Fraternity and the 'Third Way': A Study of Yukio Hatoyama's Ideological Political Leadership

EAI Japan Studies Panel Report No. 3

Author

Kim Jemma, Assistant Professor, Kansai University of Foreign Studies, Japan; Visiting Assistant Professor, Graduate School of Asia-Pacific Studies, Waseda University. She graduated from Sogang University and obtained a Master's degree in Japanese Regional Studies from Korea University's Graduate School of International Studies. She then earned a Ph.D. in International Relations from Hitotsubashi University, Japan. She has served as a Research Fellow at Hitotsubashi University, a lecturer at the Graduate School of Public Policy, and an Assistant Professor at the Graduate School of Asia-Pacific Studies, Waseda University. Her recent publications include "Globalization and Asian Regional Integration," "Globalization and New Regionalism: The Interaction of Diffusion and Convergence," "East Asian FTAs and Domestic Politics: A Case Study of South Korea," "Governance Reconsidered in Japan: Searching for New Paradigms in the Global Economic Downturn," and "Domestic Politics Surrounding Japan's FTA Policy: An Analysis of the JSEPA Negotiation Process."

I. Introduction: The Emergence of 'New Politics' Against the 'Ancien Régime'

On August 30, 2009, the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) achieved a landslide victory in the House of Representatives election, securing 308 out of 480 seats (64.2% of the total), marking a historic transfer of power. On September 16, amidst great excitement from the Japanese public, the Hatoyama administration was inaugurated, formed by a coalition of the DPJ, the Social Democratic Party, and the People's New Party. The historical significance of this change in government for Japanese party politics cannot be overstated. It signaled the end of LDP politics, characterized by policy cliques (zoku giin), interest-driven decision-making, factions, and support groups, which had been dysfunctional for two decades (Nonaka 2008). Hatoyama advocated for 'new politics' in opposition to the 'Ancien Régime' of the LDP era. He aimed to transition from 'bureaucrat-led to politician-led governance,' ending the 'politics of the bureaucrats, by the bureaucrats, for the bureaucrats.'

The international environment facing the Hatoyama administration at the time was not entirely optimistic. The 2007 global financial crisis starkly revealed fundamental problems in a global economy centered on finance and based on neoliberalism. Simultaneously, there was an urgent need for a shift in social values and consciousness, with a high priority placed on measures to combat global warming and a renewed emphasis on social fairness and wealth redistribution. Furthermore, significant shifts were occurring in the global balance of power. The economic strength of countries such as China, India, Brazil, and Russia was rapidly expanding, with China, in particular, experiencing remarkable growth in terms of economic growth rate, economic scale, and foreign exchange reserves. By 2025, China's GDP was projected to surpass that of the United States, and it was increasingly asserting its presence militarily through rapid modernization of its equipment.

Amidst this international environment of restructuring the global economic system and the multipolar shift in interstate power dynamics, the Hatoyama administration's foreign policy appeared to be off to a smooth start. Specifically, Prime Minister Hatoyama's proactive stance on arms control and his proposal at the UN Climate Change Summit and the UN Security Council to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 25% from 1990 levels by 2020 strongly impressed upon the world the significant changes Japan was undergoing due to the change in government. Hatoyama's pledges received high praise both domestically and internationally. This was because, for the first time in history, a Japanese leader had concretely articulated Japan's future goals on the international stage (Yamaguchi 2009; Yamaguchi 2012). Traditionally, Japanese politicians had set policy objectives based on the intentions of bureaucrats rather than their own will (Yamaguchi 2010; Hayao 1993). Domestically, these objectives were determined by the goals of bureaucratic organizations within each ministry and various interest groups. Internationally, they were set by considering the intentions of the United States and within the scope of not conflicting with them (Curtis 1999; George-Mulgan 2000). This was precisely the cause of the poverty of Japanese politics. In contrast, Hatoyama can be seen as having fulfilled the essential role of a politician by setting objectives based on his own will.

Domestically, Hatoyama also focused on social issues that the previous government had neglected, such as poverty, homelessness, and unemployment, under the slogan of 'politics for the vulnerable.' The revival of the 'mother-child allowance' in the public assistance policy was decided in a short period, and preparations were actively made to implement the child allowance and tuition-free high school education, which were key campaign promises, in order to realize the slogan of 'the people's livelihood comes first.' Despite such a promising start, the Hatoyama administration faced controversy over political funding issues involving Prime Minister Hatoyama and Secretary-General Ichiro Ozawa, as well as difficulties surrounding the relocation of the U.S. Futenma base. Consequently, Hatoyama's political leadership, necessary for policy and situational shifts towards new politics, failed to materialize. On June 2, 2010, Prime Minister Hatoyama resigned, bringing his short-lived administration of 266 days to an end. With a tenure of 266 days, Hatoyama's administration was the sixth shortest under the current constitution. At the time of its inauguration, the administration's approval rating was a high 72% (Kyodo News survey), and the disappointment felt by the Japanese public was correspondingly immense. Indeed, an emergency opinion poll conducted by the Asahi Shimbun on May 29, 2010, showed the Hatoyama cabinet's approval rating at 17% (compared to 71% at the time of its launch), and the DPJ's approval rating at only 21% (compared to a peak of 46% after the change of government) (<Asahi Shimbun> 2010/05/29).

