Assessing the First Korea-Central Asia Summit: Asymmetries in Substantive Cooperation and Policy Challenges

Executive Summary

The Korea-Central Asia summit held in Seoul on September 16 resulted in a dual structure where substantive outcomes were concentrated in separate bilateral channels with Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, rather than in the multilateral plenary session. Uzbekistan expanded its scope of cooperation to include AI, building on its existing Special Strategic Partnership. Kazakhstan elevated its relationship to a Future-Oriented Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, signing commercial contracts worth $19 billion and 12 official documents. In contrast, agreements with Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan remained at a declarative level, suggesting that treating the five nations as a single cooperation package could be inefficient. The fact that Kazakhstan held successive talks with India, the United States, and the UAE on the sidelines of the BRICS summit just before visiting Seoul shows that Central Asian countries view South Korea as one pillar of their diversified diplomacy—a structural condition that must be treated as a constant in future cooperation design. The South Korean government and businesses need to manage the implementation of the multilateral statement and the country-specific bilateral channels separately. It is imperative to promptly establish a differentiated strategy that concentrates resources on the two main axes of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, along with a quarterly system for monitoring implementation.

I. Analysis of the Current Situation

The First Korea-Central Asia Summit: Analysis of the Current Situation

1. Background and Developments

The cooperation framework between South Korea and the five Central Asian countries was launched in the mid-2000s as a ministerial-level dialogue channel. The Uzbek media outlet Gazeta.uz noted that this format has been in operation for nearly 20 years [12]. The local assessment is that it has functioned as a platform for political dialogue and has spurred various joint initiatives [12]. The recent upgrade to the summit level signifies a “transition from the stage of sectoral coordination to one of strategic decision-making,” according to the Uzbek perspective [12][3].

The leaders of all five countries—Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan—attended the summit in Seoul on September 16 [4]. Ahead of the summit, Foreign Minister Cho Hyun, in a contribution to Yonhap News Agency, emphasized deepening cooperation in future-oriented fields such as strategic resources, supply chains, and AI [9]. The presidential office stated that President Lee Jae-myung assessed Central Asia as a region with high growth potential [6].

A noteworthy point is that the stage for substantive negotiations was not the multilateral plenary session but individual bilateral channels. The leaders of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan made separate visits to South Korea on September 14-15, a day or two before the summit, for bilateral talks [8][10][13]. Prior to attending the summit, Kazakhstan’s president had held successive meetings with India, the United States, and the UAE at the BRICS summit [3]. This suggests that Central Asian countries treat South Korea not as an exclusive partner but as one pillar of their diversified diplomacy [3].

2. Current Situation

The relationship with Uzbekistan is already established as a Special Strategic Partnership, and this summit expanded the scope of cooperation from a focus on transportation and infrastructure to include advanced industries and AI [8]. In his meeting with President Mirziyoyev, President Lee Jae-myung referred to Uzbekistan as “the only Special Strategic Partner in Central Asia” and a “key partner” [8].

Through a bilateral summit on September 15, the relationship with Kazakhstan was upgraded to a “Future-Oriented Comprehensive Strategic Partnership” [10]. The foreign ministers of the two countries exchanged official notes, and 12 intergovernmental and inter-agency documents were signed [16]. The Astana Times reported that President Tokayev signed commercial contracts worth $19 billion during his visit to Seoul [17]. Sixty-seven projects in Alatau City (worth $6.9 billion) and 51 joint industrial projects were pre-coordinated and reflected in the summit outcomes [14]. In a speech at the Seoul Business Summit, President Tokayev proposed a new cooperation model combining South Korea’s technology with Kazakhstan’s production and suggested doubling the bilateral trade volume [11][18].

As a joint outcome of the summit, Yonhap News Agency reported that President Lee Jae-myung and the five Central Asian leaders agreed to deepen mutually beneficial cooperation in areas such as critical minerals and energy [4]. Foreign Minister Cho Hyun described this as a “new road beyond the Silk Road,” emphasizing deeper cooperation in AI and critical minerals [9].

3. Key Actors and Positions

The South Korean governmentis prioritizing its economic security agenda of diversifying critical mineral supply chains. In his meeting with his Kazakh counterpart, President Lee Jae-myung presented “pragmatic diplomacy that values national interest and tangible results” as a common denominator [10]. With Uzbekistan, Seoul aims to leverage the established Special Strategic Partnership to broaden cooperation from infrastructure to advanced industries [8].

