Russia’s Establishment of Military Footholds at Six Libyan Air Bases and the Shifting Security Landscape of the Southern Mediterranean

Executive Summary

With its access to the Hmeimim and Tartus bases in Syria jeopardized by the collapse of the Assad regime, Russia is leveraging its existing cooperative relationship with the Haftar faction in eastern Libya to establish alternative logistical hubs. It is deploying air defense systems, MiG-29 fighter jets, and drones to six bases, including Jufra. This development is unfolding amid a domestic power vacuum in Libya, characterized by the division between the Government of National Unity (GNU) and the Libyan National Army (LNA), and is solidifying into a structure that will be difficult to reverse in the short term due to the Haftar faction’s high dependence on Russian technology. Over the next 6–12 months, the most likely scenario (55% probability) is a gradual continuation of the current trend; however, a pessimistic scenario (30% probability) in which the human rights issues associated with Russian paramilitary organizations spread to Libya cannot be ruled out. The international community should prioritize preventing the further military enhancement of these bases and pressing for transparency, rather than demanding a complete withdrawal. It is also necessary to merge discussions on the water crisis and climate agenda with the issue of foreign military presence into an integrated dialogue. Although South Korea’s direct exposure is low, it should continue to monitor air defense network trends through consultations among intelligence agencies, considering the indirect impact on Mediterranean maritime logistics and the stability of energy supply chains.

I. Issue Analysis

Russia’s Establishment of Military Footholds at Six Libyan Air Bases: A Situational Analysis

1. Background and Developments

Libya has been without a unified central government since the fall of the Gaddafi regime in 2011. The country is effectively divided between the Government of National Unity (GNU) in Tripoli and the warlord forces of Khalifa Haftar, based in the eastern city of Benghazi. Russia has a long-standing cooperative relationship with the eastern faction in this divided structure, namely the side of Khalifa Haftar, who leads the Libyan National Army (LNA). This began with the Wagner Group providing troops and equipment to Haftar's forces starting in 2019.

The six bases identified by the Africa Defense Forum (ADF) are Jufra, al-Khadim, Ghardabiya, Brak al-Shati, Maaten al-Sarra, and Tamanhint [1]. They are all scattered across central, eastern, and southern Libya. This deployment was not a sudden event but rather an expansion building upon infrastructure accumulated since the period of Wagner's activities. The ADF report supported this finding by citing satellite data from the U.S. National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency’s (NGA) Tearline project [1].

Concurrently, in Kufra in southeastern Libya, the National Development Agency (NDA) is overseeing the installation of baggage handling and passenger systems at Kufra International Airport [10]. Although reported as a purely civilian infrastructure project, the fact that airport modernization in the southern border region is occurring simultaneously with other developments highlights the re-evaluation of the strategic value of all aerial infrastructure in the region.

2. Current Situation

According to the ADF report, military equipment, air defense systems, MiG-29 fighter jets, and drones have been detected at the six bases [1]. Russian military personnel and members of Russian-affiliated organizations were also identified [1]. This can be interpreted as evidence that Russia is effectively establishing alternative and supplementary footholds on the southern Mediterranean coast in Libya, as its access to the Hmeimim and Tartus bases in Syria has become uncertain following the collapse of the Assad regime.

Within Libya, this issue tends to be treated separately from other security risks. Ahead of a UN Security Council briefing, eight countries—Colombia, Denmark, France, Greece, Latvia, Liberia, Panama, and the United Kingdom—issued a joint statement warning that the water crisis and climate change threaten Libya's stability [14]. The statement noted that the depletion of aquifers and the aging water supply network (the Great Man-Made River project) could exacerbate internal conflicts and weaken state institutions [14]. This indicates that at the international level, discussions on risks in Libya are proceeding on parallel tracks, one concerning water and climate and the other concerning the presence of foreign troops. Both issues stem from the same root cause: the division between the GNU and the LNA.

3. Key Actors and Interests

Russia has an interest in using Libya as a logistical hub connecting the Mediterranean, the Sahel, and West Africa. Securing an access route to the West African coast has become more critical since its access to Syrian bases weakened. In Mali, Human Rights Watch (HRW) recently accused the Africa Corps of killing nine civilians, including four children [13]. This shows that Russian paramilitary organizations, reorganized from Wagner into the Africa Corps, are repeatedly causing human rights problems while conducting operations with national forces throughout the Sahel. The six bases in Libya are highly likely to function as rear bases supporting these Sahel operations.

