US Retreat from Africa and Competition for Influence by China and Turkey: Structural Analysis of Strategic Vacuums and Response Directions

Executive Summary

Under the 'America First' policy of the second Trump administration, the structural retreat of US engagement in Africa has created a complex competitive landscape where China and Turkey are rapidly absorbing this strategic vacuum. The US is self-inflictedly eroding its position in Africa through the weakening of the AGOA framework, the recall of ambassadors, and cuts to humanitarian aid, which in turn creates a favorable environment for China's infrastructure and resource diplomacy and Turkey's niche security and economic penetration. If the US does not establish a minimal foundation for proactive re-engagement, beyond short-term transactionalism, by restoring AGOA, rebuilding regional diplomatic expertise, and proposing infrastructure investment models utilizing private capital, there is a high risk that the continent's order, reshaped under Chinese leadership, will become irreversibly entrenched. South Korea must seek new economic and diplomatic opportunities through a differentiated partnership strategy that responds to the demand for autonomous balancing diplomacy from African nations within this competitive structure.

I. Issue Situation Analysis

US Retreat from Africa and Competition for Influence by China and Turkey

Issue Situation Analysis

1. Background and Course of the Issue

Africa has long remained on the periphery of US strategic priorities since the end of the Cold War. However, with the visible acceleration of China's engagement in Africa since the 2000s, the US has maintained its presence on the continent through three pillars: the trade preference system centered on the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), humanitarian aid, and security cooperation. Initiatives such as the Obama administration's 'Power Africa' and the Biden administration's 'Prosper Africa' strategy were extensions of this engagement approach. However, with the advent of the second Trump administration in 2025, US policy toward Africa is facing a fundamental shift in direction.

Following its re-election, the Trump administration repeatedly committed diplomatic transgressions, including recalling numerous US ambassadors to African nations, significantly cutting humanitarian aid budgets, and making openly insulting remarks towards African countries [1]. This approach is interpreted in Africa not merely as budget reduction but as a reflection of a perspective that views Africa as a burden rather than a strategic investment target, under the principle of 'America First.' Many African leaders are concluding that such US attitudes ultimately relegate Africa to a lower priority [1].

The impact on trade policy was also significant. The Trump administration declared what it called 'Liberation Day' in 2025, introducing a broad reciprocal tariff system, but this measure was invalidated by the US Supreme Court [5][13]. Consequently, the administration shifted to using Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 as a new legal tool, a significant change that reshaped the very legal foundation of US trade policy, not just a tactical adjustment [13]. Under this new tariff system, eight African countries—Nigeria, Algeria, Angola, Egypt, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, and South Africa—were subjected to a 12.5% tariff for inadequate management of supply chains related to forced labor [10]. The Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) identified 38 countries for sanctions after investigating 60 economic blocs, with African nations constituting a substantial portion of these sanctions.

2. Current Situation

The current geopolitical competition surrounding Africa has entered a complex phase characterized by the simultaneous unfolding of three trends: US withdrawal, aggressive expansion by China, and niche entry by Turkey.

The US withdrawal from engagement is manifesting as concrete policy vacuums. With South Africa and Ethiopia being excluded or facing the threat of exclusion from the AGOA framework, an unusual situation has arisen where the US business community itself is protesting these actions. Broad coalitions of US business organizations are urging the Trump administration to cease the exclusion of African countries from AGOA, warning that such measures are weakening Washington's position in its continental competition with Beijing [4]. This serves as a clear example of the administration's Africa policy lacking strategic coherence even within the US.

Confusion also persists in the security domain. The recent visit of Massad Boulos, senior advisor to the Trump administration for Africa, to Cairo for a series of meetings with Egyptian officials has raised concerns that the US appears to be taking sides without a clear strategic vision between the Egypt-Somalia-Eritrea axis and the Ethiopia-Somaliland-Israel partnership [14]. African analysts criticize this as an impulsive intervention by the US, lacking a deep understanding of African regional dynamics.

China is rapidly filling this void. Since early 2026, Beijing has been inundated with visits from leaders of various countries, and African nations are no exception [12]. Notably, the expansion of cooperation with the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC) in Africa presents an ironic contrast to the US pressure on Africa over forced labor issues. Namibia stands out as an example of how African countries can strategically refine their relationships with China in this context. Namibia is not merely passively accepting Chinese investment but is actively employing negotiation strategies to maximize its own interests [12].

Turkey's rise is also a noteworthy phenomenon. Once virtually non-existent in Africa during the Cold War, Turkey has emerged as one of the fastest-expanding external actors on the continent today. Through multi-faceted means such as exporting Bayraktar drones, constructing airports, expanding airline routes, building diplomatic networks, and operating aid organizations, the Erdoğan government is leaving a visible footprint across Africa [7]. This aligns with a strategic intent to strengthen Turkey's position as a leader in the Islamic world within Africa, going beyond mere economic interests.

