[EAI Panel Report on North Korea's Co-evolution Strategy 3] A Study on North Korea's Co-evolution Strategy: Military

Hwang Ji-hwan is a professor in the Department of North Korean Studies at Myongji University. He earned a Ph.D. in Political Science from Colorado State University and previously served as a senior researcher at the Institute for 통일 (Unification) Studies at Seoul National University. His research interests include the North Korean nuclear issue, Northeast Asian international relations, and security issues, and he has published numerous articles. His recent publications include “International Relations Theory and the North Korean Nuclear Crisis,” “Offensive Realism, Weaker States, and Windows of Opportunity: The Soviet Union and North Korea in Comparative Perspective,” “The Second Nuclear Crisis and U.S. Foreign Policy,” and “Rethinking the East Asian Balance of Power,” and “A Study on North Korea's Nuclear Policy through Prospect Theory.”

Abstract

This paper identifies the structural problems of the 'military-first' policy in North Korea's military strategy and proposes a transformation strategy for the military sector. As a new strategy for North Korea's military transformation, this paper suggests a strategy that simultaneously changes both the internal and external aspects of North Korea. The North Korean issue cannot be resolved simply by changes in the policies of the international community or the South Korean government towards North Korea. On the other hand, the problem cannot be solved even if North Korea abandons its 'military-first' policy and pursues its own reform programs. Therefore, for North Korea's survival strategy to succeed, a strategic choice must be made to abandon nuclear weapons and pursue its own reform programs, while simultaneously, surrounding countries must guarantee and support North Korea's security. The transformation strategy in North Korea's military sector aims to resolve the issues of excessive security and excessive militarization caused by the 'military-first' policy, with the core being the abandonment of nuclear weapons. This strategy consists of three stages. The first stage is for North Korea to declare the abandonment of nuclear weapons and adopt a reform and opening policy during the formation of a new succession structure. During this process, the international community will promise to guarantee the internal and external security of the North Korean regime. The second stage is when North Korea's nuclear weapons are verifiably dismantled, the 'military-first' policy transitions to an 'economy-first' policy, and North Korea escapes its security dilemma. The third stage is when the 'military-first' policy is completely replaced by an 'economy-first' policy, leading to North-South Korean disarmament and North Korea's participation in multilateral security cooperation in Northeast Asia.

1. Introduction

Since the death of Chairman Kim Il-sung in 1994 and the subsequent rise of Chairman Kim Jong-il, the 'military-first' policy has become North Korea's most important ruling method. In other words, the 'military-first' policy is the core state and survival strategy of the Kim Jong-il era. However, there is room for doubt as to whether the 'military-first' policy is an effective state strategy that can guarantee North Korea's security and enable the construction of a strong nation as intended. While the 'military-first' policy may be somewhat effective for domestic political control and propaganda, it poses significant problems as a national strategy for North Korea's survival and development in a rapidly changing world order.

North Korea has proclaimed that it will fully open the door to becoming a strong and prosperous nation by 2012 through its 'military-first' policy. However, the goal of a strong and prosperous nation, which emphasizes the military sector, and the strategy of the 'military-first' policy are hindering the development of other sectors besides the military. North Korea, which became militarized during the Kim Il-sung era, has exacerbated the problems of excessive militarization and excessive security by adopting the 'military-first' policy during the Kim Jong-il era. A strategy that concentrates almost all of the nation's capabilities in the military sector and operates the state through the military distorts resource allocation structures, increasing inefficiency. Ultimately, despite its intentions, the 'military-first' policy has inherent limitations that make it bound to fail as a national strategy for North Korea.

Perhaps North Korea itself is aware that the 'military-first' policy is bound to fail, yet maintains it because it cannot find any other alternative. Kim Jong-il may have introduced the 'military-first' policy to maintain his regime, but this policy is instead undermining the regime's stability and hindering national development. If North Korea continues to adhere to its military-first strategy, rather than accelerating the construction of a strong and prosperous nation, excessive security will lead to internal and external inefficiencies, increasing the possibility of weakening and collapsing the regime and the nation. Conversely, if it abandons the military-first strategy and makes new strategic choices in the military sector, North Korea's chances of survival will increase, and it can establish itself as a normal state in the international community.

