Kim Jong Un Leads 73rd 'Victory Day' Celebrations, Officially Accompanied by Kim Ju Ae: The Complex Implications of an Entrenched Nuclear Policy and a Crystallizing Succession Picture

Executive Summary

Through its celebrations for the 73rd anniversary of the Armistice Agreement, which it calls “Victory Day,” North Korea simultaneously achieved three political objectives: reaffirming the legitimacy of its nuclear weapons policy, strengthening its “blood alliance” with China, and bringing the succession picture into sharper focus through the official appearance of Kim Ju Ae. Rodong Sinmun extensively covered Kim Jong Un’s visits to the Cemetery of the Martyrs of the Fatherland Liberation War and the Cemetery of the Martyrs of the Chinese People's Volunteers, as well as his meetings with war veterans, to reproduce regime legitimacy and proclaim its military-first policy at home and abroad. The use of titles for Kim Ju Ae previously reserved for supreme leaders is a significant signal that North Korea’s power succession structure is entering a new phase. The most realistic scenario (60% probability) is the continuation of the nuclear weapons policy and the entrenchment of structural tensions, which requires South Korean companies to strengthen supply chain risk management and formulate business strategies that assume a long-term Korean Peninsula risk premium. The optimistic scenario of a resumption of diplomacy has only a 15% probability, so investment decisions based on expectations of short-term de-escalation should be approached with caution.

I. Issue Analysis

Kim Jong Un Leads 73rd Armistice Anniversary Events, Officially Accompanied by Kim Ju Ae

Issue Analysis

1. Background and Developments

North Korea defines the Armistice Agreement, signed on July 27, 1953, as a “victory in the Fatherland Liberation War” and has commemorated this day annually as “Victory Day.” In North Korea’s official historical narrative, the Korean War is framed as a war won against the aggression of “U.S. imperialists.” This narrative serves as a core ideological foundation that legitimizes both the Kim regime’s rule and its military-first policy. This year, the 73rd anniversary of the armistice, was actively used as an opportunity to showcase the achievements of its nuclear buildup policy to domestic and international audiences.

The immediate context for this year's events is North Korea's ongoing propaganda campaign portraying its rise as a “world-class military power” since enshrining its nuclear force policy in the country's highest law. Rodong Sinmun has repeatedly pushed the narrative that this policy has led North Korea to become a powerful nation, using Victory Day as a symbolic stage to reaffirm its legitimacy. Furthermore, as North Korea has redefined inter-Korean relations as a relationship between “two belligerent states” and has publicly declared its readiness for war using all physical means, including its nuclear arsenal [3], the Victory Day events function not merely as a commemorative ceremony but as a political ritual to proclaim its military resolve to audiences at home and abroad.

2. Current Situation

This year's Victory Day events were held intensively from July 26 to 27 in Pyongyang and the surrounding South Pyongan Province. Rodong Sinmun reported, “The respected Comrade Kim Jong Un visited the Cemetery of the Martyrs of the Fatherland Liberation War on July 26 on the occasion of the 73rd anniversary of the victory in the war,” and that “Comrade Kim Jong Un had a pleasant meeting with war veterans and warmly wished for their health and longevity” [12]. On the same day, Kim Jong Un also paid his respects at the Taesongsan Revolutionary Martyrs' Cemetery, accompanied by a large contingent of high-ranking party, government, and military officials, including members of the Presidium of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea [17].

Symbolic gestures of North Korea-China friendship were also prominent. Rodong Sinmun reported, “The respected Comrade Kim Jong Un visited the Cemetery of the Martyrs of the Chinese People's Volunteers in Hoechang County, South Pyongan Province, on July 26 on the occasion of the 73rd anniversary of the victory in the Fatherland Liberation War and paid sublime tribute to the martyrs” [8]. He was accompanied by Jo Yong-won, Kim Song-nam, and Ju Chang-il, secretaries of the Party Central Committee, as well as Foreign Minister Choe Son-hui, Minister of National Defence No Kwang-chol, and Ministry of National Defence Advisor Pak Jong-chon. The ceremony was held with an honor guard of the Korean People's Army standing in formation [8]. The visit to this cemetery, which includes the grave of Mao Zedong's son, Mao Anying, is interpreted as a diplomatic gesture to symbolically reaffirm the “blood alliance” between North Korea and China [1].

On July 27, a grand commemorative performance was held at the Pyongyang Indoor Stadium. Rodong Sinmun reported that “the respected Comrade Kim Jong Un watched the performance with war veterans and persons of wartime merit who were invited to the Victory Day celebration events” [15]. During the performance, footage of the recent Pyongyang summit between Kim Jong Un and Xi Jinping, as well as videos of Chinese troops participating in the Korean War, were shown to re-emphasize North Korea-China solidarity [6]. A small-scale military parade was also held outside the venue [6]. War veterans and persons of wartime merit who had traveled from all over the country took a commemorative photo with Kim Jong Un on July 28 [14]. Rodong Sinmun also ran an article titled “Our Party Upholds the War Veterans as Models of the Great Korean People,” publicizing the party's special treatment of the veterans [18].

