The U.S.-China Competition in AI-Integrated Laser Anti-Drone Weapons and South Korea’s Policy Challenges

Executive Summary

In response to the asymmetric proliferation of drone threats, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) and the U.S. Department of Defense are developing AI-integrated laser weapon systems and AI-based threat identification systems, respectively. This indicates a shift in the U.S.-China military competition from a race for individual weapon superiority to one focused on integrated information and command-and-control capabilities. The PLA's Type 19 laser-equipped armored vehicle appears geared toward a potential Taiwan landing operation, which, combined with Taiwan's own efforts to expand its drone forces, is structuring an asymmetric competition between drones and counter-drone systems in the Taiwan Strait. However, the PLA's use of offensive combat AI remains in an exploratory phase due to political caution, confirming that organizational integration does not immediately translate into superior operational capability. Meanwhile, Hanwha's attempt to export low-cost laser weapons to NATO's eastern flank suggests a new avenue for middle-power defense industries, driven by real-world operational demand independent of the U.S.-China rivalry. The South Korean government faces a dual task: on the security front, it must monitor developments related to the PLA's Strategic Support Force (SSF) and develop its own command-and-control systems; on the economic front, it needs to support the export of low-cost counter-drone solutions.

I. Issue Analysis

The U.S.-China Competition in AI-Integrated Laser Anti-Drone Weapons: An Issue Analysis

1. Background and Developments

The development of anti-drone weapons by China's People's Liberation Army (PLA) is linked to the evolving situation in the Taiwan Strait. On August 29, 2026, an unverified image surfaced on Chinese social media showing an amphibious armored vehicle equipped with a laser weapon and additional sensors [1]. Identified as a new variant of the Type 19 8x8 combat vehicle, this system is analyzed as being intended to enhance the anti-drone defense capabilities of frontline troops during a potential landing operation in Taiwan [1]. This development coincides with Taiwan's rapid expansion of its own drone forces and its plans to invest billions of dollars in unmanned systems [1]. Taiwan's largest aerospace and defense company, AIDC, has also stated that a dedicated, low-cost counter-drone defense system is necessary because "China is now pushing hard on drone development" [10].

The development of these individual weapon systems is part of a broader trend of AI-driven military innovation across the PLA. The Strategic Support Force (SSF), established in 2015, is an organization that integrates space, cyber, electronic warfare, and information warfare capabilities under a single command structure. According to the Brookings Institution, no other major power has pursued the military integration of AI as purposefully as China [2][3]. Beijing has already declared its national goal of becoming the world's leading AI power by 2030, a goal supported by the Communist Party leadership's innovation-driven military modernization strategy [2][3]. However, an analysis by the East Asia Institute (EAI) notes that even internal PLA research indicates a self-assessment that "the use of offensive combat AI is still in an exploratory phase." This is attributed less to technological limitations and more to the fact that "political caution surrounding Party-military relations and the delegation of command authority acts as a structural constraint" [3].

The U.S. response has focused more on threat identification and command-and-control support than on individual weapon systems. The U.S. Department of Defense has been grappling with the challenge of human operators having to simultaneously process high-speed targets, short response times, and ambiguous sensor data during missile defense operations. It is pursuing the introduction of AI to reduce this confusion [7]. This aligns with EAI's analysis that the axis of U.S.-China military competition is shifting from a race for superiority in individual interceptor weapons to one centered on integrated information and command-and-control capabilities [3].

2. Current Situation

The MSPO defense exhibition held in Kielce, Poland, in September 2026 revealed another dimension of this competition. South Korea's Hanwha proposed an armored vehicle equipped with a 50kW-class laser to Poland and other Eastern European NATO countries [4]. With Poland and several nations on NATO's eastern flank seeking affordable counter-drone defense measures, Hanwha explained that this vehicle is a higher-power version of the fixed-site Cheong-gwang laser that the South Korean military has been operating since 2024 [4]. This shows that South Korean defense companies are entering the market for low-cost counter-drone solutions based on real-world operational demand, separate from the U.S.-China AI-laser competition framework.

Separate from the Department of Defense's push for an AI-driven threat identification system, the U.S. Air Force is considering converting cargo aircraft into launch platforms for drone swarms to protect its bases [16]. The Italian Air Force is also weighing the adoption of American technology to modify low-cost unguided rockets into precision drone interceptors [12]. The trend of multiple NATO member states individually seeking low-cost counter-drone systems suggests that the asymmetric nature of the drone threat, as demonstrated on the battlefields of Ukraine, is changing procurement priorities across the European defense industry.

On the Chinese side, efforts to enhance the export competitiveness of its drones are also underway. Pakistan's recent acquisition of the HQ-17AE short-range air defense system is intended to bolster its capabilities against low-altitude drone threats amid tensions with India. Analysts suggest that the successful integration of this system with other foreign systems supports China's export competitiveness [17]. This indicates that, in addition to the PLA's own force modernization, Chinese defense exports are forming a separate competitive axis in the counter-drone and low-altitude defense market.

