The Trump Administration’s Formulation of a Post-War Middle East Strategy and South Korea’s Policy Response

Executive Summary

Amid ongoing hostilities with Iran, the Trump administration is in the process of drafting a post-war Middle East strategy centered on two pillars: containing Iran and expanding the Abraham Accords. The final form of this strategy is expected to depend on three key variables: Israel's general election in October, the U.S. midterm elections in November, and whether the actual fighting with Iran comes to an end. The fact that the largest-scale engagement since the war began occurred on September 3 highlights Washington's contradictory position of discussing an end to the war while hostilities continue. For the South Korean government and businesses, a rational approach would be to avoid committing to a specific scenario prematurely. Instead, they should treat demands for sanctions participation and military contributions as separate issues, while holding back on negotiating positions and investment decisions until Washington's final policy direction becomes clear. However, as the fallout from the war with Iran could last longer than expected or unfold in unforeseen ways, this analysis should be understood as a provisional assessment based on currently available reports.

I. Analysis of the Current Situation

The Trump Administration’s Formulation of a Post-War Middle East Strategy: An Analysis of the Current Situation

1. Background and Developments

On February 28, 2026, the United States and Israel launched airstrikes against targets inside Iran, marking the beginning of a full-scale war [3]. At the outset, Washington’s stated objectives were regime change, the dismantlement of nuclear facilities, and the neutralization of Iran's missile and drone programs [3][13]. Cutting off Iranian support for non-state armed groups in the region was also included as a goal [13].

In the early stages of the war, President Trump offered an optimistic prediction for its conclusion, stating it would be over in 'four to five weeks' [5]. He later repeated similar remarks, suggesting it would take 'two weeks, a few more days at most' [5]. Six months later, these predictions have not materialized. Although an Israeli airstrike killed Supreme Leader Khamenei, it did not lead to the collapse of the Iranian regime [3]. Instead, Iran immediately retaliated, and the Strait of Hormuz has effectively been under a blockade [3].

As the war has dragged on, domestic support in the United States for the war with Iran has fallen to 31%. President Trump's approval rating has also dropped to 33%, nearing an all-time low [3]. This decline has been driven by an erosion of support within the Republican base itself. However, there has not yet been any public break from the Republican Senate leadership [3]. Despite this public pressure, the White House appears to have effectively neglected efforts to persuade the American public since the war began [3].

2. Current Situation

According to a report by Axios, the Trump administration is in the process of drafting a post-war Middle East strategy aimed at curbing Iran's regional influence [1][4]. The strategy's two pillars are the containment of Iran and the expansion of normalization between Israel and its neighbors through the Abraham Accords [1][7]. This has been corroborated by multiple media outlets, including Reuters, TASS, ANSA, and Il Sole 24 Ore [4][7][12].

The formulation of this strategy is contingent on two political events: Israel's general election in October and the U.S. midterm elections in November [1][7]. The Italian news agency ANSA described these two elections as variables 'looming over' (incombono) the post-war planning [7]. This implies that the very timeline for finalizing the strategy could depend on the election outcomes.

At the same time, disagreements are emerging within Washington over whether to actually end the war. The Times of Oman, citing a Wall Street Journal report, stated that President Trump is privately considering a declaration to end the war [15]. Yet, at the same time, the Pentagon is extending the deployment periods for U.S. troops stationed in West Asia [10][15]. Vice President Vance remarked, 'I wouldn't call it a war,' suggesting that 'there is no actual combat at present' [12]. However, on September 3, the largest-scale engagement between the U.S. and Iran since the war began took place [16][17]. Iran launched drone attacks on U.S. Gulf allies, including Kuwait and Bahrain [17]. These contradictory signals suggest that no consensus has yet been reached within the administration on a timeline for ending the war.

An economic pressure track is also being pursued in parallel. Treasury Secretary Bessent has launched 'Operation Economic Outcast' with the goal of 'severing all remaining economic lifelines that sustain the Iranian regime' [11][14]. The European Union has officially announced its participation in this pressure campaign [12]. The Associated Press assessed that the Trump administration has pivoted to a dual-track approach, combining economic sanctions with the threat of military escalation [14].

3. Key Actors and Positions

The Trump Administrationis maintaining an ambiguous posture, keeping both an exit strategy and the option of escalation on the table as the achievement of its military objectives is delayed. The Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) critically assessed this as the 'art of concealing defeat' [2]. With original goals like regime change and the complete dismantlement of nuclear facilities unfulfilled, the critique is that the very act of formulating a post-war strategy is an attempt to manage the narrative in the absence of tangible achievements [2][5].

