by China's increasing pressure and presents the deterrence of China's military actions as a crucial task. While Japan's ability to physically deter China's military actions is limited, it can contribute partially, as evidenced by the recent mention of the Taiwan Strait in the US-Japan Joint Statement.

On April 16, 2021, a joint statement was issued following a summit between Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga and President Biden, stating the "importance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait." The significance of this simple phrase is immense. While some commentators suggest it holds no special meaning as it reiterates Japan's long-standing position, its joint declaration by the US and Japan in the context of opposing China's threat of force against Taiwan is groundbreaking. Considering the preceding US-Japan 2+2 ministerial meeting and the US-China summit in Alaska, the context is clear.

The "1972 System" That Marginalized Taiwan

While the mention of the "Taiwan Strait" in the US-Japan joint statement is emphasized as occurring "after 52 years," the context and international environment in 2021 are entirely different from those of 1969. Back then, it was the Cold War era, both the US and Japan had diplomatic relations with the Republic of China (Taiwan), and Taiwan, under the one-party rule of the Kuomintang led by Chiang Kai-shek, advocated for "One China." The Taiwan Strait was mentioned in the context of discussions regarding the scope of the US-Japan Security Treaty following the reversion of Okinawa to Japan.

Subsequently, the 1972 US-China Joint Communiqué and the Japan-China Joint Communiqué largely acknowledged the People's Republic of China's "One China Principle," leading to Taiwan's exclusion from the international community. This established the "1972 System".⑴This framework relegated Taiwan to a corner of international politics. However, the fact that China did not govern Taiwan remained unchanged. Taiwan, within its limited sphere, developed its economy, achieved democratization, and survived. After democratization, the sense of being "part of China" in Taiwan faded, and a "Taiwanese identity" asserting that "Taiwan is separate from China" spread.

Meanwhile, China has long advocated for "reunification with Taiwan," but lacked the power to realize it. However, as China grew in power, the situation changed, and movements to alter the status quo in the Taiwan Strait intensified. Since taking office, President Xi Jinping has emphasized Chinese nationalism and pursued a Taiwan policy that simultaneously seeks to deter Taiwan militarily and absorb it economically. Following the inauguration of Tsai Ing-wen's administration in Taiwan in 2016, China, citing the Tsai administration's refusal to accept the "One China" principle, closed off dialogue channels with Taiwan. In January 2019, Xi Jinping delivered a significant speech on Taiwan, strongly urging the acceptance of "one country, two systems" for reunification and expressing his resolve not to postpone it to the next generation. Impatient with the Tsai Ing-wen administration's non-compliance, China intensified its military threats against Taiwan.

US and Japanese Policy Review Towards Taiwan

The United States grew increasingly concerned that Taiwan would be unified with China if left unchecked. It began to strengthen its relationship with Taiwan to deter China, believing that a reorganization of the "1972 System" was necessary. This became evident in 2020, during the final period of the Trump administration. The Biden administration has continued this approach.

The Biden administration, while referencing the "One China policy" and defining US-Taiwan relations as "unofficial," is pursuing a more robust Taiwan policy than the Trump administration, avoiding decisive backlash from China. The Biden administration's "One China policy" serves as a kind of "talisman." As competition with China and the importance of Taiwan's role have become bipartisan policies in the US, this framework may come to be known as the "2021 System."

Japan, on the other hand, experienced a prolonged period of cold-shouldering Taiwan from 1972 through the 1980s. The Japanese government generally restricted contact with the Taiwanese government, and a practice was established where central government officials cautiously refrained from engaging with Taiwanese government counterparts. Even exchange agreements between Japanese national universities and Taiwanese national universities were not permitted (they were finally approved in 1997). This extreme neglect of Taiwan began to improve gradually in the 1990s when Lee Teng-hui promoted democratization, but the "1972 System" remained firmly in place. When Lee Teng-hui, having retired as president and become a civilian, wished to visit Japan, it was only grudgingly approved in 2001 after considerable debate.

