NSPR2 Deployment to Iraq and National Interest

Overview

Following the U.S. request for additional troop deployment, we faced several critical questions during a painful debate that lasted nearly a year. First, was the Iraq War an unjust war lacking historical justification? Second, what are South Korea's national interests pursued through the deployment to Iraq? Third, what should the ROK-U.S. relationship look like after the deployment to Iraq?

After massacring 5,000 of its own Kurdish citizens with chemical weapons and committing numerous human rights abuses, the Hussein regime persistently refused to comply with UN Security Council resolutions on disarmament 17 times from the end of the Gulf War in 1991 until 2002. Although the UN imposed sanctions through diplomatic pressure and economic blockade, Saddam Hussein employed delaying tactics through 'partial' cooperation rather than 'full' compliance, which was sufficient to arouse the U.S. administration's 'suspicion' about the possibility of Iraq possessing WMDs. Hussein's tyranny, coupled with suspicions about WMDs, provided considerable 'substantive legitimacy' to the UN and the international community, even if not 'procedural legitimacy.' However, the U.S. lacked sufficient information regarding WMDs to immediately target Iraq under the 'preemptive strike doctrine' and launch a military attack. Ultimately, the legitimacy of the Iraq War became the core of the controversy, and this controversy emboldened resistance forces within Iraq after the war, leading to an exacerbation of the situation.

Nevertheless, as the international community agrees that the resolution of the situation in Iraq is a crucial factor determining the future of the entire Middle East (UN Resolution 1546), South Korea's deployment to Iraq must consider a complex combination of maintaining the macro-level Middle East order, in which South Korea has various interests, and contributing to humanitarian efforts in Iraq. As a consensus is forming among the major powers of the international community that the 'Pandora's Box' opened by the U.S. in Iraq must be closed by any means necessary, if the war on terror is neglected as if it were solely America's problem, the possibility of a world overrun by terrorists and rampant disorder becomes increasingly likely. This point should be the starting point for the discussion on South Korea's deployment to Iraq.

In the process of reorganizing the international order after 9/11, the U.S. has been applying participation in the U.S.-led war on terror as the primary criterion for evaluating alliances. During the Cold War, the U.S. demanded that its allies follow its leadership in exchange for protection from the threat of communism. However, in the 21st century, the U.S. concept of alliance involves demanding that allies acknowledge U.S. leadership in exchange for the U.S. providing 'credit' essential for navigating a globalized international society. Alliances have now transformed from the 20th-century concept of 'blood alliances' (血盟) to the 21st-century concept of 'credit alliances' (信盟). In this regard, South Korea's deployment to Iraq is an investment, or 'use of credit' (用信), to establish a credit alliance with the U.S. The U.S. plans to make Baghdad a center of democracy and market economy in the Middle East through Iraq's reconstruction. If Iraq succeeds in reconstruction, South Korea, along with the U.S., will have the opportunity to secure a bridgehead for advancing west of the Caspian Sea, thereby enhancing energy security. Furthermore, there can be no disagreement between South Korea and the U.S. on the need to promote the human security of Iraqis through peace and reconstruction in Iraq. Cooperation between South Korea and the U.S. for human security signifies that the ROK-U.S. alliance is transcending its traditional military security nature and moving towards universal human values.

As long as both South Korea and the U.S. agree on the necessity of the continued ROK-U.S. alliance, it would be beneficial for the development of ROK-U.S. relations to establish a '21st-century vision' for the alliance before adjusting it after the North Korean threat disappears. The alliance should aim to share fundamental values of democracy and market economy, lead peace rather than respond to threats, realize a horizontal relationship rather than a vertical one with enhanced flexibility and autonomy, and further expand interoperability to become a 'comprehensive regional security alliance.'

The ROK-U.S. comprehensive alliance relationship should evolve beyond addressing traditional military threats to become a 21st-century 'human security alliance' that comprehensively addresses new security threats such as terrorism, drugs, environmental pollution, illegal human migration, and piracy. Whether this evolution is possible depends on the extent to which trust is restored between South Korea and the U.S. through the deployment of South Korean troops to Iraq. A true 21st-century alliance, or credit alliance (信盟), will be established when the U.S. and South Korea can freely engage in credit transactions across political, security, and economic fields based on mutual trust.

If the war on terror is dismissed as solely America's war, and given that the U.S. cannot lead the war on terror to victory alone, the international community will inevitably become a world of disorder and chaos, a world desired by terrorists. As the UN and other major powers cannot substitute for U.S. power, members of the international community must support and advise the U.S. in managing international relations more wisely.

In the harsh reality of international politics, we must be able to distinguish between immediate 'visible deaths' and future 'invisible deaths' to maximize national interests. While we may avoid immediate visible deaths through momentary strategic misjudgments, we must bear in mind that we could inadvertently bring about future invisible deaths on a larger scale and in a more fatal form. We experienced the painful 'IMF crisis' when we lost credit in the globalized international financial community, and it was thanks to the credit accumulated in the security field that we received support from international financial institutions led by the U.S. Although withdrawing troops might prevent immediate visible deaths, it is uncertain whether we could lay the foundation for recovery through accumulated credit in the security field if we were to face a second financial crisis. The deployment to Iraq is a strategic investment to prevent future invisible deaths.

Author

Kim Sung-han, Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security