[EAI Special Report] Taiwan Special Series ①_Challenges Facing South Korea and Taiwan Amidst Shifting International Dynamics

[Editor's Note]

In this Special Report, Wu Chung-li, Director of the Institute of Political Science at Academia Sinica, Taiwan, emphasizes the similarities in the external relations faced by South Korea and Taiwan. The author diagnoses that both countries are in a situation where they are forced to choose between 'China, a rising power that is culturally close but militarily threatening' and 'the United States, an ally with whom they have maintained a long-standing alliance and which holds vested interests.' The author introduces balancing, bandwagoning, neutrality, and hedging as strategic options available to both countries.

The US-China competition has emerged as a core political agenda for South Korea and Taiwan. Since the mid-1990s, the Northeast Asian geopolitical landscape has evolved through the interplay of three factors: socioeconomic environment, norms of the international system, and political perceptions. Firstly, in terms of socioeconomic aspects, China's rapid economic growth has fostered complementary industrial structures between China and its neighbors, South Korea and Taiwan. The cultural and linguistic similarities shared by China, South Korea, and Taiwan are also significant. Consequently, economic relations between China, South Korea, and Taiwan have become closer, and private economic and trade exchanges have accelerated. Secondly, before China's rise as a great power, the United States and other Western countries anticipated peaceful and stable development in the Asia-Pacific region. However, China's military rise since 2011 has given rise to theories such as the 'Thucydides Trap' (Allison 2017) and the 'theory of power transition' (Abdollahian and Kang, 2008; Bremer 1992; Organski and Kugler 1980). This has served as a catalyst for South Korea and Taiwan to synergize with China, respectively. Lastly, political, economic, and trade relations between South Korea and China have rapidly developed in various fields since the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1992. However, the question of what strategy the South Korean government should adopt in its diplomacy towards China and North Korea has continuously attracted attention and has emerged as a major issue in every presidential election. Broadly speaking, public opinion in South Korea harbors two opposing perspectives: 'active engagement' and 'cautious response'.

Between 1996 and 2008, Taiwan experienced the administrations of Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). During this period, political leaders in Beijing and Taipei held differing perceptions. Notably, the divergence in understanding 'One China' was significant, with both China and Taiwan adhering to their respective viewpoints, leading to a lack of substantive progress in relations due to mutual distrust. Subsequently, with the Kuomintang's (KMT) victories in the presidential and legislative elections in 2008 and 2012, cross-Strait relations entered a period of stability. In particular, the signing of the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) between Taiwan and China in 2010 opened avenues for economic cooperation across the Strait. However, this economic integration led to political conflict. Following the signing of the Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement (CSSTA) in March 2014, Taiwan experienced the Sunflower Student Movement, where student groups occupied the Legislative Yuan, resulting in a deterioration of cross-Strait relations. Nevertheless, the first cross-Strait summit between Ma Ying-jeou and Xi Jinping in Singapore in November 2015, since 1949, was a positive development for cross-Strait relations.

However, the KMT suffered a crushing defeat in the 2016 presidential and legislative elections. Tsai Ing-wen of the DPP was elected president, and the DPP secured a majority of seats. Although the Tsai Ing-wen administration emphasized maintaining the status quo in cross-Strait policy after May 2016, China began to narrow Taiwan's international space, leading five countries to sever diplomatic ties with Taiwan over two years. Consequently, the number of countries maintaining diplomatic relations with Taiwan decreased to 17. Exchanges across the Strait were suspended, and Taiwan's economy also struggled. Import/export values, the export orders index, and economic growth rates declined, while the unemployment rate rose. The DPP suffered another significant defeat in the 2018 legislative elections. However, in 2020, the DPP's policy stance against China, presented in the presidential and legislative elections, resonated with Hong Kong's 'Anti-Extradition Bill' protests, leading to Tsai Ing-wen's re-election and the DPP securing a majority of seats in the legislature.

In US-China relations, former US President Donald Trump strongly criticized China's infringement of US intellectual property rights and theft of corporate trade secrets starting in 2018. The US-China trade war intensified, and as tariff barriers were erected, the US and China imposed higher tariffs on each other's goods. Since 2020, COVID-19 has spread globally. Currently, vaccines produced in the United States, Germany, the United Kingdom, Russia, and China are being supplied to various countries, but it remains to be seen what effect vaccine supply will have on the economy of the Northeast Asian region in the future. More importantly, Joe Biden defeated Donald Trump in the 2020 US presidential election and was officially inaugurated as president in January 2021. The impact of the current confrontational US-China relations on the politics and economy of South Korea and Taiwan remains uncertain.

From a diplomatic perspective, the strategies available to South Korea and Taiwan include balancing, bandwagoning, staying neutral, and hedging (Archer, Bailes, and Wivel 2014; Keohane 1969; Lim and Cooper 2015). However, under the bipolar structure of the US and China, choosing balancing or bandwagoning is clearly not the optimal strategy for either country. Maintaining neutrality also presents practical difficulties, particularly in relation to geopolitical considerations. Therefore, hedging emerges as a relatively favorable option. The crucial question is what hedging strategy South Korea and Taiwan can employ to ensure national security and economic development. Considering that democratic politics emphasizes policy decisions by the people, the public opinion in South Korea and Taiwan towards the US and China is important (Wu and Lin 2019). However, the more critical issue is whether to choose China, a rising power that is culturally close but militarily threatening, or the United States, an ally with whom they have maintained a long-standing alliance and which holds vested interests, within the context of the bipolar structure.

South Korea and Taiwan have shared similar characteristics throughout their political development. Both countries have followed similar developmental trajectories during periods of socioeconomic transition and have progressed through mutual competition and learning in the development of new technologies. Despite the difference in status—South Korea being a middle power and Taiwan a smaller state—both nations face similar challenges and choices. Within the international system characterized by US-China confrontation, it is a crucial agenda to explore ways to increase dialogue and exchange between South Korea and Taiwan, and to understand that both countries share interdependence rather than competition. ■

■ Author: Wu Chung-li (吳重禮)Director and Research Fellow at the Institute of Political Science, Academia Sinica, Taiwan. His main research areas include US politics, comparative politics, urban and minority politics, and electoral studies. His major articles have been published in professional journals such as Party Politics, China Quarterly, Asian Survey, Parliamentary Affairs, Political Studies Review, Social Science Quarterly, International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, Japanese Journal of Political Science, and Journal of Black Studies, among others. His contact email is polclw@gate.sinica.edu.tw.

■ Management and Editing: Baek Jin-kyungDirector of Research, EAI

Inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 209) j.baek@eai.or.kr