[ADRN Working Paper] Horizontal Accountability and Democratic Resilience: The Case of South Korea in Comparative Perspective

1. Introduction

This study describes de jure horizontal accountability mechanisms and examines the de facto horizontal accountability performance of South Korea for the last two decades since 2000, putting the country in the comparative context of the third-wave democratizers.

It shows that South Korea optimally designed its inter-branch checks-and-balances mechanisms on parchment by setting legislative and judicial constraints on the executive in an unbiased manner. It also reveals the perilous discrepancies between de jure horizontal accountability mechanisms and de facto horizontal accountability performance by detecting earlier deterioration of and later reversal of inter-branch accountability outcomes in the country. Finally, it confirms that the oscillation of horizontal accountability between corrosion and restoration correlates with the fluctuation of democracy between erosion and resilience in South Korea.

In the next section, this study introduces a variety of empirical indicators to measure executive, legislative, and judicial powers in order to describe South Korea’s de jure horizontal accountability mechanisms and compare them with other third-wave democratizers. The penultimate section utilizes several empirical measures to estimate South Korea’s de facto horizontal accountability performance and the impact on the quality of democracy. In conclusion, it summarizes the main findings and suggests research agendas for the subsequent study.

2. De jure Horizontal Accountability: South Korea in Comparative Context

In this section, I introduce empirical indicators for the de jure horizontal accountability mechanisms of South Korea. As a template to evaluate the parchment configuration of horizontal accountability mechanisms, I use the following data sources to measure the strength of the constitutional inter-branch checks and balances provisions. For executive power or constitutional endowments of executive actions, I employ the ‘executive power index’ from Constitute, which ranges from 0 to 1 and captures the presence or absence of seven significant aspects of executive lawmaking: (1) the power to initiate legislation; (2) the power to issue decrees; (3) the power to initiate constitutional amendments; (4) the power to declare states of emergency; (5) veto power; (6) the power to challenge the constitutionality of legislation; and (7) the power to dissolve the legislature. The index score is the mean of the seven binary elements, with higher numbers indicating more executive power and lower numbers indicating less executive power (Elkins, Ginsburg, and Melton, 2023).

South Korea’s executive power index score is 0.43, which reflects its constitutional provisions of (1) the power to initiate legislation,[1] (2) the power to issue decrees,[2] (3) the power to initiate constitutional amendments,[3] (4) the power to declare a state of emergency[4] and (5) veto power,[5] but no constitutional provisions of (6) the power to challenge the constitutionality of legislation and (7) the power to dissolve the legislature.

For legislative power or constitutional endowments of legislative constraints on executive actions, I employ the ‘legislative power index’ from the Handbook of National Legislature, which ranges from 0 to 1 and captures the presence or absence of thirty-two important aspects of legislative constraints on the executive actions. The index score is simply the mean of the following thirty-two binary elements, with higher numbers indicating more legislative power and lower numbers indicating less legislative power (Fish and Kroenig, 2009):

(a) the legislature’s influence over the executive, which includes (1) whether the legislature alone, without the involvement of any other agencies, can impeach the president or replace the prime minister; (2) whether ministers may serve simultaneously as members of the legislature; (3) whether the legislature has powers of summons over executive branch officials and hearings with executive branch officials testifying before the legislature or its committees are regularly held; (4) whether the legislature can conduct independent investigation of the chief executive and the agencies of the executive; (5) whether the legislature has effective powers of oversight over the agencies of coercion; (6) whether the legislature appoints the prime minister; (7) whether the legislature’s approval is required to confirm the appointment of ministers or the legislature itself appoints ministers; (8) whether the country lacks a presidency entirely or there is a presidency, but the president is elected by the legislature; (9) whether the legislature can vote no confidence in the government;

