NORTH KOREA, WHERE NEXT FOR THE NUCLEAR TALKS - Peter M. Beck

本論文は、高まる北朝鮮の核危機の中で、6者会談の成果を評価し、展望している。2004年11月15日International Crisis Groupのアジア・レポートで発表された本論文は、Northeast Asia Projectを統括するDr. Peter M. Beckが執筆したもので、紹介資料と主要目次は以下の通りである。



[紹介資料]



To confront the unacceptable risk of North Korea"s expanding nuclear arsenal, the U.S. must urgently set out a comprehensive offer to Pyongyang to test once and for all the regime"s true willingness to give up its nuclear program and weapons.



North Korea: Where Next for the Nuclear Talks?,* the latest report from the International Crisis Group, details an eight-step process under which Pyongyang would reveal and dismantle various components of its nuclear program while receiving a series of economic, energy and security benefits. While there is no guarantee that any negotiating strategy with the unpredictable regime will work, only a serious proposal from the U.S., after consultation with South Korea, Japan, China and Russia, will put the other parties in a position to increase pressure on North Korea should a reasonable deal be rejected.



"There will be no agreement on coercive measures unless the U.S. first lays out a detailed plan of what North Korea can expect by way of economic assistance and security guarantees", says Crisis Group President Gareth Evans. "Indicating a rough direction of the process is not enough; all parties need a detailed picture of the destination if this is to be seen as a good-faith offer."



North Korea"s nuclear arsenal has grown to an alarming level; with as many as ten nuclear weapons, it now has enough bombs to deter an attack and still have some to sell to other states or even terrorist groups. The high risk demands urgent, concentrated action to dismantle North Korea"s nuclear program, and other policy concerns such as missile controls and human rights, important as they all are in their own right, must wait until this critical problem is resolved.



U.S. demands that North Korea dismantle it programs before any deal can be reached have been rebuffed, and the talks have stalled. It is necessary to change tack.



By the end of the step-by-step process outlined in Crisis Group"s new report, North Korea would have given up all its nuclear programs, and that would be monitored by intrusive verification. In return it would have diplomatic relations with Japan and exchanged liaison offices with the U.S. It would receive a significant input of energy assistance and aid from South Korea, Japan and the EU. It would also have a conditional multilateral security guarantee. Having given up its weapons, it would be in a position to move forward with full diplomatic relations with the U.S., sign a peace treaty for the Korean Peninsula, and develop full relations with international financial institutions.



"Of course, there is legitimate scepticism about Pyongyang"s real intentions to accept any deal, no matter how reasonable", says Evans. "But the only way to find out once and for all is to offer it a deal that all five other parties see as reasonable."





[目次]



I. INTRODUCTION



II. NORTH KOREA"S NUCLEAR PROGRAM: THREATS AND RESPONSES

 A. THE EARLY 1990S

 B. THE AGREED FRAMEWORK

 C. THE OCTOBER 2002 SURPRISE

 D. POST-2002 DEVELOPMENT OF NORTH KOREA"S NUCLEAR PROGRAM



III. THE SIX-PARTY TALKS

 A. AUGUST 2003: OPENING POSITIONS

 B. FEBRUARY 2004: DEADLOCK

 C. JUNE 2004: A START, BUT NOT ENOUGH

 D. ASSESSMENT



IV. THE ISSUES: ATTITUDES OF THE KEY PLAYERS

 A. ISSUES TO BE RESOLVED

 B. NORTH KOREA

 C. UNITED STATES

 D. SOUTH KOREA

 E. CHINA

 F. JAPAN

 G. RUSSIA



V. MOVING FORWARD

 A. REALITY CHECKS

 B. AN EIGHT-POINT INTERLOCKING SCHEDULE



VI. CONCLUSION



APPENDICES