'Reversed Ambiguity' in the Taiwan Strait: China's Shifting Response Tactics and South Korea's Strategy

Executive Summary

China's silence until the end of Taiwan's Han Kuang exercise in August 2026, followed by only a brief, dismissive comment, marks a departure from its previous pattern of large-scale counter-exercises. This suggests that unlike the traditional U.S.-led strategic ambiguity, China has begun to employ its own ambiguity tactic, making the timing and intensity of its reactions unpredictable. This shift is likely to reduce the effectiveness of the visible early-warning indicators South Korea has relied on, such as large-scale military aircraft incursions. The most probable trajectory for the Taiwan Strait situation (55% probability) is not an immediate armed conflict but a scenario where gray-zone pressure becomes constant. In this case, the crisis would build cumulatively through actions like routine entries into waters east of Taiwan and expanding military ties with Southeast Asian nations, rather than from a single event. South Korea should avoid betting on a specific scenario and instead manage semiconductor supply chain risks separately from geopolitical risks, while also guarding against simplistic crisis calculations that mechanically link the Taiwan and North Korea issues.

I. Situational Analysis

Situational Analysis: The Reversal of 'Strategic Ambiguity' in the Taiwan Strait

1. Background and Developments

At the root of tensions in the Taiwan Strait lies the peaceful unification policy introduced by Deng Xiaoping in 1979. The logic at the time was that the peaceful management of cross-strait relations was necessary for economic development [9]. This premise began to falter with the 2019 crisis over Hong Kong's national security law. Taiwanese public opinion shifted dramatically after observing Beijing's harsh crackdown on Hong Kong's pro-democracy protests. Support for gradual independence doubled from 12.8% in 2018 to 25% in 2019. During the same period, support for unification plummeted from 12.8% to the 6-7% range [5][9].

Beijing interpreted this as the demise of prospects for peaceful unification. At the 20th Party Congress in 2022, President Xi Jinping reaffirmed the position that while China would strive for peaceful unification, it would "never promise to renounce the use of force" [9]. Subsequently, the buildup of amphibious forces under the People's Liberation Army's Eastern Theater Command accelerated. A total of 49 amphibious ships, 35 attack submarines, and 700 fighter jets are now concentrated in the Eastern and Southern Theater Commands [9]. China's pressure on Taiwan has evolved into a form of hybrid warfare, combining routine exercises, disinformation, and cyberattacks, rather than consisting of isolated military actions [6].

For its part, the United States has maintained its traditional policy of "strategic ambiguity," refraining from clearly stating whether it would intervene in a Taiwan contingency. This has served the dual function of deterring a Taiwanese declaration of independence while compelling Beijing to factor the possibility of U.S. intervention into its war planning [4]. In this dynamic, the United States has long been the primary agent of ambiguity.

2. Current Situation

The Han Kuang exercise conducted by Taiwan in August 2026 differed in nature from those of previous years. The 10-day drill, which mobilized reservists and civilians, simulated a blockade, attacks on critical infrastructure, communications paralysis, and the transition from peacetime to all-out war [1][2]. The Taiwanese Air Force also conducted separate fighter jet scramble drills simulating a Chinese aerial infiltration [2]. Reflecting lessons from the war in Ukraine, the Taiwanese Army for the first time used FPV drones in live-fire exercises against armored vehicles [15]. The Taiwanese military considers this a key element in building its asymmetric deterrence capabilities [5].

What was unusual was Beijing's response. China issued no official comment until the final day of the exercise, at which point it released a brief statement dismissing it as a "wasteful charade" [1]. It chose silence instead of its usual responses, such as large-scale counter-drills or mass incursions by military aircraft. The Diplomat interprets this as a sign that Beijing is cultivating its own form of 'ambiguity' [1]. Whereas U.S. ambiguity was a strategy to conceal its decision on intervention, China's ambiguity is manifesting as a way to make the timing and intensity of its response unpredictable.

During the same period, separate tensions emerged in the waters east of Taiwan. On August 12, an Indonesian Navy frigate conducted a "passage exercise" with a frigate from the People's Liberation Army (PLA) Navy in waters east of Taiwan. Indonesia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs clarified that the ship was simply on its return route after exercises with the Russian Navy in Vladivostok, but Taiwan demanded an explanation from Jakarta [8][12]. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi later remarked at a meeting with his Indonesian diplomatic and defense counterparts that "Indonesia is a priority in China's diplomacy with Southeast Asia," calling for enhanced strategic communication [14]. The South China Morning Post points out that this incident could set a precedent, lowering the political threshold for other ASEAN member states to follow suit [14].

