[韩日联合研究：2050世界展望] ② 2050年前的未来军事与安全环境：韩日关系面临的挑战与机遇
编者按
韩国峨山政策研究院国家安全研究中心主任、首尔大学教授全采成（Chaesung Chun）探讨了东北亚地区安全格局的演变及其对韩日合作的影响。他指出了关键的变革驱动因素，包括美中战略竞争、人工智能和自主武器的进步，以及核威慑日益增长的复杂性。全教授提出了双边合作的五个优先领域：加强《核不扩散条约》（NPT）和军控努力；支持美中危机管理；通过三边协调加强美国的延伸威慑；就韩国的核武装问题进行先发制人的对话；以及为美中核均势情景做准备。他警告说，中国不断扩大的核能力可能会助长其灰色地带战略，并强调需要协调应对。
一、 评估2050年前未来军事与安全环境的主要变量
本文旨在分析韩国和日本周边地区（东北亚、东亚）及全球层面的军事安全环境变化，并探讨韩日安全合作的方向与可能性。预测未来25年的军事安全环境变化是一个复杂课题，因此，本文将以宏观的逻辑框架为指导，而非精确的时间框架，以适应中长期视角。未来的军事安全环境涉及多种变化因素，但本文将重点关注以下几个关键方面：
首先，美国全球战略及其在东亚安全战略的变化。正如2024年美国总统大选所显示的，美国的外交和安全大战略正在经历根本性转变。这些变化超越了共和党和民主党执政期间的轮替，或唐纳德·特朗普等非常规领导人的出现。过去30年持续的单极霸权体系已引发诸多问题，美国公众认为维持霸权的负担日益难以承受。最近的总统大选反映了公众对其国家外交和安全方向的评估和担忧。因此，美国的外交和安全大战略预计将发生重大变化。值得注意的是，美国全球参与和东亚事务承诺的减弱将对韩国和日本的安全环境产生重大影响。鉴于两国一直依靠与美国的强大军事同盟来维持安全，美国军事安全政策的变化将是一个主要因素。
其次，美中战略竞争的加剧。两国间的战略竞争最初出现在经济领域，但现已演变为国家治理的各个方面，包括经济安全化、经济安全问题、受政治影响的供应链脱钩、拜登政府的“去风险”政策以及特朗普政府下的更广泛脱钩政策。展望未来，美中战略竞争日益可能转向东亚关键冲突地区的军事对抗。这种动态将显著影响韩国和日本周边的军事安全环境。
第三，东亚核环境的变化。值得注意的是，中国正在迅速现代化其核武器和运载系统。美中之间可能在未来十年内实现核均势，这可能预示着相互确保摧毁（MAD）的出现。核动态的这种发展将对美中灰色地带冲突和更广泛的军事竞争产生重大影响。此外，《新削减战略武器条约》将于2026年2月到期。自20世纪70年代以来一直是美俄关系基石的战略核协议可能崩溃，可能开启大国间核竞争的新时代。鉴于乌克兰战争的持续，预计美俄关系将进一步恶化，核竞争作为严重威胁将加剧。此外，朝鲜先进的核武器和导弹能力仍将是一个重要变量。尽管朝鲜长期以来对韩国和日本的安全构成持续威胁，但其与中国和俄罗斯日益加强的战略合作可能会进一步影响涉及韩日的安全合作。
第四，尖端技术的进步将深刻影响军事安全环境。自动化和自主技术（AI）的快速发展正在推动军事技术的变革性变化。生成式人工智能、预期通用人工智能和超人工智能、量子计算、量子加密和量子通信等新兴技术将在军事领域得到广泛应用。随着这些技术变革在未来十年内加速，理解它们对韩国和日本安全环境的影响将至关重要。
第五，非传统军事安全问题，如环境挑战、生态危机和健康紧急事件，将日益影响军事和安全领域的事项。这些关键问题，可能升级为生存威胁，可能加剧国家间冲突，并可能需要军事措施来解决。COVID-19大流行表明了国家为管理危机而加强管辖权和监管权。展望未来，气候变化驱动的生态危机预计将加剧。在这种背景下，各国可能诉诸军事冲突来保护其人口，这成为一个令人担忧的领域。
二、 美国战略的变化与美中竞争的未来
2024年美国总统大选预示着美国安全战略的长期变化。自第二次世界大战以来，美国奉行旨在建立和维持自由国际秩序的外交和安全战略。虽然表面上宣扬集体安全，但这种战略实际上是基于联盟提供安全作为公共产品。
这种霸权战略使美国外交政策能够涵盖广泛的领域，结合了新孤立主义、克制和制衡的要素，这在美国共和党的战略中尤为明显。然而，在经历了三十年的单极霸权体系后，美国现在正在采取一种日益关注其国家利益的安全战略。
