Status of US-Iran Nuclear Negotiations and Prospects for Strait of Hormuz Security: Analysis of the 'Managed Uncertainty' Phase

Executive Summary

Executive Summary

In June 2025, the United States and Iran achieved diplomatic progress, including the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) mediated by Pakistan and Qatar and the holding of high-level negotiations in Switzerland. However, this agreement has been a superficial resolution, failing to fundamentally address Iran's nuclear program, ballistic missile capabilities, and support for regional proxies. The situation remains in a fragile balance, evidenced by the recurrence of attacks on civilian oil tankers in the Strait of Hormuz just nine days after the MoU's signing. The current phase most closely aligns with the baseline scenario of 'managed uncertainty'—neither a complete breakthrough nor a total breakdown—with a probability of 50%. The Trump administration's transactional diplomacy is converging on a strategy that maintains negotiation momentum through economic incentives, such as the 60-day temporary waiver for Iranian oil sales, while simultaneously securing leverage to immediately reimpose sanctions if the agreement is violated. This suggests that U.S. foreign policy is likely to unfold through a 'phased transaction' approach, accumulating short-term, visible achievements. Consequently, both corporations and governments face the core challenge of managing persistent uncertainty. Therefore, this report recommends a core response strategy of 'Conditional Readiness,' which involves proactively preparing to seize opportunities in optimistic scenarios while deferring actual resource allocation until clear trigger points are met, and simultaneously strengthening risk hedging mechanisms immediately.Conditional Readiness strategy as the primary course of action.

Phase 1: Issue Situation Analysis

Prospects for Easing Tensions in the US-Iran Nuclear Agreement and the Strait of Hormuz: Issue Situation Analysis

1. Background and Progress of the Issue

The conflict between the United States and Iran escalated into military clashes in early 2025. After approximately four months of engagement, a diplomatic solution began to emerge. On June 14, 2025, President Trump officially announced the end of the war with Iran and the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz [14]. This temporarily eased international concerns over the months-long energy supply crisis and the paralysis of global shipping. However, the prevailing assessment is that this agreement was a superficial resolution that failed to fundamentally address Iran's nuclear program, ballistic missile capabilities, and support for regional proxies. This is expected to remain a persistent source of instability in future negotiations [14].

Specific progress in the negotiations became visible in mid-June. The United States and Iran, with Pakistan and Qatar acting as mediators, signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) in Islamabad. Subsequently, on June 22, they held the first high-level meeting in Switzerland to finalize a peace agreement [7]. At the Swiss talks, U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent stated that Iran had pledged to ensure the 'free and open' passage through the Strait of Hormuz and to allow the return of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors [7]. In line with this diplomatic progress, the U.S. Department of the Treasury issued a temporary general license on the same day, permitting the sale of Iranian crude oil, petrochemicals, and petroleum products for 60 days until August 21 [2][8].

2. Current Situation (Latest Developments)

Maritime traffic in the Strait of Hormuz has shown a gradual recovery since the signing of the MoU. According to data from the maritime intelligence firm Kpler, over 172 vessels have transited the strait since June 18, the day after the agreement was signed, with 42 vessels passing through on Saturday alone [15]. In the week following the agreement, 98 oil tankers transited the strait, reaching the highest number since the conflict began. Consequently, crude oil prices have fallen to pre-war levels, and the market has begun to reflect the possibility of normalization [16]. Furthermore, based on the outcomes of the Swiss talks, the United States and Iran have established a direct communication line to prevent military clashes within the Strait of Hormuz, and a 'de-confliction cell,' including Lebanon, has been formed [13][17].

However, the situation remains unstable. Nine days after the MoU signing, an attack on a civilian oil tanker recurred in the Strait of Hormuz [1]. Iran maintains its position that nuclear negotiations cannot begin until all five provisions of the MoU are fully implemented [12]. The New York Times analyzed that the ambiguous wording of the temporary ceasefire agreement, to which the U.S. negotiating team agreed, is hindering peace efforts less than two weeks after the agreement [19]. It is also noteworthy that Iran is continuing its war of nerves with the United States by reaffirming its control over the strait [12]. The shipping industry finds itself in a dilemma, facing the dual pressure of potential Iranian retaliation if they follow U.S. guidance and U.S. sanctions if they comply with Iran's demands [6].