The Haftar/LNA faction has long considered Russian support a cornerstone of its security and military power. Russian infrastructure investment in the eastern bases strengthens the Haftar faction's negotiating position. In contrast, the Tripoli-based GNU is highly likely to view the militarization of these eastern bases as an unfavorable fait accompli in negotiations for a unified government.

The United States is bringing this issue to public attention by releasing satellite data through the NGA's Tearline project [1]. This is in line with its response to Russian hybrid threats in Europe. It follows a pattern similar to the drone incident at Germany's Leipzig Airport and signs of sabotage across the Baltic and Eastern Europe, where U.S. intelligence agencies have pointed to Russian involvement [2]. However, just as the German government has refrained from public attribution out of concern for diplomatic repercussions [2], the pace of response from Western countries on the Libya issue may vary.

The eight UN Security Council members (Colombia, Denmark, France, Greece, Latvia, Liberia, Panama, and the UK) have broadly identified the causes of instability in Libya, including non-military factors such as the water crisis and climate change [14]. This approach can be read as an effort to address the presence of foreign troops not as a standalone agenda item at the Security Council but as part of the country's overall vulnerability.

4. Key Issues

The first issue is the reliability of verification. The ADF report's evidence is based on satellite imagery analysis using data from a U.S. government agency [1]. There has been no official confirmation from the Russian government or the LNA side to date. This is a recurring pattern also seen in cases of hybrid threats in Europe. The United States is quick to point to Russian involvement, but the governments of the affected countries often refrain from official confirmation, creating an asymmetry [2].

The second issue is the entrenchment of Libya's divided political structure. The fact that most of the six bases are located in the eastern, central, and southern parts of the country indicates that Russia's military involvement is biased toward a specific faction (the LNA). This could distort the military balance in future negotiations for a unified government.

The third issue is the scope of regional spillover. The Libyan bases are likely to be linked to Africa Corps operations in the Sahel region. If the civilian killings confirmed in Mali [13] and the expansion of footholds in Libya are not separate issues but are connected within a single logistical and operational network, the problem escalates. Russia's sphere of military influence, stretching from North Africa to the Sahel, would then be seen as reshaping the security landscape of the Mediterranean itself.

II. In-Depth Analysis

Russia’s Establishment of Military Footholds at Six Libyan Air Bases: An In-Depth Analysis

1. Analysis of Root Causes

The primary condition that allowed Russia to expand its military presence in Libya is the absence of a functioning Libyan state itself. Since the fall of the Gaddafi regime in 2011, no single faction has been able to exercise exclusive sovereignty over the entire country. This power vacuum has provided an opening for external actors. The Libyan National Army (LNA), led by Haftar, needed to maintain its military strength without international legitimacy, creating a demand for an external patron. Russia responded to this demand by providing troops, equipment, and funding, beginning with the deployment of the Wagner Group in 2019.

However, internal Libyan factors alone cannot explain this recent expansion. A more direct trigger was the fact that Russia's access to its Hmeimim and Tartus bases was jeopardized by the collapse of the Assad regime in Syria. For the Russian navy and air force, the loss of their eastern Mediterranean footholds necessitated a redesign of their logistical lines connecting the Mediterranean, the Red Sea, and the Atlantic Ocean. Libya is one of the few alternatives that can geographically fill this void. This is because it is located on the southern coast of the Mediterranean and simultaneously offers inland access routes to the Sahel and West Africa. In other words, the expansion to these six bases is less a result of a sudden increase in Libya's own strategic value and more a consequence of Libya being chosen as Russia sought to replace the capabilities it lost in Syria.

2. Structural Context

Political Structure: For over eight years, Libya has maintained a dual power structure, divided between the Government of National Unity (GNU) in Tripoli and the Benghazi-based LNA. This structure has persisted despite multiple UN-led unification processes. Russia has firmly positioned itself not as a neutral mediator but as a patron of the eastern faction. This creates a situation where, even if unification talks progress, the disposition of Russian military assets will inevitably remain a separate agenda item for negotiation. The coexistence of Turkey, which has supported the GNU, and Russia, which supports the LNA, has entrenched Libyan territory as a permanent stage for great-power proxy conflict.

Economic Structure: In southeastern Libya, the National Development Agency (NDA) is overseeing the installation of baggage handling and passenger systems at Kufra Airport [10]. While ostensibly a civilian aviation infrastructure project, the fact that airport modernization in the southern border region is occurring at the same time as the expansion of the six military bases suggests that Libya's airport infrastructure as a whole is being re-evaluated as dual-use assets. In a structure where Libyan government finances are overwhelmingly dependent on oil exports, infrastructure investment by external powers has a dual effect: it fills fiscal gaps while simultaneously ceding effective control over those facilities to outside forces.

Security Structure: Ahead of a UN Security Council briefing, eight countries—Colombia, Denmark, France, Greece, Latvia, Liberia, Panama, and the UK—issued a joint statement warning that the water crisis and climate change threaten Libya's stability [14]. The statement noted that aquifer depletion and the deterioration of the Great Man-Made River system exacerbate inter-regional resource conflicts and weaken state institutions [14]. Although the issues of foreign military presence and the water/climate crisis are being handled as separate agendas, both stem from the same root cause: the GNU-LNA division. The weaker the state institutions, the greater the dependence on external military patrons, which in turn creates a vicious cycle that weakens the incentive for national unification.

3. Historical Precedents and Comparative Cases

Russia's establishment of a foothold in Libya is a repetition of its Syria model. When Russia intervened in the Syrian civil war in 2015, it secured the Hmeimim air base and the Tartus naval base by providing military support to a specific faction, the Assad regime. For the next decade, these two bases served as key assets for Russia's strategy in the Middle East and the Mediterranean. However, the collapse of the Assad regime in late 2024 has shaken the very sustainability of these assets. From Russia's perspective, the expansion to six bases in Libya can be seen as a lesson learned from the vulnerability of the Syria model, which relied entirely on a single regime for its military assets. Dispersing its footholds across six bases is likely a move to mitigate the risk of losing a single political faction's support or a single facility.

The case of Mali serves as a reference point for the negative side effects of Russian military expansion. The Africa Corps is accused of killing nine civilians, including four children, in Mali last month [13]. This occurred one month after another incident in which an airstrike killed several people [13]. Human Rights Watch (HRW) stated that this incident took place in the presence of the Malian army [13]. The fact that Russian paramilitary organizations, reorganized from Wagner into the Africa Corps, are repeatedly causing human rights problems in the Sahel region suggests a high probability of a similar pattern recurring in Libya. The structure in which the host government must bear accumulating costs in the realms of human rights and governance in exchange for Russian military support is a common feature observed in both Mali and Libya.

A comparison with cases of hybrid threats in Europe makes the nature of this establishment of footholds in Libya clearer. The drone incident at Germany's Leipzig Airport and infrastructure sabotage in the Baltic states [2] are closer to gray-zone operations by which Russia seeks to offset its disadvantages on the Ukrainian front by creating disruptions in the rear. In contrast, the expansion of bases in Libya is different in nature, as it involves the open and physical buildup of military assets rather than covert disruption. This suggests that Russia is pursuing a dual strategy: employing asymmetric pressure that avoids direct conflict in Europe, while simultaneously securing footholds comparable to regular military forces in Africa.

4. Key Variables Shaping Future Developments

First is the trajectory of Libya's domestic political unification process. If the formation of a unified government or the holding of elections between the GNU and the LNA becomes a tangible prospect, the status of Russian military assets will inevitably become subject to renegotiation with the new government. Conversely, the more entrenched the current divided structure becomes, the more likely it is that Russia's use of the bases will become a fait accompli.

Second is the level of satellite data disclosure by U.S. intelligence agencies. The ADF report itself was based on data from the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency's Tearline project [1]. Whether the U.S. continues to release such information or adjusts the level of disclosure based on the Trump administration's policy toward Russia will influence the formation of international opinion and response.

Third is any change in the Haftar faction's dependence on Russia. If Haftar seeks to balance his relationships by strengthening ties with other patrons (such as the United Arab Emirates and Egypt), Russia's exclusive influence could be constrained. Conversely, if Western sanctions or pressure push the Haftar faction further toward Russia, the establishment of military footholds will accelerate.

Fourth is the international reaction to the activities of the Africa Corps in the Sahel and West Africa. If human rights issues, such as the HRW allegations of civilian killings in Mali, accumulate [13], similar monitoring and pressure for accountability could grow regarding Russian military activities in Libya. This would act as a variable that increases the political costs of Russia's overall military foothold strategy in Africa.