更根本的担忧是，正如上次总统大选所揭示的那样，前总统特朗普不仅反对自由主义大战略，而且似乎也厌恶美国自身的全球领导地位。如果美国放弃其全球领导角色或在国际政治中的霸权地位，国际秩序将发生重大变化。如果美国优先考虑自身利益而忽视现有的多边、基于规则的秩序，世界将经历自第二次世界大战以来最根本的转变。
特朗普的外交和安全战略很可能对包括韩国和日本在内的美国盟友构成重大挑战。传统上，美国的霸权战略以仁慈的方式为特征，以安全作为公共产品，以换取盟友的经济让步。然而，特朗普政府同时要求经济让步、增加国防费用分摊和更大的军事贡献，可能会被视为一种强制性霸权战略。这种转变可能会侵蚀美国与其盟友之间的信任，为中国利用美国联盟体系内的分裂创造机会。事实上，中国似乎预期特朗普的压力将加速美国盟友独立外交和安全战略的制定，从而削弱整个联盟框架。
预计特朗普总统将强烈要求盟友增加国防费用分摊，同时寻求更大的军事贡献以加强全球威慑，特别是针对中国。这些要求偏离了美国传统的霸权战略，可能会在盟友中引起困惑和抵制。
韩国和日本对特朗普的外交政策方针尤为敏感。两国都是美国贸易顺差排名前列的国家，并且被特朗普视为对国防费用贡献不足。此外，两国都驻扎着一些最大的美国海外军事基地和大量美军。
除了特朗普，共和党的一些重要人物也公开表示，美国的军事支持现在应该不仅用于对抗朝鲜，还用于遏制中国。韩国和日本必须仔细评估它们对特朗普增加国防贡献要求的反应，同时确定它们在美国遏制中国努力中的作用。这包括应对台湾发生突发事件时美国军队可能发生的角色变化，以及为朝鲜持续挑衅制定战略。这些挑战要求采取一种能够平衡两国安全和经济利益的外交方针。
三、 新兴技术与安全环境的不确定未来
近期乌克兰和加沙的战争表明，人工智能（AI）已在战争的多个维度上得到应用，这一趋势预计在中长期内将加速并持续下去。随着核武器、常规武器以及心理战和信息战与人工智能相结合，这些领域将迅速演变为基于人工智能的核武器、自主武器系统和认知战。韩国和日本未来也预计将面临由先进技术驱动的军事安全环境变化。作为民主国家，它们一直努力建立共同规范，但未来需要采取更务实的应对措施来应对军事和安全挑战。
人工智能作为一种通用技术，充当增强现有技术的元增强剂。它不仅能改进特定的武器系统，还能改变战争的作战框架、与冲突相关的决策过程，以及政府、军事机构和社会的认知与反应。人工智能的多维度特性确保了其对未来冲突的广泛影响。
鉴于国家间的地缘政治竞争，阻止人工智能技术的军事化应用的可能性很小。此外，人工智能有可能朝着意想不到的方向迅速发展，可能逃脱人类控制。各国普遍认识到人工智能是增强国家安全的一种创新工具，因此，在国际社会共同认识到人工智能带来的共同危害之前，不太可能出现关于军事人工智能技术的积极预防措施。必须全面评估人工智能在核武器、自主武器系统和认知战中的当前应用。同样重要的是要预测这些进步可能带来的共同挑战，并及时启动严肃的讨论来应对它们。
人工智能集成到核系统会显著增加意外核冲突的风险。首先，人工智能驱动的决策可能基于错误的数据或对对手行动的误解而导致误判，从而可能加剧紧张局势。人工智能实现的加速决策为人类审议留下的时间更少，增加了错误和判断失误的可能性。其次，人工智能系统极易受到网络攻击，如数据操纵、黑客攻击或“数据投毒”，这可能扭曲核指挥系统，触发虚假警报，或阻碍适当的响应。网络化系统的互联性也放大了风险，因为一个故障可能导致整个系统级联。第三，过度依赖人工智能或不信任其判断可能会在关键时刻削弱人类控制，延迟或误导核武器使用的决策。人工智能决策过程的不透明性，即所谓的“黑箱”问题，进一步复杂化了监督和纠正。最后，人工智能集成通过增强监视和侦察能力威胁战略稳定，可能导致先发制人打击，并增加核武库的“用则即失”压力。此外，人工智能的采用助长了技术军备竞赛，加剧了全球军事竞争和不稳定。