Since then, with the growing sense of caution towards China, Japan's self-imposed restrictions regarding Taiwan have also been partially eased. Trade and investment between Japan and Taiwan have expanded smoothly. Furthermore, a sense of familiarity with Taiwan has gradually grown within Japanese society, leading to an increase in travelers between Japan and Taiwan and expanded exchanges between local governments and private organizations. This was significantly supported by the material and moral assistance from Taiwan following the Great East Japan Earthquake in 2011.

Within Japan, even those who had previously shown little interest in Taiwan began to develop a positive impression. Survey data showing that the favorability of Taiwan among the Japanese public significantly surpassed that of China or South Korea in various opinion polls began to gain attention. Private exchanges between Japan and Taiwan became far more active after the normalization of relations than before. However, the government's policy towards Taiwan remained very cautious, and even during the tenure of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, who was perceived as pro-Taiwan, changes were very slow.

Taiwan Catches a Tailwind

Taiwan has been sounding the alarm about China's coercive actions, but many countries in the international community prioritized the economic benefits China offered. However, Taiwan, through democratic elections, has expressed its will not to accept reunification, and its voice has gradually become heard. In 2020, due to the COVID-19 crisis, international attention and sympathy towards Taiwan significantly increased.

While the US-China confrontation has undoubtedly benefited Taiwan, it is incorrect to view Taiwan as merely being in a "state of suspended animation." Taiwan's importance has been recognized due to the sustained efforts and dedication to maintaining its democracy. A symbolic event was the visit of a Czech Senate delegation to Taiwan in 2020. From Taiwan's perspective, the recent US-Japan Joint Statement likely signifies a feeling of finally being acknowledged.⑵Although Taiwan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a press release stating, "We sincerely welcome and express our gratitude," Taiwanese media outlets seem to have been greatly exhilarated.

A significant factor in Taiwan's favorable turn is that the US and Japan have come to understand President Tsai Ing-wen's "maintain the status quo" approach. During the Chen Shui-bian administration, both the US and Japanese governments were wary of President Chen's nationalist rhetoric. However, President Tsai has sealed the Democratic Progressive Party's original platform of Taiwan independence and has implemented a pragmatic and subtle policy of maintaining the framework of the Republic of China while solidifying "Taiwanese identity" internally.

This is a delicate line that avoids provoking military action from China. While China is clearly impatient, its criticism of the Tsai administration is that of "hidden Taiwan independence," not "legal independence," which China absolutely will not tolerate.

The Tsai administration, while strengthening relations with the US, has also stated that it "does not seek formal diplomatic relations between the US and Taiwan." Furthermore, strict orders have been issued to the Taiwanese Air Force, which scrambles in response to incursions by Chinese military aircraft, stating that "no shots are to be fired without the authorization of the Minister of National Defense." Taiwan is reading the international situation. By exercising restraint, Taiwan has made the US and Japan's concerns about "Taiwan unilaterally altering the status quo" unnecessary.

The Possibility of China Using Military Force

While Xi Jinping upholds Deng Xiaoping's principle of "peaceful reunification," it is clear that "peaceful means" will not lead to Taiwan's reunification. This is a cold, hard analysis that China itself can make. Therefore, we must assume that threats of military force will intensify, and the possibility of some form of military action (gray zone tactics) will increase.

There is a crucial point here. If China were to annex Taiwan at any cost, it would be unstoppable, but that is not the case. China's objective is to unify Taiwan with minimal sacrifice and cost, thereby showcasing the "greatness" of the Chinese Communist Party and justifying the continuation of its one-party rule.

Taiwan is strengthening its asymmetric warfare capabilities to counter Chinese amphibious forces, making the obstacles to a Chinese invasion extremely high. Turning Taiwan into rubble through missile attacks or engaging in a costly amphibious assault to occupy Taiwan is not desirable for the Communist Party. Furthermore, a reunification that involves a major war drawing in the US and Japan does not align with the logic of the Chinese Communist Party.

However, if Taiwan and the US and Japan do not prepare, a day will come when China, with its overwhelming military power, will force Taiwan to submit and declare the realization of the "Chinese Dream." In the process, China's use of military force is entirely possible. In China, military action is considered part of diplomacy. This outcome remains the same even if China obtains certainty that "the US and Japan will not intervene."

What Should Japan Do?

