North Korea’s Strategy to Escape Isolation and Policy Responses: An Analysis of its 78th Founding Anniversary Diplomacy

Executive Summary

On the 78th anniversary of its founding in 2026, North Korea extensively reported through Rodong Sinmun and the Korean Central News Agency on congratulatory messages received not only from traditional allies like China and Russia but also from Western and non-aligned figures, including the UN Secretary-General, the King of the United Kingdom, and the kings of Thailand and Cambodia. This is a routine practice intended to showcase the regime's international legitimacy by using the number and ideological diversity of the sending countries as material for domestic propaganda, following essentially the same pattern as the exchange of messages for the 60th anniversary of the Sino-North Korean Friendship Treaty in 2021 and the 77th founding anniversary in 2025. The substantive focus of this “congratulatory diplomacy” remains on solidarity within the socialist bloc of North Korea, China, and Russia; the messages from Western countries are more akin to formulaic diplomatic protocol than signals of a policy shift. The most probable scenario (65% probability) is the maintenance of the status quo, with the messages' impact limited to domestic propaganda. The likelihood of them leading to substantive improvements in relations (15% probability) is limited as long as the UN sanctions regime remains in place. The South Korean government and businesses should avoid over-interpreting the messages themselves. Instead, they should adopt a two-track approach: monitoring follow-up contacts with sending countries like Thailand and Indonesia, and tracking high-level working exchanges after the 80th anniversary of the Workers' Party of Korea's founding in October as key outcome indicators.

I. Situational Analysis

North Korea’s Strategy to Escape External Isolation as Seen Through its 78th Founding Anniversary Diplomacy

1. Background and Developments

Every year around its September 9 founding anniversary, North Korea has consistently reported on the congratulatory messages and wreaths sent by heads of state through Rodong Sinmun and the Korean Central News Agency. The events for the 78th anniversary in 2026 followed this same practice. From September 7 to 12, news of the messages and flower baskets was released sequentially over at least six days[1][5][7][8][9][11][13][17][18][19][21][22][23].

A key feature of this year's messages was the breadth of their senders. The list included not only traditional allies like China, Russia, Cuba, and Laos, but also ideologically diverse actors such as the UN Secretary-General, the King of the United Kingdom, the kings of Thailand and Cambodia, and the presidents of Indonesia and Iran[11][12][14][22][17][13][18][19]. North Korean media chose to break these down into individual articles and publish them repeatedly. The editorial approach—publishing the same content in both Rodong Sinmun and the Korean Central News Agency and then writing separate articles for each head of state—reveals an intent to use the sheer 'number' and 'diversity' of the sending countries as material for domestic propaganda[10][15].

This exchange of congratulatory messages is not a new phenomenon. An EAI analysis has previously noted the case in 2021 when General Secretary Kim Jong Un and his Chinese counterpart exchanged messages on the 100th anniversary of the Chinese Communist Party and the 60th anniversary of the Sino-North Korean Friendship Treaty, reaffirming it as "an important political and legal foundation for the long-term friendly cooperation between the two countries"[2]. In 2025, on the occasion of North Korea's 77th founding anniversary and the 76th anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China, the two countries reaffirmed their commitment to "strengthening strategic communication"[6]. In other words, the exchange of messages has served as a routine mechanism for North Korean diplomacy to visualize the continuity of relationships when high-level communication is limited.

2. Current Situation

The participation of figures from the Western camp is a prominent feature of this year's list of messages. King Charles III of the United Kingdom sent "best wishes for the future as the people of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea celebrate their National Day," and even mentioned a willingness to cooperate on climate change[12]. UN Secretary-General António Guterres also sent a separate message, stating that "a national day is an important occasion to reflect on a country's journey, its contributions to the international community, and its aspirations for the future"[14][22]. While these messages are diplomatic formalities, North Korea appears to be using them as evidence that Western countries and international organizations recognize the legitimacy of its regime.

