Trump's Approval Rating Stalls at 33% as Public Opinion on Iran War Worsens: A Geopolitical Risk Analysis

Executive Summary

Six months after the United States initiated war against Iran, Washington’s stated objectives—including regime change and the dismantlement of nuclear facilities—remain largely unachieved. Despite the symbolic success of Ayatollah Khamenei’s death, the Strait of Hormuz remains effectively blockaded. According to a Reuters/Ipsos poll, support for the war in Iran has continuously declined to 31%, while President Trump’s approval rating has stalled at 33%. The primary drivers of this eroding support are defections within the Republican base and the tangible economic pressures of inflation and rising oil prices. However, because this shift in the base has not yet translated into a public break by the Republican Senate leadership, the White House continues to prioritize escalating pressure through expanded secondary sanctions over persuading public opinion. The actual catalyst for a policy change is more likely to be a combination of factors rather than approval ratings alone: the results of the November midterm elections, a public defection by the Senate leadership, and the physical constraint of depleting precision-guided munitions stockpiles. Consequently, a scenario of prolonged stalemate is assessed as the most probable outcome for the foreseeable future (55% probability). The South Korean government and businesses must continually monitor the ripple effects of a protracted Hormuz blockade—leading to persistently high energy prices—and expanding U.S. sanctions on Iran, particularly their impact on supply chains and energy security.

I. Situational Analysis

Trump's Approval Rating Stalls at 33% as Public Opinion on Iran War Worsens: A Situational Analysis

1. Background and Developments

On February 28, 2026, the United States and Israel launched airstrikes against targets inside Iran [8][10]. Washington's initially stated objectives were regime change, the dismantlement of nuclear facilities, the neutralization of Iran's missile and drone programs, and the cessation of its support for non-state armed groups in the region [6]. Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei was killed in an Israeli airstrike, but this did not lead to the collapse of the Iranian regime [10]. Iran immediately launched a counterattack, and the Strait of Hormuz has been under a de facto blockade since the war began [8]. Prior to the conflict, this waterway was the transit route for one-fifth of the world's crude oil supply [8].

An early end to hostilities was reached on June 17 with the "Islamabad Memorandum" [8]. However, since the memorandum's expiration on August 17, the United States and Iran have been engaged in a renewed dispute over the facts concerning passage through the Strait of Hormuz [2][8]. Six months into the war, the consensus is that Washington has achieved almost none of its stated objectives [6]. In the process, U.S. stockpiles of precision-guided munitions have been depleted. Inventories of THAAD interceptor missiles are understood to have fallen by at least 38%, and Patriot missiles by as much as 65% [2]. The cost of the war is estimated at a minimum of $35 billion [14].

2. Current Situation

According to a four-day Reuters/Ipsos poll that concluded on Monday, only 31% of respondents support U.S. military action against Iran [1][4][9]. This figure represents a continuous decline from 37% in a March poll and 34% earlier this month [1][4][7][9][11]. Al Jazeera notes that the primary driver of this drop is defections from within the Republican support base itself [9]. Reuters has reported similarly [1][4].

The same poll found that President Trump's approval rating has stalled at 33%, near a record low [12][13][15][16]. Daily Sabah and Al-Monitor point to persistent inflation and rising gasoline prices caused by the war in Iran as reasons for this stagnation [12][13]. The Globe and Mail and Arab News report that while the intensity of the fighting has decreased, diplomatic efforts to end the war have reached a stalemate. The transport of crude oil and raw materials through the Strait of Hormuz remains blocked, keeping energy prices high [15][16]. Against this backdrop, the Trump administration announced an expansion of secondary sanctions against Iran last Monday [15][16][17]. This shows that the administration's policy is weighted more toward escalating pressure than resuming negotiations.

Foreign Policy notes that since the war began, the White House has made almost no sustained effort to persuade domestic public opinion [14]. This stands in contrast to the precedent set by the Roosevelt administration, which mobilized even popular culture resources to build a case for entering World War II [14]. The Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) summarizes the options before Trump as three choices, none of them appealing: a dramatic escalation, a conciliatory de-escalation, or a continuation of the current messy stalemate [3].

3. Key Actors and Positions

The Trump White House has effectively neglected efforts to persuade domestic public opinion since the start of the war [2][14]. This can be interpreted as the result of the administration setting a high threshold for when public pressure would trigger a policy shift [2]. Instead, it has chosen to continue applying pressure by expanding sanctions [15][16][17].

