Mao Zedong and Kim Il-sung on the Eve of the Korean War: Focusing on the North Korea-China Summit of May 13-15, by Jeong Ha-min at the Mao Zedong Memorial Hall

Saint Petersburg State University

Introduction

The failure to resolve issues with North Korea over the past 70 years of division is deeply rooted in North Korea's

complex interests with China and the persistent North Korea-China relationship led by China.

While China's North Korea policy and the North Korea-China relationship have been discussed from various perspectives,

the starting point of the leaders' meetings between the two countries began with the encounter between Mao Zedong

and Kim Il-sung in Beijing on May 13. The relationship between China and North Korea, which began at this time,

has once again become a close one since 2018, with the intensification of the US-China hegemonic competition.

Through this, North Korea is pursuing its 'own path' by achieving self-reliance with China's support.

China's North Korea policy is the most important variable defining the situation on the Korean Peninsula and inter-Korean relations.

The ROK-US North Korea policy has always paid close attention to changes in China's North Korea policy and the North Korea-China relationship.

Furthermore, it is no exaggeration to say that China's influence played a significant role in the UN Security Council's sanctions resolutions against North Korea,

and the success or failure of policies through these sanctions depended on China's cooperation.

5. Mao Zedong and Kim Il-sung on the Eve of the Korean War_Mao Zedong Memorial Hall

Meanwhile, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, a large volume of historical documents recording the Cold War era

were released, leading to historical field investigations that re-examine the events of that period by comparing them with documents.

As part of this effort, the North Korea-China-Soviet relations during the Korean War, which remains a remnant of the Cold War,

are being re-examined. However, while research focusing on the meetings between Kim Il-sung, Mao Zedong, and Joseph Stalin,

the starting point of the Korean War, is actively underway in China, Russia, and the United States,

it is regrettable that comprehensive field investigations into these meetings from a uniquely Korean perspective have not been conducted.

The author's starting point was this recognition of the problem.

To understand Kim Il-sung, this study attempts to understand the meeting between Kim Il-sung and Mao Zedong,

focusing on the summit held from May 13 to 15, from Korea, which is the closest country to North Korea after China.

Furthermore, Xi Jinping, at the center of China, shows commonalities in his actions with Mao Zedong, rising to the level of absolute power.

The same applies to North Korea, where Kim Jong-un is benchmarking Kim Il-sung and pursuing the line of parallel development of establishing a sole ruling system and building nuclear power alongside economic construction.

Thus, it is no exaggeration to say that Mao Zedong and Kim Il-sung form the ideological background for Xi Jinping and Kim Jong-un.

Therefore, by delving into the summit between Mao Zedong and Kim Il-sung from May 13 to 15, the starting point of the history of the Korean War,

which has become a crucial reality in the situation on the Korean Peninsula, this study aims to understand their historical relationship,

understand the historical context of Mao Zedong and Kim Il-sung during the Korean War, and explore the significance of their meeting at that time.

Stalin and Kim Il-sung's Meeting

1. Kim Il-sung's Overture for the Korean War

With the defeat of Japanese imperialism in 1945, Korea regained its independence. However,

the joy was short-lived as the Korean Peninsula came under the trusteeship of two great powers, the Soviet Union in the north and the United States in the south.

Subsequently, due to the coexistence of socialist and democratic systems internally and the power struggle between the two great powers, the US and the Soviet Union,

two systems were eventually established on the Korean Peninsula in August and September 1948.

South and North Korea strongly desired unification but each insisted on achieving a unified Korea under their own system.

At that time, North Korea wished to communize South Korea by force, possessed favorable conditions for armed invasion,

and had established a dictatorial system led by Kim Il-sung, operating heavy industry that remained as a legacy of Japanese rule.

Furthermore, with the Soviet Union, a communist ally, as its backing, North Korea had nothing to fear.

Aware of this fact, Kim Il-sung strongly revealed his intention for armed invasion in his 1949 New Year's address by using the term 'territorial integrity' (國土完整) no less than 13 times (National Museum of Korean History, Korean War).

To translate this into action, Kim Il-sung urgently sought a meeting with Stalin to secure a promise of support.

