Geopolitical Realignment in the Horn of Africa: The Djibouti-Somaliland Competition for Military Bases and South Korea's Response

Executive Summary

As the war in Iran expands into the Red Sea and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, Djibouti's model of coexisting multilateral bases and its policy of equidistant diplomacy are being tested. To circumvent the limitations of its unrecognized status, Somaliland is attempting to enter the great power security market by proposing its own 'Djibouti model' centered on the Port of Berbera. Among three possible scenarios, the baseline scenario—a protracted crisis in the shipping lanes that neither normalizes nor fully deteriorates—is assessed as the most probable at 50%. South Korea, which has no military interests in the region but relies heavily on the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden shipping lanes, should focus its response on managing supply chain risks and securing access to information rather than on preemptive intervention. Engaging with both Djibouti and Somaliland simultaneously could create diplomatic friction with the Federal Government of Somalia and the African Union. Thus, a dual-track approach is needed, prioritizing the relationship with Djibouti while conducting due diligence on alternative ports of call like Berbera as a medium- to long-term objective.

I. Situational Analysis

Geopolitical Realignment in the Horn of Africa: The Djibouti-Somaliland Competition for Military Bases – A Situational Analysis

1. Background and Developments

Since its independence from France in 1977, Djibouti has adopted equidistant diplomacy as a national survival strategy amid regional great power competition. A small nation of just over one million people, its strategic location on the Bab el-Mandeb Strait alone has enabled it to host military bases for France, the United States, Japan, and China simultaneously. A French military base, the only permanent U.S. base in Africa (Camp Lemonnier), China's first overseas military base, and the Japan Self-Defense Forces' only overseas facility are all concentrated in Djibouti [9]. This model of multilateral base coexistence has been regarded as a successful case of rent-seeking diplomacy, providing the Djiboutian government with both rental income and a security umbrella.

This balance began to falter with the outbreak of the Israel-Iran war in February 2026. As the front expanded from the Strait of Hormuz to the Red Sea and the Bab el-Mandeb, Djibouti could no longer remain a safe observer [4][8]. Amid a reshaping of the Gulf security architecture—marked by intensified Houthi attacks in the Red Sea and the signing of the Mecca Defense Pact by Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, and Pakistan [5]—Djibouti has faced demands from the multiple great power militaries on its territory to expand their operational radiuses. A local commentary describes this situation as one where 'the Middle East war is no longer confined to the battlefields of Lebanon, Iran, Israel, and the Gulf states,' indicating a shift toward a broader confrontational framework stretching from the Persian Gulf to the Red Sea [4].

During the same period, separate political dynamics were unfolding in the unrecognized state of Somaliland. A 2024 memorandum of understanding between Somaliland and Ethiopia, which granted sea access to landlocked Ethiopia in exchange for recognition of Somaliland, was perceived by Djibouti as a potential threat to its economic and strategic interests [7]. The Port of Berbera, already the site of major investment by the United Arab Emirates (UAE), has been emerging as a potential rival to the Port of Djibouti [7][12].

2. Current Situation

In an August 2026 interview with The Economist during a visit to Nairobi, Somaliland's President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi 'Irro' stated that Somaliland could follow the 'Djibouti model' [1]. He outlined a vision to use the coastline of the Port of Berbera to attract foreign military bases, thereby contributing to the security of the strategic shipping lanes in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden [1]. Concurrently, he announced a trade strategy to develop the port into a major gateway to the Horn of Africa market [1]. This can be read as an attempt by an unrecognized state to fill the void in its international legal status with the pragmatic tool of leasing out military bases.

Within Djibouti, contrary concerns are being raised. Local commentator Omar M. Elmi warned that the escalating Middle East war could undermine Djibouti's long-standing policy of neutrality, posing this very question as the title of his op-ed [4]. For Djibouti to maintain the delicate balance of its multilateral base model, the operational demands of the stationed countries must not conflict—a premise that is now jeopardized as the Red Sea front intensifies [4].

Somaliland's internal stability is also faltering. On August 19, 2026, Colonel Ali Ahmed Ismail, a former commander in the Somaliland military, defected to join the forces of Somalia's Northeastern State [13]. The defection is rooted in a territorial dispute over the Sanaag region [13]. The fact that this occurred within its own military command structure, at the very time the president was externally promoting the hosting of foreign military bases, raises questions about Somaliland's negotiating power.

At the level of extra-regional powers, the rivalry between China and Japan continues to unfold in Djibouti. In August 2026, the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force deployed Kawasaki P-1 maritime patrol aircraft to its Djibouti base for the first time, using them in anti-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia [9]. This move effectively expands the operational scope of Japan's sole overseas military facility and draws comparisons with China's operations at its Djibouti base [9]. In the Western Pacific, the protracted war in Iran has created a vacuum as U.S. aircraft carriers have been diverted from Asia [10]. This structural constraint is a contributing factor that makes the Sino-Japanese competition in the Indian Ocean and Horn of Africa region more prominent.

