Israel's Large-Scale Airstrikes on Lebanon and Targeting of Hezbollah Infrastructure: A Geopolitical Risk Analysis

Executive Summary

On September 4, the Israeli military destroyed a Hezbollah underground tunnel network on the Ali Taher ridge in Nabatieh and subsequently expanded its airstrikes beyond the security zone. For the first time since the June ceasefire, strikes reached the Western Beqaa region, and civilian casualties are mounting, including an airstrike on a residential building in Kfar Roummane that killed 11 members of a single family. Given Prime Minister Netanyahu's domestic political constraints—namely, the burden of his corruption trial and pressure from far-right coalition partners—and Iran's dilemma between upholding the June agreement and protecting Hezbollah, the expansion of airstrikes is likely to be a structurally persistent trend rather than a temporary phase. The most probable future trajectory is the 'normalization of low-intensity airstrikes' (55% probability), while the likelihood of a return to a stalemate after securing the ridge is limited (20% probability). While direct exposure for South Korean companies in Lebanon is minimal, the indirect risks to Eastern Mediterranean aviation and shipping routes and energy projects should be managed as a constant factor throughout the current administration's term.

I. Situational Analysis

Israel's Large-Scale Airstrikes on Lebanon and Targeting of Hezbollah Infrastructure: A Situational Analysis

1. Background and Developments

The Ali Taher ridge in the Nabatieh area of southern Lebanon is known as a key hub for Hezbollah's underground tunnel network. The Israeli military has long claimed that this ridge was designed to serve as a forward base for an invasion of the Galilee [13]. Even after the June 2026 ceasefire agreement, this area remained a major flashpoint in the conflict between Israel and Hezbollah.

Iran invested significant diplomatic effort to include Lebanon in the June ceasefire agreement, aiming to protect Hezbollah from continuous Israeli airstrikes [2]. However, this agreement rested on an unstable foundation from the outset. With a high probability of renewed Israeli attacks on Hezbollah, Tehran was caught in a dilemma: risk the collapse of its agreement with the United States or risk being perceived as a bystander [2].

This dynamic is an extension of the multi-front escalation pattern that has formed since the outbreak of the Gaza war in October 2023. Israel has expanded its military operations across six countries, including not only the Gaza Strip but also Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Qatar, and Iran [6]. Local analyses have repeatedly suggested that Prime Minister Netanyahu has maintained a hardline stance amid the pressure of his corruption trial and from his far-right coalition partners [6][8].

2. Current Situation

On September 10, the Israeli military announced it had destroyed Hezbollah's underground tunnel network on the Ali Taher ridge. The explosion was powerful enough to generate shockwaves equivalent to a 4.1 magnitude earthquake [1][4]. The Israeli media outlet Ynet reported that over 1,100 tons of explosives were used in the demolition [12][15]. Prime Minister Netanyahu and Defense Minister Israel Katz confirmed in a joint statement that they had destroyed Hezbollah's underground complex on the ridge [9][10].

Within hours of announcing control of the ridge, the Israeli military expanded its airstrikes to areas outside the so-called 'security zone.' Strikes hit five areas in southern Lebanon, including Nabatieh, and reached the Western Beqaa region for the first time since June [7]. According to figures from the Lebanese Ministry of Health, these strikes killed five people and injured 24. In the Nabatieh district, two people riding a motorcycle were killed in an airstrike [7].

The airstrikes continued afterward. The Israeli military bombed Fawqa in Nabatieh twice, targeting a forested area separating the Ali Taher hills from the town [1]. The coastal towns of Mansouri and Wadi Zibqin, as well as the Khiam area (Marjayoun), were also hit [1]. On September 7, an airstrike on a residential building in Kfar Roummane killed 11 people, including women and children. Most were members of the same family [11]. The Lebanese Ministry of Health stated that 13 people were killed in that day's airstrikes alone [14].