其次，人工智能驱动的自主武器系统（AWS）的快速发展加剧了全球军事竞争，引发了重大的伦理、法律和战略担忧。人工智能驱动的AWS，如自主无人机和蜂群技术，由于其在动态环境中不可预测的行为、可能加剧意外冲突升级风险的加速决策，以及易于大规模生产（使其系统可供非国家行为者和恐怖分子使用）而构成挑战。此外，其用于定点清除（包括种族灭绝）的潜在用途放大了偏见和不成比例伤害的风险，正如面部识别技术中的缺陷所证明的那样。尽管有国际监管呼吁，但美国、中国和澳大利亚等主要大国仍在推进军事人工智能项目，进一步加剧了军备竞赛。
从长远来看，AWS的发展预计将显著改变战争动态，实现更快、更自动化的战斗，同时最大限度地减少人为干预。然而，系统错误和故障的可能性增加了国家间紧张局势加剧的几率。在美中战略竞争的背景下，两国都在积极推进军事人工智能的进步以确保主导地位，这可能威胁战略稳定。这种竞争不仅威胁全球军事平衡，还带来了复杂的伦理和法律困境，需要国际合作来应对自主武器系统带来的深远影响。
第三，认知战，由敌对势力在国际层面进行，是一种网络冲突形式，有组织的团体通过虚假信息、宣传和操纵技术来操纵在线言论并诋毁政治对手。这包括散布毫无根据的说法以破坏声誉，以及使用基于个人资料的微定向来削弱政治制度，可能导致广泛的叛乱和现有政治秩序的崩溃。人工智能通过实现精确的心理操纵、传播虚假信息以及影响信念和行为，极大地增强了认知战策略的复杂性和有效性。人工智能和神经技术等新兴技术是认知战的关键推动者，促使各国将双重用途技术军事化并加速技术军备竞赛。这种竞争动态常常破坏伦理、法律和规范约束，因为各国优先考虑颠覆性能力以维护国家安全。其结果是，认知战使思想军事化常态化，助长认知领域的鲁莽行为，并阻碍了保护心理隐私、自主和完整性的规范的建立。此外，这些动态加剧了大国之间的技术脱钩，加剧了全球紧张局势（Chun 2024）。
四、 东亚国家间不断变化的核力量平衡
1. 中国的核现代化
根据美国国防部关于“中华人民共和国涉及的军事与安全发展”的年度报告，中国的长期国家战略是到2049年实现“中华民族伟大复兴”（国防部办公厅 2022）。该战略坚定地追求政治、社会、经济、技术和军事发展，以增强中华人民共和国的国家实力，并修改国际秩序以支持中华人民共和国的治理体系和国家利益。中国人民解放军寻求在其所有战争领域实现现代化能力并提高其熟练程度，以成为一支能够进行全方位陆地、空中和海上以及核、太空、反太空、电子战和网络空间作战的联合部队。
在2021年至2035年的第一阶段，中国共产党旨在使中华人民共和国“基本”达到成为“伟大的社会主义现代化强国”的初始门槛。在此阶段，中华人民共和国可能继续将经济发展作为“中心任务”，但与其追求经济高速增长，不如致力于解决其不平衡的经济发展和不平等问题，而这些问题是北京在“新时代”认识到的中国社会新的“主要矛盾”。到2035年，中华人民共和国寻求通过增强其经济和技术实力来提高自力更生能力，包括“基本”完成军事现代化，成为“全球创新领导者”，并提高在粮食供应等关键领域的自给自足能力。中华人民共和国打算显著加强其文化“软实力”，并改善其国内法治和治理体系。
在2035年至2049年的第二阶段，中华人民共和国旨在实现民族复兴和中国现代化，实现习近平所描述的“综合国力和国际影响力领先的”国际地位。一个复兴的中华人民共和国将实现——在中国共产党诸多目标中——其建立一支世界一流军队的目标，并在符合中华人民共和国整体外交政策目标（即建立其所谓的“人类命运共同体”）的国际秩序中占据领先地位。
在未来十年，中国预计将迅速实现核力量的现代化、多样化和扩张，以提供从低当量精确打击导弹到高当量洲际弹道导弹的各种升级选项。美国国防部估计，中国核武库在2024年已超过600枚现役弹头，预计到2030年将超过1000枚，并计划到2035年进一步扩张以实现中国人民解放军的现代化目标。北京方面声称用于和平目的的快中子增殖反应堆和后处理设施，很可能为其核武器计划做出了贡献。此外，中国正在为其固体推进剂发射井场（包括三个新发射井场中的320个发射井）配备武器，并将其东风-5液体燃料发射井部队扩大到约50个发射井。这些努力符合北京建立“预警反击”态势的战略，提高了其发射场地的生存能力和响应能力（Kristensen et al. 2024, 49–72）。
Source: (Kristensen et al. 2024).