The Netanyahu Government in Israelis facing a general election on October 27. According to an EAI analysis, Netanyahu's escalatory stance is a structural outcome of the pressure from his corruption trial combined with the veto power of far-right coalition partners like Ben-Gvir and Smotrich [9]. In the current election climate, discussions about ending the war are virtually absent, and local observers believe this structural dynamic is unlikely to be fundamentally resolved even after the election [9].

Iranhas chosen to retaliate rather than submit, despite pressure aimed at collapsing the regime. The drone attacks on Gulf allies demonstrate Iran's method of responding to U.S. economic and military pressure [17]. An analysis by the Sana'a Center assesses that the United States has failed to effectively neutralize Iran's missile and drone programs and its support for regional proxies [13].

U.S. Congress and Public Opinionis showing signs of fracture. While erosion within the Republican base has been confirmed, a public break at the Senate leadership level has not yet occurred [3]. This suggests that a substantive policy shift may depend less on polling numbers and more on a combination of factors: the scale of seat losses in the midterm elections, public defections by senators, and the physical constraint of depleting precision-guided munitions stockpiles [3].

The Gulf Statesare collateral victims in this war. Kuwait and Bahrain have become direct targets of Iranian attacks [17]. They are in the dual position of being asked to cooperate with the U.S. pressure campaign against Iran while also being targets of Iranian retaliation.

4. Key Issues

The very effectiveness of the post-war strategy is being put to the test. The normalization of relations between Israel and regional states through an expanded Abraham Accords is not independent of the Israeli election results. The partners and conditions for normalization talks could change depending on the political survival of the Netanyahu government.

The conflicting signals from within Washington regarding a timeline for ending the war also warrant observation. The fact that consideration of a war-end declaration, the extension of troop deployments, and the intensification of economic sanctions are all proceeding simultaneously shows that the administration has not yet settled on a single exit scenario [10][14][15].

As long as the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz continues, the very premise of the post-war strategy could be undermined [3]. Given that the strategy remains in a draft stage, future developments could vary significantly depending on the election timelines and changes on the battlefield. It is premature at this point to consider it a finalized policy direction.

II. In-Depth Analysis

The Trump Administration’s Formulation of a Post-War Middle East Strategy: An In-Depth Analysis

1. Analysis of Root Causes

The very decision to prepare a post-war strategy is paradoxical. The war is not yet over; the largest-scale engagement to date between the U.S. and Iran occurred on September 3 [16][17]. The reason Washington has nonetheless embarked on 'post-war' planning can be found in the gap between achieving military victory and declaring a political one.

The initial war aims were regime change, the dismantlement of nuclear facilities, and the neutralization of Iran's missile and drone programs [6][13]. Six months later, the prevailing assessment is that almost none of these objectives have been achieved [6]. While the death of Khamenei was a symbolic blow, it did not lead to the regime's collapse [3]. In this situation, President Trump's options are limited: either continue to wait for the military objectives to be met or find a different framework within which to declare victory. The diplomatic achievement of expanding the Abraham Accords falls into the latter category. The CFR critically diagnosed this trend as the 'art of concealing defeat' [2].

The timing of the strategy's drafting is also linked to domestic politics. Support for the war with Iran has dropped to 31%, and Trump's approval rating is near an all-time low at 33% [3]. The decline is being driven by an erosion of support among the Republican base [3]. The White House's release of a 'post-war' blueprint at this juncture can be interpreted as an attempt to signal to the domestic public that there is an exit, regardless of whether the war has actually concluded.

2. Structural Context

Political Structure: Two Election Clocks

The timeline for formulating the strategy is defined by Israel's general election in October and the U.S. midterm elections in November [1][7]. These two elections exert pressure in different directions.

Prime Minister Netanyahu is burdened by his personal corruption trial [9]. Ahead of the general election, any discussion of ending the war is absent from Israeli political discourse [9]. Far-right coalition partners like Ben-Gvir and Smotrich effectively hold a veto over any de-escalation [9]. Within this structure, a diplomatic achievement like expanding the Abraham Accords could be an electoral asset for Netanyahu. Conversely, easing the containment of Iran or declaring an early end to the war would likely provoke a backlash from hardliners within his coalition.

The political calculus in the United States is different. War fatigue among the Republican base is already manifesting as a drop in approval ratings [3]. However, a public break at the Senate leadership level has not yet occurred [3]. The tipping point for a genuine policy shift from the White House is likely to be not the polling numbers themselves, but a combination of factors: the scale of seat losses in the midterms, public defections by Republican senators, and the physical constraint of depleting precision-guided munitions stockpiles [3]. The 'early stage' nature of the post-war strategy can be seen as reflecting an intent to finalize its form only after observing the outcomes of these two elections.

Economic and Military Structure: Parallel Dual-Track Pressure

The Trump administration is operating on both military and economic tracks simultaneously [14]. Treasury Secretary Bessent announced 'Operation Economic Outcast' with the goal of 'severing all remaining economic lifelines that sustain the Iranian regime' [11]. The European Union has also officially joined this pressure campaign [12]. At the same time, the United States has recently resumed intense airstrikes [14][16].

