[NSP Report 38] U.S. Security Strategy

He is currently an Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science and International Relations at Korea University. He received his Ph.D. from the University of Chicago and worked as a researcher at the East-West Center in the United States. His main research areas are international security and international relations theory. His books include Power Shifts, Strategy, and War (Rutledge, 2008), and his recent major academic papers include A Nuclear North Korea and the Stability of East Asia (Australian Journal of International Affairs, 2007) and Democratization and Alliance Policy (Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, 2007).

I. Introduction

The inauguration of President Barack Obama has been recognized by many people in various countries, not just Americans, as a major turning point in history, garnering significant interest and anticipation. Given that the United States is the sole superpower, interest in the future direction it will take under its new leader is natural, considering the political and economic repercussions its choices will have on the international system. In particular, due to America's unparalleled position in the global security order, the nature and content of the Obama administration's security policy have become a matter of intense global concern. For South Korea, which maintains an alliance with the United States, U.S. security policy is a critical factor significantly impacting national security, making this issue of particular importance. In this context, examining the key characteristics that will emerge in the U.S. government's security strategy holds considerable significance. This paper aims to provide insights into understanding this important issue by forecasting the security implementation strategy (policy tools utilized to achieve national security) that the Obama administration will adopt.

To briefly summarize the paper's core argument, the Obama administration is expected to adopt a fundamentally restrained and balanced security strategy. While not ruling out the use of military force in principle, it will exercise restraint in its application as much as possible and will adopt a cautious approach in promoting the spread of democracy and expanding value-based alliances. Based on this realist policy orientation, it will also actively pursue the use of liberal foreign policy tools such as international institutions and economic aid.

Contrary to public expectations, the Obama administration will not opt for a radical break in its security implementation strategy compared to the latter period of the Bush administration. The Bush administration, in its second term, largely overcame the excesses of idealism seen in its first term and moved in a direction that accommodated strategic realities. As the Obama administration cannot be entirely free from structural constraints such as wars and economic crises, it will be unable to attempt a sudden strategic shift. President Obama's emphasis on bipartisan governance and the appointment of individuals from the Republican party to key positions also reinforces strategic continuity.

To present this argument, this paper unfolds as follows. The first section first examines the four implementation strategies the United States has employed to address security threats in the post-Cold War era, and then explains how these strategic tools have been combined and utilized in recent times. Based on this discussion, the second section forecasts the Obama administration's future security strategy. Finally, it summarizes the core arguments and draws implications for the formulation of South Korea's defense policy.

II. U.S. Security Strategy in the Post-Cold War Era

1. Major Individual Implementation Strategies

To achieve its various security objectives in the 21st century, the United States has utilized a diverse range of strategic tools (implementation strategies) in military, diplomatic, and economic spheres. These implementation strategies can be broadly categorized into the following four groups (The White House 2002, 1-2). A notable characteristic is that the U.S. government has emphasized the importance of liberal strategic tools, such as promoting democracy, expanding economic ties, and strengthening international institutions. However, it has not excluded the use of military force and has also pursued the acquisition of military superiority through military transformation to respond more effectively to new security threats. These implementation strategies function both as tools for achieving security objectives and as practical sub-goals (tasks).

(1) Promoting Democracy

Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has consistently emphasized the strategic importance of promoting democracy. The George W. Bush administration, in particular, believed that democracy was the most effective long-term solution for achieving key security objectives, including eradicating the root causes of terrorism and preventing and resolving conflicts between major powers (The White House 2006, 3, 15, 36). This judgment was based on several assumptions about the political effects of democratic institutions. First, it was believed that through democratic processes, public opinion would be effectively reflected in policy decisions and opportunities for citizen participation would expand, thereby resolving political dissatisfaction and weakening the motivation for terrorism. Consequently, the spread of democratic institutions was thought to reduce the leverage of terrorist groups. Second, it was argued that since democratic states do not wage war against each other, the expansion of democratic political systems would also contribute to the establishment of a stable international order (Doyle 1983). Despite encountering unexpected difficulties and causing severe side effects in places like Iraq, Palestine, and Lebanon, this strategy of promoting democracy continued to be pursued.

The United States has also sought to form and expand "value-based alliances" composed of democratic nations (Bork 2005; Daalder and Lindsay 2004). This effort is based on the assumption that closer cooperation is possible among countries that share democratic values (Gaubatz 1996; Lipson 2003; Reed 1997, 1072-1078). Because strong alliances are likely to form between democratic states, the propagation of democratic institutions was thought to help strengthen and expand the U.S.-led alliance network. Furthermore, it was believed that democratic expansion could be promoted through close cooperation among democratic countries. As part of these efforts, NATO was expanded in Europe to include several Central and Eastern European countries, including Poland, and attempts were made to incorporate former Soviet republics, including Georgia, into the alliance. In Asia, efforts were made to transform security alliances with South Korea, Japan, and Australia into comprehensive alliances based on shared values, while actively pursuing strategic partnerships with other democracies, including India. In the Middle East, the "special relationship" with Israel, a democratic state, has been further solidified (Mearsheimer and Walt 2007)... (continued)