Post-LDP Politics: Koizumi's Leadership

EAI Japan Studies Panel Report No. 5

Author

Han Eui-seok, Professor (Contract) at the Department of Political Science and International Relations, Chung-Ang University. He graduated from the Department of Political Science and International Relations at Chung-Ang University and received master's degrees from the Graduate School of Chung-Ang University and the State University of New York at Albany. After serving as a visiting researcher at the University of Tokyo from July 2007 to July 2008, he obtained a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Southern California in 2010 with a dissertation on inter-regional disparities in Japan. His research papers include "The Emergence of Koizumi and Policy Changes in the LDP: Urban Voters and Electoral Politics" (Journal of the Korean Political Science Association, 2011).

I. Introduction

The traditional political methods and policies of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) underwent significant changes following Koizumi's ascent to power in 2001. Ahead of the LDP presidential election, Koizumi pledged to lead Japan's transformation and growth, which had been stagnating, through structural reforms and the eradication of the LDP's outdated political practices. During his premiership, he pursued neo-liberal policies such as fiscal investment and loan reform, the "three-party reform" (Sanmi-ittai reform), and postal privatization, which diverged from the LDP's traditional interest-brokering politics. In this process, Koizumi inevitably faced strong resistance from within the LDP, as well as from the bureaucracy and various interest groups. In particular, Koizumi's reform policies ran counter to the interests of the LDP's traditional support base, leading to backlash from within the party that threatened his own position as Prime Minister. Nevertheless, Koizumi was able to implement policies in his desired direction, backed by high public support, and the LDP achieved considerable success in the House of Representatives and House of Councillors elections during his tenure. Notably, despite internal conflicts within the LDP over postal privatization, the party secured 296 out of 480 seats in the September 2005 House of Representatives election, achieving a landslide victory against the Democratic Party, which won only 113 seats, showcasing his prowess as a political gambler. While it is true that some critics argue Koizumi's reform policies did not bring about fundamental change and remained superficial, it cannot be denied that public support for Koizumi and his reforms was the driving force that allowed the LDP, which had been in political crisis due to declining approval ratings in the late 1990s, to revive in the 2000s.

Since the collapse of the bubble economy in the early 1990s, there had been continuous attempts to revitalize the stagnant Japanese economy, but due to various political and economic reasons, past prime ministers continued with traditional LDP politics and policies without significant change. The LDP government's failure to properly initiate reforms was primarily due to the difficulty of implementing policies that conflicted with the interests of various factions or went against the intentions of "zoku giin" (policy-tribes lawmakers), given the characteristics of Japanese politics where it is difficult for the prime minister to wield strong leadership. In contrast, Koizumi achieved results such as the disposal of non-performing loans, reduction of public works projects, and postal privatization through a considerable level of policy transformation during his term, and the factional politics, a negative legacy of LDP politics, can be said to have been significantly weakened. If so, why were these changes possible under Prime Minister Koizumi? From an institutional perspective, it can be seen that Koizumi benefited from the electoral system reform to a single-member district system and the reform of government ministries that strengthened the prime minister's authority. However, considering that prime ministers after Koizumi have not exercised strong leadership or implemented distinct reformist policies, it is evident that attention must be paid to Koizumi's personal leadership, including his beliefs and political skills. This paper analyzes Koizumi's leadership by focusing on, first, his political experience and beliefs; second, his perception and utilization of political opportunity structures; and third, his resource mobilization strategies for achieving his goals.

Koizumi was able to become the LDP president and Prime Minister of Japan in 2001 by overcoming the unfavorable factional structure in the LDP presidential election. Furthermore, after becoming Prime Minister, he expanded the LDP's support base, which was in crisis due to declining approval ratings, by changing traditional LDP policies. This process had a high risk from an electoral engineering perspective, as it involved neo-liberal characteristics that could weaken the LDP's traditional support base. Nevertheless, Koizumi was able to maintain a strong support base among conservative LDP supporters through visits to Yasukuni Shrine and emphasis on the Japan-U.S. alliance. Despite resistance from various vested interests, including the bureaucracy and zoku giin, his fiscal soundness policies and privatization policies were pursued according to his beliefs by effectively utilizing strengthened prime ministerial authority and institutions like the Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy. He also actively sought public support for himself and his reform policies to compensate for his weak base within the party. Whenever power struggles and policy conflicts arose during his tenure, Koizumi was able to form a solid power base by framing the situation as a confrontation between himself as the leader of structural reform and traditional LDP politicians associated with anti-reform factional politics. While there may be room for criticism regarding whether Koizumi's reform policies achieved as much as he proclaimed, unlike previous prime ministers who were sluggish in resolving the political and economic problems Japan faced since the 1980s, Koizumi presented and embarked on the path of a new Japan through structural reform. Moreover, in the political crisis surrounding postal privatization, he demonstrated the will of a leader determined to implement his beliefs and policy preferences by adopting a risk-taking strategy.

