[North Korea's Co-evolution Strategy Research Panel Report 1] A Study on North Korea's Co-evolution Strategy: Politics

Professor Woo Seung-ji, currently an associate professor at the School of International Studies, Kyung Hee University, holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from Indiana University (Bloomington). He has served as a senior researcher at the Institute for International Affairs, Seoul National University, and as an assistant professor at the Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security. His research interests include North Korean politics, inter-Korean relations, and international politics. His major publications include “The Park Chung-hee Administration amid Inter-Korean Reconciliation in the Détente Period: Changes in the Threat Perception, Regime Characteristics, and the Distribution of Power” (Summer 2009, Korea Journal), “An Understanding of Inter-Korean Reconciliation during the Détente Period through the Theory of Evolutionary Expectations” (『International Politics Quarterly』, 2008), “A Preliminary Study on Understanding North Korea’s International Relations Theory in the Kim Jong-il Era” (『International Politics Quarterly』, 2007), and “South Korea’s Search for a Unification Strategy” (Summer 2003, Orbis).

Abstract

This paper contemplates what North Korea needs to escape the quagmire of isolation and stagnation and join the ranks of advanced nations. North Korea's closed-door state operations centered around the leader, emphasizing self-reliance and Juche, have led to chronic stagnation. For North Korea to advance, a fundamental transformation is inevitable. In the future, North Korea faces the challenge of shedding its identity as a fortress state and transforming into an amphibious state that connects the maritime and continental powers of East Asia, combining the advantages of both. Starting from the premise that North Korea's advancement is necessary, the process is divided into three phases: Phase 1, Phase 2, and Phase 3. Phase 1 is characterized as a period of decay where contradictions within and outside the system deepen while the military-first politics continue. Phase 2 is characterized as a transitional period of transition where gradual change occurs from the military-first system with the emergence of a new leadership. Phase 3 is set as a period of transformation where fundamental change occurs under the lines of prioritizing the people and the environment, completely breaking away from the military-first line.

Keywords

North Korea, advanced country, fortress state, amphibious state

1. Introduction

The division of the Korean Peninsula, which followed the defeat of Japanese imperialism, has persisted for over 60 years. South Korea, in alliance with the United States, a 20th-century hegemonic power, adopted an export-oriented strategy and actively entered the international market order, achieving economic growth. This growth, in turn, became the foundation for gradual democratization. South Korea is now pursuing advancement based on its economic development and democratization. In contrast, North Korea formed a ruling elite centered around anti-Japanese guerrilla fighters, allied with continental powers like China and the Soviet Union, and aimed to establish a self-reliant economy through self-regeneration. North Korea's closed-door state operations centered around the leader, emphasizing self-reliance and Juche, have led to chronic stagnation. The Kim Jong-il regime seeks to guarantee regime security through nuclear armament, but it will be difficult to escape the status of a 'fragile state' as long as it does not abandon the military-first politics and military-first economy lines.

In the arena of addressing 21st-century challenges such as human rights, the environment, climate, poverty, and violence, South Korea, as a key participant in the G20, is transforming its role from following global standards to creating them, shifting from a 'rule taker' to a 'rule setter.' As a member of newly emerging economies, South Korea is contributing to the creation of a new global economic order in the 21st century by acting as a bridge between developed and developing countries on the international stage.

The international order in the 21st century is moving in a new direction with globalization and informatization. Following the collapse of communism in the 1990s, nations have been racing towards prosperity and peace. However, North Korea alone stands apart from this race. It is highly doubtful whether North Korea can achieve the goals of democracy, openness, growth, and equality alongside South Korea through its grand strategy of military-first politics and nuclear armament. For inter-Korean co-evolutionary virtuous cycles to begin, North Korea's fundamental transformation is inevitable. In the future, North Korea faces the challenge of shedding its identity as a 'fortress state' and transforming into an 'amphibious state' that connects the maritime and continental powers of East Asia, combining the advantages of both.

The Kim Jong-il military-first regime, established in the late 1990s, showed signs of change by attempting inter-Korean dialogue, pursuing improved relations with countries like the United States and Japan, and implementing the July 1 economic management improvement measures. However, it has not yet demonstrated noteworthy political, economic, or social reform movements. This is attributed to the core leadership's judgment that pursuing reform and openness would weaken the regime's authoritarian ruling structure. The more North Korea adheres to its closed and uniform planned economy and strengthens authoritarian rule, the further it will move away from the path of prosperity and democracy.

This chapter contemplates what North Korea needs to escape the quagmire of isolation and stagnation and join the ranks of advanced nations. Advancement can be divided into advancement as a process and advancement as a final state. That is, advancement signifies the sum of all efforts to emulate and catch up with global standards, as well as efforts to stand as a creator of global standards. In this context, North Korea's advancement implies North Korea's own efforts to reduce the gap with global standards and its attempts to create standards itself. The purpose of this chapter is not to predict the most feasible future vision for North Korea under its current conditions, but rather to explore phased advancement plans based on the judgment that North Korea's advancement is necessary. In other words, it aims to provide policy recommendations by presenting gradual advancement plans to North Korean policymakers, alongside an analytical approach to North Korea's reality.