3. Key Actors and Their Positions/Interests

United StatesIn this negotiation, the United States is pursuing two core objectives: controlling Iran's nuclear program and ensuring freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz. While the Trump administration is highlighting the cessation of military conflict as a foreign policy achievement, it faces the structural limitation of entering negotiations without fundamentally resolving Iran's nuclear capabilities, ballistic missile issues, and support for regional proxies [14]. Treasury Secretary Bessent's direct announcement of the negotiation results and the issuance of the waiver for Iranian oil sales are interpreted as a strategic move to keep Iran engaged in negotiations through economic incentives [7][2].

Iranis employing a strategy to maintain control over the negotiations by setting the implementation of the MoU as a prerequisite for nuclear talks. Iran's UN Ambassador, Iravani, explicitly stated that nuclear negotiations can only commence after all five provisions of the MoU are fully implemented [12]. The joint review by Iran and Oman of potential transit fees in the Strait of Hormuz is seen as an attempt to economically institutionalize Iran's effective control over the strait [10]. Iran maintains a stance of leveraging its nuclear program and control over the strait during negotiations to extract maximum concessions.

Qatar and Pakistanare serving as mediators in this negotiation, acting as a bridge between the two parties. Following the Swiss talks, both countries issued a joint statement evaluating the 'encouraging progress' [13] and are responsible for facilitating the implementation of practical confidence-building measures, such as the establishment of a direct communication line. Qatar is utilizing its unique position, maintaining close security cooperation with the United States while also possessing diplomatic channels with Iran, to expand its influence in the Middle East.

South Koreais attempting active diplomatic engagement as a party with direct interests in the Strait of Hormuz transit issue. On June 26, South Korean Foreign Minister Cho Hyun held a phone conversation with Iranian Foreign Minister Araghchi, welcoming the signing of the MoU and urging its faithful implementation and progress in subsequent negotiations, while emphasizing the importance of ensuring free and safe passage through the Strait of Hormuz [4]. Given that South Korea relies heavily on the Middle East for its crude oil imports, this reflects the critical national interest in stabilizing the strait from an energy security perspective.

International Maritime Industryis facing an uncertain environment where they must make operational decisions caught between the dual pressures from the United States and Iran [6]. Despite the resumption of transit through the strait, the average number of vessels transiting daily remains significantly below the pre-conflict level of 138 [15], suggesting that it will take considerable time for the industry to regain confidence.

4. Summary of Key Issues

The key issues surrounding the current US-Iran negotiations can be summarized into four main points.

First, the ambiguity and implementation reliability of the MoUis a major concern. The unclear wording of the temporary ceasefire agreement has led to differing interpretations between the parties, as starkly demonstrated by the ship attack incident immediately following the agreement [1][19]. With Iran setting the full implementation of the MoU's five provisions as a prerequisite for nuclear negotiations [12], there are concerns that the sequential implementation structure of the agreement could delay the entire negotiation process.

Second, the future of Iran's nuclear programremains an issue. The three core challenges—Iran's nuclear capabilities, ballistic missile development, and support for regional proxies—were not fundamentally resolved in the current MoU and have been deferred to subsequent negotiations [14]. Although Iran has pledged the return of IAEA inspectors [7], the extent to which Iran will permit their access remains uncertain.

Third, the dispute over control of the Strait of Hormuzis significant. The joint review by Iran and Oman of potential transit fees is an attempt to economically institutionalize Iran's claim of sovereign control over the strait, which is expected to face strong opposition from the United States [10]. This issue is highly likely to become a new flashpoint for conflict after the 60-day transit fee exemption period expires.

Fourth, the sustainability of sanctions relief on Iranian oilis a critical factor. The 60-day temporary general license issued by the U.S. Department of the Treasury expires on August 21 [2][8], and the extension of sanctions relief thereafter is directly linked to progress in nuclear negotiations. If negotiations stall, sanctions could be reimposed, which could have an immediate impact on the global energy market and South Korea's oil supply.

Phase 2: In-depth Issue Analysis

Prospects for Easing Tensions in the US-Iran Nuclear Agreement and the Strait of Hormuz: In-depth Issue Analysis

1. Analysis of the Root Causes of the Issue

The root cause of the US-Iran conflict extends beyond mere nuclear non-proliferation; it stems from a structural antagonism over regional hegemony in the Middle East. Since the Islamic Revolution in 1979, both countries have adhered to ideologically and strategically incompatible regional order visions, with Iran's nuclear program becoming the most acute manifestation of this conflict. From Iran's perspective, nuclear capability is not merely an energy policy but a crucial asset that guarantees its strategic autonomy as a regional power and serves as the ultimate deterrent against military threats from the United States and Israel. Conversely, the United States has maintained a maximum pressure stance under the perception that Iran's nuclear armament would trigger a Middle East nuclear domino effect and fundamentally threaten Israel's security.