II. The Crisis of the LDP and the Emergence of Koizumi

1. The Crisis of LDP Politics and the Presidential Election

Following the collapse of the bubble economy, the stagnant Japanese economy failed to improve despite several attempts at recovery, and the increase in the elderly population and expanding fiscal deficits further exacerbated the economic situation. Meanwhile, despite the electoral system reform in 1994, the LDP's pork-barrel politics and factionalism did not improve as much as the public expected, and excessive public works spending in rural areas, in particular, heightened dissatisfaction with LDP politics, especially among urban voters. Amidst this, structural reform emerged as a major agenda item in Japanese politics. The Hashimoto (Ryutaro Hashimoto) government, which took office in January 1996, showed a relatively reformist inclination but was not free from the LDP's traditional interest-brokering politics. As the economic slump continued, it adopted economic stimulus policies contrary to its initial plans, but these were also unsuccessful. The Obuchi (Keizo Obuchi) government, which followed, also adopted economic stimulus measures, leading to a sharp increase in government long-term debt while delaying the resolution of fundamental economic problems such as the disposal of non-performing loans. In this context, the LDP lost the House of Councillors election in 1998, and Prime Minister Hashimoto resigned taking responsibility. In the House of Representatives election in 2000, the LDP secured only 233 seats, effectively a defeat. This was, above all, a reflection of voters' dissatisfaction with the prolonged economic stagnation, the failure of economic policies, the LDP's factional politics and corruption, and its passive reform efforts. The defeat was particularly pronounced in urban electoral districts; in the 2000 House of Representatives election, the LDP won only 61 out of 145 electoral districts located in cities with populations of 300,000 or more (<Nihon Keizai Shimbun>, 2000/07/11). Urban voters were more critical of pork-barrel politics, such as inefficient public works spending (<Sankei Shimbun>, 2000/08/03). Prime Minister Mori (Yoshiro Mori), who succeeded Obuchi, repeatedly made gaffes and political blunders, leading to single-digit approval ratings in 2001 and forcing him to resign (Kabashima and Steel 2007a, 79). In this situation, the LDP held an election to select a new president.

In the 2001 LDP presidential election, despite internal conflicts, when the Hashimoto faction, the largest faction within the party, agreed on Hashimoto's candidacy, many observers expected him to win, given the traditional LDP presidential election process. Moreover, Koizumi, his rival, held policy orientations contrary to the LDP mainstream, such as neo-liberal reform policies and the theory of a small government, and as an outsider within the party who had never held major positions, he faced significant challenges in becoming party president based on traditional LDP presidential selection precedents. However, Koizumi strongly criticized the LDP's outdated political practices and began to gain popularity among the public by contrasting himself as a reformer with the vested interests of the LDP mainstream politicians, which enabled him to win the presidential election. The first factor that allowed Koizumi to win was the dissatisfaction of urban voters. For decades, the LDP had built its support base centered on rural areas, and its path to power was based on securing votes through various interest groups (e.g., agricultural cooperatives, specific post offices, construction industry associations, etc.) linked to pork-barrel politics. However, unlike the mainstream LDP politicians who adhered to an electoral strategy of solidifying traditional support bases, Koizumi believed that the LDP's political survival depended on securing the support of unaffiliated voters in urban areas (Park Cheol-hee 2011, 330). Koizumi gradually gained popularity by emphasizing a departure from traditional LDP political methods and structural reform. In this process, the media played a crucial role in Koizumi's victory in the 2001 LDP presidential election. Koizumi was a politician adept at utilizing the media (Kabashima and Steel 2007a, 80), and the media also responded favorably to Koizumi's election. By highlighting Hashimoto as a factional leader and a behind-the-scenes manipulator, the media portrayed Hashimoto, who had shown some reformist tendencies, as anti-reformist, while depicting Koizumi, who emphasized the dismantling of LDP factional politics and unreserved structural reform, as a reformer (Kabashima and Steel 2007a; 2007b). During the election campaign, Koizumi clearly conveyed his arguments through public speeches and television, and actively utilized the campaign support of Diet member Tanaka Makiko, who was highly popular, to foster a reformist image (Lee Ki-wan 2007, 99; Lee Ee-beom 2006, 43). Despite being a major political leader within the LDP, he emphasized an anti-LDP stance through provocative expressions such as "smashing the LDP" (自民党をぶっ壊す), thereby differentiating himself from the core LDP politicians. Against this backdrop, Koizumi's popularity, despite being an LDP outsider, continued to rise. As a result, Koizumi began to be supported as the most suitable candidate for the next prime minister ahead of the presidential election... (continued)