Therefore, the following discussion starts from the normative argument that North Korea's advancement is necessary. It aims to present an example of an advancement program based on the self-conception and will of North Korea's elites. The rationale for presenting such a program is the negative judgment that the military-first line, chosen by North Korea after enduring the 'arduous march,' is insufficient to address the challenges of the globalization and information age. What procedures and programs are necessary for North Korea to join the global trends of 'prioritizing the people' and 'prioritizing wealth'? Assuming that North Korean contingencies such as internal and external collapse would cause pain and burden to both domestic and foreign parties, a relatively less painful gradual reform path is envisioned and divided into three phases: Phase 1 (short-term), Phase 2 (medium-term), and Phase 3 (long-term).

Phase 1 is characterized as a period of decay where contradictions within and outside the system deepen while military-first politics continue; in this phase, North Korea is likely to fail to create an escape route toward advancement and democracy due to the continuation of the military-first approach. Phase 2 is envisioned as a transitional period of transition and reform, marked by gradual change from the military-first system with the emergence of a new leadership. The appearance of an enlightened leader in this phase will enable North Korea to adopt a path of partial reform and openness. In Phase 3, as the leader-centric ruling system comes to an end, the precarious balance between reform and conservatism will tip in favor of reform. That is, this phase is set as a period of fundamental transformation of the system under the lines of prioritizing wealth and prioritizing the people. The emergence of individuals, societies, institutions, and a state that facilitate innovation will enhance North Korea's competitiveness and bring it closer to the goal of advancement. The tasks that South Korea and the international community should undertake during the transitional and transformative phases will also be discussed.

2. Characteristics of the Political System in the Military-First Era

From the 1970s onwards, due to the inefficiencies of closure and planning, North Korea experienced a process of system rigidification, facing difficulties in state operations. The collapse of socialist systems in the late 1980s, the death of Kim Il-sung in the mid-1990s, and the unprecedented economic hardship symbolized by the 'arduous march' led North Korea to experience its greatest crisis since the Korean War. Kim Jong-il's attempt to overcome this systemic crisis manifested as the proclamation of military-first politics.

North Korea traces the beginning of military-first politics to Kim Jong-il's visit to the Dabaksol Guard Post on January 1, 1995. On October 7, 1997, through a commentary broadcast by the Central Broadcasting Station, North Korea introduced Kim Jong-il's statement 'military-first, people-later,' and has consistently emphasized the primacy of the gun over the economy. The Kim Jong-il regime appears to have adopted military-first politics to overcome the internal and external crises of the post-Cold War era. North Korea emphasizes that the military must play a leading role in overcoming the crisis represented by the 'arduous march.' It argues that the organized military must take the vanguard in defending against imperialist encirclement and continuing socialist construction. North Korea asserts that without the military, there can be no people, no socialist state, and no party. It also states that if the military weakens, the state weakens, thus identifying the military as the vanguard for defending the system and national sovereignty. The Kim Jong-il regime attributes the collapse of the Soviet Union not to economic fragility but to a lack of revolutionary spirit in the military.

Despite numerous predictions of instability in the post-Kim Il-sung era following the death of Chairman Kim Il-sung and the economic crisis, the North Korean system has survived to this day. In the late 1990s, Kim Jong-il assumed the positions of General Secretary of the Workers' Party and Chairman of the National Defense Commission. In the 2000s, he held summit talks with two South Korean presidents and conducted two nuclear tests. The military-first system has the character of a crisis management system attempting to escape internal and external crises through military-first politics and nuclear armament. Military-first North Korea is concentrating its efforts on developing nuclear and missile capabilities under a self-reliance strategy to compensate for its inferiority in conventional forces. It appears to be devising various unconventional attack methods to neutralize the ROK-US alliance, which holds a military-technical advantage. Excessive investment in the defense industry to physically support the military-first policy leads to inefficiencies in the consumer economy, and the excessive promotion of military officials results in the rigidification of the system.

Economically, during the military-first era, North Korea is pursuing a 'leap forward' strategy focusing on IT, software, and animation, utilizing South Korean capital, and relying on special economic zones and tourism. As the state's resource allocation capacity reaches its limits, the North Korean leadership has adopted some market-oriented and liberalization policies. However, it is judged that fundamentally, military-first North Korea has no intention of pursuing policies that undermine the foundations of its socialist planned economy. North Korea implemented some limited reform measures from 2000 to 2004. In 2002, it enacted the July 1 economic management improvement measures, and in 2003, it permitted the emergence of general markets. Under the leadership of Prime Minister Pak Pong-ju, appointed in September 2003, reform efforts gained momentum, leading to an operational model where planning and markets coexisted. However, the expansion of reforms infringed upon the vested interests of the privileged economy, and power institutions such as the party and the military began to resist reforms from early 2005. Prime Minister Pak Pong-ju was ousted in April 2007, and a currency reform was carried out at the end of November 2009. Currently, North Korea's economic management approach is rapidly shifting towards a conservative line that suppresses markets and strengthens state control... (continued)

[Foreword] The Path to North Korean Advancement in 2032: Building a Complex Network State

[No. 1] A Study on North Korea's Co-evolution Strategy: Politics

[No. 2] A Study on North Korea's Co-evolution Strategy: Diplomacy

[No. 3] A Study on North Korea's Co-evolution Strategy: Military

[No. 4] A Study on North Korea's Co-evolution Strategy: Economy

[No. 5] A Study on North Korea's Co-evolution Strategy: Human Rights