China’s growing nuclear capabilities enable the PLA to target more U.S. cities, military facilities, and leadership sites, marking a shift from a minimal deterrence strategy focused on MAD to one capable of inflicting greater damage in a nuclear exchange. This modernization includes the development of advanced delivery systerns to counter U.S. missile defenses and lower-yield weapons for more discriminate strikes, suggesting that Beijing aims to sustain multiple rounds of counterstrikes and increase its ability to dominate in a nuclear conflict. These advancements highlight China’s long-term commitment to achieving a “world-class” military by 2049.
China’s nuclear strategy emphasizes deterrence against a first strike and counterstrike capabilities to retaliate against an adversary’s military, population, and economy, aiming to de-escalate conflicts and return to conventional warfare while maintaining sufficient force to deter further aggression. Although Beijing upholds a no-first-use (NFU) policy, ambiguities exist, as the PRC may consider nuclear first use in response to non-nuclear threats endangering its nuclear forces, command and control (C2), or the survival of the CCP regime, particularly in scenarios involving Taiwan. The combination of conventional and nuclear missile forces and the dispersal of mobile systerns during conflicts complicate the identification of missile types and escalation management, increasing the risk of inadvertent attacks on nuclear assets and “use-or-lose” pressures. This strategic ambiguity remains a key challenge for adversaries attempting to navigate deterrence and escalation dynamics with the PRC (Kristensen et al. 2024, 101–102).
China’s nuclear forces, when developed to achieve parity or near parity with the United States, could enable China to adopt a more assertive gray zone strategy. To date, China has adhered to a minimum deterrence strategy aimed at countering potential U.S. aggression. However, as U.S.-China military competition accelerates and China’s gray zone strategies become increasingly aggressive, its nuclear forces are expected to play a more significant role. In a scenario of military conflict between China and the U.S. and Taiwan over Taiwan, China may utilize its nuclear strategies in various ways.
Currently, China’s comparatively weaker nuclear forces make it wary of escalation in gray zone disputes, fearing they may lead to full-scale conventional warfare and potentially nuclear conflict with the U.S., where China’s nuclear capabilities remain inadequate. However, in a decade or more, when nuclear parity or mutual assured destruction is achieved, China may feel less compelled to exercise restraint in gray zone strategies.
China has already demonstrated the use of complex strategies in gray zone conflicts, and if nuclear capabilities are incorporated, it is likely to adopt even more assertive approaches. This could lead to an expansion of China’s aggression in areas such as the South China Sea, East China Sea, and Taiwan, posing significant security threats to South Korea and Japan.
2. Multipolar Nuclear Strategic Environment in Northeast Asia
The challenges to strategic stability in a multipolar world are becoming increasingly evident as the erosion of US-Russia arms control frameworks, exemplified by the suspension of New START, highlights the fragile nature of bilateral agreements. The shift toward a multipolar nuclear order, with China’s growing arsenal and its potential role in a broader arms race, complicates efforts to maintain stability. Meanwhile, Russia’s actions in Ukraine, including its misuse of nuclear deterrence, expose the limitations of existing arms control and nonproliferation agreements in addressing modern geopolitical crises. These developments raise concerns about the adaptability of traditional strategic stability concepts to a multipolar environment, where technological advancements and the integration of emerging nuclear powers demand new approaches (Kühn 2023).
As the post-Cold War order concludes, great power geopolitical competition intensifies, with the emergence of what could be termed “the axis of revisionism.” This includes the ongoing Ukraine war, closer strategic ties between China and Russia, the military alliance between North Korea and Russia formalized in June 2024, and Iran’s military support to Russia’s Ukraine war through drone supplies. Well-documented missile cooperation between North Korea and Iran further adds to these dynamics. Together, military cooperation among North Korea, China, and Russia is likely to have profound implications for Northeast Asian geopolitics.