The direct cause of the recent escalation into military conflict lies in the combination of Iran's acceleration of its nuclear program and its strategic pressure exerted through the Strait of Hormuz. Iran countered U.S. and Western sanctions with the asymmetric strategy of blockading the strait, which effectively functioned as leverage, immediately impacting global energy supply chains. However, as highlighted in an analysis by Foreign Affairs, the current agreement, reached after approximately four months of engagement, is assessed as a superficial resolution that has failed to fundamentally address the three core issues of Iran's nuclear program, ballistic missile capabilities, and support for regional proxies [14]. This suggests that the current agreement is likely to result in only a temporary easing of tensions rather than eliminating the root causes of the conflict.

The issue of the Strait of Hormuz is a physical manifestation of this structural conflict. Iran regards control of the strait as a strategic asset and has consistently shown an intention to leverage it maximally in external negotiations. The joint review by Iran and Oman of potential fees for passage through the strait [10] indicates that Iran is pursuing a long-term strategy to institutionalize its control over the strait not just as a military card but as a source of economic revenue. This directly conflicts with the U.S.-led principle of freedom of navigation and is expected to be a significant source of friction in future negotiations.

2. Structural Context

Political Structure

At the political level, this negotiation can be understood as an application of the Trump administration's 'transactional diplomacy' approach to Middle Eastern issues. President Trump brought Iran to the negotiating table through a combination of military pressure and economic incentives, but the ambiguous wording of the agreement has already led to interpretive conflicts between the parties [19]. Iran has set the precondition that nuclear negotiations cannot begin until all five provisions of the MoU are fully implemented [12], signifying that a struggle for control over the sequence and pace of negotiations has already begun.

The domestic political context is also crucial. Hardliners in Iran view any concessions on the nuclear program as undermining the legitimacy of the regime, and the ultimate decision-making authority of Supreme Leader Khamenei sets the practical limits of the negotiations. Within the United States, pro-Israel lobby groups and neoconservative hardliners maintain a stance that any compromise with Iran is unacceptable, making it structurally difficult for the Trump administration to advance negotiations while securing support from Congress and allies.

Economic Structure

At the economic level, the key incentive of this agreement is the return of Iranian crude oil to the international market. The 60-day temporary general license issued by the U.S. Department of the Treasury permits the sale of Iranian crude oil, petrochemicals, and petroleum products until August 21 [2][8][9], representing a strategic choice to maintain negotiation momentum through economic compensation to Iran. From Iran's perspective, resuming oil exports is crucial for recovering its economy, which has been devastated by decades of sanctions, and this serves as a core incentive for continuing negotiations.

However, this economic structure simultaneously harbors vulnerabilities in negotiation. The temporary 60-day license period is designed as a pressure tool, enabling immediate reimposition of sanctions if negotiations reach an impasse. Conversely, it also provides Iran with an incentive to prolong the process to maximize economic benefits. The post-agreement decline in oil prices to pre-war levels and the record high of 98 oil tankers transiting the Strait of Hormuz, the highest since the outbreak of conflict [16], indicate that the market has begun to reflect the possibility of normalization. However, this also signifies the vulnerability that market shocks could recur if negotiations fail.

Security Structure

From a security perspective, the most significant structural flaw in the current agreement is that Iran's nuclear capabilities remain unresolved. Although the return of IAEA inspectors has been promised [7], Iran is evading immediate discussion on the nuclear issue by framing the nuclear negotiations themselves as a subsequent phase of the MoU implementation [12]. This reflects Iran's strategic calculation to preserve its nuclear capabilities as its ultimate bargaining chip and extract concessions incrementally.

Military instability in the Strait of Hormuz also persists as a structural security threat. While the establishment of a direct communication line between the U.S. and Iran to prevent military clashes in the strait and the formation of a de-escalation cell are positive steps [13][17], the recurrence of a civilian oil tanker attack just nine days after the MoU signing [1] casts doubt on the effectiveness of this communication channel. The possibility of non-state actors, such as the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), taking independent actions, and the potential for Iran's regional proxies, like the Houthi rebels, to complicate the negotiation process also remain.