3. Analysis of Key Actors

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) and the Netanyahu government are presenting the capture of the Ali Taher ridge as their greatest achievement since the ceasefire, under the pretext of neutralizing Hezbollah's command headquarters and terrorist infrastructure [13]. At the same time, the IDF is publicly stating its intention to continue targeted strikes against Hezbollah despite the ceasefire, citing what it claims are repeated violations of the ceasefire terms by Hezbollah [11][14].

Hezbollah has not issued an official statement regarding the threat posed by these airstrikes [14]. It has also not released a separate response to the recent escalation. This suggests that Hezbollah's capacity to respond is itself limited following the military blow of losing Ali Taher.

The Lebanese government, through President Aoun's office, has expressed concern over the airstrikes, which have caused concentrated civilian casualties [16]. The Lebanese Ministry of Health continues to release casualty figures, highlighting the humanitarian toll of the strikes [7][14]. However, the Lebanese government lacks viable military or diplomatic means to effectively halt Israel's ongoing airstrikes.

Iran sought to secure a protective shield for Hezbollah through the June ceasefire, but Israel's resumption of airstrikes has put the effectiveness of this strategy to the test [2]. It remains uncertain whether Tehran will intervene, risking its agreement with the U.S., or adopt a bystander posture [2].

4. Key Issues

The first issue is the effectiveness of the June ceasefire agreement. Israel is justifying its continued strikes against Hezbollah as 'responses to violations,' effectively making them a constant feature [11][14]. Whether the agreement's text itself allows for some degree of preemptive strike rights for Israel, or if Israel is unilaterally broadening its interpretation, will likely be a key indicator of the agreement's future viability.

The second issue is the geographical expansion of the airstrikes. The fact that the strike range has widened to include the Western Beqaa in addition to existing conflict zones like Nabatieh [7] supports the interpretation that Israel is effectively expanding its 'security zone' concept. This acts as a direct constraint on the Lebanese government's sovereign territorial control.

The third issue is the political implications of accumulating civilian casualties. The case of the Kfar Roummane airstrike, where multiple members of a single family, including women and children, were killed [11], has the potential to inflame anti-Israel sentiment within Lebanon. Even in the current phase where Hezbollah is refraining from a public response, if civilian casualties continue to mount, the possibility cannot be ruled out that justifications for Hezbollah's rearmament or pressure for Iranian intervention could re-emerge.

II. In-Depth Analysis

Israel's Large-Scale Airstrikes on Lebanon and Targeting of Hezbollah Infrastructure: An In-Depth Analysis

1. Analysis of Root Causes

The ostensible justification for the current situation is the underground tunnel network on the Ali Taher ridge, which the Israeli military claims was designed as a forward base for an invasion of the Galilee [13]. However, the root cause lies in the structural flaws of the June 2026 ceasefire agreement itself. This agreement was concluded without explicitly securing Hezbollah's disarmament. Since the ceasefire took effect, Israel has publicly maintained its stance of continuing targeted strikes under the pretext of responding to Hezbollah's "repeated violations" [14].

Iran's mode of intervention is another dimension of the root cause. Tehran invested considerable diplomatic resources to include Lebanon in the June ceasefire, aiming to protect Hezbollah from continuous Israeli airstrikes [2]. However, this intervention proved to be a half-measure. Iran is trapped in a structure that forces it to choose between the risk of its agreement with the U.S. collapsing and the risk of being perceived as a bystander [2]. This dilemma has solidified into a recurring pattern each time Israel launches new attacks.

The lack of response from Hezbollah is also noteworthy. Al-Monitor reports that Hezbollah has not issued any official commentary on the recent escalation threats or intensified airstrikes [14]. This can be interpreted in two ways: either its organizational capacity has been significantly depleted, or it has deliberately chosen silence in line with Iran's containment strategy.

2. Structural Context

Political Structure: Netanyahu's Incentive for Escalation

Israeli domestic politics is a key variable explaining the intensity and timing of these airstrikes. Prime Minister Netanyahu faces the dual constraints of his corruption trial and the veto power of far-right coalition partners like Ben-Gvir and Smotrich [6]. If the war were to end prematurely, he would immediately face accountability for failing to prevent the October 7, 2023, catastrophe [6][8]. The public announcement framing the capture of the Ali Taher ridge as the "greatest achievement since the ceasefire" is not unrelated to these domestic political needs [9][10]. The fact that Netanyahu and Defense Minister Katz issued a joint statement to announce the achievement also strongly suggests an exercise in political message management.