3. Key Actors and Their Stances/Interests

Kim Jong Un personally led the entire event, reaffirming his authority as the supreme leader. He appeared at every key moment, from visiting the martyrs' cemeteries and the Chinese volunteers' cemetery to watching the commemorative performance and taking photos with veterans. This was not mere ceremonial attendance but a political performance designed to domestically solidify his image as the successor to the “victory” narrative and the completer of the project to build a military power. In particular, the propaganda that enshrining the nuclear force policy in the country's highest law led to the rise of a “world-class military power” is a way of embedding the legitimacy of the nuclear-economic parallel development policy pursued since Kim came to power within the historical frame of Victory Day.

Kim Ju Ae's official accompaniment at this event is a particularly noteworthy change. Kim Ju Ae had previously appeared mainly at military-related events [5], but her first official attendance at a Victory Day event has now been confirmed [4][10]. Rodong Sinmun has previously used the modifier “respected child” for Kim Ju Ae, a phrase that a search of the newspaper's archives reveals has only been used for Kim Il Sung, Kim Jong Suk, Kim Jong Il, and Kim Jong Un [5]. The use of such a title and her expanding public appearances suggest a connection to the succession picture. However, it is also analyzed as part of Kim Jong Un's ruling strategy to strengthen his image as the “great parent of the people” and to solidify his absolute dominance through the Confucian concept of filial piety [2]. In other words, experts are divided on whether Kim Ju Ae's appearance signifies her designation as heir apparent, with some arguing that it is premature to draw a definitive conclusion given North Korea's male-dominated Confucian culture and power structure [13].

Core Cadres of the Workers' Party of Korea were fully mobilized for this event. Party secretaries such as Jo Yong-won, Kim Song-nam, and Ju Chang-il, along with the heads of the diplomatic and security lines like Choe Son-hui, No Kwang-chol, and Pak Jong-chon, accompanied Kim to the cemetery visit [8]. The entire party, government, and military leadership, including members of the Presidium of the Political Bureau, attended the visit to the Taesongsan Revolutionary Martyrs' Cemetery [17]. This shows that the Victory Day event is not just a commemorative ceremony but a political ritual to display the collective loyalty of the party leadership and confirm their solidarity.

China was highlighted as a key diplomatic partner in this event. Kim Jong Un's visit to the Cemetery of the Martyrs of the Chinese People's Volunteers and the screening of footage from his summit with Xi Jinping during the commemorative performance carry a message reaffirming the North Korea-China “blood alliance” to both domestic and international audiences [6][8]. This aligns with North Korea's diplomatic intention to showcase North Korea-China solidarity in the face of U.S.-led pressure and to position China as its strategic patron.

War Veterans and Persons of Wartime Merit were actively used as living symbols of regime legitimacy in this event. Rodong Sinmun declared, “Our Party upholds the war veterans as models of the great Korean people” [18], publicizing the party's special treatment of them. The commemorative photo session with veterans from across the country can be seen as an effort to build Kim Jong Un's “people-friendly” image while simultaneously linking the authority of the war-winning generation to the legitimacy of the current regime.

4. Summary of Key Issues

The key issues emerging from this year's Victory Day events can be summarized in three main points.

First is whether Kim Ju Ae's official accompaniment at the event signifies the confirmation of the succession plan. The unprecedented title “respected child” used by Rodong Sinmun [5] and her continuous public appearances centered on military events [5] suggest the possibility of her designation as heir. However, this must be considered in the complex context of North Korea's male-dominated Confucian culture, its power structure, and Kim Jong Un's strategy to strengthen his own ruling image [2][13]. The fact that she officially accompanied him for the first time to a highly symbolic military event like Victory Day adds weight to its significance.

Second is the deepening strategic alignment between North Korea and China. The visit to the Cemetery of the Martyrs of the Chinese People's Volunteers and the screening of footage from the summit with Xi Jinping at the commemorative performance are diplomatic signals intentionally highlighting the North Korea-China “blood alliance” [6][8]. This is interpreted as an intention to solidify China as a strategic patron amid U.S.-led pressure on North Korea and to strengthen the North Korea-China counter-alignment against the ROK-U.S. alliance.

Third is the combination of institutionalizing the nuclear buildup policy and domestic propaganda. The way North Korea has enshrined its nuclear force policy in its highest law and promotes this as the basis for its rise as a “world-class military power” is a strategy to internally solidify the legitimacy of its nuclear possession through the historical frame of Victory Day. That Rodong Sinmun emphasized the mission of the successor generation in an article titled “We Will Carry On and Glorify the Victorious Tradition of Juche Korea” [19] is also understood in this context. This could act as a structural factor that further narrows the possibility of future denuclearization negotiations.