However, signals from the military on the ground are mixed. The Pentagon is moving to extend the deployment periods for troops stationed in West Asia [10][15], suggesting a deployment plan that extends to 2027 [10]. On the other hand, there are reports that the president himself is privately considering a declaration to end the war [15]. Vice President Vance remarked, 'I wouldn't call it a war,' suggesting there is currently no combat [12]. The engagement on September 3, which occurred right after this statement, reveals the gap between such linguistic framing and the situation on the ground [16][17]. Washington's actual position at present appears to be one of intensifying economic pressure while leaving the question of military conclusion open.

Security Structure: The Vulnerability of Hormuz and Gulf Allies

The Strait of Hormuz has been under a de facto blockade since the war began [3]. The United States publicly states its commitment to keeping the strait open [18]. However, Iran is responding by targeting Gulf allies rather than the U.S. mainland or Israel. The drone attacks on Kuwait and Bahrain are a case in point [17]. This demonstrates that Iran can continuously create fissures in the U.S. regional alliance network while avoiding the costs of direct escalation with the United States. Although the post-war strategy's core objective is to contain Iran, the current dynamic—where Gulf allies are exposed on the front lines of the conflict—casts doubt on the effectiveness of this containment strategy.

Analyses related to Africa also raise concerns that this war is eroding U.S. diplomatic capacity on other fronts. It is pointed out that U.S. strategic resources are concentrated on the war with Iran at a time when China, France, Russia, the UAE, and India are expanding their engagement on the African continent [8]. This suggests that the formulation of a post-war Middle East strategy is not merely a regional issue but is intertwined with the broader problem of U.S. global resource allocation.

3. Historical Precedents and Comparative Cases

The approach of expanding the Abraham Accords is not a new idea. Even in 2020, ahead of the Biden administration's inauguration, it was already projected that the first Trump administration viewed the Abraham Accords as a positive legacy and that the new administration would also strengthen its engagement in Middle East policy with the Accords as a centerpiece [6]. This approach, which uses partnerships with regional states as an axis for normalization in parallel with shifts in Palestine policy, can be seen as a consistent policy line continuing from the first Trump term.

A comparison with the Iran nuclear negotiations phase also offers insights. At the start of the Biden administration, Iran blamed the United States for all problems and demanded that it take the first step [6]. Hardliners within Iran actually strengthened their position following events like the assassination of a nuclear scientist [6]. In the current phase as well, despite suffering a blow at the highest level with the death of Khamenei, Iran chose immediate retaliation over regime collapse [3]. A pattern is repeating in which pressure does not lead directly to submission but instead reinforces a hardline response.

Bessent's comparison of 'Operation Economic Outcast' to the 'D-Day landings in World War II' is also noteworthy [11]. Such rhetoric is less about the actual effectiveness of the economic sanctions and more a form of political framing intended to create the impression of a decisive turning point for domestic and international audiences. Similar rhetoric has been repeated in past phases of Iran sanctions, but there have been few cases where sanctions led directly to regime change or a negotiated settlement.

4. Key Variables Shaping Future Developments

The variables that will determine the final form of the post-war strategy can be condensed into four main categories.

First is the outcome of Israel's general election in October. Whether Netanyahu secures a stable footing in the election will determine how much flexibility Israel can exercise in negotiations to expand the Abraham Accords [7][9]. If his far-right coalition partners retain their political influence after the election, any policy of containing escalation could be constrained.

Second is the scale of seat losses in the U.S. midterm elections in November. If the Republican Party suffers significant losses, a public break from the Senate leadership could materialize for the first time [3]. This is expected to lower the threshold for a policy shift from the White House.

Third is the rate at which stockpiles of precision-guided munitions are depleted. As a physical constraint, this variable determines the sustainability of military operations, independent of the political calendar [3]. If the gap widens between the Pentagon's decision to extend troop deployments and the actual weapons inventory, a declaration to end the war could shift from being a strategic choice to a de facto necessity.

Fourth is the pattern of Iranian attacks against U.S. allies in the Gulf. If attacks on Kuwait and Bahrain are repeated or expanded [17], the U.S. strategy to contain Iran will be encumbered by the new burden of protecting its regional allies. This is a variable that could undermine the very foundation of political trust necessary for expanding the Abraham Accords.

These four variables are not mutually independent. The substantive outline of the postwar strategy is expected to emerge during the October-November period, coinciding with the Israeli general election and the U.S. midterm elections, but it is too early to determine its direction at this stage. Given that the war itself is still ongoing, this draft postwar strategy should be viewed as open to readjustment depending on future developments on the battlefield.