3. Comparison with Historical Precedents and Similar Cases

Comparison with the 2015 JCPOA

The most direct historical reference for understanding the current agreement is the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) signed during the Obama administration in 2015. The JCPOA, structured around limiting Iran's nuclear activities in exchange for sanctions relief, shares a basic framework with the current agreement. However, while the JCPOA contained specific and verifiable obligations through years of meticulous multilateral negotiations, the current MoU is fundamentally fragile due to the ambiguity of its wording, which has led to conflicting interpretations immediately after its signing [19]. The precedent of the Trump administration unilaterally withdrawing from the JCPOA in 2018 has fostered fundamental distrust in Iran regarding the reliability of U.S. commitment to the agreement, which in turn underpins Iran's insistence on preconditions for the MoU's implementation [12].

Similarities with North Korea-U.S. Nuclear Negotiations

The U.S.-Iran nuclear negotiations exhibit a structurally similar pattern to the North Korea-U.S. nuclear negotiations. As in the case of North Korea, Iran views its nuclear capabilities as the ultimate safeguard for regime survival and employs a strategy of phased negotiations to maximize economic benefits while delaying a final decision on denuclearization. Just as negotiations stalled after the 2018 Singapore North Korea-U.S. summit, the current U.S.-Iran agreement risks exhausting its initial diplomatic momentum during the implementation of detailed provisions. In particular, Iran's stance of demanding 'action for action' bears a structural resemblance to North Korea's 'action-for-action' principle in denuclearization talks, foreshadowing prolonged and stalled negotiations.

The Hormuz Crisis Following the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s

Tensions surrounding the Strait of Hormuz have historically recurred. The so-called 'Tanker War' during the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s was the first empirical demonstration of the impact that attacks on merchant vessels in the Strait of Hormuz and the Persian Gulf could have on global energy supply chains. At that time, the U.S. played a role in ensuring the strait's security through Operation Earnest Will, which involved reflagging Kuwaiti tankers with the American flag. In the current situation, the contest for control over the safety of passage through the strait between the U.S. and Iran is being replayed. The consideration by Iran and Oman of imposing transit fees [10] can be seen as an extension of Iran's historical attempts to institutionalize its effective control over the strait.

4. Key Variables in Issue Development

Variable 1: Completeness of MoU Implementation and Timing of Nuclear Negotiations

The most decisive variable in the future development of this issue will be the completeness of the implementation of the five provisions of the MoU and the subsequent timing of the commencement of nuclear negotiations. Iran has set the complete implementation of the MoU as a prerequisite for nuclear negotiations [12], while the U.S. seeks to secure the early return of IAEA inspectors and free passage through the Strait of Hormuz [7]. The speed and direction of negotiations will be determined at this point of conflicting interests. The expiration of the 60-day license on August 21st will be a critical juncture, and if no tangible progress is made in nuclear negotiations by this date, the cycle of sanctions reimposition and heightened tensions could resume [2][8].

Variable 2: The Direction of the Strait of Hormuz Control Dispute

The consideration of transit fees by Iran and Oman [10], along with Iran's continued assertion of control over the strait [12], carries the risk of setting a precedent that the U.S. finds unacceptable. As long as the U.S. adheres to the principle of freedom of navigation, Iran's attempt to monetize passage could lead to a fundamental rift in negotiations. Conversely, if the current situation, where the number of transits through the strait is only about 25% of the pre-war daily average of 138 vessels, persists [16], the uncertainty in the global energy market will not be resolved.

Variable 3: Actions of Regional Proxies and the Non-State Actor Variable

Independent actions by Iran's regional proxies, such as the Houthi rebels, Hezbollah, and Iraqi militias, are non-linear variables that could complicate the negotiation process at any time. The formation of a de-escalation cell, including Lebanon [13], reflects the complexity of this issue, but it remains unclear whether Iran exercises complete control over these forces. The oil tanker attack shortly after the MoU signing [1] serves as a warning sign that non-state actors can disrupt negotiations regardless of the Iranian government's intentions.

Variable 4: Consistency of U.S. Foreign Policy and the Domestic Political Dynamics of the Trump Administration

The foreign policy of the Trump administration has a structural characteristic of being heavily dependent on the President's personal judgment. If negotiations do not progress at the speed expected by President Trump, a sharp pivot towards maximum pressure cannot be ruled out. Simultaneously, Israel's reaction is also a significant variable. Israel may view any nuclear agreement with Iran as a threat to its security and could potentially neutralize the negotiations themselves through independent military action. The South Korean Foreign Minister's emphasis on freedom and safety of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz and urging the implementation of the MoU in a phone call with the Iranian Foreign Minister [4] clearly illustrates how energy-import-dependent nations, including South Korea, are reacting sensitively to U.S. diplomatic consistency as stakeholders in these negotiations.