Japan's Fighter Jet Deployment to India and Deepening Indo-Pacific Minilateral Security Cooperation: Background and South Korea's Response

Executive Summary

The Japan Air Self-Defense Force's first fighter deployment to India is a result of the confluence of a U.S. aircraft carrier gap in the Western Pacific, China's rise, and India's pursuit of strategic autonomy; it is not a consequence of South Korea's exclusion. Japan has adopted a pragmatic approach, simultaneously expanding separate minilateral exercises with multiple partners like India, the United States, and Australia. This network is not yet a consolidated alliance system, and this phase of low-intensity, parallel expansion is expected to continue for a considerable period (55% probability). China is expected to continue framing even individual exercises as "bloc politics," making it advantageous for South Korea to justify its participation based on maritime security and supply chain resilience rather than defense alliances. Therefore, South Korea should prioritize partial, Quad Plus-style participation in supply chain and maritime security areas over formal participation in defense, while also establishing a separate ROK-Japan defense supply chain track and developing its own monitoring systems to prepare for recurring U.S. carrier gaps. This three-pronged response should be implemented in stages, starting with low-cost, reversible measures, as part of a strategy to pragmatically integrate into the Indo-Pacific minilateral network while managing the costs to its relationship with China.

I. Situational Analysis

Situational Analysis: Japan's Fighter Jet Deployment to India and Deepening Indo-Pacific Minilateral Security Cooperation

1. Background and Developments

The Japan Air Self-Defense Force (JASDF) announced it will conduct a joint exercise, "Veer Guardian 26," with the Indian Air Force in Rajasthan, India, from September 9 to 21 [1]. This marks the first time the JASDF has deployed fighter jets to Indian territory [1]. JASDF Chief of Staff Takehiro Morita described the exercise as a "valuable opportunity to promote mutual understanding and trust" [1]. Defense Minister Koizumi met with Indian Defence Minister Rajnath Singh to discuss the matter [1].

This move is not a one-off event. It is an extension of a diplomatic policy that has been evolving for a decade, since Prime Minister Shinzo Abe first formalized the "Free and Open Indo-Pacific" (FOIP) concept at the Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD) in 2016 [11][4]. Abe had already proposed a regional concept linking the Pacific and Indian Oceans during a visit to India in his first term as prime minister in 2006 [5]. While the concept was initially focused on securing commercial sea lanes, it has transformed into an arena of geopolitical competition with China's military rise [11]. Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi recently identified strengthening supply chains as a new direction for the "evolution" of FOIP in an interview with Sankei Shimbun, a direction former Prime Minister Kishida also deemed "appropriate" [4]. This indicates that Japan's Indo-Pacific strategy is expanding to encompass both military cooperation and economic security.

This deployment to India is linked to the structural variable of a U.S. aircraft carrier gap in the Western Pacific. The prolonged Iran war led to the diversion of the Yokosuka-based USS George Washington to the Middle East, creating a U.S. carrier gap in the Western Pacific. This is seen not as a deliberate slight to Asia by the Trump administration but as a result of the structural constraints of an 11-carrier fleet struggling to cover two theaters simultaneously [2]. In response to this gap, Japan is expanding its independent deterrent capabilities by increasing its defense budget by 1.2 trillion yen and pursuing a policy of excluding China from its defense supply chains [2].

2. Current Situation

Almost concurrently with the India deployment announcement, Japan is conducting the "Oriental Shield 26" joint exercise with the United States and Australia from September 8 to 24 [16]. China's state-run Global Times has labeled this exercise "bloc politics disguised as cooperation," criticizing it as an example of how large-scale multilateral drills inject forward-deployed firepower and a confrontational posture into the Asia-Pacific's fragile security environment [16]. From Beijing's perspective, Japan's deployment to India is not a separate issue from the Japan-U.S.-Australia exercise but part of a single trend of simultaneously deepening defense cooperation with like-minded countries.

Internally, Japan's defense buildup is proceeding on multiple levels. The Acquisition, Technology & Logistics Agency (ATLA) has signed a production contract for the "Terra B1," a 3D-printed interceptor drone, and has set a goal of deploying a large-scale unmanned aerial vehicle force by 2027 [10]. Fujitsu has signed a memorandum of understanding with the U.S. company General Atomics regarding maintenance for surveillance drones [14]. The number of beds in Self-Defense Forces hospitals is also being expanded from Okinawa to Tokyo, indicating preparations for potential contingencies [7]. These moves suggest that the deployment to India is not an isolated symbolic gesture but part of a broader trend of strengthening defense capabilities across equipment, infrastructure, and personnel.

On the Indian side, there is also internal discussion about the limitations of its air defense operations. Citing lessons from the wars in Ukraine and Iran, The Hindu pointed out that air power alone cannot conclude a war, and explored the implications for the Indian military's discussions on "theatre-isation" [15]. This shows that while India is expanding air power cooperation with Japan, it also recognizes the limits of air-only deterrence and is simultaneously pursuing reforms to its joint command structure for land, sea, and air forces.