Security Structure: The Expansion of the 'Security Zone' Concept

Immediately after announcing the capture of the ridge, the Israeli military expanded its airstrikes to areas outside the so-called 'security zone' [7]. This demonstrates that the ceasefire regime itself rests on the concept of a buffer zone unilaterally defined by Israel. The boundaries of this security zone are not fixed by negotiation but are flexibly reinterpreted according to the operational needs of the Israeli military. The expansion of the strike range to the Western Beqaa region for the first time since June is a case that demonstrates this flexibility [7].

Economic and Humanitarian Structure: The Accumulation of Civilian Casualties

The airstrike on a residential building in Kfar Roummane killed 11 people, including women and children, most of whom were members of the same family [11]. In the Nabatieh district, two people on a motorcycle were killed in a targeted strike [7]. The Lebanese Ministry of Health tallied 13 deaths on September 7 alone [14]. This pattern of casualties suggests that Israel's strikes are not limited to purely military facilities. The Lebanese government is trapped in a structure where the humanitarian toll accumulates while it lacks both the political capital to disarm Hezbollah and the military means to deter Israeli airstrikes.

3. Historical Precedents and Comparative Cases

The current situation is a repetition of the pattern that unfolded after Israel's ground operation in Lebanon in October 2024. At that time, Iran launched approximately 200 ballistic missiles at Israeli military targets, and weeks later, the Israeli Air Force struck Iran's air defense networks and missile production facilities. It was the largest-scale attack Iran had received from an enemy state since the end of the Iran-Iraq War [5]. In other words, a precedent already exists where localized strikes against a proxy escalated to direct strikes on Iranian territory.

A comparison with the framework of UN Security Council Resolution 1701 from 2006 is also relevant. Under that resolution, Israel has long demanded Hezbollah's withdrawal from the Israel-Lebanon border area [8]. However, for nearly 20 years, the resolution has failed to effectively guarantee Hezbollah's disarmament. Given that the June 2026 ceasefire agreement has similar structural limitations, the possibility that the failure of Resolution 1701 will be repeated cannot be ruled out.

There are also structural similarities with the concurrent tensions between Israel and Turkey in Syria. In Syria, following the collapse of the Assad regime, Israel and Turkey are competing to establish their respective spheres of influence in the security vacuum [3]. Israel has also maintained a policy of preemptive strikes in Syria, labeling the new government as jihadist [3]. A common thread observed on both the Lebanese and Syrian fronts is Israel's refusal to accept the other side's political consolidation or reconstruction efforts as a fait accompli, instead adopting an approach of continuously reshaping the status quo through military superiority.

4. Key Variables Shaping Future Developments

First is Iran's choice. Whether Tehran will tolerate further Israeli attacks on Hezbollah to preserve its agreement with the U.S., or risk the agreement's collapse by intervening, is a critical juncture that will determine future escalation [2].

Second is Netanyahu's domestic political calendar. It is highly likely that the frequency and intensity of the airstrikes will be influenced by the progress of his corruption trial and the degree of pressure from his far-right coalition partners [6]. It has already been observed that in the run-up to the general election scheduled for October 27, discussions about ending the war are likely to disappear entirely [6].

Third is the response capacity of the Lebanese government. While President Aoun's office has issued a statement on the airstrikes [16], its effective control over Hezbollah and its deterrent capabilities against Israel are limited. Whether the Lebanese Armed Forces demonstrate the ability and will to dismantle Hezbollah's remaining infrastructure on their own will be a key factor in determining the sustainability of the ceasefire regime.

Fourth is the pace of expansion of the 'security zone' concept. If the Israeli military continues to expand its operations into areas beyond its previous strike range, such as the Western Beqaa, the ceasefire will become effectively meaningless, and the probability of a return to a state of low-intensity warfare will increase [7].