Simultaneously, following their summit on May 28, 2026, Japan and the Philippines launched negotiations to delimit their EEZ and continental shelf boundaries in the waters east of Taiwan. Tokyo is presenting this as a model for peaceful resolution based on the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, but Beijing is strongly protesting [10]. Ahead of the 55th Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) scheduled to be held in Palau, an attempt to adopt a joint statement on China's submarine-based ballistic missile test failed due to a lack of regional consensus [11].

3. Key Actors and Interests

Taiwanese Government and Military.The Lai Ching-te administration has been upgrading the Han Kuang exercise scenarios to be more combat-realistic. The inclusion of blockade and infrastructure attack scenarios is based on the assessment that China's pressure could prove decisive in the pre-invasion phase—a psychological warfare stage aimed at inducing political surrender [5]. The Taiwanese military, viewing hardware-based deterrence as insufficient, is elevating urban resilience training to a core pillar of its deterrence strategy [5].

Chinese Government and People's Liberation Army.Beijing's objective is to instill a perception within Taiwanese society that their government is incapable of protecting, informing, and supporting its people. The intent is to force a political solution before an amphibious operation is launched [5]. The tactic of remaining silent until the last day of the exercise before issuing a brief, dismissive comment can be read as a calculated choice to undermine the effectiveness of Taiwan's drills without providing a pretext for escalation [1]. Simultaneously, China is expanding its permanent presence in the waters east of Taiwan through naval exercises with Indonesia and by showcasing its submarine power to Pacific Island nations [10][11].

United States.While maintaining its traditional policy of strategic ambiguity, Washington is facing a new variable: the vulnerability of its defense industrial base. The Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) assesses that the U.S. military currently lacks the necessary stockpiles of weapon systems and the production capacity to deter and defeat a Chinese invasion or blockade of Taiwan [7]. This is a structural constraint that could undermine the credibility of the ambiguity policy itself.

Indonesia.Jakarta is attempting to avoid direct friction with Taiwan and the United States by framing its participation in the naval exercise with China as a "simple transit." However, as demonstrated by Foreign Minister Wang Yi's immediate portrayal of the event as a step toward strengthening strategic cooperation, Beijing intends to use this incident as leverage to lower the participation threshold for other ASEAN nations [14].

Japan and the Philippines.The two countries are attempting to establish an order based on international law through their negotiations to delimit their EEZs in the waters east of Taiwan. This move serves as a check on China's attempts to normalize its activities in the region [10].

4. Key Issues

The first issue is the changing nature of ambiguity. Previously, the object of ambiguity was whether the U.S. would intervene; now, the very manner and timing of Beijing's response have become unpredictable. This complicates crisis management calculations for both Taiwan and the United States [1][4].

The second issue is the contest in the phase before physical conflict. If Beijing's assessment is correct that it can achieve its political objectives through psychological warfare and infrastructure disruption alone, without a blockade or precision strikes, then Taiwan's deterrence strategy centered on conventional military power will inevitably need to be redesigned [5][13].

The third issue is the fracturing of consensus among ASEAN and Pacific Island nations. The Indonesia case and the PIF's failure to issue a joint statement show that China has growing room to induce regional countries to break ranks on its policies, separate from its military pressure [8][11][14].

The fourth issue is the gap in America's actual deterrent capability. Separate from maintaining policy ambiguity, the lack of munitions stockpiles and production capacity to back up an intervention in a contingency could act as a variable constraining Washington's options in a Taiwan Strait crisis [7].

II. In-Depth Analysis

In-Depth Analysis: The Root Causes and Structural Context of China's 'Reverse Ambiguity' Tactic

1. Analysis of Root Causes

The fundamental reason for Beijing's choice of silence is its narrative dilemma over the Taiwan issue. China has consistently framed Taiwan as a domestic issue. Responding to a "domestic" matter with large-scale counter-exercises would be tantamount to admitting that the Taiwanese military's training scenarios are realistic. Dismissing the drills as a "wasteful charade" only at their conclusion was a minimal verbal response intended to sidestep this dilemma [1].

A key variable shaping the Taiwan Strait situation is the structural shift in Taiwanese public opinion. The fact that support for unification plummeted to the 6-7% range after the 2019 Hong Kong national security law crisis signifies the political demise of Beijing's peaceful unification scenario [5][9]. President Xi Jinping's reaffirmation at the 2022 Party Congress that China would not renounce the use of force for unification was a response to this changing public opinion landscape [9]. China's shift in response tactics is a tactical adjustment based on this structural condition.

Another root cause is the wavering signals in U.S. policy toward Taiwan. Washington's traditional strategic ambiguity served the dual function of deterring a Taiwanese declaration of independence and Chinese intervention [4]. However, since the first Trump administration, actions once considered red lines, such as visits by high-level officials to Taiwan, have been carried out, blurring the boundaries of this ambiguity [2][11]. From Beijing's perspective, as U.S. signals become less clear, the incentive grows to adjust its own response patterns to be less predictable.