(b) the legislature’s institutional autonomy, which includes (10) whether the legislature is immune from dissolution by the executive; (11) whether any executive initiative on legislation requires ratification or approval by the legislature before it takes effect; (12) whether laws passed by the legislature are veto-proof or essentially veto-proof; (13) whether the legislature’s laws are supreme and not subject to judicial review; (14) whether the legislature has the right to initiate bills in all policy jurisdictions; (15) whether the expenditure of funds appropriated by the legislature is mandatory; (16) whether the legislature controls the resources that finance its internal operation and provide for the perquisites of its members; (17) whether members of the legislature are immune from arrest and/or criminal prosecution; and (18) whether all members of the legislature are elected;

(c) the legislature’s specified powers, which include (19) whether the legislature alone, without the involvement of any other agencies, can change the Constitution; (20) whether the legislature’s approval is necessary for the declaration of war; (21) whether the legislature’s approval is necessary to ratify treaties with foreign countries; (22) whether the legislature has the power to grant amnesty; (23) whether the legislature has the power of pardon; (24) whether the legislature reviews and has the right to reject appointments to the judiciary or the legislature itself appoints members of the judiciary; (25) whether the chairman of the central bank is appointed by the legislature; (26) whether the legislature has a substantial voice in the operation of the state-owned media;

(d) the legislature’s institutional capacity, which includes (27) whether the legislature is regularly in session; (28) whether each legislator has a personal secretary; (29) whether each legislator has at least one non-secretarial staff member with policy expertise; (30) whether legislators are eligible for re-election without any restriction; (31) whether a seat in the legislature is an attractive enough position that legislators are generally interested in and seek re-election; and (32) whether the re-election of an incumbent legislator is common enough that at any given time the legislature contains a significant number of highly experienced members.

South Korea’s legislative power index score is 0.59, which reflects its constitutional provisions for:

(a) the legislature’s influence over the executive about (2) whether ministers may serve simultaneously as members of the legislature,[6] (3) whether the legislature has powers of summons over executive branch officials and hearings with executive branch officials testifying before the legislature or its committees are regularly held,[7] (4) whether the legislature can conduct an independent investigation of the chief executive and the agencies of the executive,[8] and (5) whether the legislature has effective powers of oversight over the agencies of coercion;

(b) the legislature’s institutional autonomy about (10) whether the legislature is immune from dissolution by the executive, (11) whether any executive initiative on legislation requires ratification or approval by the legislature before it takes effect,[9] (14) whether the legislature has the right to initiate bills in all policy jurisdictions, (15) whether the expenditure of funds appropriated by the legislature is mandatory, (16) whether the legislature controls the resources that finance its internal operation and provide for the perquisites of its members, and (18) whether all members of the legislature are elected;[10]

(c) the legislature’s specified powers about (20) whether the legislature’s approval is necessary for the declaration of war,[11] (21) whether the legislature’s approval is necessary to ratify treaties with foreign countries,[12] 以及 (24) 立法机构是否审查并有权否决对司法机构的任命，或立法机构本身是否任命司法机构成员；[13]

(d) 立法机构的制度能力，关于 (27) 立法机构是否定期开会，[14] (28) 每位议员是否拥有一名私人秘书，(29) 每位议员是否至少拥有一名具有政策专业知识的非秘书工作人员，(30) 议员是否可以不受任何限制地竞选连任；(31) 立法机构的席位是否足够有吸引力，以至于议员们普遍有兴趣并寻求连任；以及 (32) 现任议员的连任是否足够普遍，以至于在任何给定时间，立法机构都拥有一批经验丰富的成员。

关于司法权或对行政行为的宪法性制约，我采用了“司法权指数”，该指数来自“Constitute”，其范围从 0 到 1，捕捉了对行政行为的十二项重要司法制约因素的存在或缺失。该指数得分是这十二个二元要素的简单平均值，得分越高表示司法权越大，得分越低表示司法权越小（Elkins, Ginsburg, and Melton, 2023）：