3. Key Actors and Positions

China's PLAis developing a laser-and-sensor-integrated armored vehicle with the specific operational goal of supporting a landing operation in a Taiwan contingency [1]. However, this development is taking place within the larger framework of SSF-led AI military integration. There is an assessment that the low-cost development model of the commercial AI ecosystem has the potential to asymmetrically narrow the military AI gap [3]. Internally, the PLA still exhibits strong political caution about delegating command authority to AI [3].

U.S. Department of Defenseis prioritizing the domain of command-and-control support, specifically the real-time identification of missile and space threats, over individual interceptor weapons [7]. The U.S. Air Force is separately pursuing the establishment of a counter-drone swarm system for base protection [16]. This can be interpreted as a strategic choice by the United States to maintain its advantage in information processing speed and accuracy rather than engaging in a symmetric hardware response.

South Korea's Hanwhais attempting to enter the Eastern European NATO market by leveraging the operational track record of its systems with the South Korean military (the Cheong-gwang laser) [4]. This is an example of a South Korean defense company carving out its own export channels independent of the U.S.-China competition, aligning with the demand from NATO's eastern flank nations for low-cost defense solutions.

Taiwanis simultaneously pursuing the expansion of its own drone forces and the establishment of a dedicated, low-cost counter-drone shield in response to the PLA's buildup of drone and counter-drone capabilities [1][10]. Taiwanese defense companies like AIDC are rapidly expanding their business from aircraft manufacturing to counter-drone systems [10].

NATO Eastern European Countries and Italyshare a common position of seeking low-cost counter-drone solutions instead of premium individual interceptor weapons [4][12]. This is a pragmatic response to the threat of mass drone use, a lesson learned from the war in Ukraine, and it is opening up market opportunities for various suppliers, including Hanwha.

4. Key Issues

The first issue is the gap between the PLA's organizational caution and its technological progress. While the will for AI integration at the SSF level is clear, the actual delegation of command authority to offensive weapon systems is constrained by the political sensitivities of Party-military relations [3]. This suggests that there may be a time lag between the unveiling of an individual weapon system and its operational deployment.

The second issue is that the axis of competition is shifting from the performance of individual weapons to integrated information and command-and-control capabilities. The U.S. Department of Defense's push for AI-driven threat identification is a prime example of this shift, and there are projections that China's low-cost commercial AI development model could narrow this gap [3][7].

The third issue is the position of middle-power defense countries, including South Korea, in the low-cost counter-drone market. Hanwha's proposal to Eastern European NATO members shows that a market based on real-world operational demand is forming outside the framework of the U.S.-China great power competition, which has direct implications for South Korea's defense export strategy [4].

II. In-Depth Analysis

The U.S.-China Competition in AI-Integrated Laser Anti-Drone Weapons: An In-Depth Analysis

1. Analysis of Root Causes

The asymmetric proliferation of drone threats is the primary driver of this competition. Taiwan is rapidly expanding its low-cost drone forces [1]. An executive at AIDC, Taiwan's largest aerospace and defense company, stated that a dedicated, low-cost counter-drone defense system is needed because "China is now pushing hard on drone development" [10]. This stems from the asymmetry wherein drones are cheap offensive tools, while the means to intercept them are far more expensive. Using conventional surface-to-air missiles to shoot down small drones results in a cost inversion. This is the same reason the Italian Air Force is considering American technology to convert cheap unguided rockets into precision interceptors [12]. Lasers have emerged as a structural solution to this cost-inversion problem because their cost-per-shot is effectively limited to the cost of electricity.

The second root cause is the PLA's preparation for a potential landing operation in Taiwan. The timing of the sighting of the new Type 19 8x8 combat vehicle variant, which integrates a laser and additional sensors, coincides with Taiwan's plans to invest billions of dollars in expanding its unmanned systems [1]. This suggests that the PLA already considers the possibility of its landing forces being exposed to Taiwanese drone attacks during the coastal approach phase as a concrete threat.

The third cause is the cognitive bottleneck in the missile defense domain. The U.S. Department of Defense has long faced the structural difficulty of human operators having to simultaneously process high-speed targets, short response times, and ambiguous sensor data [7]. The introduction of AI is less about innovating the weapon systems themselves and more an attempt to resolve this problem of decision-making delays.

2. Structural Context

From a security structure perspective, this competition is situated within the broader trend of PLA organizational reform. The Strategic Support Force (SSF), established in 2015, consolidated space, cyber, electronic warfare, and information warfare capabilities under a single command structure [2][3]. The Brookings Institution assesses that while all major powers profess to be pursuing the military application of AI, "none have done so as purposefully as China" [2]. However, an analysis by the East Asia Institute points out that this organizational integration does not immediately translate into operational capability. It notes that "even internal PLA research indicates a self-assessment that the use of offensive combat AI is still in an exploratory phase," attributing this less to technology than to the fact that "political caution surrounding Party-military relations and the delegation of command authority acts as a structural constraint" [3]. In other words, a politically defined gap exists between the emergence of individual platforms like the counter-drone laser vehicle and the level at which AI is actually involved in combat decisions.

