The Spread of "Techno-Fascism" Discourse and the Political Realignment of U.S. Tech Power: Implications for Middle Powers

Executive Summary

The "techno-fascism" discourse originated not in Silicon Valley but within Latin American and European intellectual circles. The shift of U.S. billionaires toward the Trump camp is analyzed not as an ideological conversion but as a recalculation of interests following the post-pandemic funding crunch. The realignment around the AI safety discourse is bringing together ideologically opposed figures like Bernie Sanders and Steve Bannon on the common ground of strengthening regulation, expanding the fault lines in U.S. domestic politics to cut across the left-right axis. While Europe, echoing the warning of ECB President Lagarde, is concerned that its dependence on U.S. tech infrastructure could be used as negotiating leverage, the United Nations has warned against delegating the direction of development to a few Big Tech firms, though its effectiveness is limited. The most likely future scenario is one where ideological debates and policy realities proceed on separate, parallel tracks. In this case, middle powers should refrain from official responses at the discourse level and instead focus on managing practical channels, such as AI infrastructure access and regulatory negotiations. In an optimistic scenario where a bipartisan coalition for checks and balances becomes institutionalized, middle powers should also consider strategies to secure a voice in the early stages of norm-setting.

I. Situational Analysis

The Spread of "Techno-Fascism" Discourse: Concerns over the Convergence of Tech Billionaires and Far-Right Ideology

1. Background and Developments

The starting point for this discourse was not Silicon Valley but the intellectual circles of Latin America and Europe. The Uruguayan outlet La Diaria discussed the interpretive trend of retroactively applying Hannah Arendt's *The Origins of Totalitarianism* to contemporary tech power. The argument is that just as antisemitism, imperialism, mass society, and bureaucracy were retrospectively rearranged as stations on the road to totalitarianism, the same narrative structure is being projected onto the techno-fascism discourse [1]. By pointing out the methodological risks inherent in this genealogical approach, the article's tone differs from an uncritical acceptance of the techno-fascism thesis [1].

Within the United States, some analyses suggest this convergence stems from the economic frustrations of the post-COVID-19 era. *Wired* explains that as the post-pandemic tech stock bubble burst and startup funding tightened, a group of billionaires seeking deregulation and more government contracts shifted toward the Trump camp [5]. This reflects a domestic perspective that sees the move as less of an ideological conversion and more of a recalculation of interests after the end of the pandemic boom [5].

2. Current Situation

The recent phase has led to a realignment of camps around the "AI safety" discourse. When Anthropic CEO Dario Amodei proposed slowing the pace of AI development, Sam Altman, Demis Hassabis, and Elon Musk quickly followed suit [14][16]. *The Hankyoreh* reported an analysis suggesting that behind this call for a slowdown lies a calculation to protect established technological advantages and slow down latecomers [13]. An interesting aspect of this dynamic is that ideologically opposite figures like Bernie Sanders and Steve Bannon have found common ground on the issue of strengthening AI regulation [11]. Sanders called on Trump to negotiate a treaty with Xi Jinping to halt AI development, and Bannon, despite being a close associate of Trump, expressed the same concern [11]. This suggests that the demand for checks on tech power is expanding into a bipartisan phenomenon that cuts across the left-right ideological axis.

The Chinese state-run media outlet *Global Times* reframes this trend from a European perspective, presenting a different narrative. It highlighted the geopolitical threat to Europe from the "tech right" trend in the U.S. by quoting ECB President Lagarde's warning that Europe would face "unprecedented risks" if it failed to develop its own AI technology and computing capabilities [8]. Lagarde's statement that access to U.S. tech companies could itself be used as leverage in tariff or digital tax negotiations shows that the techno-fascism discourse is expanding beyond a simple ideological debate into an issue of the U.S.-Europe technological dependency structure [8].

Responses at the UN level are also underway. UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Türk sent a letter to governments and AI developers warning that the direction and pace of super-powerful AI cannot be left to a few Big Tech companies alone [15]. This can be read as an attempt by a multilateral organization to put the brakes on the autonomous exercise of power by tech billionaires.

3. Key Actors and Positions

Latin American and European Intellectual CirclesThese are the epicenter of the techno-fascism discourse. The *La Diaria* commentary, while cautioning that a genealogical narrative from totalitarianism to techno-fascism could fall into the trap of historical determinism, acknowledges the need for an alternative analytical framework [1]. This shows that critical self-reflection is accompanying the spread of the discourse.