Kazakhstanis positioning itself as an energy and resource-rich nation with high-tech industrial potential, and has identified South Korea as an important partner for economic security cooperation [10]. President Tokayev presented trade and investment cooperation as top priorities [11] and holds the strategic goal of establishing his country as a Eurasian transshipment hub [3]. At the same time, as demonstrated by his meetings with India, the US, and the UAE at the BRICS summit, Kazakhstan is managing its cooperation with South Korea as one component of its diversified diplomacy [3].

Uzbekistanis the only Central Asian country to maintain a Special Strategic Partnership with South Korea, allowing for a relatively faster pace of deepening cooperation [8]. Gazeta.uz interpreted the upgrade to the summit level as an entry into a stage of strategic decision-making [12].

Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, and TajikistanThe leaders of these three countries attended the summit [4], but their individual achievements through bilateral channels were less prominent compared to those of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. This suggests that the pace of deepening cooperation will diverge markedly by country.

4. Key Issues

First is the gap between the format of a multilateral summit and the actual implementation structure centered on bilateral channels for substantive negotiations. This structure inevitably creates a disconnect between multilateral agreements at the level of joint declarations and country-specific practical implementation [3].

Second is the hedging diplomacy of Central Asian states. The fact that Kazakhstan held sequential meetings with India, the US, and the UAE on the sidelines of the BRICS summit shows that its cooperation with South Korea is not an exclusive partnership but part of a diversified portfolio [3].

Third is the issue of country-specific disparities in cooperation. While Uzbekistan has expanded its cooperation scope to AI based on its Special Strategic Partnership [8], other countries, including Kazakhstan, remain at a relatively early stage [3].

Fourth is the viability of Kazakhstan's proclaimed strategy to become a Eurasian transshipment hub. Despite the signing of large-scale investment contracts [17][14], if logistics and infrastructure bottlenecks are not resolved, it remains a key variable whether these contracts will translate into actual supply chain outcomes [3].

II. In-Depth Analysis

The First Korea-Central Asia Summit: In-Depth Analysis

1. Root Causes: The Intersection of Diplomatic Diversification and the Strategic Use of Resources

The upgrade of this summit from the ministerial to the presidential level after 20 years is driven by more than just an elevation of diplomatic protocol. The Uzbek media outlet Gazeta.uz described the upgrade as a “transition from the stage of sectoral coordination to one of strategic decision-making” [12]. This expression can be read as an indication that Central Asian countries intend to handle issues that cannot be addressed at the working level—namely, resource development rights and large-scale capital allocation—through political decisions made by their leaders.

The root causes are twofold. From South Korea's side, there is an urgent economic security need to move away from reliance on specific countries for critical mineral supply chains. Ahead of the summit, Foreign Minister Cho Hyun described cooperation on strategic resources and supply chains as a “new road beyond the Silk Road” [9]. This reflects an internal government consensus that existing trade-centric relationships are insufficient to address mineral supply chain risks.

The fundamental driver on the Central Asian side is different. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are determined to upgrade their industries, aiming to build domestic processing and manufacturing capabilities to move beyond their status as resource exporters. At the Seoul Business Summit, President Tokayev directly proposed a framework of “Korea’s technology, Kazakhstan’s production” [11]. This clearly reveals an intention to create value-added within their own territories, breaking from the old model of exporting raw materials. The Astana Times also pointed out that a key agenda of the summit was “expanding local processing and production” [1]. This cooperation framework can be seen as having formed at the intersection of South Korea’s demand for supply chain diversification and Central Asia’s demand for industrial upgrading.

2. Structural Context

Political Structure: The Institutionalization of Hedging Diplomacy

The foreign policies of the five Central Asian countries are based on hedging to avoid over-reliance on any single major power. The fact that Kazakhstan held successive meetings with India, the US, and the UAE at the BRICS summit just before visiting Seoul illustrates this [3]. This is not a one-off diplomatic schedule but a structural pattern in Kazakhstan's foreign policy. In Seoul, President Tokayev also remarked that “high-intensity geopolitical tensions worldwide are exerting unprecedented pressure on global trade and economic stability,” positioning cooperation with South Korea as a means to counter this pressure [15].

Within this structure, South Korea is one of several partners competing in parallel with China, Russia, the EU, the US, India, and Türkiye. The fact that only Uzbekistan has been granted the higher status of a “Special Strategic Partnership” [8] conversely shows that relations with the other four countries remain on a lower tier. Although the relationship with Kazakhstan was upgraded to a “Future-Oriented Comprehensive Strategic Partnership” during this summit [10], it is nominally distinct from Uzbekistan’s “Special” designation. The emergence of a dual structure—a multilateral summit stage and separate bilateral channels—is a natural reflection of this hedging structure.