3. Key Actors and Positions

The Government of Djiboutiseeks to maintain the structure on which its finances heavily depend: income from leasing out multiple military bases. However, as the Red Sea front expands, the growing likelihood of conflicting operational demands from the stationed forces of France, the U.S., China, and Japan is testing its traditional formula of equidistant diplomacy [4]. The development of Berbera by Somaliland and the prospect of its wider recognition are perceived as an economic threat that could erode the Port of Djibouti's status as the regional gateway [7].

The Government of Somalilandis attempting to bypass its fundamental constraint of non-recognition under international law through the realist transaction of providing military bases. President Irro's mention of the 'Djibouti model' is interpreted as a strategy to first establish tangible security partnerships to build de facto statehood, rather than prioritizing the quest for formal recognition [1]. The UAE's investment in the Port of Berbera and discussions of Israeli recognition of Somaliland already serve as precedents for this approach [7][12].

The Federal Government of Somaliamaintains its long-standing position that all of Somaliland's independence-oriented moves are a violation of its territorial sovereignty. The defection of a Somaliland military commander over the Sanaag region to join Northeastern State forces [13] exposes the limits of Somaliland's internal cohesion and provides Mogadishu with domestic leverage to check Somaliland's attempts to attract foreign military bases.

The UAEis already deeply involved in the port infrastructure of the Horn of Africa through its investment in the Port of Berbera [7][12]. The Slovenian media outlet Delo describes the UAE's moves as an 'Arab imperialist push into Africa,' framing the competition over Berbera as an extension of the struggle for a geostrategic hub dating back to ancient Greek times [12]. For the UAE, Berbera holds value as an alternative hub to Djibouti and as a forward base for its operations in Yemen and the Red Sea.

The United States and Franceseek to maintain their existing base system, centered on Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti, in conjunction with operations in the Strait of Hormuz and the Red Sea. However, they face the constraint of having their carrier forces dispersed due to the protracted war in Iran [10][14]. With a carrier gap already present in Asia, their capacity to project additional power into the Horn of Africa is limited.

China and Japanare extending their maritime rivalry from the Indian and Western Pacific Oceans into the Horn of Africa, with Djibouti as a key theater. China remains anchored to the symbolism of its first overseas base in Djibouti, while Japan is actively expanding the operational radius of its sole overseas base through the deployment of P-1 patrol aircraft [9].

4. Key Issues

The first key issue is whether Djibouti's model of multilateral base coexistence can be sustained amid escalating conflict. While the operational demands of the various stationed countries were compatible in peacetime, the probability of them conflicting increases now that the Red Sea has become an active combat zone [4].

The second issue concerns the compatibility of Somaliland's unrecognized status with its offer to host military bases. Key questions are what standing a base leasing agreement would have under international law without state recognition, and how strong a backlash this would provoke from the Federal Government of Somalia and the African Union.

The third issue is how the competition between the ports of Berbera and Djibouti to be the regional gateway is becoming intertwined with regional security competition. As economic rivalry spills over into a contest to host military bases, a pattern is emerging in which commercial interests and security alliance formations are becoming entangled [7][12].

The fourth issue is the extent to which the maritime competition dynamic of the Western Pacific and Indian Oceans is being transposed onto the Horn of Africa. It remains to be seen whether the extension of Sino-Japanese rivalry to Djibouti and the structural dispersion of U.S. carrier forces [10] are creating the conditions to solidify the region as a new sub-theater of U.S.-China competition.

II. In-Depth Analysis

Geopolitical Realignment in the Horn of Africa: The Djibouti-Somaliland Competition for Military Bases – An In-Depth Analysis

1. Analysis of Root Causes

The root cause of the current situation lies in a structure where the value of geographic rent is traded separately from international legal recognition. As a sovereign state, Djibouti has simultaneously hosted bases for France, the U.S., China, and Japan, exchanging rental income for security guarantees [9]. Somaliland has been de facto independent from Somalia since 1991 but has not been officially recognized by any country. President Irro's reference to the 'Djibouti model' implies he has found a way to bypass this recognition gap [1]. The calculation is that even without the political asset of statehood, security deals can be struck with great powers based solely on the physical assets of a port and coastline.

This calculation is viable because the provision of security for the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden shipping lanes operates on market principles, regardless of a state's recognition status. As Houthi attacks increased risks along the Red Sea route, countries using these lanes began seeking alternative security providers [5]. Any entity that can meet this demand, whether a recognized state or an unrecognized quasi-state, earns a seat at the negotiating table. Somaliland's proposal is aimed squarely at this supply-and-demand dynamic.

For Djibouti, the root cause works in the opposite direction. Its model of multilateral base coexistence rested on the tacit premise that the operational objectives of the various stationed countries would not conflict. This premise is now collapsing as the war in Iran spreads from the Persian Gulf to the Red Sea [4]. If the American, French, and Chinese forces at Camp Lemonnier are tasked with operations linked to the interests of opposing blocs, the Djiboutian government will be forced to choose between its tenants. Elmi articulated this problem by noting that Djibouti 'can no longer remain a safe observer' [4].

