[EAI Working Paper] The 21st General Election from the Perspective of the Ruling and Opposition Party Judgment Theory and the Dilemma of Conservative Innovation

Editor's Note

A working paper analyzing the deepening conservative rift after the 21st general election and the challenges facing conservatism has been published. In this paper, the author conducts an in-depth analysis of why the 'regime judgment theory' advocated by the conservative party throughout the general election failed to resonate with voters and why the opposition party judgment theory was activated. The author focuses on identifying the dilemma that made it difficult to restore the alienated conservative base that emerged in the 2016 general election and the candlelight/impeachment phase, rather than the apparent reasons for the opposition party's defeat, represented by the COVID-19 pandemic and the nomination conflict. The author argues that for conservatism to regain its former competitiveness, it must first escape the dichotomous approach of 'regime judgment theory' and restore the trust of alienated conservatives through self-reflection and innovation.

※ The following is an excerpt from the working paper. For the full text, please refer to the attached file below.

I. The 21st General Election Ended in a Landslide Victory for the Ruling Party

The results of the 21st general election once again proved that the 'regime judgment theory' paradigm, which has been treated as a golden rule in political circles, is in fact an illusion with no realistic basis. In past general elections, the opposition party has advocated for 'balancing' to check the ruling party's unilateralism or has put forward a 'regime judgment theory' to punish the government's wrongdoings. In contrast, the ruling party's campaign has primarily focused on promoting stability for the government's stable governance in the latter half of its term or on regional development to counter the ignition of the regime judgment theory... The 21st general election was also held in a two-party structure between the ruling party advocating for national stability and the main opposition party advocating for regime judgment. ... The result was that the public largely chose national stability over the regime judgment theory expected by the opposition party, leading to the judgment and defeat of the main opposition party.

II. Why Did the Regime Judgment Theory Not Ignite?

1. 'Election During Term = Midterm Evaluation = Regime Judgment Theory' A Schematic Illusion

Until the campaign line was modified two to three days before the election with a plea strategy to 'prevent the ruling party from achieving a constitutional majority,' the main opposition party and some media outlets blindly believed in the 'midterm evaluation = regime judgment theory' paradigm. There was even a tendency to understand this as an unthinking phenomenon that operated like an ironclad rule. However, looking at the general election results since 2000, the midterm evaluation = regime judgment theory paradigm is the result of an illusion with no historical basis... Election cases show that the regime judgment theory paradigm is a more suitable explanatory model for local elections than general elections... The belief in political circles and the media that the regime judgment theory operates in general elections during the middle of a term can be seen as a result of the accumulated memory of regime judgment in local elections acting as confirmation bias, leading to a false stereotype.

2. The Structure of the 21st General Election: From Simultaneous Judgment of Both Parties ⇒ Sharp Increase in Opposition Party Judgment Theory, Struggle for Third Parties

It is noteworthy that the 'opposition party judgment theory' was overwhelmingly dominant in the 21st general election... While it is paradoxical for the ruling party in power to advocate for the opposition party judgment theory as a campaign strategy, voters can judge whether to support or reject the opposition party, separate from the issue of judging or supporting the regime. Although this cannot be understood within the existing dichotomous analytical framework that equates 'support for regime judgment' with 'support for the opposition party,' a significant portion of Korean voters already make independent judgments about the ruling and opposition parties. While the simultaneous judgment theory, which argued for judging both the ruling and opposition parties, created a surge for the third party in the 20th general election, this general election resulted in a landslide victory for the ruling party due to the dominance of a one-sided opposition party judgment theory, prioritizing the judgment of the opposition party over the judgment of the regime.

3. Key Reason for the Activation of the Opposition Party Judgment Theory: Failure to Restore Swing Conservatives

In fact, the maintenance of a ruling party-dominant electoral structure and the activation of the opposition party judgment theory can be seen as a result of the Future United Party's own making. The failure of the regime judgment theory to ignite, as the Future United Party had hoped, was due to the disadvantage in party support rates, which indicates the basic distribution of power in electoral competition. The conservative party's disadvantage stems from the division of the so-called 'concrete conservative base,' which used to fluctuate between 35-40%, into 'consistent conservatives (CC)' who remained supporters of conservative parties like the Liberty Korea Party or the Bareun Party after the candlelight protests, and 'swing conservatives (SC)' who alienated themselves. Although conservative party support rates, which remained in the low 10% range during the impeachment, have partially recovered to the low 20% range under the Moon Jae-in administration, it is clear that the conservative party has not fully restored its past concrete conservative base.

III. Tasks and Dilemmas for Conservative Party Restoration

In this general election, the Future United Party likely harbored hopes of rallying swing conservatives and even moderates if the regime judgment theory had taken hold. However, it was reconfirmed that a 'complete' reunion of conservatives is difficult solely through groundless faith in shy conservatives and a blind regime judgment theory without self-innovation. So, what are the tasks that the Future United Party must address for conservative restoration? First, it must start by clearly defining its position on impeachment, moving away from a clear-cut stance based on security ideology. Second, a clear relationship with the 'Taegukgi' (ultranationalist) rallies needs to be established. Third, to regain the dignity of an alternative force, it must shed the image of 'obstructionism,' 'ideological excess,' and 'abusive language politics.' Ultimately, the starting point should be to accurately identify the factors that caused the alienation of conservative voters and provide them with a reason to return through efforts at transformation.

IV. Conclusion: The Conservative Party at a Crossroads and its Choice

The aspects identified as reasons for the Future United Party's defeat in this general election—① an image as a party that opposes for the sake of opposition, ② prioritizing integration over self-innovation, and ③ a series of harsh verbal attacks—show a high degree of synchronicity with the image of the now-victorious ruling party during its period of consecutive defeats in general elections. The current ruling power also once blamed the 'uneven playing field' and focused solely on 'anti-Saenuri alliances/integration,' failing to build an image as a trustworthy alternative party. Consequently, in 2012, although over 60-70% of voters agreed with the MB regime judgment theory, they failed to achieve a change in government. Although this is now dismissed as a dark chapter in the ruling party's history, it happened less than 10 years ago. What will the conservative party look like when it faces the presidential election in two years? Conversely, the current conservative party has experience in restoring conservatism by reforming the party and reuniting its scattered supporters during the 2004 impeachment backlash. The choice will likely depend on whether they follow the path of reviving their crisis-resolution model demonstrated in 2004, or repeat the precedent of their opposition party days when they became accustomed to being a 'losing opposition party.' ■

■ Author: Jeong Han-wool_ Senior Researcher at the Public Opinion Analysis Center, Korea Research. He holds a Ph.D. in Political Science and International Relations from Korea University. He has served as Deputy Director of the EAI Public Opinion Analysis Center, Deputy Director of the Center for Diplomacy and Security, and Secretary-General. His main research areas include elections and generational politics, national identity and security perceptions, and CSR research. His major works include "20s Men," "Korean Policy Preferences on Universal Basic Income," "Koreans' 'New Security' Perceptions: Changes and Continuities," and "An Empirical Study on the 'Gapjil' Culture in Korean Society."

■ Editor: Yoon Jun-il, EAI Research Fellow

Inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 203) I junilyoon@eai.or.kr

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Attachment: [EAI Working Paper] The 21st General Election from the Perspective of the Ruling and Opposition Party Judgment Theory and the Dilemma of Conservative Innovation.pdf