3. Key Actors and Their Positions and Interests

African Countries (Local Actors)are positioning themselves not as passive objects but as active agents within this competitive landscape. As the case of Namibia illustrates, African countries are seeking to leverage the dual dynamic of US withdrawal and Chinese assertiveness as an opportunity to enhance their bargaining power [12]. Major African nations, including Nigeria, have expressed strong dissatisfaction with US tariffs imposed due to forced labor concerns, viewing them as an attempt to externally constrain Africa's economic development path [10]. The prevailing sentiment across the African continent is converging on the perception that the US, rather than offering genuine partnership, is imposing unilateral conditions centered on its own interests.

The Trump Administration (US)perceives Africa as a theater of strategic competition, yet its actual policy tools lean more towards pressure and withdrawal than engagement. Actions such as imposing tariffs for forced labor, excluding countries from AGOA, and recalling ambassadors can be seen as attempts to increase US leverage in the short term, but they are ultimately counterproductive, ceding strategic space to China and Turkey. The fact that the US business community is protesting these measures suggests that the administration's Africa policy carries a self-contradictory nature, conflicting with US national interests [4].

Chinais actively exploiting the US retreat in Africa as a strategic opportunity. By deepening relations with African countries through infrastructure investment, trade expansion, and diplomatic engagement, China is also leveraging the US pressure on Africa over forced labor issues to position itself as a more reliable partner. Within the context of the US-China ideological competition, China advocates for principles of non-interference in internal affairs and unconditional cooperation in Africa, differentiating itself from the Western model that imposes conditions related to human rights and democracy [2].

Turkeyis expanding its niche influence in Africa through a unique combination of means—drones, construction, aviation, and diplomacy—without directly confronting either China or the US [7]. The Erdoğan government is increasing its presence, particularly in the Sahel and East Africa, through a complex strategy that combines Islamic solidarity, development cooperation, and military technology exports.

US Business Communityhas expressed an unusually public opposition to the administration's Africa policy. They argue that AGOA exclusion measures weaken the access of US companies to African markets and consequently grant a competitive advantage to Chinese firms [4]. This indicates a deepening rift within Washington regarding Africa policy between the administration and the business community.

4. Summary of Key Issues

First, the issue of US strategic incoherenceis critical. While the Trump administration claims to be countering China, its actual reduction of engagement in Africa is paradoxically facilitating China's growing influence. The core problem lies in the disjointed and ad hoc implementation of measures such as recalling ambassadors, cutting humanitarian aid, imposing tariffs for forced labor, and excluding countries from AGOA, without an interconnected strategic vision.

Second, the issue of the strategic counterproductivity of forced labor tariffsis significant. The 12.5% tariff imposed on eight African countries, including Nigeria, ostensibly aims to eradicate forced labor in supply chains [10], but it is actually accelerating diversification towards alternative partners like China and Turkey by weakening African countries' trade dependency on the US. The fact that the US business community itself warns of the counterproductive effects of this measure highlights the policy's internal contradictions [4].

Third, the issue of strengthening African strategic autonomyis evident. As seen in the case of Namibia, African countries are no longer passively accepting competition among external powers; they are strategically utilizing multiple partners to maximize their bargaining power and development interests [12]. This suggests a structural limitation: if the US approaches Africa merely as a tool for countering China, it will be difficult to elicit the voluntary cooperation of African nations.

Fourth, the issue of the new competitive landscape created by Turkey's niche strategyis important. Analyzing African competition solely through the lens of the US-China bipolar structure risks underestimating the variable of Turkey. Erdoğan's 'Africa machine' operates through a unique combination of drone diplomacy, construction networks, aviation connectivity, and Islamic solidarity [7], particularly exploiting the vacuum created by the simultaneous weakening of US and French influence in the Sahel region.

Fifth, the issue of deepening policy confusion within the USis problematic. The administration's Africa policy is clashing with the US business community, parts of Congress, and traditional diplomatic circles, leading to a fragmented decision-making structure for US Africa policy in Washington. This internal confusion further undermines US foreign credibility and creates a structural obstacle that makes it difficult for African countries to perceive the US as a long-term, reliable partner [1][4].

