Embedded Transformational Leadership: A Study of Yasuhiro Nakasone's Political Leadership

EAI Japan Panel Report No. 7

Author

Choi Hee-sik, Assistant Professor, School of International Studies, Kookmin University. He graduated from Seoul National University with a degree in Political Science and earned a Ph.D. in Political Science from Keio University in Japan. His recent publications include "The Normalization of Relations between Korea and Japan as History II: Post-Colonialism (co-authored)," "Revisiting Korea-Japan Relations during the Park Chung-hee Era (co-authored)," "A Study on the Formation Process of the Concept of Open Regionalism in Japan," "Problems and Solutions of the Bicameral System in the Stalemate of Japan's Divided Diet," "Japan's Post-War Asian Diplomacy Strategy: From an Internal to an External Approach," and "The Structure of Post-War Korea-Japan Relations and Korea-Japan Relations under the Democratic Party Government."

I. Introduction

The parliamentary cabinet system, which was expected to foster strong leadership through 'institutional effects' akin to the Westminster model in Britain, has exhibited the opposite phenomenon in Japan. This was due to the decentralization of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) caused by factional politics, the underdeveloped functions of the Prime Minister's Office, and the constraints on the Prime Minister's leadership imposed by bureaucratic politics, the influence of 'zoku giin' (policy-tribes lawmakers), and the LDP's preliminary review of legislation. While strong leadership was indeed exercised in politicized foreign policy issues such as the revision of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty under the Kishi cabinet, the return of Okinawa under the Sato cabinet, and the normalization of relations between Japan and China under the Tanaka cabinet, the general consensus is that the political leadership of Japanese prime ministers in the post-war era has been 'weak' (Ito Mitsutoshi 2007; Tatebayashi Masahiko 2007; Lee Won-deok 2007).

In contrast, Yasuhiro Nakasone was known for his strong leadership, earning him the moniker 'Presidential Prime Minister.' His cabinet brought about significant changes in both domestic politics and foreign policy, including the privatization of state-owned enterprises, the abolition of the 1% of GNP defense spending limit, and the exceptional application of the three principles on arms exports to the United States. This was the first time since the Yoshida cabinet that such sweeping changes were enacted. Given that there were no fundamental changes in the institutional factors that constrain a prime minister's leadership, how was Nakasone, who hailed from a minor faction, able to exert such strong leadership? This is the central question of this paper.

Previous research has emphasized three aspects. First, it highlights Nakasone's personal qualities, such as his skillful use of rhetoric in public performances and his exceptional political acumen developed through navigating factional politics as a member of a minor faction, as reasons for his strong leadership. Second, it points to his behavioral approach, including the utilization of factional politics through mechanisms like the deliberation council system (or advisory politics, brain politics), alliances with influential factions, and the co-optation of key party figures; the engagement of 'zoku giin'; and the construction of 'influence coalitions.' Third, it emphasizes the congruence between structural factors and his political ideology, suggesting that his neoliberal and neoconservative stances aligned with global trends and domestic reforms in fiscal and administrative policy, thereby enabling his strong leadership.

However, this paper proposes that his leadership was characterized by 'embedded transformational leadership,' which demonstrated a reformist drive to transform the existing system while simultaneously being embedded within it. This allowed him to avoid direct confrontation with the existing regime and, instead, leverage specific aspects of it to ensure policy implementation.

Political leadership is generally categorized as reform leadership or revolutionary leadership, depending on the political objectives. James MacGregor Burns classified the relationship between leaders and followers in political leadership into transactional leadership and transformational leadership. According to Burns, reform and revolutionary leadership fall under transformational leadership, as they aim to achieve political goals by unifying followers through the leader's charisma and intellectual stimulation (Burns 1979, 169-240). However, this paper focuses on analyzing the political goals and ideology rather than the leader-follower relationship. Therefore, transformational leadership is defined here as political leadership that seeks to achieve systemic transformation, encompassing both reform and revolutionary leadership.

Fundamentally, transformational leadership inherently seeks to reform the system itself, thus possessing a resonance that extends beyond the existing system. Consequently, it often leads to direct confrontation with the existing order and failure due to multifaceted opposition (Jang Dal-joong 2007). Nakasone's leadership, however, as will be discussed later, was deeply rooted in the very system he sought to transform, and possessed a strong tendency to sow seeds of change from within. A prime example is his affirmation of the values of 'international liberalism,' cultivated by the post-war system, even while he rejected the post-war system itself. His leadership, therefore, was transformational yet simultaneously embodied the flexibility to utilize the existing system.

This embedded transformational leadership differs from the 'restorationism' that Tetsuo Najita used to describe Japanese political leadership. Restorationism, often a reaction against 'bureaucratism,' is closer to an idealistic pursuit based on cultural idealism or nostalgia, aiming for radical transformation of the existing system (Najita T. 1992, 19-35). While Nakasone's political ideology did contain strong elements of idealism and nostalgia, such as a return to tradition, his leadership differed in that he did not radically reject and dismantle the existing system due to a dual assessment of it; instead, he sought to leverage its positive aspects.