(a) 司法独立性，包括 (1) 宪法是否包含关于司法独立的明确声明；(2) 宪法是否规定法官享有终身任职；(3) 最高法院的任命是否涉及司法委员会或两个（或更多）行为体；(4) 罢免是否被禁止或受限，以至于需要立法机构的多数票提案，或者只有公众或司法委员会可以提出罢免，并且需要另一个政治行为体批准此类提案；(5) 罢免是否仅限于犯罪和其他不当行为、叛国或违反宪法的问题；以及 (6) 司法薪资是否免受削减。

(b) 司法能力，包括 (7) 宪法是否规定了司法审查；(8) 法院是否有权监督选举；(9) 任何法院是否有权宣布政党违宪；(10) 法官是否在罢免行政长官方面发挥作用，例如在弹劾中；(11) 任何法院是否有能力审查紧急状态的宣布；以及 (12) 任何法院是否有权审查条约。

韩国的司法权指数得分为 0.58，这反映了其宪法规定了：

(a) 司法独立性，包括 (1) 宪法是否包含关于司法独立的明确声明，[15] (3) 最高法院的任命是否涉及司法委员会或两个（或更多）行为体，[16] (5) 罢免是否仅限于犯罪和其他不当行为、叛国或违反宪法的问题，以及 (6) 司法薪资是否免受削减。[17]

(b) 司法能力，包括 (7) 宪法是否规定了司法审查，[18] (9) 任何法院是否有权宣布政党违宪，[19] (10) 法官是否在罢免行政长官方面发挥作用；[20]但没有关于 (8) 法院是否有权监督选举、(11) 任何法院是否有能力审查紧急状态的宣布，以及 (12) 任何法院是否有权审查条约的宪法规定。

为了将韩国的行政、立法和司法权力指数得分置于比较背景下，我构建了一个由十八个第三波民主化国家组成的样本，这些国家包括 (1) 东亚和东南亚：印度尼西亚（1999年）、蒙古（1991年）、菲律宾（1988年）、韩国（1988年）、台湾（1996年）和泰国（1998年）；(2) 中欧和东欧：保加利亚（1991年）、捷克共和国（1990年）、匈牙利（1990年）、波兰（1990年）、罗马尼亚（1991年）和斯洛伐克共和国（1994年）；以及 (3) 中南美洲：阿根廷（1984年）、巴西（1987年）、智利（1990年）、哥伦比亚（1991年）、墨西哥（1996年）和秘鲁（1981年）。[21]

图 1 展示了一个散点图，其中横轴显示这十八个第三波民主化国家的行政权力指数得分，纵轴显示这十八个第三波民主化国家的立法权力指数得分。每条虚线表示每个权力指数得分的平均值。在右上角，即“帝国总统”与“顽固的议会”相遇的地方，是蒙古、保加利亚、波兰、匈牙利和罗马尼亚。台湾、阿根廷和墨西哥位于左下角，即“非主导性行政”与“屈从的立法机构”相遇的地方。智利采用了结合了“帝国总统”和“屈从的立法机构”的宪法设计，而捷克共和国则采用了结合了“非主导性行政”和“顽固的议会”的宪法设计。关于“法律上的问责制，韩国在十八个第三波民主化国家中似乎拥有最可行的行政-立法分支间制衡机制之一。

图 1。18个第三波民主化国家的行政和立法权力指数得分

资料来源：Elkins, Ginsburg, and Melton 2023; Fish and Kroenig 2009

图 2 展示了一个散点图，其中横轴代表这十八个第三波民主化国家的行政权力指数得分，纵轴表示这十八个第三波民主化国家的司法权力指数得分。每条虚线表示每个权力指数得分的平均值。保加利亚位于右上角，即“帝国总统”与“顽固的法院”相遇的地方。印度尼西亚和墨西哥位于左下角，即“非主导性行政”与“屈从的法庭”相遇的地方。罗马尼亚、匈牙利和泰国采用了结合了“帝国总统”和“屈从的法庭”的宪法设计，而台湾则采用了结合了“非主导性行政”和“顽固的法院”的宪法设计。关于“法律上的问责制，韩国在十八个第三波民主化国家中似乎拥有最可行的行政-司法分支间制衡机制之一。

