[Public Opinion on Korea-Japan Relations Series] 9. Perceptions of Neighboring Countries and Changes in Mutual Perceptions between Korea and Japan (2013-2023)

I. Introduction

This article analyzes the impact of Korean and Japanese public perceptions of neighboring countries on their mutual perceptions, based on the results of surveys on mutual perceptions between Korea and Japan conducted by the East Asia Institute (EAI) since 2013. While various factors influence mutual perceptions between Korea and Japan, perceptions of the bilateral relationship are understood in connection with international contexts and trends, not solely within the bilateral relationship itself. Therefore, this study aims to identify the relationship between Korean perceptions of Japan and perceptions of neighboring countries. Specifically, it examines the changes in perceptions of the respective countries, focusing on questions related to China, and how these changes align.

Recently, countries including Korea and Japan have been strengthening their alliances with the United States and reinforcing solidarity among like-minded nations. Changes in the international and domestic political landscapes affect individuals, leading them to establish relationships, such as friend and foe, through the distinction between self and other. This, in turn, influences perceptions of other countries and their people, as well as perceptions of relationships with those countries.

Variables in international and domestic politics influence individual identity and perceptions of other countries and relationships. Clearly, the recent US-China conflict, the Russia-Ukraine war, and the Yoon Suk-yeol administration's policy towards Japan and the Kishida government's policy towards Korea are various variables affecting recent Korea-Japan relations (Son Yeol et al., 2023). The US-China confrontation and the narrative of a Chinese threat have served as a driving force for improving Korea-Japan relations (Son Yeol, 2022). This study seeks to ascertain how these changes in domestic and international circumstances influence public perceptions and manifest as such. The expression of individual perceptions of international relations is influenced not only by national identity but also by perceptions based on individual experiences. This affects the distinction between self and other, and worldviews and perceptions of neighboring countries are formed and expressed through the process of perceiving threats from other countries and confirming one's own identity.

Threat perception has long been analyzed as a crucial factor in understanding relationships between states and analyzing sources of conflict (Jervis 1976; Rouhana and Fiske 1995; Kemmelmeier and Winter 2000). Stephen M. Walt emphasized the significant role of threat perception, not just hard power, in the formation of alliances between states, and proposed the concept of 'Balance of Threat' (Walt 1895). Whether a state possessing nuclear weapons is perceived as a friend or foe can determine if it is perceived as a threat. This demonstrates that the identity of the relationship between a state and its counterpart is linked to threat perception.

This study examines the correlations between perceptions of neighboring countries and perceptions between Korea and Japan, under the premise that various changes in international and domestic circumstances are reflected in items related to favorability and threat perception among the Korean and Japanese publics. Focusing on survey items regarding perceptions of neighboring countries from the past decade's public opinion data, this study explains the recent changes in mutual perceptions between Korea and Japan.

II. Perceptions of Neighboring Countries by the Korean and Japanese Publics

1. Threat Perceptions of Neighboring Countries by the Korean and Japanese Publics

EAI has surveyed threat perceptions of neighboring countries among the Korean and Japanese publics. First, respondents were asked if they felt threatened by any country or region, and then, among those who answered yes, they were asked to identify the 'countries and regions perceived as military threats.' Examining the trend from 2014 to 2023, significant changes are observed around the pre- and post-COVID-19 periods. In Korea, threats from China, North Korea, and Japan have been perceived as high. In Japan, threats from China, North Korea, and Russia have been perceived as high.

Japan's threat perception of Russia increased from 30.7% in 2020 to 62.2% in 2021, nearly doubling. This indicates that concerns about Russia were already high even before the direct conflict between Russia and Ukraine. This stands in stark contrast to Korea, where interest and perception of Russia were very low.

Threat perceptions of China and North Korea are highest for both Korean and Japanese publics. As of 2023, North Korea (89.7%) and China (57.9%) were ranked highest for Korea, while North Korea (80%) and China (68%) were ranked highest for Japan. Notably, in Korea, the threat perception of Japan is 28.9%, ranking third highest. Conversely, in Japan, the perception of Korea as a threat is low. The fact that Korea perceives Japan as a threat in the context of Korea-Japan relations, while Japan does not, is significant. This is because threat perception shapes coping mechanisms towards the 'other' and constructs 'otherness,' implying that the influence of Korea and Japan on each other may differ in the process of forming self-identity.