The Republican Base is the key variable that drove the recent decline in support [1][4][9]. The Reuters/Ipsos poll explicitly attributes the drop to defections from within the Republican base itself [1][4]. However, a public break by the Republican Senate leadership has not yet materialized [2]. This gap between the fracturing support base and the cohesive leadership is a key point to watch for gauging any future policy shift.

Iran, even after the death of Ayatollah Khamenei, has avoided regime collapse, launched a counteroffensive, and maintained a de facto blockade of the Strait of Hormuz [8][10]. In the dispute over the facts of passage since the memorandum expired, Iran has shown no sign of backing down to the United States [2][8].

The U.S. Military Command is facing the physical constraint of depleting its stockpiles of precision-guided munitions [2]. The reduction in THAAD and Patriot interceptor missile inventories is a factor that limits the capacity for further escalation [2].

The American Electorate is expressing fatigue with the war in Iran through the tangible costs of inflation and rising gas prices [12][13]. This reaction stems more from economic burden than from ideological anti-war sentiment, and as such, it should be viewed as a structural pressure that will be difficult to reverse in the short term.

4. Key Issues

The first key issue is whether the decline in approval ratings will actually lead to a policy shift. EAI analysis suggests that a substantive policy change is more likely to be determined by a combination of factors than by poll numbers alone: the scale of seat losses in the November midterm elections, a public break by Republican senators, and the physical constraint of depleting precision-guided munitions stockpiles [2]. This implies that it is difficult to predict a change in the White House's position based on approval ratings alone.

The second issue is the contradiction between expanding sanctions and pursuing negotiations to end the war. The administration announced the expansion of sanctions at the same time that peace talks stalled [15][16][17]. It is unclear whether this is a strategy to gain negotiating leverage through pressure or a result of negotiations themselves being deprioritized.

The third issue is that physical constraints are beginning to override political calculations. The depletion of precision-guided munitions stockpiles is cited as a factor that curtails the Trump administration’s very authority to decide on escalation [2]. This means that military options are narrowing, independent of pressure from public opinion or Congress.

II. In-Depth Analysis

Trump's Approval Rating Stalls at 33% as Public Opinion on Iran War Worsens: An In-Depth Analysis

1. Analysis of Root Causes

The direct cause of the decline in support is the gap between the stated rationale for the war and its actual results. At the outset of the conflict, Washington presented its goals as regime change, the dismantlement of nuclear facilities, the neutralization of Iran's missile and drone programs, and the cessation of its support for regional non-state armed groups [6]. Six months later, the prevailing assessment is that almost none of these objectives have been met [6]. While there was the symbolic achievement of Ayatollah Khamenei's death, it did not lead to the regime's collapse [10]. This gap between objectives and achievements is the primary cause for the erosion of public support.

A second cause lies in the White House's very approach to managing public opinion. Foreign Policy points out that the Trump administration has made almost no sustained effort to persuade the domestic public since the war began [14]. This is a stark contrast to the precedent of the Roosevelt administration, which mobilized even popular culture resources to build the case for entering World War II [14]. This is not merely the absence of a public relations strategy; it aligns with the assessment that the White House has set an extremely high threshold for responding to public pressure [2]. Indeed, President Trump has not shown a tendency to react immediately to poll numbers before making decisions on escalation or withdrawal.

A third cause is the tangible cost of living. Amid persistent inflation, rising gasoline prices due to the war in Iran are cited as a factor behind Trump's stagnant approval ratings [12][13]. This is supported by the fact that energy prices remain high because the transport of crude oil and raw materials through the Strait of Hormuz remains blocked [15][16]. As the war, which started as a security issue, has transformed into the economic issue of household costs, the base of opposition has broadened, contributing to the decline in support.

2. Structural Context

Political Structure: The primary driver of the recent decline in support is defections from within the Republican base itself [1][4][9]. However, this has not yet led to a public break with the administration's policy by the Republican Senate leadership [2]. In American party politics, a public defection by members of the president's own party is a signal that has a much higher threshold than poll numbers. With Trumpism already established as the mainstream ideology of the Republican Party [10], it is politically risky for individual members of Congress to challenge the president based only on early signs of an eroding base. This structure is the reason the White House is likely using potential fractures within the Senate—rather than public opinion figures—as its true benchmark for a policy change.