图 2。18个第三波民主化国家的行政和司法权力指数得分

资料来源：Elkins, Ginsburg, and Melton 2023

3. 事实上的横向问责制：韩国的比较背景

在本节中，我将展示韩国“事实上的”横向问责制表现及其对民主质量影响的实证指标。作为评估横向问责制机制的实际结果和民主质量的模板，我使用以下数据来源进行测量。对于“事实上的”横向问责制表现，我采用了民主种类（V-Dem）的“横向问责制指数”，其范围从 0 到 1，通过汇总以下指标来衡量“横向政府问责制”理想的实现程度：(1) V-Dem 司法制约行政指数；(2) V-Dem 立法制约行政指数；以及 (3) V-Dem 其他国家机构（审计长、总检察长或监察员）制约行政指数。得分越高表示“事实上的”横向问责制越多，得分越低表示“事实上的”横向问责制越少（Luhrmann, Marquardt, and Mechkova 2020）。

关于民主质量，我采用了 V-Dem 的“自由民主指数”，其范围从 0 到 1，衡量“自由民主”理想的实现程度。得分越高表示民主质量越高，得分越低表示民主质量越低（Coppedge et al., 2020）。

为方便展示，我计算了自 2000 年以来每五年期间十八个第三波民主化国家每个指数得分的平均值。韩国的横向问责制指数得分如下：(1) 2000-2004年：0.925；(2) 2005-2009年：0.902；(3) 2010-2014年：0.865；以及 (4) 2015-2019年：0.933。韩国的自由民主指数得分如下：(1) 2000-2004年：0.772；(2) 2005-2009年：0.738；(3) 2010-2014年：0.649；以及 (4) 2015-2019年：0.722。

图 3。18个第三波民主化国家 2000-2004 年与 2005-2009 年的横向问责制指数得分

资料来源：V-Dem（https://www.v-dem.net/data/)

图3展示了一张散点图，其中横轴表示18个第三波民主化国家的横向问责指数得分2000-2004年均值，纵轴表示这18个第三波民主化国家横向问责指数得分2005-2009年均值。如果一个国家位于45度线的左侧，则其“事实上的”横向问责有所改善。如果一个国家位于45度线的右侧，则其“事实上的”横向问责有所恶化。智利、秘鲁和罗马尼亚属于前者，而韩国、台湾、阿根廷和泰国则属于后者。就“事实上的”问责而言，韩国似乎是这18个第三波民主化国家在此期间横向问责小幅恶化的案例之一。de facto横向问责有所改善。如果一个国家位于45度线的右侧，则其“事实上的”横向问责有所恶化。智利、秘鲁和罗马尼亚属于前者，而韩国、台湾、阿根廷和泰国则属于后者。就“事实上的”问责而言，韩国似乎是这18个第三波民主化国家在此期间横向问责小幅恶化的案例之一。de facto横向问责有所恶化。智利、秘鲁和罗马尼亚属于前者，而韩国、台湾、阿根廷和泰国则属于后者。就“事实上的”问责而言，韩国似乎是这18个第三波民主化国家在此期间横向问责小幅恶化的案例之一。de facto问责而言，韩国似乎是这18个第三波民主化国家在此期间横向问责小幅恶化的案例之一。

图4。18个第三波民主化国家的自由民主指数得分，2000-2004年与2005-2009年

来源： V-Dem (https://www.v-dem.net/data/)

注：哥伦比亚、墨西哥、菲律宾、罗马尼亚和泰国因得分较低而被排除。

图4展示了一张散点图，其中横轴表示18个第三波民主化国家自由民主指数得分2000-2004年均值，纵轴表示这18个第三波民主化国家自由民主指数得分2005-2009年均值。如果一个国家位于45度线的左侧，则其民主质量有所改善。如果一个国家位于45度线的右侧，则其民主质量有所恶化。在横向问责表现较好的国家中，智利和秘鲁的民主质量有所改善。在横向问责表现较差的国家中，韩国和阿根廷的民主质量有所恶化。就民主而言，韩国似乎是这18个第三波民主化国家在此期间由横向问责引发的民主倒退案例之一（Sato et al. 2022）。