China's pressure on Japan will intensify in the near future. Japan needs to avoid being intimidated. It is necessary to re-evaluate what is important for Japan. If a war breaks out in the Taiwan Strait, it will be initiated by China's military attack on Taiwan. Therefore, preventing war, that is, deterring China's military actions, becomes the most crucial task. This should be a shared concern for Japan's liberals and pacifists as well.

Doing what China dislikes serves as deterrence. It is necessary to persistently appeal for "peace and stability" through diplomacy with China, and at the same time, quietly prepare to support the US military based on security legislation. Furthermore, it is essential to foster a loose network of countries participating in a "free and open Indo-Pacific." The "Quad" comprising the US, Japan, India, and Australia is a prime example of this.

There are those who argue that cooperation is meaningless due to the differing interests of these countries with China. However, China cannot ignore the fact that these countries' views on China are becoming increasingly strict. If China considers military action against Taiwan, it must calculate the cost of its national image and the propaganda strategies of Chinese companies being destroyed overnight. Even a loose network makes things difficult for China. It must be repeatedly conveyed to China that these series of containment efforts are not contradictory to cooperating with China in areas where dialogue or cooperation is possible.

Nevertheless, China may retaliate and impose various penalties on Japan. While this will affect Japan, it will also rebound on China. Sino-Japanese relations may stagnate, but if China is not deterred from the immense cost of a Taiwan invasion operation, peace in the Taiwan Strait cannot be maintained. A policy of "it is undesirable to provoke China" or "it is undesirable to escalate tensions between China and Japan" actually increases the risk of war.

The Future of the Taiwan Strait

What will be the future state of the Taiwan Strait? In Taiwan, "Taiwanese identity" has become entrenched, and the possibility of a candidate advocating for reunification winning an election is now nonexistent. A fierce competition will continue between China, which seeks opportunities by intensifying military threats, and the US, which strengthens its vigilance and supports Taiwan from behind the scenes. If the balance is maintained, China will be unable to launch a military invasion; however, if it collapses, the dangerous state of war will persist.

Meanwhile, there are factors that prevent a decisive outcome. While Taiwan's international presence will increase to some extent, the pretext of "One China" will likely be maintained by both the US and Japan. Tensions will continue, but it is conceivable that economic relations with China will remain at a high level for Taiwan, Japan, and the US overall. In such a scenario, will the "2021 System" become a "state of continued military tension without escalating to war, while the US, Japan, and Taiwan maintain close economic ties with China"? If this continues for five, ten years, and beyond, it would be far better than war and align with Japan's national interests. Above all, the will of the Taiwanese people would be protected.

While Japan's capabilities are limited (especially militarily), it can still make a certain contribution within those constraints. The recent joint statement marked an important step in this regard. It is hoped that this will serve as an opportunity to broaden discussions on conflict prevention in the Taiwan Strait. ■

⑴Refers to the international arrangement concerning Taiwan formed in 1972 (Masahiro Wakabayashi, "The Politics of Taiwan: Post-War History of the "Taiwanization" of the Republic of China" and Shin Kawashima, Uraara Shimizu, Yasuhiro Matsuda, Yongming Yang, "History of Japan-Taiwan Relations 1945-2020"). Although it seemed like a provisional framework at the time, it has continued for 50 years.

⑵President Tsai Ing-wen tweeted, "I appreciate the reaffirmation of the importance of peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait." (April 20, 2021).https://twitter.com/iingwen/status/1384448517498757128?s=20

■ Author: Yoshiyuki Ogasawara_Professor at Tokyo University of Foreign Studies. He holds Master's and Doctoral degrees from Hitotsubashi University and has served as a lecturer and associate professor at Tokyo University of Foreign Studies. He was a visiting researcher at the University of Sheffield in the UK and National Chengchi University in Taiwan. His research areas include Taiwan politics, China-Taiwan relations, East Asian politics, and comparative politics. His major works include "China-Taiwan Relations: Taiwanese Identity and 'One China Principle'" in Presidential Elections in Taiwan (Koyoshobo) and China and its Neighbours (Pentagon Press).

■ Editor: Jin-kyung Baek_EAI Head of Research

문의: 02 2277 1683 (내선 209) j.baek@eai.or.kr