II. In-Depth Analysis

Kim Jong Un Leads 73rd Armistice Anniversary Events, Officially Accompanied by Kim Ju Ae

In-Depth Analysis: Root Causes, Structural Context, and Historical Precedents

1. Root Cause Analysis

The root cause of this year's Victory Day events lies in the convergence of three political demands structurally necessary for the North Korean regime: the reproduction of legitimacy, the justification of the nuclear weapons policy, and the crystallization of the succession plan. These three demands are not independent but are organically linked within the logic of the Kim Jong Un regime's rule, and the symbolic stage of Victory Day serves as the venue for their combination.

First, in terms of reproducing legitimacy, North Korea has defined the Korean War as a “war won against the aggression of U.S. imperialists” and has used this historical narrative as the ideological foundation of the Kim regime. Rodong Sinmun described July 27 as a “symbol of the heroism and invincibility of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea” [12], positioning the day not as a simple historical anniversary but as a core element of national identity. In particular, Rodong Sinmun uses the phrase “the people's sublime respect for the honorable first defenders of our state, the creators of the noble tradition of victory” [18] to name the war veterans as living proof of the regime's legitimacy. In this way, Victory Day functions as a mechanism to renew the regime's historical legitimacy through annually repeated rituals.

Second, in terms of justifying the nuclear weapons policy, this event is directly linked to the trend of promoting North Korea's rise as a “world-class military power” since it enshrined its nuclear force policy in its highest law. As North Korea has redefined inter-Korean relations as a relationship between “two belligerent states” and has publicly declared its readiness for war using all physical means, including its nuclear arsenal [3], Victory Day functions as a political ritual to reaffirm that military resolve to domestic and international audiences. Rodong Sinmun's repeated emphasis on the “realization of the historic great cause of a rich country and a strong army” [15] in its Victory Day coverage reflects an intention to internalize the logic that the nuclear buildup policy is a historical extension of the Korean War “victory.”

Third, in terms of crystallizing the succession plan, Kim Ju Ae's first official accompaniment at this event carries political implications that go beyond simple family participation. Rodong Sinmun had already used the expression “respected child” for Kim Ju Ae in its November 27, 2022 report, a modifier that, according to the Rodong Sinmun database, has only been used for Kim Il Sung, Kim Jong Suk, Kim Jong Il, and Kim Jong Un [5]. Applying a title previously granted only to supreme leaders to Kim Ju Ae suggests that her political status is transcending that of a mere “leader's daughter.”

2. Structural Context

Political Structure: North Korea's Victory Day event is a central axis of the political rituals that visibly reproduce Kim Jong Un's monolithic leadership system. During this event, Kim Jong Un successively visited the Cemetery of the Martyrs of the Fatherland Liberation War, the Taesongsan Revolutionary Martyrs' Cemetery, and the Cemetery of the Martyrs of the Chinese People's Volunteers, accompanied by a large contingent of high-ranking party, government, and military officials [8][12][17]. This is not a simple act of remembrance but a ritualistic act to publicly reaffirm the power hierarchy centered on the supreme leader. In particular, Rodong Sinmun's declaration that “Our Party upholds the war veterans as models of the great Korean people” [18] shows a structure that reproduces the vertical relationship—in which the party is devoted to the people and the people are loyal to the party—within the historical context of Victory Day.

Kim Ju Ae's official accompaniment is emerging as a new variable within this political structure. According to an analysis by the East Asia Institute (EAI), Kim Jong Un intends to solidify his position as the “great parent of the people” by featuring his young daughter, and to use Kim Ju Ae as a model of filial piety toward a parent in a North Korean society imbued with Confucian culture [2]. This is part of a ruling strategy to strengthen absolute dominance through a logic more powerful than ideological constraints: the Confucian idea that “a parent loves a child unconditionally, and a child does not blame a flawed parent or betray them in difficult times” [2].

Socioeconomic Structure: Behind North Korea's large-scale celebration of Victory Day lies the need for internal cohesion. Rodong Sinmun emphasizes that “The heroic spirit of the victorious generation is a precious ideological and spiritual nourishment that constantly pushes our people and the soldiers of the People's Army toward the realization of the historic great cause of a rich country and a strong army, and it is the cornerstone of victory” [15]. This constructs a narrative that transforms the memory of war into a spiritual driving force for overcoming current economic difficulties. This is structurally similar to the historical pattern in which North Korea, when its legitimacy was threatened by the collapse of the communist bloc in the 1990s, promoted the “theory of the socialist great family” to foster single-minded unity [2]. The more economic pressure intensifies, the more the regime tends to strengthen internal cohesion by combining heroic historical narratives with familistic ideology.