Examining the trend of threat perception by year, North Korea and China are perceived as high threats by both Korea and Japan. Threat perception of Russia is particularly high in Japan, while threat perception of the United States is lowest for both Korea and Japan.

<Figure 1> Threat Perceptions of Neighboring Countries in Japan and Korea (2014-2023, %)

For a long time, North Korea, China, and Japan have been perceived as threats and have been 'othered' by Korea. North Korea has been the most significant threat. Between 2018-2019, the perceived threat from North Korea relatively decreased in Korea, reflecting the domestic political shift towards inter-Korean reconciliation. In 2023, the threat perception of North Korea reached its peak.

During the 2014-2015 period, Japan was perceived as a greater threat than China by Korea. Subsequently, China has been perceived as a greater threat than Japan, with a particularly sharp increase in threat perception towards China since 2021. Threat perception towards Japan was high in 2015 and also increased in 2020.

For a long time, North Korea, China, and Russia have been perceived as threats by Japan. The threat perception of Russia shows the largest difference compared to Korea. North Korea has consistently been perceived as the greatest threat. Notably, the threat perception of China significantly eased between 2017-2019, seemingly reflecting the favorable atmosphere for building new Sino-Japanese relations during the Xi Jinping and Abe administrations. Since 2020, threat perception of China has surged, and as of 2022, threat perceptions of North Korea and China have risen to nearly similar levels.

Japan's threat perception of Korea is low; during the 2017-2018 period, it was even lower than the threat perception of the United States. While the threat perception of Russia was considerably low in Korea, it increased in 2022 due to the Russia-Ukraine war.

According to the 2023 survey results, the threat posed by North Korea to the Korean public was recorded at 89.7%, the highest figure during the survey period. The threat posed by Russia also increased from 16.5% to 19.9%. In contrast, threat perceptions of China and Japan by Korea decreased compared to the previous year. North Korea, China, and Japan continue to be perceived as threats to Korea in that order, with Japan remaining a significant threat. Meanwhile, the threat perception of Russia is increasing.

Meanwhile, in Japan, threat perceptions of Russia and China slightly decreased in 2023, while threat perception of North Korea remained high at 80%. The countries perceived as threats to Japan are North Korea, China, and Russia in that order. Threat perception of Korea further decreased from 9.4% in 2022 to 5.8%.

<Figure 2> Threat Perceptions of Neighboring Countries in Korea and Japan (2022-2023)

An interesting point is the increasing threat perception of the United States in both Korea and Japan. In Korea, it increased by 88% from 3.3% in 2022 to 6.2%. In Japan, the threat perception of the United States increased by 46% from 7.4% to 10.8%. Although the figures themselves are low, the high rate of increase warrants attention for future trends. While more detailed research is needed to understand the reasons for the increasing threat perception of the United States, one factor to consider is the growing burden on its allies, Korea and Japan, amidst intensifying US-China competition. This will be examined in more detail in the following section on changes in perceptions of neighboring countries amidst US-China competition.

2. Changes in Perceptions of Neighboring Countries amidst US-China Competition in Korea and Japan

Examining the survey results from 2016 to 2020 on 'Countries or regions important for Korea's future,' we observe a high perception of the importance of the United States, accompanied by a sharp decline in responses concerning China.

<Figure 3> Countries/Regions Important to Korea (2016-2023)

In 2016, China (47.2%) was considered more important than the United States (40%). However, this figure subsequently decreased to the 30% range, while responses regarding the United States reached the 50% range. By 2023, the response indicating the importance of China plummeted to 9.5%, while the perception of the importance of the United States rose to 78.1%, demonstrating an unprecedented level of US-centricity. The perception of Japan's importance remained low at 2-3%, but after hitting a low of 1.3% in 2019, it surged to 4.4% in 2020 and has since maintained around 3.1% as of 2023.

Meanwhile, in Japan, the response indicating a sense of closeness towards the United States decreased from 56.2% in 2022 to 28.9% in 2023. The response indicating no sense of closeness towards either the US or China increased from 13.4% to 18.3%, and the 'don't know' responses also increased. This highlights the difference in perceptions of the United States between Korea and Japan.

