The Trump-GCC Summit and Qatar's Proposal for an Inclusive Regional Security Architecture with Iran: A Geopolitical Risk Analysis

Executive Summary

Seven months into the U.S.-Israeli air campaign against Iran, the initial objectives of regime change and the dismantlement of nuclear facilities remain unachieved. Meanwhile, Iran has reasserted control over the Strait of Hormuz by force, posing a direct threat to all Gulf oil-producing states. In response, Qatar has proposed a collective security architecture that would guarantee security for the entire region without excluding Iran. However, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) is internally divided—with Bahrain keeping its distance, the UAE pursuing pragmatic engagement, and Saudi Arabia maintaining a hardline stance—making a unified response difficult. President Trump's mixed signals of intense pressure and willingness to negotiate in his UN speech indicate that Washington's own policy course has not yet been set. As a result, Qatar's initiative currently remains at the level of a political gesture. Amid this dual uncertainty, the South Korean government and companies should avoid betting prematurely on either an optimistic or pessimistic scenario. Instead, they should prioritize establishing a continuous monitoring system to track the individual policy lines of the six GCC states, based on a principle of 'assess then act.' It would be prudent to make phased decisions on whether to readjust crude oil and LNG supply sources after Washington's actual policy direction becomes clear following the midterm elections and once the prospects for the institutionalization of Qatar's proposal can be confirmed.

I. Situation Analysis

The Trump-GCC Summit and Qatar's Proposal for an Inclusive Regional Security Architecture with Iran: A Situation Analysis

1. Background and Developments

The starting point for the recent New York meeting is the U.S.-Israeli air campaign against Iran, which began on February 28, 2026 [3][8]. At the outset of the war, Washington's stated objectives were regime change, the dismantlement of nuclear facilities, and the neutralization of Iran's missile and drone programs [3][8]. Supreme Leader Khamenei was killed in an Israeli airstrike [8]. However, the regime change intended by Israel did not materialize [8]. Early in the war, President Trump predicted it would be over in "four to five weeks" [3][7]. He later repeated statements such as "two weeks, a few more days at most" [3][7]. Now, seven months into the conflict, these predictions have not come to pass [13].

The 'Islamabad Memorandum' signed on June 17 stipulated an immediate cessation of military actions on all fronts [6]. However, it was interpreted as containing a provision that allowed Iran to restrict navigation through the Strait of Hormuz [6]. Following the memorandum's expiration, Iran reasserted control over the strait by force [3][6]. Given that about one-fifth of the world's pre-war oil supply passed through the strait, this reassertion of control was a direct threat to all Gulf oil-producing states [6]. The Gulf states' responses have been fractured. Bahrain opted to keep its distance until diplomatic relations with Iran are restored, while the UAE, in contrast, has maintained pragmatic contact with Tehran and sought an interim agreement on shipping lanes [3][6]. The Salalah talks, which Oman had tried to arrange, were postponed just before they were scheduled to take place [6].

Against this backdrop, Qatari Emir Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani assessed that the Gulf is facing "one of its most dangerous phases" [9]. He stated that the U.S.-Israeli war against Iran "can be resolved through diplomatic means," reaffirming Qatar's role as a "trusted mediator" [9]. The solution he mentioned was a "sustainable solution that guarantees the security of the entire region," including Iran [9]. This vision presupposes a durable security order that includes Iran, rather than one based on its containment.

2. Current Situation

Coinciding with the high-level week of the UN General Assembly, President Trump met in New York with leaders and senior officials from the six GCC countries [DELETED SOURCE][7][14]. The meeting included Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain, and Oman, with Iraq and Jordan also participating [1][4]. The possibility of Egypt's attendance was also raised [1][4]. Just before the meeting, President Trump, in his speech to the UN General Assembly, presented Iran with a choice: "negotiate or face the annihilation of the Islamic Republic" [DELETED SOURCE][8]. At the meeting itself, he applied pressure, stating, "We have isolated Iran financially," and "I hope they make the right decision quickly" [8]. At the same time, he also remarked that "dialogue with Iran has been productive," mixing hardline rhetoric with signals of negotiation [8].