Silicon Valley Tech LeadersThis group is showing internal divisions. Amodei, Altman, Hassabis, and Musk agree on the rationale of slowing down AI, but as analyzed by *The Hankyoreh*, this is linked to the commercial motive of solidifying their existing advantages [13][14]. In contrast, some billionaires like Peter Thiel are identified as a faction that perceives international organizations and multilateral cooperation as threats, supporting a discourse that justifies the pursuit of unregulated power.

U.S. Political SphereThis sphere is forming an unusual coalition that transcends the ideological axis. The fact that Sanders (progressive) and Bannon (far-right Trump associate) have met on the common ground of AI regulation [11] suggests that checks on tech power could become a catalyst for reshaping the left-right political landscape. At the same time, President Trump has repeatedly drawn a line against strengthening AI regulation, citing competition with China [17], placing the executive branch in the contradictory position of defending the autonomy of tech companies.

ChinaChina defines and pushes back against U.S. arguments about AI risks as "kicking away the ladder," claiming they "only hinder technological progress" [17]. The *Global Times* goes a step further, framing the rise of the U.S. "tech right" as an issue of geopolitical leverage over Europe, thereby shifting the U.S. internal ideological conflict into an issue of U.S.-Europe technological dependency [8].

The United NationsThe United Nations, through High Commissioner for Human Rights Türk, has clarified its position that AI governance cannot be entrusted to a few Big Tech companies [15]. This shows that the multilateral organization is taking on the role of a defensive line against the anti-multilateralist tendencies of tech billionaires.

4. Key Issues

The first issue is the analytical validity of the concept of techno-fascism itself. As *La Diaria* raised, narrating the political choices of certain individuals as an inevitable path to totalitarianism could be an over-interpretation [1]. This is linked to the risk of the original context being simplified as U.S. domestic political discourse spreads externally.

The second issue is the question of sincerity in the AI safety discourse. It is unclear whether the moves by Big Tech CEOs calling for a slowdown are genuine risk management or rhetoric aimed at solidifying market dominance [13][16]. This means that in the realms of U.S. domestic politics and foreign strategy, the direction of international AI governance discussions could change significantly depending on the regulatory framework adopted by the administration.

The third issue is whether this discourse will culminate in a challenge to the multilateral system itself. If the criticism that tech billionaires like Peter Thiel perceive international organizations as a threat is true, the UN's attempt to intervene in AI governance [15] could become a point of direct confrontation in the future. From the perspective of middle powers, the key question is whether this rift will end as temporary noise in U.S. domestic politics or develop into a structural variable that shakes the multilateral tech governance order itself. The trend of Europe moving to build its own AI infrastructure, as warned by Lagarde [8], suggests that middle powers also need to separately manage the risks of technological dependency on specific tech powers.

II. In-Depth Analysis

The Spread of "Techno-Fascism" Discourse: Concerns over the Convergence of Tech Billionaires and Far-Right Ideology

1. Analysis of Root Causes

The root cause for the spread of this discourse should be sought in a recalculation of interests rather than ideology. As *Wired* pointed out, the end of the pandemic boom in 2022 led to a sharp tightening of funding for Silicon Valley startups [5]. After the remote work platform boom subsided, tech capital had to find new growth engines, and deregulation and increased government contracts emerged as alternatives [5]. The shift toward the Trump camp began in earnest at this point. This was not an ideological conversion but a redesign of capital's profit-making path; therefore, viewing the convergence with far-right ideology as purely a matter of conviction is inconsistent with domestic analyses [5].

The second root cause is the competitive logic within the AI industry. Safety concerns are not the only reason why Anthropic, OpenAI, and Google DeepMind simultaneously came out with calls for a "slowdown" [13][14][16]. As *The Hankyoreh* pointed out, there is an underlying calculation by companies that have already secured a technological advantage to slow down the pursuit by latecomers [13]. The calls for regulation may in fact be an attempt to design regulations in their own favor. This is where the contradiction arises of the same actors being criticized for "seeking unregulated power" while simultaneously making public statements "demanding regulation for safety" [13][14].

The third root cause is the decline of trust in the multilateral system. The very fact that UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Türk sent a letter to governments and AI developers warning that "the world stands on the threshold of an irreversible change that will affect not only the current generation but all of humanity to come" [15] paradoxically shows that the control of multilateral organizations has already weakened. The warning that the direction and pace of development cannot be left to a few Big Tech companies [15] stems from the diagnosis that such a situation is already becoming a reality.