<Figure 4> Comparison of Friendliness towards the US and China

<Figure 5> Perception of Friendly Countries towards the Respective Country

This trend is also evident in surveys on perceptions of countries with significant relationships with one's own country. In Korea, the importance of the United States increased from 74.9% to 78.1%. However, in Japan, the perception of the United States' importance decreased from 62.2% to 53.5%. Instead, it is noteworthy that the perception of the importance of ASEAN and India is increasing. The perception of China's importance has decreased in both Korea and Japan, while the mutual importance between Korea and Japan has increased from 2022 to 2023.

III. Comparison of Korea-China Relations and Korea-Japan Relations

1. Korea: Reversal of Favorable Perceptions from Korea-China to Korea-Japan

In the East Asia Institute survey data from 2013, ten years ago, there was an item comparing the importance and favorability towards Japan and China. When asked which country, between Japan and China, was more likely to become an ally of Korea, 72.8% of Korean respondents indicated China, while 25.2% indicated Japan, suggesting a more favorable perception towards China.

<Figure 6> Which Country is More Likely to Become an Ally of Korea: Japan or China (2013, Korea)

The response 'China's rise is an opportunity rather than a threat to Korea' was 52.6%, higher than the opposing response of 47.3%. While perceptions of China were more positive ten years ago compared to Japan, the perception of China began to turn very negative starting in 2021. Throughout the first half of the survey period, favorability towards China remained considerably high.

When asked which country, between Japan and China, was more important for Korea's future, the response that relations with both countries were most important was high from the 2013 survey to the 2020 survey. However, among responses selecting only one country, Korea-China relations were overwhelmingly favored over Korea-Japan relations. As of 2020, 47.3% responded 'both,' 38% responded 'Korea-China relations,' 9% responded 'neither,' and 5.7% responded 'Korea-Japan relations.' In 2022, the response 'Korea-Japan relations are important' surged to 13.6%, while the response 'Korea-China relations are important' plummeted to 23.7%.

<Figure 7> Korea: Comparison of the Importance of Korea-Japan Relations and Korea-China Relations

<Figure 8> Korea: Comparison of Friendliness towards Japan and China

Furthermore, regarding the question of which country, Japan or China, respondents felt more friendly towards, the response indicating friendliness towards China was higher until 2020. As of 2020, 14.2% felt friendly towards Japan, 24.4% towards China, 6.3% towards both, and 34.6% towards neither. However, in the 2022 and 2023 surveys, a reversal in favorability perceptions between Japan and China occurred. The response indicating friendliness towards Japan surpassed that towards China. It is also important to note that the response indicating no friendliness towards either Japan or China reached over 40%, a higher level than ever before.

How can the response of 'not feeling favorable towards either' be interpreted? This question was not conducted in the 2021 survey. To examine the trend, the 2021 survey on impressions of China showed that 'unfavorable impression' (73.8%) was overwhelmingly higher than 'favorable impression' (10.7%). Regarding the reasons for the unfavorable impression of China, 'due to China's coercive behavior' (65.2%) and 'does not respect Korea' (43.8%) were highly cited (based on multiple responses for 1st and 2nd choices). Bilateral relations are reciprocal, and the opinion that China does not respect Korea warrants attention.

2. Japan: Recovering to Pre-10-Year Favorable Perception Levels?

In Japan, when asked which country, Korea or China, is more important for the future, the response that both are important is consistently the highest. However, the response that China-Japan relations are more important than Korea-Japan relations has been consistently higher throughout the survey period. This is similar to Korea, where Korea-China relations are perceived as more important than Korea-Japan relations. However, while the importance of Japan has recently surged in Korea, the importance of Korea-Japan relations in Japan was higher prior to 2015 and has not yet recovered to those pre-2015 levels. Nevertheless, as the perception of importance has been somewhat increasing since 2019, it is necessary to observe whether it will reach the pre-2015 level or higher.

