US-China Nuclear Military Strategy Competition

Abstract

The hard power competition between the United States and China is difficult to discuss without considering nuclear weapons and nuclear strategy. This paper examines the nuclear weapon systems and capabilities of the United States and China within the framework of the traditional nuclear triad—consisting of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and strategic bombers—and discusses the implications of the nuclear strategy and capability gap or disparity between the US and China in the East Asian region. To date, there have been few signs or incentives indicating that China is entering into a full-scale nuclear arms race with the United States, as the former Soviet Union did. China appears to be maintaining a defensive nuclear strategy based on the principles of no first use and minimum deterrence. However, if the security dilemma escalates due to any cause in the future, leading to heightened conflict and distrust between the US and China, the possibility of China making intensive investments and efforts to enhance its nuclear capabilities cannot be ruled out. In this context, the North Korean nuclear issue, cross-strait relations, the paradoxical destabilizing effect of Missile Defense systems, and the deployment of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system in South Korea could all serve as factors testing the durability of the nuclear balance or nuclear peace that has persisted between the US and China in Northeast Asia.

Main Text

"Soon, China's defense budget is expected to reach half of the current US budget of $600 billion, and this gap will further narrow as the US defense budget decreases. Moreover, considering that US military power is global in scope while China's is still concentrated in Asia, centered on its mainland, the military balance in the Asia-Pacific region could be seen as already converging towards equilibrium. If so, what about the competition in the most critical area of strategic weapons amidst the growing US-China military competition? Examining the competition, particularly in the realm of strategic nuclear weapons, offers an important facet of the US-China military strategy competition."

"In quantitative terms, the reduction of US ground-based nuclear forces is proceeding in parallel with efforts to modernize its nuclear arsenal. The aim is to pursue a more stable nuclear balance and cost savings by possessing fewer nuclear weapons, while simultaneously enhancing their performance to supplement nuclear attack and deterrence capabilities."

"Since its first nuclear test in October 1964, China has adhered to a nuclear policy based on the concept of 'minimum deterrence.' Among nuclear-armed states, China was the first to adopt a 'no first use' (NFU) policy in 1964, declaring that its nuclear weapons would only be used in retaliation against a nuclear attack on China. This means China will not launch a preemptive nuclear strike against other nuclear states, nor will it use nuclear weapons or threaten their use against non-nuclear states or nuclear-weapon-free zones. This stance is analyzed as a significantly different approach compared to other nuclear powers. China holds a very limited view of the utility of nuclear weapons. Consequently, during the Cold War, while the US and the Soviet Union developed over 10,000 warheads each and engaged in a nuclear arms race, China has possessed fewer than 250 warheads to this day."

"China's nuclear weapons policy prioritizes the pursuit of a nuclear counter-attack capability that can survive an enemy's attack and inflict sufficient damage in return. This minimal approach to nuclear weapons is evident not only in the absolute number of weapons but also in the weapon systems. While the US and the Soviet Union engaged in a quantitative and qualitative nuclear competition across all domains of the 'nuclear triad'—capable of launching nuclear attacks from land, sea, and air during the Cold War—China's nuclear forces have primarily relied on a minimal number of ground-launched intercontinental ballistic missiles."

"Until recently, China has relied on ground-launched medium- and long-range nuclear missiles as its primary means of nuclear deterrence, adopting a 'one-pillar' system that depends solely on ground-based systems, unlike the US and Soviet nuclear triad. However, since the 2000s, China has made new efforts to develop submarine-launched ballistic missiles. The Chinese Navy currently boasts the largest fleet in Asia, comprising over 50 diesel-electric attack submarines, 5 nuclear-powered attack submarines, and 4 strategic nuclear submarines."

"However, it remains uncertain whether China's strategic submarine fleet will pose a substantial military threat. China has stated on multiple occasions that it will not utilize its nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines as a nuclear deterrence force, and the Chinese Navy lacks the experience in operational aspects such as personnel and command and control systems. In reality, even if China deploys nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines, there are few suitable locations for their deployment during a crisis."

"In the 21st century, US nuclear strategy prioritizes preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons to rogue states and the transfer of nuclear weapons and materials to terrorists (Arbatov 2010). In his 2009 'Prague Speech,' President Obama presented a vision of a world without nuclear weapons, urging the United States and the world to move towards the goal of eliminating nuclear weapons. Concurrently, the US Department of Defense has continued to strive for stable nuclear balance with Russia and China, while also focusing on providing nuclear umbrellas to allies and partners and strengthening deterrence capabilities against potential regional threats. However, in a reality where the possibility of large-scale nuclear war has diminished, efforts are being made to reduce over-reliance on nuclear weapons. Indeed, the United States has pursued nuclear disarmament continuously since the end of the Cold War, when the threat of full-scale nuclear war with the former Soviet Union disappeared."