Meanwhile, India is building a diversified defense cooperation network beyond Japan. It recently held its first joint defense committee meeting with Kuwait to discuss cooperation in training, military medicine, defense industry, and R&D [12][13][17]. This aligns with India's policy of strategic autonomy, positioning its cooperation with Japan as one pillar of a multi-directional defense network that includes the Middle East, rather than simply aligning with the U.S. camp [2].

3. Key Actors and Positions

Japan Air Self-Defense Force and Ministry of Defensedescribes the exercise in principled terms as promoting "mutual understanding and trust" [1], but in reality, it should be seen as a strategic move to extend Japan's independent deterrent network to India during a U.S. carrier gap [2]. The Takaichi administration is redefining FOIP to encompass supply chain security, thereby repackaging the rationale for checking China in the language of economic security [4].

Indian Government (Modi Administration)is using deeper defense cooperation with Japan as a means to enhance its strategic autonomy, not as a step toward joining the U.S. camp [2]. The concurrent timing of new defense cooperation with Kuwait [12][13] and the first fighter exchange with Japan can be interpreted as an intention to maintain leverage by pursuing diversified partnerships rather than becoming subordinate to any single axis.

Chinaframes these moves as factors contributing to bloc formation and escalation. The Global Times criticized the Japan-U.S.-Australia exercise as an "expansion at the expense of regional stability" [16], and Japan's deployment to India is highly likely to be perceived in the same context as an attempt to build an encirclement network against China. However, China's response is likely to manifest as an increased frequency of low-intensity activities in the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea [2].

United Statesremains a relatively background actor in this phase. The fact that the structural constraint of diverting a U.S. carrier to the Middle East triggered Japan and India's expanded independent cooperation [2] suggests that the physical limits of resource allocation, rather than Washington's policy choices, are the key variable shaping Tokyo's and New Delhi's actions.

4. Key Issues

First, it is unclear whether Japan's deployment to India is intended to supplement the U.S.-Japan alliance or signals the construction of an independent deterrent network for times when the U.S. is absent. Future developments will depend on whether this is a response to a temporary variable—the carrier gap—or the initial case in a structural pattern [2].

Second, the compatibility of India's "strategic autonomy" policy with Japan-led minilateral cooperation is a key issue. India's simultaneous expansion of cooperation with non-Western countries like Kuwait [12][13] reflects New Delhi's intention to manage its partnership with Japan to prevent it from solidifying into a commitment to a specific bloc.

Third, the level and nature of China's reaction are crucial. Whether the Global Times' criticism of bloc formation remains rhetorical or leads to an actual intensification of activities in the Taiwan Strait and South China Sea will determine the level of tension in the future Indo-Pacific security architecture [16][2].

Fourth, there is the question of the effectiveness of air power-centric cooperation. The lesson from recent conflicts, as pointed out by The Hindu, is that air superiority alone does not determine the outcome of a war [15]. This suggests that for Japan-India cooperation to transition from symbolic significance to a credible deterrent, it must expand to include cooperation at the joint land, sea, and air level.

II. In-Depth Analysis

In-Depth Analysis: Japan's Fighter Jet Deployment to India and Deepening Indo-Pacific Minilateral Security Cooperation

1. Analysis of Root Causes

Japan's decision to deploy fighter jets to Indian territory for the first time cannot be explained by a single trigger. It stems from the convergence of three layers of causes.

The first layer is the U.S. aircraft carrier gap in the Western Pacific. The prolonged war in Iran led to the diversion of the Yokosuka-based USS George Washington to the Middle East [2], creating a gap in the forward-deployed deterrent force that Japan has traditionally relied on in a contingency [2]. This gap is seen less as a policy choice by Washington and more as a result of the structural limitations of an 11-carrier fleet struggling to cover two theaters simultaneously [2]. From Tokyo's perspective, this is not a one-time event but a signal of a recurring pattern. This has fueled a growing sense of urgency within the Ministry of Defense to reduce reliance on U.S. forces and secure alternative or supplementary capabilities.

The second layer is the cumulative response to China's military rise. Japan's Indo-Pacific concept, originally focused on securing commercial sea lanes, has shifted to become an arena of geopolitical competition in response to China's expanding sphere of influence [11]. This shift is not a recent development but the culmination of a policy line pursued for over a decade, first conceived by Shinzo Abe during his first term in 2006 and formalized at TICAD in 2016 [5][11]. Deepening defense cooperation with India represents the latest stage of this long-term policy.

The third layer is India's own strategic motivation. India has consistently pursued a path of strengthening its strategic autonomy rather than integrating into the U.S. camp [2]. India's reason for expanding defense and maritime security cooperation with Japan is not to become a junior partner in the U.S.-Japan alliance, but to bolster its own deterrent capabilities without becoming subordinate to either the U.S. or Chinese bloc. As demonstrated by the first joint defense committee meeting with Kuwait [12][13], India is simultaneously expanding its defense cooperation channels in multiple directions, including the Middle East. Cooperation with Japan is just one pillar of India's diversification strategy. Overlooking this point leads to the misreading of Japan's outreach to India as merely an extension of the U.S.-Japan alliance.

