[EAI Panel Report on North Korea's Co-evolution Strategy 2] A Study on North Korea's Co-evolution Strategy: Diplomacy

Professor Jeon Jae-sung is currently an associate professor in the Department of Political Science and International Relations at Seoul National University. He graduated from the Department of Political Science and International Relations at Seoul National University and obtained a Ph.D. in Political Science from Northwestern University in the United States. He previously served as an assistant professor in the Department of Political Science and International Relations at Sookmyung Women's University. His major publications include "Hans Morgenthau's Classical Realist Theory of International Politics," "Reinhold Niebuhr's Christian Realist Thought on International Politics," "An Essay for a Realist Theory of International Institutions," "The United States' Policy Toward Korea Regarding the Normalization of Diplomatic Relations between South Korea and Japan in 1965 and the Dispatch of Troops to Vietnam," "North Korea's Strategy and Response Measures After Nuclear Tests," "Building a Peace Regime on the Korean Peninsula: Issues, Tasks, and Prospects," "A Comparative Review of South and North Korea's Conceptions and Policies for a Korean Peninsula Peace Regime," and "The Current Status and Future Tasks of the ROK-US Alliance."

Abstract

This paper examines the background and development process of the military-first diplomacy, which focuses on creating a diplomatic environment that guarantees the survival of North Korea's socialist regime and enables it to achieve the status of a strong nation in the future, and ultimately presents the reasons why military-first diplomacy is bound to fail. Furthermore, it posits a three-stage transition from military-first diplomacy to economy-first and people-first diplomacy as a measure to advance North Korean diplomacy, and considers the parallel efforts of neighboring countries and the international community necessary for the evolution of such North Korean diplomatic strategies. In assessing the post-Cold War era and the dynamics of the 21st century, North Korea has shown limitations in moving beyond a Cold War-era perception of the international situation, despite pursuing a partially realist approach. However, if it continues to pursue a national strategy of maintaining military-first diplomacy, it will lead to the institutionalization of sanctions against North Korea and the deepening of its economic difficulties. Therefore, to ensure North Korea's survival and normal development diplomatically, it will be necessary to make a strategic decision to abandon nuclear weapons (Stage 1), implement systemic reforms and openness (Stage 2), and then pursue pragmatic diplomacy necessary for economic advancement and modernization (Stage 3). In addition, it is crucial for neighboring countries and the international community to make co-evolutionary efforts in their strategies toward North Korea, based on a shift in perception that understands the North Korean nuclear issue not as a problem of producing and proliferating weapons of mass destruction, but as a political issue directly linked to the political survival of North Korea.

1. Introduction

As the Cold War ended and the former socialist bloc collapsed, and as South Korea, its former rival, established diplomatic relations with the former Soviet Union and China, North Korea embarked on a arduous path for survival. Witnessing communist regimes that had ruled for decades for socialist construction voluntarily collapse or transition away from communism, either under duress or popular pressure, North Korea, which had to worry about not just transition but also absorption, felt an existential crisis in the post-Cold War era regarding the maintenance of its system and regime.

With the collapse of the socialist bloc, the development of the US-led liberal democratic camp accelerated. Not only did the power distribution structure change with the end of the Cold War, but also the grand currents of globalization, informatization, and democratization emerged. Socialism was revealed as a system lacking the openness, democracy, and creativity to counter these grand currents, while liberal democracy and market economies developed in alignment with these new trends. Furthermore, the United States, identified as North Korea's arch-rival, created an unprecedented unipolar hegemonic system with unparalleled leadership conditions, intensifying North Korea's sense of crisis.

In an effort to secure its survival, the Kim Il-sung regime, between 1991 and 1992, triggered the first North Korean nuclear crisis in 1993. Subsequently, the Kim Jong-il regime, which emerged in 1994, sought to escape the post-Cold War crisis situation through robust military-first politics in exchange for freezing its nuclear program. During this process, North Korea simultaneously strove to consolidate its internal system and create opportunities for economic development, while also making its utmost efforts to foster a diplomatic environment conducive to its long-term survival. Based on the bilateral diplomatic relations established with the US during the first North Korean nuclear crisis, it sought to achieve a tangible change, namely the withdrawal of the so-called 'hostile policy toward North Korea' from the United States, while also focusing on strengthening its self-defense capabilities based on military power, centered on military-first politics. Regarding South Korea, it sought to prevent absorption and utilize South Korea's engagement policy toward North Korea to gain practical benefits necessary for future regime development.

In addition, it made efforts to maximize economic and diplomatic support by pragmatically improving relations with neighboring countries such as China, Russia, and Japan. At the same time, it pursued a pragmatic diplomatic line by establishing diplomatic relations with non-Asian countries, including those in Europe, to seek economic and diplomatic benefits that could be partially obtained.

However, following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the conservative shift in US foreign policy and the anti-terrorism context created an even more challenging diplomatic environment for North Korea. Ultimately, the second North Korean nuclear crisis erupted in October 2002, leading North Korea to revert to a rigid, nuclear-centric military-first diplomacy. Although sporadic discussions were held within the framework of the Six-Party Talks concerning the denuclearization of North Korea and economic assistance, North Korea was unable to make the strategic choice to abandon its nuclear weapons, and its satisfaction with the security assurances from neighboring countries remained insufficient, resulting in a continued stalemate centered on the nuclear issue.