From Southeast Asia and the Middle East, messages were sent by Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto, Thai King Maha Vajiralongkorn, Cambodian King Norodom Sihamoni, and Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian[17][13][18][19]. The message from Thailand stated, "For 50 years since the establishment of diplomatic relations, Thailand and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea have consistently cooperated to develop a bond of goodwill and sincere friendship," and expressed a desire to expand trade, cultural, and technological cooperation[16]. This shows Thailand's stance of seeking to maintain, at least formally, its existing diplomatic ties even within the framework of sanctions against North Korea.

Among traditional allies, President Xi Jinping noted that "for 78 years, under the leadership of the Workers' Party of Korea, the Korean people have, through self-reliance and united struggle, driven the steady development of the socialist cause in all fields," directly mentioning Kim Jong Un's achievements in economic and social construction[24]. Cuban President Díaz-Canel and Lao President Thongloun Sisoulith also sent messages emphasizing socialist solidarity[7][8]. At the level of the diplomatic corps in Pyongyang, military attachés from the Russian, Chinese, Vietnamese, Cuban, and Iranian embassies delivered congratulatory letters, and wreaths were presented by ambassadors from Iran, Cuba, Indonesia, Palestine, India, and Nigeria[9][1][5].

3. Key Actors and Positions

North Korean AuthoritiesThrough their reporting on these messages, North Korean authorities are targeting two messages simultaneously. One is to strengthen domestic solidarity by showcasing the regime's international recognition. The other is to project an image of maintaining diverse diplomatic relations despite sanctions and isolation. The editorial practice of separating messages from heads of state and wreaths from embassies into distinct, repetitive articles itself illustrates this dual purpose[10][15].

ChinaBy specifically mentioning achievements in economic and social construction in its message, China expressed substantive support for the Kim Jong Un regime[24][23]. This is an extension of the closer alignment that has continued since the joint appearance of the North Korean, Chinese, and Russian leaders at the Victory Day parade in September 2025 and Premier Li Qiang's visit to Pyongyang[6]. EAI's existing analysis holds that while the Sino-North Korean relationship is formally marked by the exchange of messages, it is underpinned by strategic calculations in response to U.S. pressure on China[2].

Western Figures (UK, UN)The messages from these figures do not signify a substantive improvement in relations. They remain at the level of ceremonial National Day greetings, and any mention of denuclearization or human rights issues is excluded[12][14]. Nevertheless, North Korea's extensive reporting on them is largely aimed at leveraging the image of receiving formal recognition even from the West for propaganda purposes.

Southeast Asian Countries (Thailand, Indonesia, Cambodia)These countries are continuing the formal practice of sending congratulatory messages based on long-standing diplomatic ties and the non-aligned tradition. In Thailand's case, its mention of 50 years of diplomatic relations and its call to expand economic cooperation are noteworthy[16]. This can be interpreted as a signal that Southeast Asian nations do not want a complete rupture of bilateral ties, even amid the sanctions regime against North Korea.

VietnamAlthough Vietnam did not appear on this year's list of messages, the fact that General Secretary To Lam attended the military parade for the 80th anniversary of the Workers' Party of Korea's founding in October 2025 and sat right next to Chairman Kim Jong Un has drawn separate attention[4]. This suggests that Vietnam is approaching its relationship with North Korea with a complex set of calculations involving socialist solidarity, middle-power diplomacy, and the presentation of its own model of reform and opening.

4. Key Issues

First is whether the diversity of the sending countries signifies a genuine normalization of diplomatic relations. The ceremonial greetings from the UK and the UN are different in nature from the substantive expressions of solidarity from China, Russia, and Cuba. North Korean media are reinforcing a narrative of overcoming international isolation by reporting these in parallel without distinguishing between them.