2. Structural Context

Security Architecture: The U.S.-led hub-and-spoke alliance system of the Cold War era still operates in the Pacific, but India was never part of this system in the Indian Ocean. Constrained by its non-alignment tradition and reliance on Russian weapon systems, India has not formally joined the U.S.-led security network. Japan's deployment to India is an attempt to build a partnership independently in this vacuum—the Indian Ocean axis where the U.S. alliance network does not reach. This can be interpreted as a sign that the bilateral Japan-India relationship is beginning to develop its own momentum, moving beyond the framework of the four-nation Quad consultative body [3][8].

Political Structure: In Japanese domestic politics, Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi has set a course to "evolve" FOIP, identifying supply chain reinforcement as a new pillar [4]. Former Prime Minister Kishida also described this direction as "appropriate" in an interview with Sankei Shimbun [4]. This demonstrates that the Liberal Democratic Party's Indo-Pacific strategy is continuing regardless of changes in leadership. The defense budget increase (1.2 trillion yen) and the policy of excluding China from defense supply chains [2] are also less the temporary policies of a specific cabinet and more akin to a cross-party consensus built up over several administrations.

Economic and Industrial Structure: Japan's defense buildup is proceeding in parallel with a reorganization of its industrial base, not just in operational aspects like fighter deployments. The Acquisition, Technology & Logistics Agency (ATLA) has signed a production contract for the "Terra B1," a 3D-printed interceptor drone, positioning it as the Japanese counterpart to the "Terra A1," which has already been proven on the battlefields of Ukraine [10]. The maintenance cooperation between Fujitsu and U.S.-based General Atomics for surveillance drones [14] is part of the same trend. The expansion of hospital beds in Self-Defense Forces facilities [7] is a preparatory measure that assumes mass casualties in a contingency, suggesting Japan is shifting from a "peacetime-contingency" dichotomy to a state of constant readiness. While this industrial and medical infrastructure overhaul may seem separate from the India deployment, it is in fact another facet of the same trend: Japan's effort to build a self-contained deterrent system and move away from one dependent on the United States.

3. Historical Precedents and Comparative Cases

There are few precedents for the Japan Air Self-Defense Force deploying fighter jets to another country's territory. Until now, Japan's overseas military cooperation has been largely limited to joint exercises with the United States or participation in multinational drills. The deployment to Rajasthan, India, is a case that breaks this mold, representing the first real test of Japan operating its fighter assets independently outside the framework of the U.S.-Japan alliance.

A comparable case is the trilateral Japan-U.S.-Australia exercise, "Oriental Shield 26" [16]. It is no coincidence that both exercises are being held almost concurrently in September. If Oriental Shield represents a deepening of the existing U.S.-Japan alliance network, Veer Guardian represents the building of a new partnership outside that network. China's state-run Global Times labeled Oriental Shield "bloc politics disguised as cooperation" [16]. Applying the same logic, Veer Guardian is also likely to be read in Beijing as an event on the expanding front of an anti-China encirclement. However, given that India has kept its distance from military bloc formation aimed at containing China, even within the Quad framework, it is assessed that China's threat perception of these two exercises will not be identical.

Another relevant case is the first India-Kuwait Joint Defense Committee meeting [12][13]. While not directly related to Japan-India cooperation, it is significant in that it shows a pattern of India building multiple, parallel defense partnerships without being co-opted into a specific bloc. India's foreign defense cooperation is developing based on case-by-case judgments of "with whom to cooperate and in what area," rather than "with whom to ally." Cooperation with Japan should be seen as one outcome of these individual judgments, and it is difficult to assume that the relationship will automatically deepen and expand in the future.

4. Key Variables Shaping Future Developments

The first variable is the duration of the U.S. aircraft carrier gap.If the situation in Iran stabilizes and the USS George Washington returns to Yokosuka, the urgency Japan attaches to expanding its independent deterrent capabilities may decrease [2]. Conversely, if the gap becomes a recurring structural pattern, cooperation with "like-minded" countries, including India, could change in nature from a supplement to a substitute.

The second variable is India's perception of China and the situation on their border.India's deepening defense cooperation with Japan is largely based on security anxieties stemming from its border dispute with China. If this conflict de-escalates, the strategic importance India places on cooperation with Japan could also diminish. Given that India has maintained the flexibility to adjust its level of cooperation according to its national interests, the possibility that the relationship may not be institutionalized to the extent Japan hopes cannot be ruled out.

The third variable is the continuity of Japanese domestic politics.Whether the "evolution" of FOIP proposed by the Takaichi cabinet [4] will be maintained by the next administration depends on factional dynamics within the LDP and the cycle of prime ministerial changes. However, considering the continuity of this policy over more than a decade from Abe to Kishida to Takaichi [5][11][4], the probability of a sharp reversal is low.

The fourth variable is the nature of China's response.As the tone of the Global Times suggests [16], China may raise the level of its diplomatic backlash, framing Japan-led minilateral cooperation as "bloc formation." However, whether this backlash translates into an actual escalation of military tensions or remains at the level of rhetorical criticism is a question that must be assessed in conjunction with the situation in the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea.