The Intensifying Yemeni Civil War and the Dual Chokepoint Risk in the Red Sea: A Response Plan for South Korean Companies

Executive Summary

The Yemeni civil war has reignited in the aftermath of the Israel-Iran war, which began in February 2026. Within the framework of a proxy war where Iran seeks to maintain its negotiating leverage over the Strait of Hormuz through the Houthis, the Houthis are intensifying their offensive on the Taiz-Mocha front to seize control of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. With the Strait of Hormuz effectively blockaded, instability in the Bab el-Mandeb would realize the “dual chokepoint” risk, where alternative shipping routes effectively disappear. EAI's baseline scenario (45% probability) forecasts continued localized conflict and an entrenched risk premium. EAI recommends that South Korean companies transition to using the Cape of Good Hope route as a permanent operational standard, diversify their supply chains, and monitor the high-level variables shaping the Saudi-Iranian proxy conflict.

I. Situational Analysis

Escalation of the Yemeni Civil War and Competition over Alternative Red Sea Shipping Routes: A Situational Analysis

1. Background and Developments

The Yemeni civil war had remained in a state of low-intensity confrontation following the UN-brokered ceasefire in 2022. This equilibrium was not broken by developments within Yemen itself, but rather by the Israel-Iran war that began in February 2026, which destabilized the entire Gulf security landscape [6]. Iran resumed attacks targeting Saudi Arabia through its proxy force, the Houthis [6]. The situation escalated sharply in early July after two Iranian aircraft landed in Houthi-controlled territory [2], triggering the most intense clashes between Saudi and Houthi forces since the 2022 ceasefire [2].

In response, the Houthis declared a naval blockade against Saudi Arabia [2], claiming to have attacked three ships in the Red Sea [2]. They also targeted Saudi airports and oil infrastructure [2]. Yemeni government forces struck the runway at Sana'a airport [2], while Riyadh retaliated with airstrikes on Houthi military and communications facilities along the Hodeidah coast [2]. The UN Special Envoy for Yemen assessed this phase, stating that “the risk of a return to full-scale war is higher than at any point since the UN-brokered truce of 2022” [5].

During the same period, the Strait of Hormuz was under a de facto blockade due to the fallout from the U.S.-Iran war [6][10]. Before the war, approximately one-fifth of the global crude oil supply transited through this strait [6]. The military standoff between the United States and Iran, temporarily eased by the Islamabad Memorandum in June, flared up again when the agreement expired on August 17 [6]. Against this backdrop, the Red Sea shipping lane, which passes through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, began to receive renewed attention as an alternative to the Strait of Hormuz [1][14].

2. Current Situation

The fighting that erupted near Taiz in southwestern Yemen on September 3 is being recorded as the deadliest in recent years. Le Monde reported that approximately 180 combatants from both sides were killed in the four days after September 3 [12]. According to Der Standard, at least 84 government soldiers and 57 Houthi fighters were killed [7]. The Hankyoreh reported that the death toll, initially counted at 129, has continued to climb [10]. Al-Monitor estimated the number of fatalities to be over 140 [14].

The fighting was directly triggered by a Houthi offensive. According to Al Jazeera, Houthi fighters attempted to isolate the city of Taiz from the coast by cutting off the road connecting it to the port city of Al-Makha (Mocha) [4]. ABC News Australia also confirmed that the Houthis launched an offensive to blockade the port of Mocha and advance toward the border region near Bab el-Mandeb [15]. In response, Yemeni government forces announced a counteroffensive, stating they had recaptured the Al-Khazan and Al-Makhana heights in the Jabal Habashi district [16]. Daily Sabah also reported that government forces had retaken strategic positions near Taiz [17].

From Riyadh's perspective, the threat to the Bab el-Mandeb Strait is tangible. According to the Sana'a Center for Strategic Studies, since the U.S.-Iran conflict began, Saudi Arabia has rerouted its crude oil shipments to its western ports to bypass the Strait of Hormuz [11]. Amid this situation, the Houthis have continued to strengthen their positions along the Red Sea coast and on the Marib and Hodeidah fronts [11]. Saudi Arabia has long attempted to de-escalate tensions with the Houthis to protect its East-West Pipeline to Yanbu from threats to Red Sea access [13]. This pipeline has become a critical conduit for Saudi oil exports following Iran's blockade of Hormuz [13].

3. Analysis of Key Actors

The Houthi RebelsLeveraging their position as an Iranian proxy, the Houthis are using control over the Red Sea and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait as negotiating leverage. Their declaration of a naval blockade against Saudi Arabia and claims of attacking ships [2] are actions timed to capitalize on the increased strategic value of alternative routes following the blockade of Hormuz. The Houthis' military objective is clear: to cut the Taiz-Mocha road, thereby isolating the government-controlled port city from the coast [4][15].