While the bilateral nuclear balance between the U.S. and Russia has been pivotal, the emerging era will prioritize a multipolar nuclear order. Strategic agreements between the U.S. and Russia may not be extended, and the likelihood of nuclear arms negotiations between the U.S. and China remains extremely low. Meanwhile, North Korea continues to enhance its nuclear and missile capabilities despite international sanctions. The strategic cooperation among North Korea, Russia, and China is accelerating in this context (Eom 2024).
Although a formal trilateral alliance has not yet emerged, strategic contradictions and overlaps exist among these nations’ interests. Nonetheless, their common opposition to the U.S. could drive closer collaboration, particularly if the U.S.’s relative military strength declines. If Russia utilizes nuclear power to alter the status quo in Europe, China and North Korea may similarly combine their nuclear capabilities to seek changes in Northeast Asia. Such developments would compel the U.S., South Korea, and Japan to address a multifaceted nuclear threat.
In such a scenario, challenges arise over how the U.S. could extend nuclear deterrence to South Korea and Japan, and how the region could collectively respond to a hybrid nuclear threat posed by North Korea. Conversely, international and multilateral cooperation to address these developments remains limited.
V. Prospects for South Korea-Japan Security Cooperation Toward 2050
Long-term security cooperation between South Korea and Japan becomes increasingly critical. First, if the U.S. East Asia security strategy undergoes fundamental shifts, both nations could face heightened security threats. Since World War II, South Korea and Japan have relied on close alliances with the U.S. to ensure their security. During the Cold War, their strategy was centered on countering the military threats from communist forces, with the U.S. alliance serving as the axis of this framework. As Victor Cha has noted, when U.S. security commitments to East Asia weaken, South Korea and Japan have historically accelerated security cooperation despite bilateral tensions (Cha 1999). While this trend has not always been consistent, a weakening U.S. security commitment underscores the growing necessity for South Korea-Japan security collaboration. If U.S. foreign policy shifts further toward Trumpian “America First” doctrines or offshore balancing strategies, the security needs of South Korea and Japan will inevitably increase. Managing bilateral issues effectively while establishing new frameworks for security cooperation will be crucial.
Second, as U.S.-China strategic competition intensifies, South Korea and Japan will face similar security challenges. The U.S. may leverage the South Korea-U.S. and U.S.-Japan alliances to counter China’s security threats, requiring both countries to increase defense spending and adapt their strategic frameworks. This burden is heavier for South Korea. Japan already maintains direct military tensions with China, particularly in the East China Sea, and has been proactively pursuing changes in the U.S.-Japan alliance to counter China’s military rise. In contrast, South Korea has yet to formulate clear strategic responses, despite the Taiwan Strait crisis posing a significant threat to its supply chains and economic security.
In the long term, if China secures dominance in the first island chain and integrates regions within the Belt and Road Initiative into its security sphere, South Korea and Japan will face shared exposure to China’s threats. As U.S.-China competition escalates into military confrontation, and as Taiwan Strait and South China Sea issues impact the protection of supply routes, economic security, and military security in South Korea and Japan, the need for cooperation will only intensify.
South Korea and Japan also face the challenge of balancing their deep economic ties with China while addressing U.S. demands for military containment of Beijing. The broad areas of cooperation under frameworks such as China-South Korea-Japan trilateral initiatives further complicate strategic responses to U.S.-China competition for both countries.
Third, amid the rapid advancement of cutting-edge technology, South Korea-Japan technological cooperation is increasingly vital. On the one hand, both countries must prevent the military exploitation of advanced technologies that could destabilize strategic stability in East Asia. As liberal democracies, they should collaborate to establish international norms to prevent the militarization of AI and other emerging technologies.
At the same time, they must prepare for great power geopolitical competition leveraging advanced technologies. China’s potential to surpass the U.S. in military AI and quantum technology could rapidly shift the military balance. Despite changes in the U.S. global strategy, technological cooperation among the U.S., South Korea, and Japan remains indispensable. Even with lukewarm U.S. engagement, sustained South Korea-Japan cooperation in advanced technology is crucial. This necessitates close dialogues to evaluate security environments and align security strategies between the two nations.
