[NSP Report 71] Park Chung Hee Administration's Choices During the Détente Period

Associate Professor, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Seoul National University. He graduated from the Department of Diplomacy at Seoul National University and received a Master's degree in Political Science from the same university. He earned a Ph.D. in Political Science from Pennsylvania State University. He has served as a Senior Researcher at the Institute of International Affairs, College of Social Sciences, Seoul National University, and as an Assistant Professor and Associate Professor in the Department of International Relations at the University of Seoul. His main research areas include international organizations and Korean Peninsula and international politics. His major works include “The Choices of Small and Medium-Sized Countries in Coping with Security Threats” (2010), “Bargaining, Nuclear Proliferation, and Inter-state Dispute” (2009, co-authored), and “Senior Officials Speak on the Nuclear Crisis” (2009, edited).

I. Introduction

During the détente period of the 1970s, the domestic and foreign policies of the Park Chung Hee administration presented a stark contrast. Externally, the Park Chung Hee administration sought to foster a phase of appeasement in relations not only with North Korea but also with the communist bloc. The South Korean government attempted inter-Korean dialogue with unification in mind, moving away from endless competition between the South and the North. It did not prevent North Korea's accession to international organizations and even sought to improve relations with the communist bloc. Conversely, domestically, the South Korean government acted as if the nation's survival was at risk due to impending confrontation with North Korea. Examples include the Military Modernization Plan, the promotion of heavy and chemical industries to lay the economic foundation for self-reliant defense, and attempts to develop nuclear weapons. Furthermore, South Korean democracy entered a dark age with the declaration of the October Yushin, ostensibly to "actively develop inter-Korean dialogue and cope with the rapidly changing surrounding situation."

The debate on the reasons for South Korea's divergent domestic and international approaches during the détente period can be broadly categorized into three main arguments. First, according to traditional views and research based on declassified documents, the Park Chung Hee administration sought domestic integration and self-reliant defense to cope with security anxieties stemming from the withdrawal of U.S. troops and North Korean provocations (e.g., Kim, Hyung-a 2005; Ma, Sang-yoon 2003, pp. 176-184), and pursued inter-Korean dialogue and détente with surrounding countries to buy time for these efforts (e.g., Yoon, Hong-seok 2004, p. 78; JoongAng Ilbo Special Reporting Team 1998). Second, studies focusing on the prolonged rule of the Park Chung Hee administration interpret that the security anxieties during the détente period were exaggerated, and that the significantly expanded military establishment exploited these anxieties to seek long-term authoritarian rule (e.g., Kim, Jeong-ju 2008, pp. 483-48; Kim, Ji-hyung 2008, pp. 34-36; Lim, Hyuk-baek 2004, pp. 235-238; Hong, Seok-ryul 2010, pp. 305-311). Third, studies focusing on South Korea's internal social contradictions and economic growth trajectory view the Yushin regime as a mechanism for forced capital concentration and mobilization to foster heavy and chemical industries (e.g., Kang, Min 1983, pp. 353-360; Han, Sang-jin 1988).

This article examines the choices made by North and South Korea during the détente period, focusing on the state strategies of the ruling elites in the 1960s. The article is divided into three parts. First, it describes the phenomenon of discordant state strategies between North and South Korea after the Korean War. In the 1950s, the Syngman Rhee administration pursued military buildup under the guise of a non-existent "unification by advancing north" theory. In contrast, North Korea focused on post-war reconstruction under the banner of the "democratic base line." However, in the 1960s, the focus areas of North and South Korea were reversed. The Park Chung Hee administration, which came to power through a military coup, established "modernization of the fatherland" as its national goal and subsequently invested national resources in economic growth. Conversely, North Korea adopted the "Byungjin line" (parallel development of economy and defense) and began concentrating national resources on defense spending. As North and South Korea pursued discordant state strategies, they failed to find common ground for genuine reconciliation. Second, it examines the Park Chung Hee administration's perception of crisis during the détente period. Facing potential crises due to confrontation with North Korea, shortcomings in its domestic economic growth strategy, and domestic political vulnerabilities, the Park Chung Hee administration felt a severe sense of crisis with the impending withdrawal of U.S. forces. Third, it examines the Park Chung Hee administration's survival strategies during the détente period item by item. To cope with the risk of abandonment by the United States, the possibility of North Korean provocations, the stagnation of economic growth, and the backlash from domestic political forces, the Park Chung Hee administration implemented policies such as self-reliant defense, the promotion of heavy and chemical industries, and diplomatic offensives. Furthermore, it sought to buy time for the development of heavy and chemical industries while expecting that North Korea would not provoke during the ongoing dialogue (Park Chung Hee, January 14, 1975, National Archives of Korea; Ministry of Unification 1985; Ministry of Unification, 670). Finally, it reviews the crisis factors and coping mechanisms of the Park Chung Hee administration, the legacy of its response measures, and draws lessons for current political forces in South Korea.

