[EAI Working Paper] South Koreans' Ideological Identity and Attitudes Toward Democracy

Editor's Note

The East Asia Institute (EAI) has conducted the <Korean Identity> survey four times over the past 15 years (2005-2020). This working paper by Professor Kang Woo-chang of Korea University is the second report in the second working paper series, “The Political World of Koreans: Political Polarization, Democracy, and Government,” based on the 2020 survey results. The author states that South Koreans' satisfaction with democracy has significantly improved since the mid-2000s. This survey indicates that Koreans not only recognize democracy as the only game in town that defines political competition but also show support for the way democracy actually functions and its outcomes. Notably, even supporters of conservative parties who lost in the 21st general election and respondents with conservative inclinations evaluated the outcomes of democracy highly. This is a positive finding compared to previous studies showing that voters supporting losing parties tend to have lower satisfaction. However, it is important to consider that this survey was conducted at a time when high approval ratings for the president and government were maintained, based on successful responses to COVID-19. If negative evaluations of the current government's performance increase, there is a possibility that negative evaluations of the current democracy could spread, particularly among those with conservative ideological identities. Furthermore, it is noteworthy that respondents who feel that inter-party conflict in Korea is severe show low support for democracy as a principle. Given that the ideological polarization between progressives and conservatives, which has recently intensified, could weaken fundamental support for democracy among the general public, efforts to resolve this issue are necessary.

※ The following is the introduction to this working paper. Please refer to the attached file above for the full text.

I. Introduction

Citizens' attitudes toward democracy significantly influence its effective functioning and stable maintenance (Almond and Verba 1963; Inglehart 1988). Democracy refers to a system where sovereign power resides with the people, who exercise that power directly or indirectly to govern for the people. Therefore, if citizens' voluntary participation is limited, or if the people's will is not reflected in policy decisions, it signifies that democracy is not functioning properly at a normative level. Furthermore, if citizens do not place trust in and support the way democracy operates, democracy cannot endure as a stable regime in a practical sense. If the democratic system is not recognized as the rule of the game that defines political competition, no ruling power, regardless of which party wins elections, can gain legitimacy. Thus, public support and consent for democracy are often considered essential conditions for democratic consolidation (Dalton 1999; Diamond 1999; Linz and Stepan 1996; Shin and Shyu 1997). In new democracies where democratic norms and values have not yet taken root and resistance to democratic change persists, citizens' evaluations of democracy carry even greater significance. This is because public support for democracy not only checks and defends against challenges from anti-democratic groups but also enables the qualitative deepening of democracy (Rose et al. 1998).

In this context, a series of studies have been conducted on citizens' attitudes toward democracy, particularly on democratic support. According to these studies, citizens' support for democracy is a multi-dimensional concept that cannot be reduced to a single dimension, and it is multi-directional in that the attitudes constituting each dimension may not be closely related (Hong Jae-woo 2006). For example, Easton (1965; 1975) distinguished between specific support and diffuse support for democracy. Specific support refers to attitudes toward a particular government, policy, leader, or the government, its leaders, and specific policies pursued by the government in power at a given time. Diffuse support, on the other hand, refers to attitudes toward the institutions and fundamental principles that constitute democracy. Compared to specific support, diffuse support is more enduring and takes longer to form or weaken, as it is not significantly affected by the performance of a particular regime. Therefore, citizens' specific and diffuse support for democracy may not be correlated. Indeed, recent empirical studies on democratic attitudes show that diffuse support is high while specific support is low in most democracies (Fuchs et al. 1995; Klingemann 1999).

This is no exception in Korea. Existing studies on South Koreans' attitudes toward democracy show that while Koreans recognize democracy as the only game in town, they are not very satisfied with the actual functioning of politics under democracy or the performance of individual regimes (Cho Young-ho et al. 2013; Park 2011). Citizens' dissatisfaction and distrust regarding the specific functioning of democracy can, in the short term, hinder voter political participation and, ultimately, weaken the foundation of democratic politics. In this regard, previous studies have focused on understanding the reasons for the difference between Koreans' diffuse and specific support for democracy. Scholars who emphasize the cultural underpinnings of democratic institutions, in particular, argue that while Koreans' strong desire for democracy drove rapid democratic transition, dissatisfaction with democracy has increased due to insufficiently developed democratic norms and lingering authoritarian legacies compared to the ideal, thus delaying democratic consolidation (Park and Shin 2006; Rose and Shin 2001). Similarly, studies focusing on the conflict between participatory civic culture and representative institutions (Cho Young-ho and Kim Yong-cheol 2017) and the conflict between consensus-oriented culture and majoritarian institutions (Kang Shin-gu 2019) also argue that the mismatch between political institutions and political culture creates the gap between specific and diffuse support for democracy.

These studies generally analyze the period up to the early 2000s after democratization or analyze public opinion at specific points in time. In this context, this chapter aims to analyze South Koreans' attitudes toward democracy since 2000, based on the results of the 'Korean Identity' survey conducted four times in 2005, 2010, 2015, and 2020.

■ Author: Kang Woo-chang_ Professor, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Korea University. He received his Ph.D. in Political Science from New York University and served as a postdoctoral researcher at the East Asian Studies Program at Yale University. His main research areas include comparative politics, elections, and political behavior. His recent publications include "Envy and Pride: How Economic Inequality Deepens Happiness Inequality in South Korea" (2020, co-authored), "The Liberals Should Pray for Rain: Weather, Opportunity Costs of Voting and Electoral Outcomes in South Korea" (2019), and "The Corruption Scandal and Voter Realignments in the 19th Presidential Election in South Korea" (2019, co-authored).

■ Contact and Editing: Seo Ju-won, EAI Research Fellow

Inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 206) jwseo@eai.or.kr

[EAI Working Papers] are scholarly reports that identify and in-depth analyze the core issues of major domestic and international affairs. Please cite the source when quoting. EAI is an independent research institution independent of any partisan interests. The claims and opinions expressed in reports, journals, and books published by EAI are not affiliated with EAI and solely represent the views of the individual author.