II. In-depth Issue Analysis

US Retreat from Africa and Competition for Influence by China and Turkey

In-depth Issue Analysis

1. Fundamental Cause Analysis of the Issue

The US retreat from Africa, while superficially appearing as a policy choice of the Trump administration, is rooted in deeper causes: structural fatigue in US foreign strategy and domestic political realignment. Since the end of the Cold War, the US has approached Africa more as an object of humanitarian obligation and democratic expansion than as a stage for strategic competition. This approach fundamentally clashes with the 'America First' doctrine, which emphasizes tangible strategic returns. From the perspective of the Trump administration, humanitarian aid and diplomatic investment in Africa are perceived as costs that do not directly contribute to US national interests, which was immediately reflected in the recall of ambassadors and cuts to aid budgets [1].

Examining the fundamental causes from a trade policy perspective, the Trump administration's tariffs related to forced labor are not merely a tool of human rights diplomacy but serve a dual purpose of supply chain restructuring and countering China. The Reciprocal Trade Agreements (ART) signed by the US with countries like Argentina, Cambodia, Bangladesh, Indonesia, and Malaysia include seven supply chain control mechanisms, such as the exclusion of forced labor, restrictions on third-country trade, and alignment of export controls. These agreements, while not explicitly naming China, are structured in a way that effectively targets China [3]. The imposition of a 12.5% tariff on eight African countries is also part of this broader supply chain restructuring strategy, intended to block African countries from using Chinese intermediate goods for indirect exports to the US market [10]. However, the core issue is that African countries' actual economic development capacity and trade relationships are suffering collateral damage in this process.

Another fundamental cause is the lack of strategic vision within the US policy community concerning Africa. The Trump administration's Africa policy lacks a consistent strategic document or regional expertise, instead exhibiting a mix of short-term transactionalism and impulsive diplomacy. The series of meetings conducted by senior US advisor for Africa, Massad Boulos, in Cairo has raised concerns that the US is risking taking sides without a clear strategic vision between the Egypt-Somalia-Eritrea axis opposing Ethiopia and the Ethiopia-Somaliland-Israel partnership [14]. This lack of understanding of regional contexts acts as a structural cause that exacerbates policy confusion.

2. Structural Context

Political Structure

The political structure of the US-China strategic competition surrounding Africa is embedded within a broader framework of ideological and systemic rivalry. As the analysis suggests, "the offensive by the United States based on democracy and human rights and China's response pursuing the re-universalization of Chinese civilization may lead to a fierce competition between the two countries"[2], Africa is one of the main arenas for this ideological competition. However, the Trump administration is weakening even this framework of ideological competition. As the traditional US approach of using human rights and democracy as a justification for its Africa policy has been replaced by transactional trade pressure, African countries have begun to question the credibility of US political engagement itself.

From the perspective of African domestic politics, many African leaders have perceived US engagement as characterized by intrusive conditional aid and unilateral diplomatic pressure that infringes upon their sovereignty. Against this backdrop of accumulated historical grievances, the Trump administration's insulting rhetoric and unilateral tariff impositions have acted as a catalyst, stimulating anti-American sentiment across the continent[1]. In contrast, China is appealing to the political preferences of African leaders by advocating the principle of non-interference in internal affairs and unconditional cooperation, which is creating a favorable political environment for the expansion of Chinese influence in the short term.

Economic Structure

In terms of economic structure, the vacuum created by the US retreat from engagement with Africa is profound. The African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) has been a key economic cooperation framework since the late 1990s, providing African countries with access to the US market, thereby supporting the development of manufacturing bases and export diversification. The exclusion or threat of exclusion of South Africa and Ethiopia from AGOA has dealt an immediate blow to their textile, auto parts, and agricultural exports, while simultaneously undermining incentives for US companies to invest in African supply chains. The fact that broad coalitions of US business organizations have urged the Trump administration to halt the exclusion of African countries from AGOA demonstrates that Washington itself recognizes that this policy directly conflicts with the interests of American businesses[4]. Thus, US economic policy toward Africa contains a self-contradictory tension between the strategic goal of containing China and the practical benefits for American industry.

China's economic offensive is precisely exploiting this vacuum. The expansion of cooperation with the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC) in Africa is strengthening the direct linkage of China's production networks with Africa in agriculture, textiles, and infrastructure, thereby deepening African countries' economic dependence on China and becoming intricately entangled with the forced labor supply chain issues that the US is concerned about. Meanwhile, discussions are underway for funding from the US Export-Import Bank and the World Bank for the Africa Atlantic Gas Pipeline (AAGP) project connecting West Africa and Europe[8], indicating that US economic engagement in energy infrastructure has not entirely disappeared. However, unless such individual project-level engagement evolves into a strategically coherent economic diplomacy, the structural vacuum will persist.