Second is whether the trilateral alignment of North Korea, China, and Russia is serving as the substantive backdrop for this congratulatory diplomacy. Considering the high frequency of high-level exchanges since the 2025 Victory Day, China's stance in this year's message can be seen as more than mere custom; it could be a strategic reaffirmation[6].

Third, it is necessary to determine whether the outreach from Southeast Asian and Middle Eastern countries is a sign of the sanctions regime weakening or simply the inertial maintenance of existing diplomatic ties. The messages from Thailand and Indonesia include language about economic cooperation, making it difficult to dismiss them as purely ceremonial.

Fourth, as the case of Vietnam shows, it is necessary to watch what role high-level personal exchanges, separate from congratulatory diplomacy, will play in North Korea's future foreign strategy. The coexistence of three possible interpretations—socialist solidarity, middle-power mediation, and the presentation of a reform model—has direct implications for South Korea's diplomacy toward Southeast Asia and its calculations regarding inter-Korean relations[4].

II. In-Depth Analysis

The Structural Context of North Korea’s Congratulatory Diplomacy: Between Isolation and Legitimacy

1. Analysis of Root Causes

North Korea's reasons for using founding anniversary messages as domestic propaganda material are not simple. They stem fundamentally from the gap between the regime's domestic legitimacy narrative and the reality of its external isolation.

The North Korean system has long reinforced the legitimacy of its hereditary succession—from Kim Il Sung to Kim Jong Il to Kim Jong Un—with the veneer of "international recognition." There are two main ways it demonstrates the regime's stability to its domestic population. One is by showcasing its nuclear and missile capabilities; the other is by constructing an image of not being diplomatically isolated. The reporting on congratulatory messages falls into the latter category. Messages from Western and international organization sources like the UN Secretary-General and the King of the United Kingdom are consumed as proof that the regime has not been completely ostracized by the international community, even amid sanctions[14][22][11][12].

The very editorial practice of Rodong Sinmun and the Korean Central News Agency breaking down the same content by country for repetitive publication demonstrates this purposefulness[1][5][10][15]. This implies that the 'number' of countries sending messages is a more important variable for domestic propaganda than the actual diplomatic weight of the messages. This suggests that the messages function less as an indicator of substantive improvement in relations and more as raw material for the regime's self-produced legitimacy narrative.

2. Structural Context

Political Structure: North Korea's diplomatic channels lack a structure for regular, high-level communication between leaders. The experience of having high-level exchanges virtually severed during the COVID-19 lockdown period helped establish the formality of exchanging messages as an alternative means of confirming the continuity of relationships[2]. In a situation where summits or working-level contacts are difficult, annual anniversary messages remain almost the only routine mechanism for signaling the 'temperature' of a relationship both domestically and internationally. This pattern is most pronounced in Sino-North Korean relations. The repeated exchange of messages on occasions like the 100th anniversary of the CCP's founding and the 60th anniversary of the friendship treaty in 2021, and the 77th DPRK founding anniversary and 76th PRC founding anniversary in 2025, has solidified the practice into an annual ritual, reproduced regardless of any substantive progress in the bilateral relationship[2][6].

Economic Structure: Under the sanctions regime, countries that maintain formal diplomatic ties with North Korea are constrained to manage the relationship formally without undermining the sanctions framework. Thailand's statement expressing its will to expand trade, cultural, and technological cooperation, mentioning the "bond of goodwill and sincere friendship for 50 years since the establishment of diplomatic relations," is the strongest possible expression under such constraints[16]. It is closer to a gesture aimed at keeping the relationship alive than a move toward substantive economic cooperation. The messages from non-aligned and Middle Eastern countries like Indonesia and Iran have a similar character[17][19]. These countries take a dual approach: participating in principle in the sanctions against North Korea while continuing to extend formal courtesies as diplomatic partners in their individual bilateral relations.