Yemeni Government Forces (Saudi-backed)While responding with counteroffensives to recapture heights near Taiz [16][17], they have not yet fully regained the initiative across the entire front. Government forces have also undertaken symbolic retaliatory actions, such as striking the runway at Sana'a airport [2].

Saudi ArabiaIts paramount interest is to secure Red Sea access and defend its East-West Pipeline [11][13]. With the Strait of Hormuz effectively blocked, the pipeline to Yanbu has become an alternative lifeline for Saudi crude exports [13]. While Riyadh has responded with airstrikes on Houthi facilities along the Hodeidah coast [2], it has also long maintained a dual policy of seeking to avoid a full-scale escalation with the Houthis [13].

IranIs once again pursuing a strategy of maintaining its negotiating leverage at low cost through the Houthis, without leaving traces of direct intervention [3]. The fact that a single symbolic act—landing aircraft in Houthi territory—was enough to reignite the entire Yemeni front demonstrates the powerful leverage Iran wields through its interventionist methods [2].

The International CommunityHas officially warned of the risk of a return to full-scale war via the UN Special Envoy [5], but effective channels for mediation have not been activated. Private shipping companies and the logistics industry are already responding to the rising risk premium for Red Sea routes [14].

4. Key Issues

First is the future of military control over the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. If the Houthis gain effective control of the approaches to the strait, the entire Suez Canal route between Asia and Europe could be held hostage [14]. Second is the possibility of a dual blockade of Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb. A scenario where both straits are threatened simultaneously would mean the elimination of alternative routes in global maritime logistics [6][9]. Third is Saudi Arabia's dilemma. Escalating the war against the Houthis is necessary to defend the Yanbu pipeline, yet this paradoxically threatens the foundation of Saudi Arabia's own stable crude exports [11][13]. Fourth is the humanitarian crisis within Yemen. The Sana'a Center notes that the Houthi blockade in the Red Sea serves as a tool to obscure their governance failures and the country's famine crisis [8].

II. In-Depth Analysis

Escalation of the Yemeni Civil War and Competition over Alternative Red Sea Shipping Routes: An In-Depth Analysis

1. Analysis of Root Causes

The flashpoint for the current crisis was not internal Yemeni politics. The direct trigger was the incident in early July when two Iranian aircraft landed in Houthi-controlled territory [2]. This event in itself was largely symbolic, yet it sparked the most intense clashes between Saudi and Houthi forces since the 2022 UN-brokered ceasefire [2]. This confirms that the Yemeni civil war is no longer solely a Yemeni issue. It is the result of Yemen's reintegration into Iran's proxy war strategy in the aftermath of its war with Israel.

The root cause traces back to the Israel-Iran war, which started in February 2026 [6]. This war effectively placed the Strait of Hormuz under a de facto blockade [6][10]. Prior to the war, approximately one-fifth of the global crude oil supply passed through this strait [6]. From Iran's perspective, Hormuz is a bargaining chip. According to a previous EAI analysis, escalating tensions in Yemen via the Houthis functions as a low-cost method for preserving the value of this chip [3]. Iran “holds the Hormuz card while using the Houthis to maintain its negotiating power without leaving a trace of direct involvement” [3].

Within this framework, the Houthi offensive cannot be read separately from the interests of mainland Iran. The Houthi attacks on shipping in the Red Sea and on Saudi oil infrastructure send a signal that transcends Yemen's domestic balance of power [2]. The Houthis themselves recognize that if Bab el-Mandeb also falls under their control while Hormuz is blocked, it would inflict a dual blow on the international oil logistics network [10]. This rise in strategic value forms the structural background that has amplified the Houthis' incentive for an offensive.

2. Structural Context

Political Structure: The Entrenchment of a Proxy War System

On the surface, the Yemeni civil war is a conflict between the internationally recognized government and Houthi rebels. The de facto actors, however, are Saudi Arabia and Iran. Saudi Arabia backs the government forces, while Iran employs the Houthis as a proxy [6]. This structure has been in place since the intervention of the Saudi-led coalition in 2015. What is different in the current phase is that a higher-level conflict, the Iran-Israel war, is now functioning as the key variable determining the intensity of the proxy war in Yemen.

Saudi Arabia has also taken steps to secure its own deterrent capabilities. An example is the joint defense pact signed by Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, and Pakistan in Mecca on August 7 [3]. However, the prevailing assessment is that this agreement “is more of a symbolic signal, falling short of a NATO-style automatic intervention clause, and is thus unlikely to function as an immediate deterrent to Houthi attacks” [3]. In fact, the Houthi offensive in the Red Sea and Taiz has only intensified since the pact was signed [4][15]. This demonstrates that the diplomatic safeguards secured by Saudi Arabia are not translating into effective deterrence on the battlefield in Yemen.