The North Korean nuclear issue is not a problem of nuclear weapons but a problem of the survival of North Korea as a political entity. North Korean nuclear diplomacy is also diplomacy for North Korea's survival, not diplomacy surrounding nuclear weapons, and it is an issue related to the entire North Korean system under the military-first regime. As long as nuclear military-first diplomacy and the North Korean military-first system interact, the advancement of North Korean diplomacy alone is impossible. Without synergistic advancement in all areas of North Korea, including politics, economy, military, and society, the advancement of North Korean diplomacy will also be impossible.

Furthermore, advancement alone by North Korea will not achieve the desired objectives. The policies of neighboring countries toward North Korea, which support and strengthen the forces within North Korea seeking advancement, must also evolve simultaneously. This is because it is within the context of co-evolution between North Korea and its neighbors that North Korea's political concerns will be resolved, and diplomatic agreements and implementation plans regarding North Korea's future position in the East Asian order will be established.

This chapter argues that if North Korea's diplomacy continues on the path of nuclear military-first diplomacy, which supports the construction of a strong nation, North Korea will ultimately be unable to survive as a normal and developed nation in the international community. It is necessary for North Korea to be reborn as a truly advanced nation conforming to 21st-century global standards through the strategic decision to abandon nuclear weapons, and for this, the advancement of the North Korean system and the advancement of North Korean diplomacy must operate in synergy. In addition, the evolution of neighboring countries' policies toward North Korea, which support North Korea's advancement, is also necessary. This chapter will first briefly review the development process of North Korean diplomacy to date, then analyze the reasons why North Korea's military-first diplomacy is ultimately bound to fail. Subsequently, it will posit a path for the advancement of North Korean diplomacy in three stages, and through this, explore the possibility for North Korea and its neighbors to co-evolve, enabling the entire North Korean system to pursue a normal and advanced path.

2. Content and Evaluation of Military-First Era Diplomatic Strategy

(1) Content of Military-First Era Diplomatic Strategy

Diplomacy in the military-first era has strategic objectives that serve the strategic goals of military-first politics. If military-first politics, as a means to ensure the survival and future strengthening of North Korea's socialist regime after the end of the Cold War, prioritizes the military as the most important pillar and promotes the militarization of all society, then diplomatic strategy also becomes a pillar for pursuing these strategies. Therefore, diplomacy in the military-first era, i.e., military-first diplomacy, focuses on guaranteeing the survival of North Korea's socialist supreme leader-centered regime and creating a diplomatic environment for its future development into a so-called strong nation. Furthermore, as the authority and power of the military are strengthened, the military's status and voice in the foreign policy decision-making process inevitably increase, and military means are frequently employed in the selection of diplomatic policy tools. The development of nuclear weapons to be used as an important diplomatic tool can also be considered a byproduct of the military-first political system.

Indeed, discourse on North Korea's military-first politics is closely linked to the assessment of the international situation and the formulation of future foreign policy directions. That is, by analyzing the environment of military-first politics, it seeks the 'fundamental tasks posed by the current era' within the context of international politics. The objective of foreign policy is stated as "defending and upholding the Juche socialist bastion of world socialism from the joint attacks of the imperialist allied forces and completing the Juche cause." To elaborate further, "as long as imperialism exists on earth and the imperialists' acts of aggression continue, we can never lay down our arms and must firmly grasp them to achieve the ultimate victory of the Juche cause. The fundamental spirit pulsating through the military-first ideology is to fight to the end with the imperialists who seek to crush Juche socialism by mobilizing all military-political and economic strength, and to build a new, independent and peaceful society," which demonstrates the direction of diplomatic strategy.

Specifically, military-first diplomacy consists of strengthening military deterrence and ensuring the survival environment through negotiations with the United States, pragmatic diplomacy to acquire economic resources, and South-North diplomacy aimed at gaining economic assistance from South Korea and diplomatic resources necessary for survival by presenting a unification strategy toward the South. Regarding the survival environment, North Korea expresses that "strong military response to the imperialist warmongers who only pursue aggressive war is the only path to peace" and that "military-first politics guarantees the peaceful environment, which is a prerequisite for national unification." Furthermore, regarding the acquisition of economic assistance, it explains that "when the entire economy was damaged due to unprecedented food shortages and energy deficits caused by the US's economic blockade and military suppression, it was a fruit of military-first politics that the military took charge of these areas and resolved bottlenecks, thereby revitalizing the entire economy," and explains the necessity of "vigorously accelerating socialist construction with the military as the core and main force." Regarding the South-North strategy, it claims that "military-first politics is the most powerful sword of unification that can realize the cherished national aspiration of reunification within our generation" and "it can create a peaceful environment for unification, the fundamental prerequisite for national unification, by thwarting the US's plot to provoke a war of invasion against the North," and argues that "this is because military-first politics is a political method that provides the war deterrence necessary to prevent the risk of war on the Korean Peninsula"... (continued)

[Foreword] The Path to North Korean Advancement in 2032: Building a Complex Network State

[Issue 1] A Study on North Korea's Co-evolution Strategy: Politics

[Issue 2] A Study on North Korea's Co-evolution Strategy: Diplomacy

[Issue 3] A Study on North Korea's Co-evolution Strategy: Military

[Issue 4] A Study on North Korea's Co-evolution Strategy: Economy

[Issue 5] A Study on North Korea's Co-evolution Strategy: Human Rights