Furthermore, embedded transformational leadership is distinct from 'realist idealism' or 'opportunism.' Realist idealism merely involves adjusting the priority and intensity of reforms to achieve idealistic policy objectives, inevitably facing challenges from both those who absolutize idealism and those who oppose it. Opportunism, characterized by a lack of a firm policy ideology, involves ambivalent responses to conflicting policies and thus lacks reformist potential. In contrast, embedded transformational leadership fully actualizes reformism through a systematic reform agenda while maintaining flexibility by being based on a dual assessment of the target of transformation, allowing it to encompass or mitigate challenges from both proponents and opponents of reform.

This paper argues that 'embedded transformational leadership' is a key characteristic of Nakasone's political leadership and that this attribute enabled strong policy execution. It does not deny that domestic and international structural and institutional factors in the 1980s were significant contributors to the strengthening of Nakasone's political leadership. Rather, this paper contends that even these structural factors could be transformed into a foundation for strong leadership due to 'embedded transformational leadership,' as leadership is what converts situational variables such as structure and institutions into resources of power (Samuels 2003, 6).

II. The Post-War System and Nakasone: Nakasone's Leadership from the Perspective of Political Ideology

Japan's 'post-war system' was built upon two pillars: the Peace Constitution and the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. The Peace Constitution, a product of the so-called 'Yalta System,' served as an institution guaranteeing the demilitarization and democratization policies of the initial occupation. In contrast, the 'asymmetrical' Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, predicated on the stationing of large numbers of U.S. forces in Japan involved in East Asian security and the U.S. administration of Okinawa, was a product of the 'Cold War system' and functioned as a mechanism ensuring Japan's role as a 'base country' in support of U.S. East Asian policy (Nam Ki-jung 2001; Pyle 2007, 372-381).

In this sense, the conservative-progressive confrontation structure, known as the '1955 System,' can be seen as having internalized the post-war system domestically within Japan (Dower 1993, 4-5). Indeed, the progressive forces grew within the context of the U.S. occupation's demilitarization and democratization policies, embodied by the Peace Constitution, and conversely, made the protection of this Peace Constitution their most important political objective. Conversely, the conservative forces succeeded in their resurgence under the 'reverse course,' represented by the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, and conversely made anti-communism or liberalism their core policy values. In this regard, the 1955 System served as the domestic political structure supporting the post-war system.

Concurrently, the 'Yoshida Doctrine,' a policy reflection of the post-war system, became established with key elements of security dependence on the United States, minimal armament, and economic growth. The Yoshida Doctrine had a strong aspect of being an 'unavoidable choice' aimed at securing political stability by absorbing the policy orientations of the progressive bloc within the conservative-progressive confrontation structure. In other words, the Yoshida Doctrine was a policy choice intended to reconcile the contradictions between the Peace Constitution and the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty (Soe Yosihide 2005, 32-35).

This post-war system became a target of attack for the right-wing forces within the LDP. To them, the post-war system represented imposed democracy and a loss of subjectivity. Consequently, their activities focused on constitutional revision and the amendment of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, directly aiming at the collapse of the post-war system. However, these efforts by the Hatoyama and Kishi groups encountered the solid wall of the post-war system, showing a tendency to converge towards the Yoshida Doctrine. This was because the two elements constituting the post-war system were so firmly internalized by the 1955 System that reforming them was nearly impossible (Iokibe Makoto 2010, 290-291).

Nakasone also sought to dismantle the post-war system by advocating for constitutional revision and self-reliant defense. However, Nakasone's political orientation, based on a dual assessment of the Peace Constitution and the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, allowed him to maintain significant flexibility.

In the 1940s and 1950s, Nakasone advocated for the complete negation of the Peace Constitution and the establishment of a sovereign constitution. However, by the 1960s, he clearly expressed high regard for the fundamental values of the Peace Constitution, such as pacifism and democracy, and committed to their inheritance. What he questioned was the loss of Japanese subjectivity due to the constitution being established under American 'coercion.' Simultaneously, he argued that the retention of military forces and the right to wage war, negated by the constitution, undermined Japan's subjectivity by making it dependent on the U.S. for security (He Lìqún 2005, 133-134). Therefore, when public opposition to constitutional revision was high, constitutional revision faded as a concrete policy objective, allowing him to emphasize the values of the Peace Constitution and appease the criticism from progressive forces. Conversely, when the atmosphere was deemed favorable, it served as a concrete policy objective.

Nakasone's advocacy for self-reliant defense in the 1950s and 1960s involved arguments for a significant reduction of U.S. forces in Japan and the establishment of an alliance comparable to the Anglo-American alliance, even suggesting the possibility of forming an independent power bloc. However, through his experience as Director-General of the Defense Agency in the 1970s, his stance shifted towards a Japan-U.S. security burden-sharing framework that presupposed the continued presence of U.S. forces in Japan (Nakajima Takuma 2002; Nakajima Takuma 2005). This was due to his dual assessment of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. He recognized the Japan-U.S. alliance as a 'value alliance' sharing fundamental values, which was crucial for Japan. However, he was concerned that Japan's autonomy would be undermined by complete dependence on the U.S. for its security. Therefore, his concept of self-reliant defense could function as an active Japan-U.S. cooperation line emphasizing Japan's role-sharing, and simultaneously, due to his nationalistic tendencies, it possessed a logical structure that could be transformed into a strategy of 'relative positioning of the Japan-U.S. alliance' or a strategy for Japan's 'independent power bloc formation'...(continued)