Economic Structure: Logistical Bottlenecks and Asymmetrical Capital Allocation

Kazakhstan’s vision of a Eurasian transshipment hub is heavily dependent on physical infrastructure constraints. For the 67 projects in Alatau City ($6.9 billion) and the 51 joint industrial projects [14] to become operational, Kazakhstan's domestic rail and port connectivity must be adequate. If this condition is not met, the $19 billion worth of commercial contracts signed in Seoul [17] are likely to face significant delays during the implementation phase.

The asymmetry of capital allocation is also a structural factor. Cooperation with Kazakhstan is designed to be quantitatively vast, spanning multiple sectors such as crude oil, nuclear power, automobile manufacturing, and urban development [13][14]. In contrast, cooperation with Uzbekistan is deepening along a specific axis from infrastructure and minerals to AI [8]. This reflects the differences in the two countries' economic scales and reform speeds, structurally indicating that it is difficult for the South Korean government and businesses to manage all five countries at the same pace of cooperation.

Security Structure: The Proliferation of the Economic Security Framework

The elevation of critical minerals cooperation to a summit-level agenda is rooted in the international trend of redefining this issue not as a purely commercial matter but as one of economic security. Examples such as the US strategic framing of infrastructure cooperation within the Quad [2] and the Russia-China axis linking resource and energy cooperation with a security narrative at SCO meetings [7] show a common trend where critical minerals are no longer handled solely by market logic. The Korea-Central Asia summit is part of this trend. However, South Korea’s approach differs in that it does not carry the explicit color of a security alliance like the Quad or the SCO, instead maintaining an economic facade of industrial and supply chain cooperation.

3. Historical Precedents and Comparative Cases

This summit offers points of comparison with the case of the revitalized ROK-Japan-China trilateral summit. When the trilateral summit, suspended since 2019, resumed in 2024, a similar structure emerged where substantive issues were handled through bilateral channels, separate from the trilateral joint declaration [5]. This division of labor, where multilateral summits handle symbolic agreements and bilateral channels manage practical implementation, is a recurring pattern in East Asian multilateral diplomacy. The Korea-Central Asia summit followed the same pattern, with the plenary session producing a comprehensive agreement on critical minerals and energy cooperation [4], while actual contracts and relationship upgrades were handled in bilateral summits.

The SCO’s Bishkek summit is another relevant case. An EAI analysis defined the SCO not as a monolithic anti-Western bloc but as a framework of “asynchronous hedging,” where the Russia-China, Iran, and India axes cohere at different speeds [7]. This concept is also applicable to Korea-Central Asia relations. The fact that the Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan tracks are developing their relationships with South Korea at different paces and depths suggests that an approach treating the five countries as a single bloc may be detached from reality.

Kazakhstan's transshipment hub strategy is similar to the pattern in the early days of the Belt and Road Initiative, where Central Asian countries prioritized securing infrastructure connectivity while accepting Chinese capital. However, a key difference this time is the attempt to utilize multiple capital sources simultaneously—including South Korea, India, the EU, and Gulf states—rather than relying on a single source like China. This can be seen as a more sophisticated diversification effort than in the past.

4. Key Variables Shaping Future Developments

The first variable is the diverging implementation speed between the two main tracks of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. Uzbekistan has already established a high-level institutional framework with its Special Strategic Partnership and has expanded cooperation to AI [8], whereas Kazakhstan has just upgraded its relationship status [10]. If the implementation gap between the two countries widens, South Korea's Central Asia policy could effectively be split into separate policies for Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan.

The second variable is whether Kazakhstan can improve its logistics infrastructure. For the Alatau City projects and the 51 joint industrial projects [14] to proceed as planned, bottlenecks in rail and transshipment infrastructure must first be resolved. Without confirmed progress in this area, the $19 billion worth of contracts [17] risk remaining mere agreements on paper.

The third variable is the scope of the Central Asian states' external hedging. If the pattern of Kazakhstan conducting parallel negotiations with India, the US, and the UAE at the BRICS summit [3] continues, the exclusivity of cooperation that South Korea can secure will be limited. The degree to which Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan each prioritize South Korea will be a key indicator of the future substantive depth of cooperation.