"Nevertheless, the United States has stated that it will continue to pursue its proactive nuclear deterrence policy against potential nuclear rivals like Russia and China, and against states pursuing nuclear development or violating non-proliferation agreements, such as North Korea and Iran. During the Cold War, the US adopted a nuclear deterrence strategy based on preemptive nuclear strikes, including the use of nuclear weapons even without a nuclear attack from the adversary, to counter the formidable conventional forces of the Soviet Union in Europe."

"Meanwhile, while pursuing strategic stability through continuous nuclear reduction efforts, including the New START treaty with Russia, the US remains vigilant about Russia's continuous maintenance, improvement, and modernization of its nuclear forces as the most powerful nuclear state. The US has also announced new investments to bolster its aging nuclear capabilities. Notably, the US has recently mentioned China's rapidly modernizing military capabilities, expressing doubts about China's future strategic intentions, particularly regarding its quantitative and qualitative enhancements of nuclear forces. This is why maintaining strategic stability in nuclear weapons with China, alongside Russia, is presented as a future task for US nuclear policy."

"China's nuclear strategy is still summarized by the maintenance of minimum deterrence capabilities and the assurance of a second-strike capability, based on the principle of no first use that originated during the Cold War. Since developing nuclear weapons in 1964, China has adhered to the 'no first use' policy, meaning nuclear weapons will only be used in retaliation against an external nuclear attack. According to its 2015 Defense White Paper, China has maintained a defensive nuclear strategy based on the 'no first use' (NFU) line, pledging not to launch a first strike against any nuclear state."

"However, the US government and experts remain skeptical about the opacity of China's nuclear weapons capabilities and policy direction (doctrine). One fact is clear: China is increasingly making efforts towards the diversification and modernization of its nuclear weapons. In the 2015 Defense White Paper, which reaffirmed the no-first-use principle, China stated its commitment to optimizing its nuclear weapon systems to deter nuclear attacks or threats against China, improving early warning systems, and continuing to enhance nuclear capabilities in areas such as command and control, missile penetration, rapid response, survivability, and protection of nuclear assets."

"The quantitative gap in nuclear capabilities between the US and China widens further when comparing the qualitative aspects of their weapon systems. Firstly, China does not possess a nuclear triad compared to the US. This significantly reduces the survivability of its nuclear forces, which is crucial for second-strike capability. Specifically, the US operates a formidable strategic submarine fleet, ensuring sufficient second-strike capability even against a preemptive strike on its homeland, whereas China has, until recently, relied solely on a very small number of ground-launched missiles for its nuclear forces."

"If the nuclear strategy competition, where thousands of nuclear weapons aimed at each other in preparation for all-out nuclear war, was the core of the US-Soviet Cold War in the 20th century, then a new Cold War between the US and China in the 21st century does not yet exist, at least in the realm of nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, if the growing checks and tensions between the US and China continue, particularly in the Asia-Pacific region, the possibility of a full-fledged competition in nuclear weapon systems and strategies between the two cannot be ruled out. China does not assume the necessity or possibility of an all-out nuclear war with the US, but it harbors concerns that the overwhelming US nuclear military power could act as a significant deterrent to China's pursuit of military and security interests in the Asia-Pacific region. In the event of a Taiwan contingency or a situation in the South China Sea, the US might exert pressure with overwhelming nuclear threats to deter China's projection of conventional military power. Recent efforts to modernize and increase nuclear forces reflect these concerns of China."

"The reality that US missile defense, which pursues nuclear disarmament and a world without nuclear weapons, becomes a major factor in China's nuclear buildup exemplifies the paradoxical side effects of missile defense, as articulated by Waltz. If North Korea's nuclear development not only shatters peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula but also triggers a US-China nuclear competition, it would be a truly regrettable tragedy for both Koreas, the US and China, and all of East Asia."

Author

Professor at the Graduate School of International Studies, Seoul National University. He graduated from the Department of Diplomacy at Seoul National University and holds Master's and Ph.D. degrees from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University. His main research areas include military security, US foreign policy, and affairs in East Asia and the Korean Peninsula. His publications include "The North Korean Nuclear Issue and Peace Settlement on the Korean Peninsula" (2008, co-authored) and "Dilemma of South Korea’s Trust Diplomacy and Unification Policy" (2014, International Journal of Korea Unification Studies).