On the table at this meeting was a separate framework proposed by Qatar. According to a report by *Daily Sabah*, the framework proposed by Qatar is a concept that would bring Iran and the Arab Gulf states together into a single, collective security architecture [11]. At the Qatar Economic Forum in New York, Qatari Prime Minister Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani stated that this framework must entail both security guarantees for the Gulf states and expanded economic interdependence with Iran [11]. This can be read as an attempt that goes beyond simple ceasefire mediation to design the post-war regional security order itself to be inclusive of Iran.

At the same time, signs of a willingness to negotiate were detected from the Iranian side. An Iranian official mentioned that Iran could reopen the Strait of Hormuz for Gulf shipping if the United States lifts its blockade [16]. Iran presented conditions for reopening the strait, and Secretary of State Marco Rubio showed an open attitude toward the possibility of dialogue with Iran at the UN General Assembly [DELETED SOURCE][16]. Iranian Foreign Minister Araghchi visited the United States for the first time since the war began to attend the UN General Assembly [15]. However, the Iranian president stated at the UN that he would "resolutely defend" Iran's position, maintaining a posture where dialogue and hardline rhetoric coexist [15]. Concurrently, threats from Yemen are also shaping the context of Gulf security discussions, as exemplified by the Saudi king's condemnation of a Houthi rebel attack targeting Mecca [8].

3. Key Actors and Positions

Qatar has emerged as the most active mediator in this phase. Doha has a dual set of interests: its relationship with the United States, centered on Al Udeid Air Base, and its shared stake with Iran in the South Pars/North Dome gas field. The proposal appears to stem from the assessment that continued regional tensions could erode Qatar's economic and security foundations simultaneously. The Qatari emir's statement about being in "one of the most dangerous phases" is more than a rhetorical warning; it points to the structural vacuum created by the absence of a regional collective security system [9].

UAE has pursued a pragmatic course. In earlier phases, it maintained exceptional contact with Tehran and sought an interim agreement on shipping lanes [3][6]. Presidential advisor Anwar Gargash's comment that a "new way of thinking" is needed in relations with Iran [12] suggests that Abu Dhabi shares a principled agreement with Qatar's inclusive approach.

Saudi Arabia is in a relatively more cautious position. As demonstrated by the king's direct condemnation of the Houthi attack targeting Mecca [8], the threat from Iranian proxies via the Yemen front remains a direct security concern. Saudi Arabia is showing a dual approach: participating in the trend toward normalizing relations with Iran while maintaining a hardline stance against the military actions of Iranian proxies.

Bahrain is closer to the hardline camp on Iran within the GCC. It has maintained a stance of keeping its distance from multilateral negotiation frameworks until diplomatic relations with Iran are restored [3][6]. It is assessed that Bahrain would also find it difficult to readily join Qatar's proposed inclusive architecture.

United States simultaneously sent dual signals at this meeting of strengthening the blockade and offering incentives for negotiation. President Trump issued a warning of "annihilation" at the same time he mentioned "productive dialogue" [DELETED SOURCE][8], which some assess is less a policy shift and more rhetoric intended to apply pressure for negotiations ahead of the midterm elections [5]. The Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) has pointed out that the more hawkish figures among the meeting's attendees do not have the power to dictate the actual course of events and that they too do not want a renewed strike [2].

Iran is using its control over the Strait of Hormuz as negotiating leverage. Its existing stance of framing the reopening of the strait not as part of a multilateral framework with the GCC but as a condition for bilateral negotiations with the United States continues in the current phase [6][16]. While Foreign Minister Araghchi's visit to New York suggests a possible resumption of dialogue, the president's hardline remarks show that this tactical flexibility for negotiation has not extended to a broader softening of the regime's overall position [15].

4. Key Issues

The most fundamental issue is whether Qatar's proposal can actually proceed to the institutionalization phase. A collective security architecture that includes Iran would be difficult to develop into a GCC-level agreement without the participation of hardline states like Bahrain. As long as the divergence in policy toward Iran within the GCC—the gap between the pragmatism of the UAE and Qatar and Bahrain's distancing—is not bridged, this proposal is likely to remain merely an initiative from Doha [3][6].

The second issue is when the United States' dual signals will converge into a single policy line. The current situation, where the contradictory messages of strengthening the blockade and opening negotiations coexist, is linked to the observation that a substantive policy direction will likely not become clear until after the November 3 midterm elections [5]. Until then, the Gulf states remain in a state of uncertainty, finding it difficult to align their own policies toward Iran with Washington's eventual decision.