This chapter identifies the structural problems of the 'military-first' policy in North Korea's military strategy and proposes a direction for national development through the transformation of the military sector. As a new strategy for North Korea's military transformation, this paper, like other chapters, proposes a co-evolution strategy. A co-evolution strategy is one that simultaneously changes both the internal and external aspects of North Korea. The North Korean issue cannot be resolved simply by changes in the policies of the international community or the South Korean government. The problems with the Lee Myung-bak administration's 'Grand Bargain' or the Obama administration's 'Comprehensive Package' lie in the absence of North Korea's own change program. On the other hand, the problem cannot be solved even if North Korea abandons its 'military-first' policy and pursues its own reform programs. Even if the North Korean leadership pursues reform and opening policies similar to those of China or Vietnam, the possibility of success is very low, considering North Korea's current domestic situation and its surrounding environment. The weakening of domestic political control in the early stages of reform and opening would accelerate socio-economic instability, and the presence of a strong South Korea would expose North Korea's vulnerabilities, increasing the leadership's sense of threat. Therefore, for North Korea's survival strategy to succeed, a strategic choice must be made to abandon nuclear weapons and pursue its own reform programs, while simultaneously, a co-evolution strategy is needed where surrounding countries guarantee and support North Korea's security.

The co-evolution strategy, which advocates for simultaneous change both internally and externally in North Korea to resolve the North Korean issue, is not an entirely new concept. The Sunshine Policy of the Kim Dae-jung administration and the 'Non-nuclear, Open 3000' policy of the Lee Myung-bak administration also intended for North Korea's change and international support to occur simultaneously, although the order of implementation differed. The discussions on a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula within the Six-Party Talks also aim to induce strategic choices from North Korea through changes in the security environment surrounding the Korean Peninsula. However, in the absence of mutual trust, these approaches have been very limited and insufficient to bring about fundamental change in North Korea. Therefore, the international community needs a more fundamental strategy that provides North Korea with the regime security it desperately desires, in exchange for abandoning its nuclear weapons and 'military-first' strategy.

Although simultaneously pursuing regime security for North Korea and nuclear abandonment may seem reckless and unrealistic at first glance, the recent environment surrounding the Korean Peninsula presents a very good opportunity to resolve the North Korean issue through a co-evolution strategy. North Korea is currently facing triple difficulties, including the existing nuclear issue, economic crisis, and the emerging issue of leadership succession. Therefore, resolving the North Korean issue requires fundamental reforms not only in the nuclear aspect but also in all other areas, including politics, diplomacy, economy, and socio-culture. To this end, the 'military-first' policy, which prioritizes the military, must be abandoned, and new strategic decisions must be made. The co-evolution strategy aims to provide a clue for resolving the North Korean issue by inducing North Korea's strategic decisions regarding nuclear issues and economic policies during the succession process. Therefore, the strategic decision for North Korea proposed by the co-evolution strategy is to abandon the 'military-first' (先軍) policy and transition to an 'economy-first' (先經) policy. However, considering North Korea's domestic political situation, the possibility of abandoning nuclear weapons and attempting economic reform is very low unless political system changes precede it. This means that unless the nature of the North Korean regime changes, the likelihood of North Korea making new strategic decisions is slim. Therefore, it is necessary to create an opportunity for strategic choices during the succession process, with the emergence of a new reformist leader.

In the military sector, the co-evolution strategy aims to resolve the issues of excessive security and excessive militarization caused by the 'military-first' policy, with the core being the abandonment of nuclear weapons. The co-evolution strategy for the military sector, like other sectors, consists of three stages. The first stage is for North Korea to declare the abandonment of nuclear weapons and adopt a reform and opening policy during the formation of a new succession structure. During this process, the international community will promise to guarantee the internal and external security of the North Korean regime. The second stage is when North Korea's nuclear weapons are verifiably dismantled, the 'military-first' policy transitions to an 'economy-first' policy, and North Korea escapes its security dilemma. The third stage is when the 'military-first' policy is completely replaced by an 'economy-first' policy, leading to North-South Korean disarmament and North Korea's participation in multilateral security cooperation in Northeast Asia. This strategy represents a new approach for North Korea to build a strong and prosperous nation.

2. Content and Evaluation of Military Strategy in the 'Military-First' Era

(1) Content of Military Strategy in the 'Military-First' Era

Kim Jong-il's 'military-first' policy can be understood as a basic inheritance and development of the 'military-first' ideology and state strategy from the Kim Il-sung era's armed struggle. Kim Jong-il emphasized, "It is the unwavering conviction and will of our Party to defend and uphold our socialism with guns and to complete the cause of the Juche revolution to the end," stating that one should not expect any change from him and that he has made a "resolute decision to break through all difficulties relying on guns." However, Kim Jong-il's 'military-first' policy reportedly shows some differences from the state strategy of the Kim Il-sung era. In particular, the 'military-first' policy places the People's Army at its core, which differs from Kim Il-sung's primary reliance on the working class. Kim Il-sung reportedly relied mainly on the working class during the anti-Japanese war and the process of state-building due to the absence of a party, state, or regular army. However, Kim Jong-il's 'military-first' policy argues that in the current situation where a party and state exist, it is necessary to rely on formidable military power centered on the People's Army to counter the international community's hostile policies and protect socialism.