2. Structural Context

Military Structure: The People's Liberation Army has concentrated 49 amphibious ships, 35 attack submarines, 700 fighter jets, and 250 bombers in its Eastern and Southern Theater Commands [9]. This force structure supports not only a large-scale amphibious operation but also various other options, including a blockade and joint firepower strikes [13]. Foreign Affairs categorizes an invasion, joint firepower strikes against cities and political institutions, and a naval blockade as China's three main military options, assessing all three as high-cost gambles involving massive asset depletion and casualties [13]. A blockade, it is noted, also carries the risk of direct attacks on third-country vessels, increasing the likelihood of conflict with international forces, including the United States [13]. This high-cost structure is the backdrop for why Beijing prioritizes ambiguity-based psychological warfare over immediate military action.

Political Structure: Taiwan is redefining deterrence beyond hardware-centric capabilities to include urban resilience as a core component [5]. This is based on the analysis that China's coercive strategy may focus on inducing political surrender before an invasion by fostering the perception that the Taiwanese government is incapable of protecting, informing, and supporting its people [5]. From this perspective, Beijing's "tactic of silence" is itself an extension of psychological warfare. Instead of responding with large-scale exercises, its dismissal of Taiwan's drills as a "wasteful charade" can be interpreted as an attempt to stir skepticism within Taiwan about the effectiveness and cost of the exercises [1].

Economic and Diplomatic Structure: China is simultaneously expanding its military ties with Southeast Asian countries. The "passage exercise" conducted by an Indonesian frigate with a Chinese frigate in the waters east of Taiwan is a prime example [8][12]. At that time, Foreign Minister Wang Yi designated Indonesia as a diplomatic priority for China in Southeast Asia and called for strengthening strategic communication [14]. The SCMP noted that this exercise could set a precedent that lowers the political threshold for neighboring countries to engage in similar activities [14]. This is creating a dual-pressure structure that aims to isolate Taiwan militarily while also encircling it diplomatically.

3. Comparison with Historical Precedents and Similar Cases

Beijing's tactic of silence contrasts with its past patterns of response to Taiwan-related issues. During the 2022 visit of then-U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, China immediately responded with large-scale encirclement drills and missile launches. In response to the recent Han Kuang exercise, however, it remained silent for ten days before issuing only a brief comment on the final day [1]. It has thus employed opposite response methods to similar types of perceived provocations. This contrast shows that Beijing's response is driven more by the need to manage its political narrative than by the military threat level of the event itself.

The difference in nature is clear when compared to traditional U.S. strategic ambiguity. Washington's ambiguity was a method of concealing the substance of its policy—namely, whether it would intervene [4]. In contrast, the ambiguity employed by Beijing is a method of concealing not the policy substance but the timing and intensity of its response [1]. While the former was a tool to maintain the credibility of deterrence, the latter is aimed more at disrupting the adversary's cost-benefit calculations regarding its own exercises and provocations.

The method of drawing in Southeast Asian nations is structurally similar to how the United States used allied naval assets during the Cold War to regularize "freedom of navigation" in specific maritime areas. This time, however, the direction is reversed, with China using a non-aligned country, Indonesia, to normalize its own military activities in waters near Taiwan as "routine passage" [8][10][14]. The failure of the Pacific Islands Forum to agree on a joint statement regarding China's submarine-launched ballistic missile test shows a similar pattern. China appears to be gradually expanding its sphere of activity by lowering the international community's threshold for responding to individual provocations [11].

4. Key Variables Shaping Future Developments

First is the consistency of U.S. policy signals. As pointed out by the Congressional Research Service and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington has yet to decide whether to use the Taiwan issue as a bargaining chip with China or to maintain it as a red line [2][4]. The CFR assesses that the United States does not have the production capacity to counter China's expanding weapons systems [7]. If this gap is not closed, Beijing may have room to employ its ambiguity tactics more boldly.

Second is the interplay between Taiwanese public opinion and its defense posture. The key question is whether urban resilience training and the strengthening of asymmetric capabilities translate into an effective deterrent [5][15]. Another variable is how much traction China's narrative framing Taiwan's exercises as a "wasteful charade" gains within Taiwanese society [1].

Third is the shifting attitude of Southeast Asian nations. If other ASEAN member states follow Indonesia's precedent, regional opposition to China's military activities in the waters east of Taiwan could weaken [14]. This would result in linking tensions in the Taiwan Strait with issues in the South China Sea and the Western Pacific.

Fourth is the independent response of regional countries like Japan and the Philippines. The fact that China is strongly protesting their move to pursue EEZ delimitation negotiations for the waters east of Taiwan within the UNCLOS framework [10] suggests that Beijing's ambiguity tactic can selectively be converted into a clear response toward specific actors. How the scope and exceptions of this ambiguity are defined will be a key point to watch.