图5。18个第三波民主化国家的横向问责指数得分，2005-2009年与2010-2014年

来源： V-Dem (https://www.v-dem.net/data/)

图5展示了一张散点图，其中横轴表示18个第三波民主化国家横向问责指数得分2005-2009年均值，纵轴表示这18个第三波民主化国家横向问责指数得分2010-2014年均值。如果一个国家位于45度线的左侧，则其“事实上的”横向问责有所改善。如果一个国家位于45度线的右侧，则其“事实上的”横向问责有所恶化。巴西、罗马尼亚和泰国属于前者，而韩国、台湾、阿根廷、匈牙利和墨西哥则属于后者。就“事实上的”问责而言，韩国似乎是这18个第三波民主化国家在此期间持续横向问责恶化的案例之一。de facto横向问责有所改善。如果一个国家位于45度线的右侧，则其“事实上的”横向问责有所恶化。巴西、罗马尼亚和泰国属于前者，而韩国、台湾、阿根廷、匈牙利和墨西哥则属于后者。就“事实上的”问责而言，韩国似乎是这18个第三波民主化国家在此期间持续横向问责恶化的案例之一。de facto横向问责有所恶化。巴西、罗马尼亚和泰国属于前者，而韩国、台湾、阿根廷、匈牙利和墨西哥则属于后者。就“事实上的”问责而言，韩国似乎是这18个第三波民主化国家在此期间持续横向问责恶化的案例之一。de facto问责而言，韩国似乎是这18个第三波民主化国家在此期间持续横向问责恶化的案例之一。

图6。18个第三波民主化国家的自由民主指数得分，2005-2009年与2010-2014年

来源： V-Dem (https://www.v-dem.net/data/)

注：哥伦比亚、墨西哥、菲律宾、罗马尼亚和泰国因得分较低而被排除。

图6展示了一张散点图，其中横轴表示18个第三波民主化国家自由民主指数得分2005-2009年均值，纵轴表示这18个第三波民主化国家自由民主指数得分2010-2014年均值。如果一个国家位于45度线的左侧，则其民主质量有所改善。如果一个国家位于45度线的右侧，则其民主质量有所恶化。在横向问责表现较差的国家中，韩国、捷克共和国、匈牙利、阿根廷和保加利亚的民主质量有所恶化。就民主而言，韩国似乎是这18个第三波民主化国家在此期间由横向问责加速的民主倒退案例之一（Shin 2021）。

图7。18个第三波民主化国家的横向问责指数得分，2010-2014年与2015-2019年

来源： V-Dem (https://www.v-dem.net/data/)

图7展示了一张散点图，其中横轴表示18个第三波民主化国家横向问责指数得分2010-2014年均值，纵轴表示这18个第三波民主化国家横向问责指数得分2015-2019年均值。如果一个国家位于45度线的左侧，则其“事实上的”横向问责有所改善。如果一个国家位于45度线的右侧，则其“事实上的”横向问责有所恶化。韩国、秘鲁和阿根廷属于前者，而波兰、巴西、印度尼西亚、匈牙利和菲律宾则属于后者。就“事实上的”问责而言，韩国似乎是这18个第三波民主化国家在此期间横向问责侵蚀逆转的案例之一。de facto横向问责有所改善。如果一个国家位于45度线的右侧，则其“事实上的”横向问责有所恶化。韩国、秘鲁和阿根廷属于前者，而波兰、巴西、印度尼西亚、匈牙利和菲律宾则属于后者。就“事实上的”问责而言，韩国似乎是这18个第三波民主化国家在此期间横向问责侵蚀逆转的案例之一。de facto横向问责有所恶化。韩国、秘鲁和阿根廷属于前者，而波兰、巴西、印度尼西亚、匈牙利和菲律宾则属于后者。就“事实上的”问责而言，韩国似乎是这18个第三波民主化国家在此期间横向问责侵蚀逆转的案例之一。de facto问责而言，韩国似乎是这18个第三波民主化国家在此期间横向问责侵蚀逆转的案例之一。