Security Structure: The reaffirmation of the North Korea-China military “blood alliance” is the core security message of this event. Rodong Sinmun reported that “The respected Comrade Kim Jong Un visited the Cemetery of the Martyrs of the Chinese People's Volunteers in Hoechang County, South Pyongan Province, on July 26 on the occasion of the 73rd anniversary of the victory in the Fatherland Liberation War and paid sublime tribute to the martyrs” [8]. The foreign minister and defense minister accompanied him, sending both diplomatic and security messages. The screening of footage from the recent Pyongyang summit between Kim Jong Un and Xi Jinping and videos of Chinese troops in the Korean War at the commemorative performance [6] functions as a security signal to proclaim at home and abroad that the North Korea-China alliance is ongoing. This is also a structural choice to manage its security dilemma by solidifying its strategic alliance with China amid the U.S.-led pressure campaign.

3. Historical Precedents and Comparative Cases

North Korea's Victory Day events have been repeated annually, but they show a pattern where the intensity of the political message and the scale of the event change significantly on major anniversaries. For the 70th anniversary event in 2023, North Korea invited high-level officials from China and Russia, held a large-scale military parade, and publicly displayed the Hwasong-18 ICBM, staging its largest-ever event [7]. This shows a precedent of North Korea actively using major anniversary events as a stage for external military power displays and strengthening diplomatic solidarity. The fact that this year's 73rd anniversary event was limited to a relatively small-scale military parade [6] compared to the 70th suggests that North Korea has shifted the political focus of the event from showcasing military power to crystallizing the succession picture and emphasizing North Korea-China friendship.

In terms of Kim Ju Ae's official accompaniment, Kim Jong Un's own succession process provides an important historical precedent. Kim Jong Un is known to have been designated as Kim Jong Il's successor at the age of eight [5], and the North Korean practice of using public exposure and the bestowal of titles as signals of an heir's designation could apply equally to Kim Ju Ae's case. Rodong Sinmun's use of the expression “the child whom Kim Jong Un loves the most” for Kim Ju Ae in its November 27, 2022 issue [5] is consistent with the linguistic patterns used in past succession processes. However, Dr. Park Won-gon of the East Asia Institute points out that “it is difficult for a female leader to take power in North Korea, which maintains a male-dominated, conservative Confucian culture” [13], and analyzes that Kim Ju Ae is likely to remain a propaganda tool for strengthening the ruling system at this stage.

Regarding the reaffirmation of the “blood alliance” with China, the shared historical memory of fighting together in the Korean War continues to function as a structural foundation of the bilateral relationship. The act of North Korea's supreme leader personally visiting the Cemetery of the Martyrs of the Chinese People's Volunteers, where Mao Zedong's son Mao Anying is buried [1][8], is a classic example of symbolic politics where the leadership of both countries share the historical legitimacy of their blood alliance. This pattern has been repeatedly used as a diplomatic mechanism to restore relations whenever tensions arise between North Korea and China by invoking the memory of historical solidarity.

4. Key Variables Shaping Future Developments

The key variables that will determine the future course of this issue can be summarized in four main points.

The first variable is the frequency of Kim Ju Ae's official appearances and changes in her title. How the modifiers bestowed upon Kim Ju Ae by Rodong Sinmun and her status at official events change will be a key indicator for judging whether the succession plan has been confirmed. In particular, if her pattern of accompaniment, which has been concentrated in the military sector, expands to the party and government sectors, it could be interpreted as a signal of a substantive heir designation, not just a propaganda tool [5][13].

The second variable is the level of strategic alignment in North Korea-China relations. North Korea's combination of visiting the Cemetery of the Martyrs of the Chinese People's Volunteers and screening footage of the North Korea-China summit at the commemorative performance is a strategic choice to solidify its alliance with China amid the U.S.-led pressure campaign [6][8]. The frequency and content of future high-level exchanges between North Korea and China will be a practical indicator of this variable.

The third variable is the intensity of domestic and external propaganda for the nuclear weapons policy. The pattern of Rodong Sinmun repeatedly using Victory Day to promote the achievements of its nuclear buildup policy as the basis for its rise as a “world-class military power” reflects North Korea's dual strategy of pursuing both internal cohesion and external deterrence. The intensity of this propaganda is likely to be adjusted depending on changes in relations with the United States and South Korea [3].

The fourth variable is the sustainability of the symbolic use of the war veteran generation. Although Rodong Sinmun declares, “Our Party upholds the war veterans as models of the great Korean people” [18], naming them as living proof of the regime's legitimacy, this symbolic resource will become increasingly scarce as the war generation biologically fades away. How North Korea reconstitutes the “successor generation” [15] as bearers of legitimacy will emerge as a key task for the reproduction of the regime's ideology.