<Figure 9> Japan: Comparison of the Importance of Korea-Japan Relations and China-Japan Relations

<Figure 10> Japan: Comparison of Friendliness towards Japan and China

In Japan, the response indicating friendliness towards Korea was highest at 45.5% ten years ago in 2013. After decreasing to 37.2% in 2014 and 23% in 2015, it has not recovered to the 2013 level of friendliness. However, friendliness towards Korea has been increasing since 2020, recovering to 35.8% in 2023, similar to the 2015 level. Amidst the trend of increasing favorability, it remains to be seen whether it can rise to or exceed the level of 2013. In the 2020 survey, when Korea-Japan relations were not friendly, the response indicating friendliness towards Korea was at its lowest point at 20.3%, and the response indicating no friendliness towards either China or Korea was the highest at 41.7%.

While China-Japan relations have always been perceived as more important than Korea-Japan relations in Japan, favorability towards Korea-Japan relations has consistently been higher than towards China-Japan relations. By comparing with China, we can see that while perceptions of both China and Japan have changed more significantly in Korea, perceptions of China have remained relatively unchanged in Japan, with significant changes observed in perceptions of Korea.

IV. Changes in Perceptions of Each Other Between Korea and Japan

Looking at the impressions of each other between the Korean and Japanese publics over the past decade, while unfavorable impressions generally outweigh favorable ones in both countries, favorability has gradually increased since the nadir in 2020. In Japan, favorable impressions were 37.4% and unfavorable impressions were 32.8% in 2023, with favorability surpassing unfavorability.

<Figure 11> Impressions of the Respective Country (2013-2023)

<Figure 12> Importance of Korea-Japan Relations (2013-2023)

Regarding the perception of the importance of Korea-Japan relations, the proportion of Koreans who consider Japan important is high, while the proportion of Japanese who consider Korea important is lower compared to Korea's perception of Japan's importance. However, it is noteworthy that in 2022, contrary to the previous downward trend, the importance of Korea increased by approximately 21% from 46.6% to 56.5%. The fact that the importance of the respective country increased in both Korea and Japan in 2022 indicates a change in Korea-Japan relations in the post-COVID-19 era. In 2023, the perception of Japan's importance to Korea further increased to 61.8%.

What, then, are the factors driving these changes? The 2023 results show an increase in responses indicating that Korea and Japan share common security interests as 'allies' of the United States and that they need each other as part of a 'containment of China' strategy. Responses suggesting that Korea-Japan cooperation could become a new axis amidst conflicts between major powers also emerged. This indicates that perceptions of the roles and interests of Korea and Japan are becoming prominent, based on the international context of US-China competition and perceptions of neighboring countries.

<Figure 13> Reasons for the Importance of Korea-Japan Relations

Comparing the survey results from 2021 and 2023 on whether Korea and Japan consider the other country a 'friendly nation,' responses indicating a newly recognized friendly nation in Korea surged by 16.9%, while responses indicating it is not a friendly nation decreased by 17.2 percentage points. In Japan as well, responses indicating a friendly perception increased to 30.9% (A+B), confirming a positive trend in perceptions of each other as friendly nations in both countries.

<Figure 14> Perception of Friendly Countries towards the Respective Country

Furthermore, in the international community, the perception that Korea and Japan should strengthen ties with China as US 'allies' (Korea 22.6%, Japan 20.7%) is high. Responses indicating that they should actively cooperate on global challenges as 'partners' (Korea 26.4%, Japan 19.7%) and that they should establish relations as friendly nations (Korea 16.4%, Japan 19.7%) confirm a positive trend in bilateral relations. The perception of the relationship as 'rivals' was 6.9% in Korea and 1.4% in Japan.

<Figure 15> Partners, Friendly Nations, Rivals

<Figure 16> Are Korea and Japan Becoming Equal Partners?

These various regulations of relations between South Korea and Japan can be seen as stemming from changes in the power and status of the two countries. Regarding the question of whether South Korea and Japan are becoming equal in status, which was presented in the 2021 and 2022 surveys, a high level of recognition was observed in South Korea, with respondents indicating that they are already equal or moving in that direction. In particular, in 2022, the opinion that they are already in an equal relationship increased by 4.1 percentage points compared to the previous year. In Japan, the response 'I don't know' was high at 43.6%, indicating a significant difference in perception compared to South Korea. The discrepancy in perceptions of relative power between the two countries is becoming pronounced, and continued tracking is needed to observe future changes in responses.