This is clearly demonstrated in the term 'military-first, labor-second' (선군후로, Seon-gun hu-ro) emphasized by the 'military-first' policy. 'Military-first, labor-second' means prioritizing the military over the working class in carrying out the socialist cause, recognizing that the role of the working class can only be realized with the support of a powerful military. This is because, in the struggle for socialism, even the working class, as the vanguard class, cannot escape the fate of slaves without a strong military. Therefore, it is a perspective that values the revolutionary spirit of soldiers more than the revolutionary spirit of the working class, viewing the military not as a tool of politics, but as a force that leads politics. In other words, with the increase in perceived internal and external threats to North Korea after the end of the Cold War and the collapse of socialism, the proportion of the military sector in the state strategy has increased accordingly.

Ultimately, the 'military-first' policy can be understood in two main ways: as a 'political method that places the military as the primary national task' and as a 'political method centered on the military as the core and main force.' From the perspective of military strategy, the former is a strategy for external security assurance, while the latter is a strategy for internal regime stability.

a. Military Strategy in the 'Military-First' Era for External Security Assurance

North Korea states that the 'military-first' policy is a 'political method that places the military as the primary national task.' While state affairs encompass various areas such as politics, economy, and culture, the perception is that in a situation where the international community, including the United States, threatens North Korea's right to survival, the military sector must be prioritized above all else to protect other areas like politics, economy, and culture. North Korea claims that the 'military-first' policy is a creative principle that differs from existing socialist theories. Existing theories, based on historical materialism, recognized the military sector as dependent on the economic sector, believing that socialism could be built and the military strengthened based on the development of productive forces. However, the 'military-first' policy, based on the principles of Juche ideology, presents the principle of prioritizing the strengthening of the military.

Since the military sector is the most important, the 'military-first' policy prioritizes strengthening the People's Army to enhance national defense capabilities. To strengthen military capabilities, it is particularly necessary to focus on developing the defense industry, which is essential for establishing an all-people, all-state defense system centered on the military and thereby strengthening the nation's defense capabilities. However, North Korea explains that the 'military-first' policy is not for an arms race with imperialism or to threaten other countries, but for building an invincible military power that guarantees the construction of a strong and prosperous nation by defending the nation's and people's right to survival and sovereignty. Therefore, it emphasizes that the 'military-first' policy is for deterring war and achieving peace.

This external security military strategy of North Korea can be understood as the so-called 'military-first peace theory.' The 'military-first peace theory' argues that peace is maintained around the Korean Peninsula because North Korea, through its 'military-first' policy, has achieved the status of a strong and prosperous nation, thereby possessing deterrence against the U.S. This argument fundamentally stems from the perception that the threat to peace on the Korean Peninsula is not North Korea itself, but the United States. In particular, the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula did not originate from North Korea's nuclear weapons program but from the Cold War-era U.S. nuclear policy and its hostile policy towards North Korea, which initially brought nuclear weapons to the Korean Peninsula. Therefore, it is most important to secure a balance of power to counter the U.S. threat, which dates back to the Cold War era, thereby ending the U.S. hostile policy towards North Korea and guaranteeing North Korea's security. North Korea holds the perception that securing external security and preventing war is only possible through military strength, which can be seen as aligning with realist international relations theory, which posits that war can be prevented and peace achieved through a balance of power.

Consequently, North Korea's 'military-first' policy inevitably necessitates the development and possession of missiles and nuclear weapons. North Korea views possessing nuclear weapons as the most effective alternative as a means of self-defense against U.S. threats. It accepts the historical fact of the so-called 'balance of terror,' where wars have not occurred between nuclear-armed states, and it has not been easy to initiate wars... (continued)

[Foreword] The Path to Advanced North Korea by 2032: Building a Complex Network State

[Report 1] A Study on North Korea's Co-evolution Strategy: Politics

[Report 2] A Study on North Korea's Co-evolution Strategy: Diplomacy

[Report 3] A Study on North Korea's Co-evolution Strategy: Military

[Report 4] A Study on North Korea's Co-evolution Strategy: Economy

[Report 5] A Study on North Korea's Co-evolution Strategy: Human Rights