The third issue is the right of passage through the Strait of Hormuz. If Iran continues to use the reopening of the strait as a bargaining chip for bilateral negotiations with the United States rather than as part of a multilateral framework, there is a possibility that the regional multilateral security system proposed by Qatar will fail to become a practical channel for resolving the strait issue [6][16]. In this case, Qatar's proposal would remain a political declaration, and a dual structure could become entrenched where the stabilization of passage through the strait is decided on a separate U.S.-Iran bilateral track.

II. In-Depth Analysis

The Trump-GCC Summit and Qatar's Proposal for an Inclusive Regional Security Architecture with Iran: An In-Depth Analysis

1. Root Cause Analysis

Qatar's decision to publicly propose a collective security architecture inclusive of Iran stems not from a single cause but from a confluence of three pressures. First is the failure of the United States to achieve its military objectives. Seven months into the war, the initial goals of regime change and the dismantlement of nuclear facilities have not been met [3][8]. President Trump's predictions for the war's end, first "four to five weeks" and later "two weeks," have all been proven wrong [3][7][13]. From the perspective of the Gulf states, this is seen as a process in which confidence in Washington's military solutions is eroding. If the United States is prolonging the war without decisively subduing Iran, the incentive for Gulf states to continue aligning with a hardline anti-Iran policy, which presupposes an ultimate American victory, diminishes.

Second is the use of force around the Strait of Hormuz. After the Islamabad Memorandum expired in June, Iran reasserted control over the strait not through negotiation but by force [3][6]. With the shipping lane through which one-fifth of the world's pre-war oil passed now under Iran's unilateral control, the Gulf oil-producing states faced a situation where their economic lifeline depended not on American military superiority but on Iranian goodwill [6]. This was a decisive moment that led the Gulf states to question the effectiveness of the blockade policy itself.

Third is the division within the GCC on policy toward Iran. Bahrain is keeping its distance until diplomatic relations with Iran are restored, while the UAE has maintained pragmatic contact with Tehran and sought an interim agreement on shipping lanes [3][6]. The fact that the Salalah talks, which Oman tried to arrange, were postponed just before they were to be held also reveals the fragility of internal coordination within the Gulf [6]. Qatar's proposal for a collective security architecture comes in the absence of a single, alternative framework to bridge this division. The Qatari emir's description of the Gulf as being in its "most dangerous phase" [9] is not rhetorical hyperbole but closer to a practical judgment that the risks for the entire Gulf will grow if the current ambiguous balance of neither blockade nor dialogue persists.

2. Structural Context

Political Structure: GCC Cohesion and Qatar's Position

Although the GCC is formally a council of six nations, in practice it has rarely presented a unified position on policy toward Iran. In the current situation as well, Saudi Arabia has taken a hardline stance by condemning the Houthi attack on Mecca [8], while the UAE has maintained a pragmatic line of engagement [3][6]. Within this fractured structure, Qatar occupies a unique position. Doha is both a party that shares the world's largest gas field, the South Pars/North Dome, with Iran, and a security partner of the United States, hosting the largest U.S. military base in the region, Al Udeid. This dual position creates a structural incentive for Qatar to assume the role of a "trusted mediator" [9]. The framework requirements outlined by the Qatari prime minister at the New York forum—the two pillars of security guarantees for Gulf states and expanded economic interdependence with Iran [11]—align precisely with Doha's own interests. Security guarantees would allay the concerns of the Gulf oil producers, while economic interdependence would have the effect of institutionally protecting the gas field sharing relationship Qatar has with Iran.

Economic Structure: Energy Dependence and the Hormuz Risk

The structural vulnerability of the Gulf economies is their irreplaceable dependence on the Strait of Hormuz. While Saudi Arabia and the UAE have some bypass pipelines, they are insufficient to replace their total export volume, and virtually all of Qatar's LNG exports depend on passage through the strait. The incident where Iran reasserted control by force after the memorandum's expiration [3][6] made the Gulf oil-producing states directly feel the economic costs of a military blockade strategy. The assessment that Brent crude prices are trading within a range amid alternating phases of negotiation and blockade [6] creates an incentive for Gulf states to seek an institutional solution rather than accept this uncertainty as a permanent cost. The inclusion of expanded economic interdependence in Qatar's proposed framework [11] can be seen in this context as an attempt to bundle security and energy supply into a single package, rather than treating them as separate issues.