V. Conclusion

This study tracked changes in mutual perceptions between South Korea and Japan, focusing on perceptions of neighboring countries within EAI's mutual perception surveys conducted over the past decade. Amidst intensifying US-China competition and changes in the international landscape due to factors such as the COVID-19 pandemic and the Russia-Ukraine war, perceptions between South Korea and Japan are being understood within a global context. In particular, the necessity of cooperation between South Korea and Japan, and their positions within their relationships with China and the United States, are being highlighted, leading to increased favorability towards each other. The relationship between South Korea and Japan is being perceived in an international context, and it is important to note that changes in their bilateral relations are occurring based on the perception of South Korea's and Japan's positions and roles within the international community.

Above all, a common self-perception as allies of the United States and the recognition of the need for South Korea-Japan cooperation to counter the common threats of China and North Korea are prominently emerging. As shared values of liberal democracy are pursued mutually, perceptions change according to the shift in South Korea's status, and perceptions of threat from China and North Korea are shared, the importance of each other country is also changing.

As indicated by the survey title 'Mutual Perceptions of South Korean and Japanese Citizens,' it is also noteworthy that within the actual survey, how one country treats the other influences perceptions of that country. This is particularly evident in the perception of China, where 'respect' for the other country is a crucial factor in relationship perception. It is necessary to conduct comparative reviews and track perceptions of China's changing status by South Korea and Japan, South Korea's changing status by Japan and China, and Japan's changing status by China and South Korea.

Tracking the trends over the past decade reveals distinct changes in the perceptions of citizens of South Korea and Japan towards neighboring countries and each other. In the early stages of the survey in 2013, China was perceived as more important and intimate than Japan in South Korea; however, from around 2021, a reversal occurred, with Japan becoming more intimate than China. In Japan, while perceptions of China have not changed significantly, perceptions of South Korea have shown a marked change. Nevertheless, the favorability towards South Korea, which was very high at the start of the survey in 2013, has not yet been reached. It remains to be seen whether recent favorability towards South Korea will rise again to exceed the 2013 levels.

We hope that EAI's mutual perception surveys of South Korean and Japanese citizens will continue to be conducted regularly and consistently, thereby further enhancing the value of the annual data, and that research and analysis utilizing this data will become more active. As the influence and importance of perceptions of neighboring countries are increasing, we anticipate that by conducting comparative reviews with annual data on China-Japan relations and the United States from Genron NPO, Japan's partner in joint public opinion surveys with EAI, it will be possible to conduct more three-dimensional and in-depth comparative analyses not only of South Korea and Japan but also of perceptions within China-Japan, East Asia. ■

References

East Asia Institute (EAI). 2013-2023. "Mutual Perception Survey of South Korean and Japanese Citizens." East Asia Institute.

Son, Yeol. 2022. "Will Public Opinion Urging Improvement in South Korea-Japan Relations Lead to Policy?" EAI Issue Brief.

____, Kim, Yang-gyu, and Park, Han-soo. 2023. "The Distance of South Korean and Japanese Citizens' Desire for Improved Relations: Analysis of the 2023 Mutual Perception Survey Results." EAI Issue Brief.

Jervis, Robert. 1976. Perception and Misperception in International Politics. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Kemmelmeier, M., & Winter, D. G. 2000. "Putting threat into perspective: Experimental studies on perceptual distortion in international conflict." Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 26, 7.

Rouhana, N. N., & Fiske, S. T. 1995. "Perception of power, threat, and conflict intensity in asymmetric intergroup conflict: Arab and Jewish citizens of Israel." Journal of Conflict Resolution, 39, 1

Rousseau, David L and Rocio Garcia-Retamero. 2007. "Identity, Power, and Threat Perception: A Cross-National Experimental Study." The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 51, 5.

Walt, Stephen. 1985. "Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power." International Security 9, 4: 3-43.

■ Oh, Seunghee is a research professor at the Institute for Japanese Studies, Seoul National University.

■ Responsible and Edited by: Oh, Joonchul_EAI Research Assistant

    Inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 205) | jcoh@eai.or.kr