Security Structure

In terms of security, the US retreat from engagement in Africa has directly led to security vacuums, particularly in the Sahel and East Africa. US military intervention against Islamist insurgent groups in Nigeria has had the counterproductive effect of undermining US credibility as a stabilization partner on the ground[1], raising the need for a fundamental re-evaluation of the US approach to security engagement itself. Turkey is rapidly entering this security vacuum by combining drone technology with military training cooperation. Turkey, which had virtually no presence in African geopolitics during the Cold War, is rapidly expanding its influence on the continent through a dense network of drone manufacturers, airport construction companies, airlines, diplomats, aid organizations, and businesses[7]. Erdoğan's Africa strategy employs a complex approach that leverages Islamic cultural solidarity as a diplomatic asset while combining it with practical economic cooperation and security support, aiming to build structural influence beyond mere arms sales[7].

3. Comparative Analysis of Historical Precedents and Similar Cases

The pattern of other countries filling the void created by great power competition in Africa and the strategic withdrawal of the United States has been repeated throughout history. During the Cold War, the US and the Soviet Union engaged in proxy wars by intervening in civil wars and independence movements in various African countries, but after the end of the Cold War, as the US withdrew its strategic attention, Africa was relegated to the periphery of the international community. The US's indifference and early withdrawal during the Rwandan genocide and the Somali crisis in the 1990s impressed upon African leaders how conditional and reversible US engagement was. This historical experience serves as a background for African countries' caution against strategic dependence on the US and their pursuit of diversification today.

A more direct parallel can be drawn to China's expansion into Africa since the 2000s. China emerged as a strategic partner for African countries by injecting large amounts of capital unconditionally into infrastructure investment, an area where the US and Europe hesitated due to governance conditions. Although the controversy of China's "debt trap diplomacy" has been raised, there is also a strong view on the ground in Africa that this is an exaggerated criticism from the West. The case of Namibia is particularly noteworthy in this context. Amidst a global trend of countries vying for Beijing's favor, Namibia is presenting a model of refining its strategy toward China not as a mere beneficiary relationship but as a conditional partnership[12]. This demonstrates the strategic maturity of African countries, which are not passively accepting great power competition but actively leveraging it to maximize their own interests.

Turkey's expansion into Africa shares a similar pattern with India's increased engagement in Africa and the investment offensives of Gulf states in Africa, serving as an example of a middle power building regional influence by exploiting the strategic vacuum left by great powers after the Cold War. In that all of them are creating their own space for engagement outside the binary competition between the US and China, it suggests that Africa is transforming into a stage for multipolar competition rather than merely an arena for the rivalry of the two great powers[7].

A comparison with the first Trump administration also provides a meaningful precedent. While the first Trump administration also showed diplomatic indifference and aid cuts to Africa, some continuity was maintained as the Biden administration attempted a restoration. However, a significant difference in the second Trump term is that the legal durability of policies is increasing by replacing mutually agreed tariffs, which were invalidated by court rulings, with Section 301 tariffs[9][13], making the policies less reversible than in the first term. This increases the likelihood that the US retreat from engagement with Africa is a structural shift rather than a temporary policy fluctuation.

4. Key Variables in Issue Development

The key variables that will determine the future development of this issue can be summarized into four main categories.

The first variable is the survival of AGOA and the intensity of pressure from US industry. The situation where US business organizations are pressuring the administration to allow South Africa and Ethiopia to remain in AGOA[4] shows that the policy confusion within Washington regarding Africa is not merely an external observation but is disrupting the policy-making process itself. Whether the backlash from US industry can lead to congressional legislation or a revision of administrative policy is the most important short-term variable.

The second variable is the evolution of China's engagement in Africa. The expansion of XPCC's cooperation in Africa is contributing to the strengthening of the very supply chain structure that the US is targeting with forced labor tariffs, suggesting that the competition over African supply chains between the US and China will become even more intense. As seen in the case of Namibia, as African countries develop their capacity to refine the conditions and methods of cooperation with China, there may be limits to China's unilateral expansion of influence[12].

The third variable is the capacity of African regional organizations and individual countries to secure strategic autonomy. Whether regional organizations such as the African Union (AU) and ECOWAS can exert independent bargaining power in the competition between great powers, and whether large-scale infrastructure projects like the Africa Atlantic Gas Pipeline (AAGP) can reshape regional energy geopolitics and enhance Africa's strategic value, are emerging as important variables[8].

The fourth variable is the internal dynamics within Washington concerning US Africa policy. The Trump administration's Africa policy is characterized by improvisation rather than strategic consistency, and it continues to exhibit policy confusion, such as risking alignment with specific factions in the Horn of Africa without a clear strategic vision[14]. As the analysis suggests, "many Republicans support alliances, which can serve as a check on Trump's foreign policy"[11], the extent to which traditional internationalist forces within the Republican Party can play a restraining role in Africa policy will be a crucial internal variable determining the direction of US policy.