[EAI Working Paper] Korean Media Identity

Editor's Note

The East Asia Institute (EAI) has conducted four surveys on "Korean Identity" over the past 15 years (2005-2020). As the third report in the third working paper series of the 2020 survey results, "The Life Worlds of Koreans: Associations, Multiculturalism, Work-Life Balance, and Communication," we have published the working paper "Korean Media Identity" authored by Professor Han Kyu-sup of Seoul National University and Roh Sun-hye, a master's student in the Department of Media and Information, Seoul National University. Both the United States and Korean society are experiencing political polarization, and as this trend of political polarization spills over into various aspects of life, a phenomenon of social identification is becoming evident. In this context, media trust is also becoming polarized, entering a phase of social identification. Unconditional support is given to media outlets based on identity and partisan logic rather than facts or editorial stance. This phenomenon is further exacerbated in the current media environment, characterized by the advent of the era of individual media, compared to the era dominated by established media where gatekeeping was somewhat possible. This survey conducted a trust assessment of a total of 34 media outlets, including broadcast, newspapers, and YouTube channels, by comparing trends between those who trust specific media and average supporters of progressive and conservative parties. The survey results showed that only nine media outlets remained relatively neutral between progressive and conservative parties, indicating that evaluations of most media are vastly different, and that polarization regarding media outlets is more severe than political polarization. Furthermore, attention was drawn to the fact that among the 34 media outlets, YouTube channels were present at both extremes, reflecting the tendency of these platforms to appeal strongly to voters at both ends of the political spectrum due to their inherent characteristics. Notably, 12 out of 15 YouTube channels were positioned further to the right than the average conservative party supporter, suggesting that YouTube is perceived as an alternative medium among voters with strong conservative leanings.

※ The following is the introduction to this working paper. Please refer to the attached file above for the full text.

I. Introduction

Since democratization in 1987, public evaluation of our media has paradoxically declined to one of the lowest levels globally. According to the Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism at Oxford University's 2020 survey of 40 major countries worldwide, South Korea has consistently ranked lowest for five consecutive years since 2016. Despite over 30 years having passed since achieving democratization, public trust in the media is not significantly higher than before democratization. A 2016 survey by Kantar Public indicated that public evaluation of the media was lower than that of large corporations like Samsung, meaning the public trusts large corporations, which are supposed to be monitored by the media, more than the media itself. This is a paradoxical situation for the Korean media, where freedom of the press has been achieved, but public trust in the media has not improved compared to the pre-democratization era. The reality that a majority of the public distrusts the media, despite the guarantee of press freedom after democratization, can be described as a 'paradox' of the Korean media.

How can this paradox be explained? The most significant reason is political polarization. It can be interpreted that due to political polarization, the evaluation of media outlets varies by their orientation, resulting in the absence of a media outlet trusted by the majority of the public.

In the United States, there is an academic debate regarding the extent of polarization among the general public. There is little disagreement that polarization among political elites has intensified. Researchers such as McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal (2006) have shown through analyses of congressional voting records that the gap between the Democratic and Republican parties has continuously widened. However, there is debate about the extent to which the general public is polarized. For instance, scholars like Morris Fiorina (1999) argue that political polarization is not severe, citing the increasing proportion of voters who identify as "moderate." They contend that the general public appears polarized only because the polarization of political elites presents voters with highly polarized choices. In other words, the polarization of political elites fosters the polarization of the general public. Conversely, scholars such as Abramowitz et al. (2008) argue that the polarization of the general public is severe, pointing to the widening gap in stances between party supporters on social values and certain key policy issues compared to the past. Thus, depending on the focus of analysis, the results vary, and there is a lack of consensus in academia regarding the degree of public polarization.

These debates are now converging on the conclusion that political polarization has become a matter of 'social identity.' Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes (2012) found weak evidence for a widening gap in policy preferences between Democratic and Republican supporters, but significant deterioration in 'affect' towards the opposing party compared to the past, as measured by thermometer scales. This indicates that political polarization has evolved into a form of social identity, transforming conflicts from differences in policy positions to conflicts based on 'identity.' For example, research by Iyengar, Konitzer, and Tedin (2017) shows that among couples marrying annually in the U.S., approximately 54% supported the same party in 1973, not significantly deviating from a 50% probability. However, by 2010, this proportion had risen to about 74%. This suggests that political polarization has extended into the realm of daily life. Furthermore, animosity towards supporters of the opposing party has been found to be significantly higher than animosity towards other racial groups (Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes 2012). This demonstrates that political polarization has become so entrenched as an in-group versus out-group conflict, based on identity, that reaching rational consensus has become nearly impossible.

It can be inferred that emotional polarization in Korean politics is similarly severe, if not more so, than in the United States. For instance, a 2016 survey conducted by Maeil Business Newspaper found that less than 15% of Korean voters, both conservative and progressive, reported being married to a spouse with different political leanings. This clearly indicates that political polarization in Korea has also transferred into daily life and social identification. The pervasive logic of partisan alignment in all social discussions further demonstrates that political polarization among Korean voters has progressed to the level of social identity.

■ Author: Han Kyu-sup_ Professor, Department of Media and Information, Seoul National University. He holds a Ph.D. in Communication from Stanford University and has served as Associate Dean of the Humanities and Social Sciences Division at the Seoul National University Big Data Research Institute, Vice President for Cooperation at Seoul National University, and Professor at the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA). His main research area is political communication. Recent publications include "Economic and Cultural Drivers of Support for Immigrants" (2019), "Korean Political Trends as Seen Through Big Data" (2016, co-authored), and "The Influence of “Social Viewing” on Televised Debate Viewers’ Political Judgment."

■ Author: Roh Sun-hye_ Master's student, Department of Media and Information, Seoul National University

■ Editor: Juwon Seo, EAI Research Fellow

Inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 206) jwseo@eai.or.kr

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