Security Structure: The timing, which coincides with the deepening of North Korea-Russia ties and a readjustment in Sino-North Korean relations, is also part of the structural context. The scene of the leaders of North Korea, China, and Russia observing a military parade together at China's Victory Day event on September 3 was interpreted as a signal of bloc formation in response to U.S. pressure[6]. Within this trend, the founding anniversary messages can be read as part of a dual strategy: reaffirming solidarity with traditional allies while simultaneously inserting messages from Western and international organizations to project an image of "not being besieged."

3. Historical Precedents and Comparative Cases

The archetype of this congratulatory diplomacy can be found in the rituals of the socialist bloc during the Cold War. The exchange of messages between the leaders of North Korea, China, Cuba, and Laos is not a product of a specific situation but an example of a practice unique to the socialist world that continues to this day. President Xi Jinping's message, which directly quotes North Korea's "self-reliance" narrative by using the phrase "for 78 years, under the leadership of the Workers' Party of Korea, the Korean people have, through self-reliance and united struggle..."[23][24], shows that the grammar of mutual recognition rituals among socialist fraternal states from the Cold War era is being reproduced with almost no modification.

In the 2021 message for the 60th anniversary of the Sino-North Korean Friendship Treaty, the phrase "for the past 60 years, the two countries have defended the development of the socialist cause and peace and stability in the region and the world" was used[2]. This is structurally consistent with the similar rhetoric used by Lao President Thongloun Sisoulith in this year's 78th-anniversary message, who stated that "the fraternal Korean people are vigorously waging a struggle to defend and develop the country"[3][8]. The grammar of socialist bloc congratulatory messages is characterized by the fact that the core vocabulary and sentence structure remain almost fixed, even when the sending country changes.

The participation of Western figures should be seen not as a relatively new phenomenon but as an extension of routine international diplomatic practice. The practice of the UN Secretary-General sending a formal message on a member state's national day, or the King of the United Kingdom conveying ceremonial greetings on the national day of a country with which it has diplomatic ties, is not applied exceptionally only to North Korea[11][12][14][22]. However, a distinction arises in the way North Korea receives these messages—namely, by reinterpreting a ritual that is part of normal international relations as a basis for regime legitimacy and reporting it as such domestically. This was similarly observed in the case of Vietnamese General Secretary To Lam's attendance at the military parade for the 80th anniversary of the Workers' Party of Korea's founding in 2025, where he sat right next to Chairman Kim Jong Un[4]. A pattern is repeating in which North Korea maximally exploits the gap between a substantive act, such as an actual visit or meeting, and the symbolic interpretation of that scene.

4. Key Variables Shaping Future Developments

First is the pace of alignment within the North Korea-China-Russia triangle. The joint attendance of the three leaders at the September Victory Day parade[6] and the frequency of subsequent high-level exchanges are variables that will determine the weight and tone of messages from traditional allies in future founding anniversary messages. If Sino-North Korean relations shift into a phase of closer alignment, the content of the messages could evolve beyond the ceremonial level to strategic language.

Second is the continuation of messages from Western and international organization sources. The messages from the King of the United Kingdom or the UN Secretary-General could be an annually repeated practice, or they could be a case that North Korea has intentionally highlighted in a specific context. The key point to observe is whether these messages continue at a similar level next year or are scaled back in response to security issues, such as a resumption of North Korean nuclear or missile tests.

Third is a change in the attitude of Southeast Asian and Middle Eastern countries. Whether countries like Thailand, Indonesia, and Cambodia move beyond the formal management of diplomatic ties to substantive economic and personnel exchanges could become an indicator of the extent of cracks in the sanctions regime. For now, the assessment that these countries' messages remain at a ceremonial level is reasonable[13][16][17][18].

Fourth, as the case of Vietnam illustrates, dual tracks of ideological solidarity and pragmatic middle-power diplomacy coexist even within the socialist bloc[4]. The persuasiveness of the "regime that is not isolated" narrative that North Korea seeks to build through its congratulatory diplomacy will vary depending on which of these tracks becomes dominant.