Economic Structure: The Dual Chokepoint Risk

In the context of crude oil and container logistics, the Straits of Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb are not mutually exclusive alternatives but exist in a relationship of sequential dependency. Since the U.S.-Iran conflict began, Saudi Arabia has diverted its oil shipments to its western ports to bypass Hormuz [11]. The access route to these western ports is the Red Sea via the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. Saudi Arabia's East-West Pipeline to Yanbu has emerged as “central to Saudi oil exports following Iran's blockade of the Strait of Hormuz” [13]. Thus, the closure of Hormuz has concentrated Saudi Arabia's alternative export routes in the Red Sea, a concentration that has paradoxically created a new target for the Houthis.

Within this structure, the Houthis' moves to strengthen their positions along the Red Sea coast and on the Marib and Hodeidah fronts are more than simple territorial expansion [11]. They are closer to a strategic gambit aimed at bringing Saudi Arabia's sole alternative export route within their striking distance. The Houthis' claim to have attacked three vessels and their declaration of a naval blockade against Saudi Arabia are also interpreted in this context [2].

Security Structure: A Cascade of Surveillance Gaps

The concentration of international naval assets in the Strait of Hormuz and the northern Red Sea has had the collateral effect of creating a surveillance blind spot in the Gulf of Aden and the southern Western Indian Ocean [9]. The increase in vessel seizures by pirate groups from Puntland, Somalia, which have exploited this vacuum since April 2026, demonstrates that the Yemeni civil war and the Hormuz crisis are not isolated incidents but together form a single security vacuum [9]. EAI has previously characterized this as a structure that is “subordinate to the trajectory of the Yemeni civil war and the Hormuz crisis, making it difficult to resolve in the short term” [9]. This implies that the risks in the three key areas of Hormuz, the Red Sea, and the Gulf of Aden are interlinked in a chain and cannot be managed in isolation.

3. Comparison with Historical Precedents and Similar Cases

The closest precedent is the period during the Gaza War when the Houthis threatened the Red Sea-Bab el-Mandeb shipping lane by targeting vessels with links to Israel [3]. At the time, global shipping companies suspended operations in the Red Sea and opted for the detour route around the Cape of Good Hope [3]. The difference in the current crisis is the nature of the targets. Houthi attacks during the Gaza War were aimed at a limited category of targets—namely, Israel-affiliated ships. In contrast, the current situation involves a declared naval blockade directly targeting Saudi Arabia, which significantly broadens the scope of potential attacks [2]. This suggests that the use of detour routes may become more widespread and prolonged than in the previous instance.

Another point of comparison is the state of the Yemeni civil war prior to the 2022 UN-brokered ceasefire. In that period, the conflict was a protracted war of attrition between the Saudi-led coalition and the Houthis, with limited impact on global oil prices or Red Sea shipping lanes. What makes the current situation fundamentally different is the confluence of a higher-level variable: the blockade of Hormuz. This is the context behind the UN Special Envoy for Yemen's assessment that “the risk of a return to full-scale war is higher than at any point since the UN-brokered truce of 2022” [5]. In terms of the intensity of the civil war alone, there have been similar phases in the past, but the structural condition of a dual Hormuz-Red Sea chokepoint is unprecedented.

4. Key Variables Shaping Future Developments

The first variable is the trajectory of U.S.-Iran negotiations regarding the Strait of Hormuz. The reignition of the U.S.-Iran military standoff on August 17, upon the expiration of the Islamabad Memorandum that had temporarily eased tensions in June [6], shows that the normalization of passage through Hormuz remains uncertain. If negotiations over Hormuz succeed, the value of the strategic leverage the Houthis have gained in the Red Sea will likely diminish. Conversely, if the talks collapse, it increases the probability of the “pessimistic scenario in which attacks expand across Saudi Arabia's eastern infrastructure,” as previously outlined by EAI [3].

The second variable is the effectiveness of the Mecca Defense Pact. Whether this pact signed by Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, and Pakistan leads to actual military intervention could determine the continuation of the Houthi offensive [3]. To date, evidence indicates that the Houthi offensive has, in fact, intensified since the agreement was signed [4][15][16].

The third variable is the de facto balance of power on the battlefield. Evidence of government counteroffensives, such as the recapture of heights in the Jabal Habashi district [16] and the retaking of strategic positions near Taiz [17], suggests that the phase of a unilateral Houthi offensive may not continue. However, with the Houthis still maintaining their blockade of the port of Mocha and advancing toward the border area near Bab el-Mandeb [15], it seems unlikely that the front lines will stabilize in the near future.