Economic Structure: The expansion of U.S. shale production and America's transition to a net energy exporter have already eroded the logical basis for its security commitments in the Persian Gulf [8]. As Vice President Vance has stated, the priority of U.S. policy on Iran has shifted from regime change and dismantling nuclear facilities to stabilizing consumer oil prices [8]. This can be interpreted as a signal that Washington is departing from its long-standing practice of providing the public good of protecting Gulf sea lanes at no cost [8]. Simultaneously, the rise in oil prices caused by the Hormuz blockade creates a contradictory dynamic, boomeranging to impact domestic politics. A conflict exists between the strategic intention to reduce the burden of intervention, undergirded by energy independence, and the political reality that the war is driving up oil prices and eroding the president's support.

Security Structure: The depletion of precision-guided munitions stockpiles is a variable that defines the physical limits of this war. Inventories of THAAD interceptor missiles are understood to have decreased by at least 38%, and Patriot missiles by as much as 65% [2][10]. This rate of depletion is a factor that curtails the Trump administration’s very authority to decide on escalation [10]. Regardless of how much public opinion worsens—or, conversely, even if it were to pressure for escalation—these inventory constraints have physically narrowed the available policy options. In this respect, this issue should be viewed not as a purely political contest of public opinion, but as a case where the limits of logistical capacity are defining policy discretion.

3. Comparison with Historical Precedents and Similar Cases

The most direct parallel is the 2003 Iraq War. Whereas a majority of Republican supporters at the time backed the Bush administration's invasion, Donald Trump took an unusually oppositional stance [10]. The assessment later solidified that the failure of the Iraq War had damaged Republican trust in the Bush administration to an irreparable degree. Amid this trend, Trump's political standing as an opponent of the mainstream view was actually strengthened [10]. This precedent is ironic, as Trump now finds himself in a similar trap. It suggests a potential repeat of the pattern in which a prolonged war that fails to achieve its objectives erodes the trust of a leader's political base.

However, there are also distinct differences. Support for the Iraq War started at an overwhelmingly high level and eroded slowly over a long period. In contrast, support for the current war in Iran has shown a pattern of rapid, successive declines in a short time frame: from 37% (March) to 34% (early August) and then to 31% (late August) [1][4][7][9][11]. The faster pace of this decline suggests that the White House has a relatively shorter window in which to respond.

Another point of reference is the failed U.S. intervention against Houthi rebels in Yemen. An analysis by the Sana'a Center points out that the United States has failed to achieve any of its objectives against Iran: regime change, dismantlement of nuclear facilities, containment of missile and drone programs, or cessation of support for regional non-state armed groups [6]. The pattern of deploying overwhelming military force yet failing to break the will of an asymmetric adversary is now repeating for a third time, following Afghanistan and Iraq. The CFR's diagnosis that Trump faces three "unappealing" options—escalation, conciliatory de-escalation, or continued stalemate—is based on this premise of historical repetition [3].

4. Key Variables Shaping Future Developments

The first variable is the November midterm elections. The actual scale of seat losses, rather than the approval ratings themselves, will likely serve as the substantive indicator determining whether the White House reconsiders its policy [2]. If the Republican Party loses its majority in the House of Representatives, congressional checks on the administration's Iran policy could take more concrete form.

The second variable is whether there is a public break by the Republican Senate leadership. To date, while defections among the base have been confirmed, there has been no public change of course at the Senate leadership level [2]. The point at which such a break becomes visible is assessed to be the effective threshold for a policy shift.

The third variable is the depletion rate of precision-guided munitions stockpiles. If the decline in THAAD and Patriot inventories continues [2][10], the conflict could reach a phase where further escalation is physically constrained, regardless of public opinion or political pressure. In that event, a policy change would manifest not as a political choice but as a forced result of logistical limitations.

The fourth variable is the outcome of the dispute over passage through the Strait of Hormuz. The dispute over the facts of passage has continued since the expiration of the Islamabad Memorandum [2][8]. As long as this issue remains unresolved, the upward pressure on energy prices will likely continue to weigh down approval ratings. Conversely, the normalization of passage could become a catalyst for a rebound in support.