图8。18个第三波民主化国家的自由民主指数得分，2010-2014年与2015-2019年

来源： V-Dem (https://www.v-dem.net/data/)

注：墨西哥、菲律宾和泰国因得分较低而被排除。

图8展示了一张散点图，其中横轴表示18个第三波民主化国家自由民主指数得分2010-2014年均值，纵轴表示这18个第三波民主化国家自由民主指数得分2015-2019年均值。位于45度线左侧的国家表明民主质量有所改善，而位于45度线右侧的国家表明民主质量有所恶化。在横向问责表现较好的国家中，韩国的民主质量有所改善。在横向问责表现较差的国家中，波兰和巴西的民主质量有所下降。就整体民主而言，韩国似乎是这18个第三波民主化国家在此期间由横向问责恢复引发的民主韧性案例之一（Laebens and Luhrmann 2021）。

4. 结论

本研究表明，可行的“}]}ordinance法定的 形式上的纵向问责机制根植于韩国的宪法设计之中，其中跨部门的制衡条款在行政、立法和司法部门之间分配了相对平等的权力。从纸面上看，韩国的政体似乎摆脱了帝国总统与顽固议会相遇的制度陷阱，后者危及纵向问责和民主。

关于“事实上的”纵向问责，其表现似乎辜负了韩国“法定的”纵向问责机制的制度最优性。鉴于韩国“事实上的”问责表现曾在恶化和恢复之间摇摆，该国的民主质量也随之波动。形式上的问责与“法定的”问责和“事实上的”问责之间存在显著差距，以及“事实上的”问责表现与民主质量的相关性，需要进一步研究为何正式的问责机制与实际的问责结果之间存在差距，以及这种差距如何影响韩国的民主。■

参考文献

Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Adam Glynn, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Daniel Pemstein, Brigitte Seim, Svend-Erik Skaaning, and Jan Teorell. 2020. Varieties of Democracy: Measuring Two Centuries of Political Change. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Elkins, Zachary, Tom Ginsburg, James Melton. 2023. “Constitute: The World’s Constitutions to Read, Search, and Compare.” https://www.constituteproject.org/content/indices_data?lang=en

Fish, M. Steven and Matthew Kroenig. 2009. The Handbook of National Legislature: A Global Survey. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Laebens, Melis G. and Anna Luhrmann. 2021. “What Halts Democratic Erosion? The Changing Role of Accountability.” Democratization 28, 5: 908-928.

Luhrmann, Anna, Kyle L. Marquardt, and Valeriya Mechkova. 2020. “Constraining Governments: New Indices of Vertical, Horizontal, and Diagonal Accountability.” American Political Science Review 114, 3: 811-820.

Sato, Yuko, Martin Lundstedt, Kelly Morrison, Vanessa A. Boese, Staffan I. Lindberg. 2022. “Institutional Order in Episodes of Autocratization.” V-Dem Working Paper.

Shin, Doh Chull. 2021. “Democratic Deconsolidation in East Asia: Exploring Systеm Realignments in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan.” Democratization 28, 1: 142-160.

[1] Article 52: Bills may be introduced by members of the National Assembly or by the Executive.

[2] Article 75: The President may issue presidential decrees concerning matters delegated to him by law with the scope specifically defined and also matters necessary to enforce laws.

[3] Article 128: A proposal to amend the Constitution shall be introduced either by a majority of the total members of the National Assembly or by the President.

[4] Article 76: (1) In time of internal turmoil, external menace, natural calamity or a grave financial or economic crisis, the President may take in respect to them the minimum necessary financial and economic actions or issue orders having the effect of law, only when it is required to take urgent measures for the maintenance of national security or public peace and order, and there is no time to await the convocation of the National Assembly; (2) In case of major hostilities affecting national security, the President may issue orders having the effect of law, only when it is required to preserve the integrity of the nation, and it is impossible to convene the National Assembly.

[5] Article 53: (1) Each bill passed by the National Assembly shall be sent to the Executive, and the President shall promulgate it within fifteen days; (2) In case of objection to the bill, the President may, within the period referred to in Paragraph (1), return it to the National Assembly with written explanation of his objection, and request it be reconsidered. The President may do the same during adjournment of the National Assembly.

[6] Article 43: Members of the National Assembly shall not concurrently hold any other office prescribed by law; National Assembly Act Article 29: (1) No National Assembly member shall concurrently hold office, except the office of Prime Minister or a member of the State Council.

[7] Article 62: (2) When requested by the National Assembly or its committees, the Prime Minister, members of the State Council or government delegates shall attend any meeting of the National Assembly and answer questions.

[8] Article 61: (1) The National Assembly may inspect affairs of state or investigate specific matters of state affairs, and may demand the production of documents directly related thereto, the appearance of a witness in person and the furnishing of testimony or statements of opinion.

[9] Article 76: (3) In case actions are taken or orders are issued under Paragraphs (1) and (2), the President shall promptly notify the National Assembly and obtain its approval.

[10] Article 41: (1) The National Assembly shall be composed of members elected by universal, equal, direct and secret ballot by the citizens.

[11] Article 60: (2) The National Assembly shall also have the right to consent to the declaration of war, the dispatch of armed forces to foreign states, or the stationing of alien forces in the territory of the Republic of Korea.

[12] Article 60: (1) The National Assembly shall have the right to consent to the conclusion and ratification of treaties pertaining to mutual assistance or mutual security; treaties concerning important international organizations; treaties of friendship, trade and navigation; treaties pertaining to any restriction in sovereignty; peace treaties; treaties which will burden the State or people with an important financial obligation; or treaties related to legislative matters.

[13] Article 104: (1) The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall be appointed by the President with the consent of the National Assembly; (2) The Supreme Court Justices shall be appointed by the President on the recommendation of the Chief Justice and with the consent of the National Assembly.

[14]第47条：（1）国会常会每年依法律规定召开一次，国会临时会应总统或全体议员四分之一以上之要求而召开。

[15]第103条：法官依其良心，依据宪法及法律独立审判。

[16]第104条：（1）大法院院长由总统经国会同意任命之；（2）大法院判事由总统依大法院院长之推荐，经国会同意任命之。

[17]第106条：（1）除弹劾或判处有期徒刑以上之刑外，非经国会同意，不得剥夺法官之公职，亦不得停止其职务、减俸或施加不利处分。

[18]第111条：（1）宪法法院就下列事项进行审判：1. 依法院之请求，审判法律是否合宪。

[19]第111条：（1）宪法法院就下列事项进行审判：3. 政党之解散。

[20]第111条：（1）宪法法院就下列事项进行审判：2. 弹劾。

[21]括号内注明该国根据民主转型项目“民主的种类”（https://v-dem.net/data/）从封闭或选举性专制向选举性或自由民主转型的时间。在每个地区，选取了1990年人口最多的六个第三波民主化国家。

■ 金正汉是朝鲜大学政治学副教授兼教务长。现任延世大学国际学研究生院和国际学院客座教授、亚洲民主网络区域协调员、《Asian Perspective》和《Tamkang Journal of International Affairs》编委会委员、《Seoul Shinmun》专栏作家、大韩民国国防情报局政策咨询委员会委员。他本科毕业于韩国大学政治学专业，并在耶鲁大学获得政治学博士学位。

■ 负责人及编辑：朴汉秀_EAI研究员

联系方式：02-2277-1683 (分机号 204) hspark@eai.or.kr