From an economic structure perspective, the proliferation pressure of low-cost weapons is reshaping the defense export market. Poland and many countries on NATO's eastern flank are seeking affordable counter-drone defense systems [4], a demand that South Korea's Hanwha is targeting with its 50kW-class laser-equipped armored vehicle [4]. This is an example of a middle-power defense industry entering a market based on real-world operational demand, a dynamic distinct from the high-tech AI competition between the U.S. and China. At the same time, this is an extension of the reorganization of the robotics and drone supply chain noted by EAI. The analysis that U.S. regulations on foreign-made robots and drones are having the "counter-effect of promoting circumvention exports by Chinese companies to third markets such as Europe" [6] suggests that a similar dynamic of circumvention and competition could form in the counter-drone weapon market.

From a political structure perspective, both the U.S. and China have built narratives that justify the militarization of AI at the national strategy level. In its 15th Five-Year Plan, China places AI at the center of its industrial strategy, pursuing "technological self-reliance and domestic market protection" while simultaneously promoting the seemingly contradictory goals of "international proliferation of AI models and strengthening cooperation on global AI governance" [11]. The United States seeks to lead AI norm-setting in multilateral forums like the G7 and the UN, but Brookings assesses that a recent series of AI summits has actually led to the "widening of the gap between the U.S. and China" [8]. This political gap provides the backdrop for arms development proceeding in a virtual absence of common norms or confidence-building measures in the military AI domain.

3. Historical Precedents and Comparative Cases

The laser anti-drone weapon competition is structurally similar to the recent U.S.-China technological race over hypersonic missiles. A case in point is the U.S. DARPA's launch of a next-generation hypersonic cruise missile project just one year after China unveiled a hypersonic missile in a military parade [15]. In both cases, a pattern emerges where China first visually displays a specific platform, and the United States subsequently formalizes a responsive research and development program. However, the nature of the competition differs: while the hypersonic race is a competition of speed and range between offensive systems, the laser anti-drone race is a competition of cost-effectiveness in defensive systems.

China's reaction to Japan's development of AI satellites also serves as a point of comparison. Chinese state broadcaster CCTV described the enhancement of surveillance information analysis and counter-strike capabilities through AI-equipped satellites as a "core pillar of a space militarization strategy" and a "serious threat" [14]. This illustrates a pattern where one country's military application of AI is immediately framed as a threat by another. A similar mutually reinforcing structure is at play in the laser anti-drone competition, where the PLA's unveiling of its armored vehicle reinforces the narrative for Taiwan's drone expansion, which in turn helps justify the U.S.'s AI-driven threat identification system.

Pakistan's acquisition of the Chinese-made HQ-17AE low-altitude air defense system is a relevant case from the perspective of defense export competition in anti-drone weapons. Amid heightened tensions with India, the Chinese system is being used to enhance Pakistan's drone defense capabilities, and analysts believe this real-world integration case will significantly boost China's future export competitiveness [17]. Hanwha's proposal to Poland is also based on the reliability of its Cheong-gwang laser, which has been operated by the South Korean military since 2024 [4]. This shows a common dynamic where operational validation is a key variable for export competitiveness.

4. Key Variables Shaping Future Developments

The first variable is the pace at which the PLA delegates command authority. Even if the SSF's organizational integration progresses, AI-based autonomous engagement decisions will likely remain limited unless the "political caution surrounding Party-military relations and the delegation of command authority" is resolved [3]. This variable is a critical factor that will determine whether the PLA's counter-drone systems evolve into fully autonomous systems or remain human-in-the-loop systems over the next 3-5 years.

The second variable is whether U.S. regulations on robots and drones actually succeed in curbing China's market expansion. EAI analysis points out that U.S. measures to block individual markets are having the "counter-effect of promoting circumvention exports by Chinese companies to third markets such as Europe" [6]. If this counter-effect persists, U.S. control over the counter-drone laser and drone defense markets may be more limited than anticipated.

The third variable is the procurement decisions of NATO's eastern flank countries. Whether countries like Poland actually adopt Hanwha's 50kW-class laser [4] will not only determine the success of South Korean defense companies in the counter-drone market but also serve as a litmus test for whether a third supplier can establish a foothold in this market outside the U.S.-China great power framework.

The fourth variable is whether U.S.-China dialogue on AI governance makes substantive progress. Although discussions are ongoing in multilateral forums like the G7 and the UN [8], unless these extend to confidence-building measures in the military AI domain, it is judged that the militarization of AI by various countries, including in counter-drone weapons, will continue to accelerate in a normative vacuum.