2. Structural Context

Security Structure: The Horn of Africa is not a region with its own independent security order but rather a nexus where three larger security structures overlap. The first is the Gulf security structure, in which the Mecca Defense Pact (Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, and Pakistan) and Iran's strategic leverage in the Strait of Hormuz have ripple effects down to the southern Red Sea [5][8]. The second is the Indo-Pacific maritime competition structure; force deployments in the Western Pacific and Indian Ocean are interlinked, as shown by the redeployment of the USS George Washington toward the Indian Ocean when a carrier gap emerged in the Western Pacific [10]. The third is the intra-African structure, where Ethiopia's landlocked status and its quest for sea access shape the triangular relationship among Somaliland, Djibouti, and Somalia [7]. These three structures are simultaneously exerting pressure on the narrow geographical bottleneck that is the Horn of Africa.

Economic Structure: The ports of Berbera and Djibouti are in a near-zero-sum competitive relationship. The UAE has already made massive investments in the Port of Berbera, which is perceived as a direct threat to the port fee revenue that forms the core of Djibouti's economy [7][12]. The UAE's port investments in Africa are not confined to the Horn but follow a broader pattern of expansion into ports and land across the continent. The Slovenian media outlet Delo has characterized this as an 'Arab imperialist push into Africa,' suggesting the competition over Berbera is an extension of a geoeconomic struggle for a strategic hub that dates back to ancient Greek times [12]. Thus, the current military base competition is as much an economic rivalry over port revenue rights as it is a security issue.

Political Structure: Somaliland's internal politics are not stable enough to support President Irro's foreign policy vision. In the Sanaag region, a Somaliland military commander defected and joined the forces of Somalia's Northeastern State [13]. This highlights the contradiction of Somaliland playing the external card of hosting foreign military bases while it lacks complete control even over its own border regions. In essence, it is pursuing a strategy as a security provider to obtain external recognition while its own national integration remains incomplete.

3. Historical Precedents and Comparative Cases

Djibouti's model of multilateral base coexistence is itself a precedent. Since independence in 1977, Djibouti has allowed its former colonial power, France, to maintain a military presence, while also providing Camp Lemonnier to the U.S. in 2001 and hosting China's first overseas naval base in 2017 [9]. Hosting bases for rival great powers on a single territory is a combination that would have been difficult to establish anywhere other than the Horn of Africa. This model has been sustained because the operational objectives of the stationed forces—such as combating Somali piracy and counter-terrorism—have remained within a non-conflicting scope. In fact, both China and the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force have conducted their respective patrol activities from Djibouti with the shared goal of countering Somali piracy [9]. What is unique about the current situation is that this non-conflict premise is being tested for the first time by the external variable of the war in Iran.

Somaliland's attempt can be compared to cases of unrecognized or partially recognized states, such as Taiwan and Kosovo, that have sought to overcome their lack of recognition by offering security and economic benefits. However, Somaliland's approach is far more direct than the conventional path of seeking diplomatic support. Instead of requesting recognition, it first offers its physical assets—a port and a coastline—in the expectation that recognition will follow. The fact that discussions about Israeli recognition of Somaliland are already perceived as a threat by Djibouti [7] indicates this approach is having some effect. At the same time, this strategy is a card that directly clashes with relations with the Federal Government of Somalia and the African Union's principle of territorial integrity.

The 2024 Ethiopia-Somaliland memorandum of understanding serves as a direct precedent for the current events. It was a transaction in which the interests of a landlocked country seeking sea access and an unrecognized state seeking recognition perfectly aligned [7]. The current proposal for military bases in Berbera can be seen as an attempt to expand this transaction model from a single country, Ethiopia, to Western and Gulf nations as a whole.

4. Key Variables Shaping Future Developments

The first variable is the trajectory of the war in Iran and the crisis in the Strait of Hormuz and Red Sea shipping lanes. If negotiations over the Islamabad Memorandum collapse and Houthi attacks expand to include infrastructure in eastern Saudi Arabia [5][8], the operational demands placed on Djibouti by the stationed countries will become far more acute. Conversely, if Omani-mediated negotiations make progress and mitigate navigational risks, the pressure on Djibouti to maintain its neutrality will also ease.

The second variable is Somaliland's internal control. If incidents like the defection of the commander in the Sanaag region recur and spread [13], foreign governments may re-evaluate the Berbera base proposal, viewing it not as a deal with a stable partner but as an investment in a region at risk of civil war. This would undermine the credibility of President Irro's entire foreign policy initiative.

The third variable is the intensity of the response from the Federal Government of Somalia and the African Union. Somaliland's attempt to host military bases independently is in direct conflict with Somalia's claims of territorial sovereignty. Whether the Somali government and the African Union tolerate this move or actively counter it through diplomatic or military means will determine the feasibility of the Berbera initiative.

The fourth variable is the choice made by the government of Djibouti. To sustain its rent-seeking model of multilateral base coexistence, it requires the diplomatic capacity to manage the conflicting interests of the stationed countries. If this capacity proves insufficient, Djibouti could be forced to tilt toward a specific bloc, or its overall negotiating power could be weakened by the emergence of Berbera as a viable alternative.