II. Democratic Base vs. Unification by Advancing North

This section describes the discordant state strategies of North and South Korea in the early 1950s and 1960s. In the 1950s, North Korea, under the sponsorship of China and the Soviet Union, pursued a policy focused on post-war reconstruction, while South Korea adopted the "unification by advancing north" theory. During this period, North Korea felt confident in its control of the situation due to successful post-war reconstruction and South Korea's economic problems. South Korea, despite proclaiming "unification by advancing north," was at a disadvantage in managing the division.

(1) North Korea's Priority on Economy vs. South Korea's "Unification by Advancing North"

After the cessation of hostilities in the Korean War in July 1953, North and South Korea adopted divergent state strategies. North Korea proclaimed the 'Democratic Base Line' and concentrated on post-war reconstruction. At the plenary meeting of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea on November 3, 1954, Kim Il Sung concluded the following regarding unification (Ministry of Unification 1985a, p. 261):

For the unification of our fatherland, we must do well in two aspects. On one hand, we must consistently exert our party's influence on the South Korean people to incite them to rise up against the U.S. imperialists and the traitor Syngman Rhee. On the other hand, we must further strengthen the democratic base in the northern half into an impregnable fortress.

The Democratic Base Line focuses on North Korea's economic construction. Kim Il Sung developed the logic that if (1) the democratic base was economically strengthened to the extent of becoming a "paradise," then (2) South Korean residents would aspire to North Korea, increasing revolutionary momentum in the South, and (3) the material foundation of North Korea combined with the labor movement in the South would lead to unification (Kim Il Sung, August 25, 1957, cited in Ministry of Unification 1985a, p. 341). In other words, the construction of the democratic base was the most crucial task, serving as "the fundamental factor for all changes in the situation" on the Korean Peninsula (Kim Il Sung, September 20, 1957, cited in Ministry of Unification 1985a, p. 345). North Korea concentrated on economic construction under a three-stage logic leading from the construction of the democratic base to unification. From 1954 to 1956, North Korea successfully implemented the "Three-Year Plan for Post-War Reconstruction." During this period, North Korea achieved remarkable post-war recovery through economic aid of 1 billion rubles from the Soviet Union, food aid from China, and the mobilization of its own population. By 1955, it had recovered its pre-Korean War economic production capacity (Kang, In-deok 1974, Vol. 1, p. 468).

From 1957 to 1961, North Korea implemented the "Five-Year Plan for the Development of the People's Economy." Kim Il Sung defined the central task of the First Five-Year Plan as "laying the foundation for socialist industrialization and basically resolving the people's food, clothing, and shelter needs." In other words, he declared the intention to create a "self-sufficient country" by developing heavy industry for socialist economic development and light industry to supply consumer goods to the populace in a balanced manner (Kim Il Sung 1981a, pp. 106-107). North Korea's First Economic Plan was outwardly successful. The average annual growth rate in the industrial sector was 36.6%, and irrigation, electrification, and mechanization were implemented in the agricultural sector as well. It was even declared that the issues of food and clothing and shelter had been fundamentally resolved (Kim Il Sung 1981b, pp. 157-184)... (Continued)