Fourth, the issue of the future global nuclear order is directly linked to the security interests of South Korea and Japan. If the U.S. extended deterrence commitment weakens while nuclear capabilities of China, North Korea, and Russia grow, coupled with strengthened cooperation among these states, it would pose a critical threat to the security of both South Korea and Japan. Therefore, it is important to identify areas where South Korea and Japan can cooperate to address challenges.
First, South Korea and Japan need a shared understanding of the weakening and possible collapse of the global nuclear order. As non-nuclear weapon states surrounded by nuclear-armed nations, South Korea and Japan share a common predicament. Thus, they should strongly advocate for the strict adherence to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the suppression of vertical nuclear proliferation among major powers, and the necessity of arms control negotiations among nuclear-armed states. In this process, efforts should also be made to establish a multilateral framework that addresses the complete denuclearization of North Korea. Additionally, it is crucial to recognize that the nuclear order in Northeast Asia carries significant global implications and to devise joint measures to address this issue on a global scale.
Second, though immediate prospects for nuclear arms control agreements between the U.S. and China are limited, the importance of dialogue and laying the groundwork for future negotiations must be underscored. South Korea and Japan, as key U.S. allies, should actively support U.S.-led efforts to initiate crisis management discussions with China, emphasizing the need for transparency and responsible nuclear strategy. Both nations must strengthen regional coordination with the U.S. to ensure unified messaging while enhancing their own deterrence capabilities, particularly in missile defense, to complement U.S. efforts and maintain regional stability. Furthermore, they should advocate for China’s inclusion in multilateral arms control frameworks, such as through the P5 or regional security mechanisms, encouraging broader engagement and accountability. By aligning closely with U.S. strategies and promoting multilateral dialogue, South Korea and Japan can contribute to reducing risks and ensuring stability amidst increasing U.S.-China strategic competition (Santoro 2023).
Third, given the growing nuclear threats, joint efforts between South Korea and Japan are necessary to strengthen the U.S. extended deterrence commitment. Although South Korea and Japan maintain bilateral alliances with the United States, they face common challenges due to nuclear threats from neighboring countries. The Camp David Agreement includes provisions for immediate consultations in the event of issues significantly affecting regional security. Similarly, close cooperation among South Korea, Japan, and the United States is essential when nuclear threats from neighboring countries escalate. The core of this effort lies in the U.S. extended deterrence commitment, and it will require a shared understanding between South Korea and Japan as well as coordinated demands on the United States to continuously enhance this commitment.
Fourth, if North Korea’s nuclear threat intensifies and the U.S. extended deterrence weakens, South Korea may feel an increasing necessity for independent nuclear armament. In such a scenario, South Korea would inevitably face concerns about economic sanctions from the United States and the international community, as well as fears of a nuclear domino effect involving Japan and potentially Taiwan. If South Korea finds no alternative to independent nuclear armament, it will need to work closely with Japan in advance to establish mechanisms to convince Japan that South Korea’s nuclear armament contributes to Japanese security and regional nuclear deterrence in Northeast Asia. Exploring the feasibility of prior consultations or dialogues between South Korea and Japan will be crucial to prevent South Korea’s nuclear armament from undermining the global nuclear order.
Lastly, both South Korea and Japan need a common preparation for the scenario where nuclear parity is achieved between China and the United States, accompanied by mutual assured destruction. As aforementioned, if China attains nuclear parity with the United States, it is likely to adopt more aggressive gray zone strategies in conflict zones across East Asia. This would pose shared threats to South Korea and Japan, necessitating the sharing of threat perceptions and coordinated responses. Both countries should demand greater transparency from China and effectively convey their shared intent to both the United States and China to encourage nuclear arms control negotiations between the two powers.
Despite existing differences and perception gaps between South Korea and Japan on various issues and within security contexts, they will ultimately face common military threats and the necessity for long-term cooperation. Thus, sustaining multidimensional consultative efforts from now is vital to fostering long-term cooperation.
References
References
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Cha, Victor D. 1999. Alignment Despite Antagonism: The United States-Korea-Japan Security Triangle. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Chun, Chaesung. 2024. “Military Challenge ②: The Development of AI-Based Autonomous Weapon systerns, Cognitive Warfare, and Changes in the Military Security Order.” EAI National Security Research Center Special Report, September 6.
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■ Chaesung Chun is Chair of EAI’s National Security Research Center and Professor at Seoul National University.
■ Translated and edited by Chaerin Kim, Research Assistant
For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 208) | crkim@eai.or.kr
*本文为使用 AI 从英语原文翻译而来，部分译文或语感可能存在偏差。