Security Structure: Fissures in the Credibility of U.S. Security Guarantees

The most fundamental structural backdrop to this issue is the changing status of the United States as a security provider. In his UN speech and at the GCC meeting, President Trump presented a choice of "negotiate or face annihilation," maintaining his hardline rhetoric [DELETED SOURCE][8]. Yet at the same time, he also made remarks about "productive dialogue with Iran" [8]. A CFR associate interpreted this combination of statements as "laying the groundwork for negotiations" and assessed that while disagreements exist among the Gulf partners, the hardliners do not have the power to dictate the actual course of events [2]. This shows that, from the perspective of the Gulf states, Washington's policy toward Iran is not perceived as a predictable, single trajectory but as a fluid variable that sways with the election calendar and domestic politics. The fact that Gulf states are simultaneously keeping open options like Qatar's multilateral security framework or individual state-level contacts with Iran, instead of relying solely on the U.S. military umbrella, can be interpreted as a self-insuring move based on the premise that the security provided by the United States could be readjusted at any time.

3. Historical Precedents and Comparative Cases

The fact that the GCC itself was established in 1981 in response to a regional security threat—the Iran-Iraq War—demonstrates the structural recurrence of the current issue. At that time as well, the Gulf oil-producing states adopted a dual strategy of combining U.S. military support with their own regional solidarity to counter the single threat of Iran. During the so-called 'Tanker War' of the 1980s Iran-Iraq War, the safety of passage through the Strait of Hormuz also emerged as the greatest vulnerability of the Gulf economies, and the United States intervened by reflagging Kuwaiti oil tankers with the U.S. flag and escorting them. In the current crisis, Iran's pattern of reasserting control over the strait by force [3][6] reaffirms that this historical vulnerability has not been resolved even after more than 40 years.

A more recent precedent is the shift in the UAE's policy toward Iran following the 2019 drone and missile attack on Aramco facilities. At that time, the UAE independently sought to de-escalate tensions with Tehran instead of relying on U.S. military protection, which is consistent with the UAE's current behavior of maintaining pragmatic contact with Iran, in contrast to Bahrain [3][6]. Qatar also has the experience of withstanding the Saudi- and UAE-led blockade during the 2017-2021 Gulf diplomatic crisis by leveraging its relationships with Iran and Türkiye. This experience provides the basis for Qatar's confidence that it can once again lead an inclusive framework that does not exclude Iran. However, these precedents were all cases of bilateral hedging at the individual state level; a multilateral security system including Iran has never actually been operational at the GCC level. In this respect, the current proposal is distinct from past cases in its level of intended institutionalization.

4. Key Variables Shaping Future Developments

The first variable that will shape the issue's development is the U.S. domestic political calendar. The Trump administration's substantive policy direction is likely to become clear only after the November 3 midterm elections. Until then, the current dual track of coexisting hardline rhetoric and negotiation signals is likely to continue [5]. During this period, Qatar's framework is likely to remain at the level of being reviewed among the Gulf states rather than being adopted as a formal agenda item.

The second variable is Iran's negotiating conditions and whether it actually implements them. An Iranian official has signaled that the Strait of Hormuz could be reopened to Gulf shipping if the U.S. lifts its blockade [16], which can be read as an intention to use the UN General Assembly as an opportunity to restart negotiations. However, given that Iran has historically treated the reopening of the strait as leverage for bilateral negotiations with the U.S. rather than for multilateral talks with the GCC [6], whether Iran will actually join the multilateral security architecture envisioned by Qatar is a separate issue. If Iran determines it can secure its interests through a bilateral channel with the U.S., it has a strong incentive not to be bound by a Gulf multilateral framework.

The third variable is whether the different policy lines within the GCC can converge. The key question is whether the three divergent approaches—Saudi Arabia's hardline stance, the UAE's pragmatic engagement, and Bahrain's distancing [3][6][8]—can be reconciled under Qatar's single framework. If this reconciliation does not occur, Qatar's proposal will remain a diplomatic initiative from Doha and will be difficult to elevate to official GCC policy. Furthermore, the fact that non-GCC Arab countries such as Iraq, Jordan, and Egypt were present at this meeting [1][4][12] suggests the potential for this framework to expand beyond the Gulf to an all-Arab approach to Iran. However, this also presents a dilemma: as the number of participating countries increases, it becomes more difficult to converge on a single security guarantee system.