This paper examines Hatoyama's leadership formation process in three stages: the archetype of Hatoyama's leadership, the transitional period after the founding of the Democratic Party until gaining power, and leadership failures during his premiership. Hatoyama advocated for 'new politics' based on fraternity (友愛, yūai) – an ideology that excludes 'totalitarianism of left and right' (左右の全体主義, sayū no zentai shugi) and realizes a balance between 'freedom and equality' and 'independence and coexistence' – thereby clearly distinguishing himself from the politics of the Liberal Democratic Party, which prioritized the principle of competition and efficiency. In this sense, Hatoyama's fraternity can be understood as being in line with the 'Third Way' (Giddens 1998). This paper defines Hatoyama's leadership as 'ideological leadership' seeking the Third Way amidst globalization and will examine the factors behind its success and failure.

II. The Archetype of Yukio Hatoyama's Leadership: Fraternity and Ideological Leadership

Who is Hatoyama, the man who brought about a historic transfer of power? Former Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone described Hatoyama as 'a born politician, a great serpent that swallows everything' (Mori 2009). Some have criticized Hatoyama's idealistic and moderate approach, rooted in his political creed of 'fraternity,' as indecisive and unreliable (Yamauchi 2011, 156-165), and he is also known by the nickname 'alien' due to his unique behavior and speech. He has also been referred to as 'the man who makes politics scientific,' a moniker reflecting his desire to apply the theories and thinking he learned in the field of engineering to the world of politics (Takahashi & Takeuchi 2009).

The ideological roots of Hatoyama's thought are based on 'fraternity' (Hatoyama 1996; Hatoyama Website n.d.). Originally, 'fraternity' was an ideology advocated by Hatoyama's grandfather, Ichiro Hatoyama, the first president of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). Ichiro Hatoyama was a leading politician of postwar Japan who established the LDP through the conservative merger (Hoshu Gōdō) and solidified the 1955 system. In October 1956, he normalized diplomatic relations between Japan and the Soviet Union (Peace Politician Research Club 2009). Inheriting his grandfather's ideology, Hatoyama presents 'fraternity' as an ideology that excludes 'totalitarianism of the left and right' and realizes a balance between 'freedom and equality' and 'self-reliance and coexistence.' This is based on the concept of fraternity advocated by the Austrian politician Richard von Coudenhove-Kalergi. Regarding fraternity, Hatoyama states the following:

Among the words favored by modern Japanese people is 'ai' (love), which typically refers to 'love.' Consequently, many people seem to perceive my use of 'yūai' (fraternity) as somewhat weak. However, the 'yūai' I speak of is a different concept. It refers to 'fraternité,' the slogan of the French Revolution. When my grandfather, Ichiro Hatoyama, translated and published Coudenhove-Kalergi's work, he translated 'fraternité' not as 'hakuai' (philanthropy) but as 'yūai' (fraternity). Far from being weak, it is a combative concept that became the banner of revolution (Hatoyama 2009b).

Totalitarianism that pursues equality, and capitalism that has degenerated into licentiousness, both ultimately infringe upon human dignity and transform humans, who should be the ultimate purpose, into mere means. While both freedom and equality are important for humans, if they become rigid principles, the resulting tragedies and calamities are immeasurable. Therefore, an ideology is needed to promote balance without infringing upon human dignity, and Kalergi sought this in fraternity (Hatoyama 2009b).

Hatoyama argues that without fraternity, freedom leads to anarchic chaos, and equality leads to tyranny. Humans must be ends, not means, and the state must be a means, not an end. In a similar vein, political scientist Shigeki Uno points out that the ideology of fraternity is a noteworthy political concept, interpreting its greatest characteristic as the aspiration to overcome the inherent contradictions between freedom and equality by mediating them (Uno 2010). In other words, fraternity is interpreted as a political orientation that, while excluding market fundamentalism, retains certain neoliberal aspects and simultaneously addresses new social problems such as poverty and inequality with full effort. This aligns with Hatoyama's political intention to provide a point of convergence within the DPJ, a party that encompasses neoliberal, social democratic, and conservative factions. Thus, fraternity can be understood as existing in the middle ground between freedom and equality, or between the right and the left, excluding extremes and rather mediating between them. Hatoyama's concept of fraternity was implemented as actual policy after the change of government.

In this manner, Hatoyama strongly appealed for reforms by championing 'fraternity' as a political ideology, advocating for the 'new public,' and promoting 'politician-led governance' in policy operations. In particular, 'reducing reliance on bureaucrats' based on 'fraternity' formed the core of his political ideology and remained a consistent policy principle from the founding of the DPJ to gaining power. The achievements of Hatoyama, who brought about a historic transfer of power, cannot be attributed to leadership (ideological leadership) based on this ideology. Even after gaining power, Hatoyama's leadership, which clearly distinguished itself from the previous LDP regime by advocating for politician-led governance, the new public, regional sovereignty, and an East Asian community—aligning with the 'Third Way' (Giddens 1998)—should not be overlooked. In this context, Hatoyama's leadership can be defined as 'ideological leadership.'

III. The Utopia Study Group and the Transformation of Postwar Politics

1. The Merits and Demerits of Factions and the Desire for Electoral System Reform: 'Let's Become Sakamoto Ryoma of Muroran'

Hatoyama describes the ten years from his transition from engineering to politics in 1986 until the founding of the DPJ in 1996 as a 'condensed decade' (Fuji TV 2009/09/20). Political commentator Eiken Itagaki analyzes that although Hatoyama shifted direction from the engineering field to the turbulent world of politics, he harbored a desire to apply the theories, knowledge, and experiences gained from his engineering background to the political world (Itagaki 2009, 106). This connects with Hatoyama's political slogan of 'making politics scientific.' Regarding Hatoyama's qualities as a politician, his approach of contemplating the future without being swayed by immediate concerns was a type absent in previous Japanese leaders, but paradoxically, it has also been assessed as a fatal lack of decisiveness as a politician (Sano 2009, 84-85)... (to be continued)