2. Structural Context

Political StructureIn the political structure, this phenomenon is directly linked to the realignment of U.S. domestic politics. The shift of the billionaire group to the Trump camp is not an individual choice but a structural outcome created by the economic conditions of the post-pandemic tech stock bubble collapse [5]. This also affects the direction of the U.S. administration's foreign policy. President Trump's repeated drawing of a line against strengthening AI regulation, citing competition with China [17], shows that the interests of domestic tech capital and the logic of external competition are intertwined. At the same time, the fact that Bernie Sanders and Steve Bannon have formed a common front on AI regulation [11] suggests that the demand for checks on tech power is creating a domestic political fault line that cuts across the left-right ideological axis. This is a point that needs to be continuously monitored in the issue areas of U.S. domestic politics and foreign strategy.

Economic StructureIn the economic structure, the concentration of capital around AI infrastructure is key. From a European perspective, this issue is read as a threat of technological dependency. ECB President Lagarde warned that if Europe does not develop its own AI technology and computing capabilities, access itself could be used as negotiating leverage [8]. The *Global Times* quoted this statement to highlight the geopolitical pressure that the U.S. "tech right" trend exerts on Europe [8]. This shows that different camps are appropriating the same phenomenon to suit their own strategic needs. The very way Chinese state media quotes European concerns implies an intention to use the U.S.-Europe rift to its advantage in the U.S.-China competition [8].

Security StructureIn the security structure, a war of nerves is unfolding between the U.S. and China over the pace of AI development. *La Tercera* defined this as a "quiet cold war," analyzing that the demand to slow the pace of AI has opened a new front between Washington and Beijing [16]. *The Hankyoreh* reported that China pushed back against U.S. Big Tech's arguments about AI risks, stating they "only hinder the progress of global AI governance" [17]. A dual structure has formed where the U.S. AI industry's call for a slowdown acts as a barrier to entry for China, while for the U.S. itself, it raises concerns of being caught up [17].

3. Historical Precedents and Comparative Cases

The point raised by the *La Diaria* commentary is the danger of historical analogy. In the interpretive trend of retroactively applying Hannah Arendt's *The Origins of Totalitarianism* to the present day, antisemitism, imperialism, mass society, bureaucracy, racism, and the crisis of the nation-state are retrospectively rearranged as stations on the road to totalitarianism [1]. The core point of this outlet's critique is that the same narrative structure is being projected directly onto the techno-fascism discourse [1]. This entails the risk of methodological determinism. The approach of first positing a specific phenomenon (the convergence of Big Tech and the far-right) and then rearranging past cases to fit that conclusion can become closer to political rhetoric than historical explanation [1].

This critique serves as an important reference point for dealing with the techno-fascism thesis. It is necessary to distinguish whether the convergence of billionaires and far-right politics is actually a new totalitarian threat or the result of projecting the image of past fascism onto the current situation. *La Diaria* explicitly states in its title that "alternatives (alternativas)" are needed for this genealogical approach [1]. This reflects the cautious stance of Latin American intellectual circles, which suggests that rather than fully accepting the concept of techno-fascism, its formation process and political effects should be critically examined [1].

Meanwhile, the realignment of camps occurring within the United States shows a structure closer to the formation of the military-industrial complex during the Cold War than to the capital-politics convergence during the rise of European fascism in the 1930s. The pattern of capital seeking to expand government contracts aligning with a specific political force [5] is similar to the history of the military-industrial complex's formation, in that it is a convergence of interests mediated by budgets and regulatory authority rather than an ideological alliance.

4. Key Variables Shaping Developments

The first variable is whether the internal divisions within the U.S. AI industry will persist. Although Altman, Hassabis, and Musk supported Amodei's proposal for a slowdown [14][16], whether this cooperation will lead to actual policy depends on the Trump administration's prioritization of competition with China. As President Trump has drawn a line against strengthening regulation, citing competition with China [17], it will not be easy for the safety discourse to be institutionalized as substantive regulation.

The second variable is the potential for expansion of the bipartisan coalition for checks and balances that cuts across the left-right divide. The key question is whether the common front of Sanders and Bannon [11] will remain a temporary event or develop into a sustained political force in U.S. domestic politics. This could be an indicator of whether checks on tech power will emerge as a major issue in the 2028 presidential election cycle.

The third variable is the capacity of multilateral organizations, including the UN, for substantive intervention. Whether High Commissioner Türk's letter [15] leads to actual regulatory legislation by national governments or remains a declarative warning will determine the effectiveness of the multilateral system.

The fourth variable is the pace at which Europe secures its own AI capabilities. Whether the technological dependency risk warned of by Lagarde [8] leads to actual policy responses (such as investment in its own computing infrastructure) will determine whether the techno-fascism discourse transforms into a substantive tension in U.S.-Europe relations. How China attempts to exploit this rift is also a point to watch [8].