Following the establishment of the Cominform, Stalin, within the global communist system,

5. Mao Zedong and Kim Il-sung on the Eve of the Korean War_Mao Zedong Memorial Hall

He placed great emphasis on the exchange of information and the unity of action. Tito incurred Stalin's wrath due to his unilateral actions in the Balkan Federation and the Greek Civil War,

and was not only expelled from the Cominform but also narrowly escaped assassination by the Soviet Committee for State Security (KGB). Kim Il-sung was well aware of this,

and as evidenced by the large volume of telegrams and meeting records within the Russian archives, Kim Il-sung's actions were cautious, and he absolutely avoided overstepping the boundaries of his authority (Shen Zhihua 2017, 265).

In February-April 1949, Kim Il-sung undertook a visit to the Soviet Union to plan for a military unification.

This visit was one of the important agendas to obtain Soviet approval for the war, along with numerous North Korean policymakers. During this visit,

on March 7, Kim Il-sung conveyed his intention to invade the South to Stalin. Stalin agreed to North Korea's initiation of war if South Korea started it first,

but opposed North Korea taking the initiative to start the war (Yevgeny 1998, 44). However, aid to North Korea was to proceed.

Accordingly, on March 17, 1949, an agreement on economic and cultural cooperation was signed between North Korea and the Soviet Union (Shen Zhihua 2017, 265).

During the meeting at that time, Stalin stated that North Korea's military strength was not yet overwhelming,

and urged caution regarding the invasion plan, encouraging more thorough preparation. In terms of the international situation at the time,

the Soviet Union did not possess nuclear weapons, and the presence of US forces in South Korea posed a significant obstacle to aid for North Korea. Furthermore, in the context of the early Cold War following World War II,

it was inevitably burdensome for the Soviet Union to create further points of confrontation with the United States.

In late April 1949, when the North Korean delegation visited China and informed them of the consultations with Stalin,

Mao Zedong also advised a temporary postponement of the war. At that time, China was undergoing internal reorganization due to the Chinese Civil War,

so its own security was a priority. Moreover, Mao Zedong stated that a war on the Korean Peninsula could be a blitzkrieg or a protracted conflict,

and judged that a prolonged war could lead to the involvement of Japan in supporting the South Korean 'government' (Torkunov 1998, 118).

However, China transferred two divisions of the Chinese People's Liberation Army composed of Koreans, who had aided in the Chinese Civil War, to North Korea for invasion preparations, indicating preparations for war.

Kim Il-sung, having received homework assignments to be resolved from Stalin of the Soviet Union and Mao Zedong of China, inwardly harbored regret that he could not achieve it alone and continuously sought opportunities to solve the problem,

intending to prepare for an invasion of the South. In June 1949, after the US military completed its withdrawal from South Korea,

Kim Il-sung, seeing this as an opportunity, once again sought Stalin's permission for an invasion, but ultimately failed to obtain permission for a full-scale war.

Instead, he conveyed a plan to occupy a portion of the Samcheok area in Gangwon Province and simultaneously mentioned the possibility of revolution through armed uprising by partisans in South Korea.

5. Mao Zedong and Kim Il-sung on the Eve of the Korean War_Mao Zedong Memorial Hall

"To accelerate unification at this juncture, first, we must plan for a large-scale armed uprising involving the South Korean people with the objective of supporting partisans in South Korea, establishing liberated zones, overthrowing the reactionary regime, and successfully resolving the task of North-South unification.

Second, the People's Army must be comprehensively reorganized and strengthened." (Russian State Archives of the President).

Stalin expressed his support for communization through revolution, which led to frequent skirmishes between North and South along the 38th parallel, including in the areas of Kaesong and Ongjin.

However, concerned that these small-scale battles might escalate into a large-scale conflict, Stalin issued an order to Kim Il-sung in October 1949 to cease the fighting along the 38th parallel.

2. Stalin's Permission for the Southern Invasion

Subsequently, the international situation began to favor the communist bloc.

In August 1949, the Soviet Union successfully conducted a nuclear test, and in October, Mao Zedong defeated Chiang Kai-shek in the Chinese Civil War, leading to the communization of China.

Furthermore, the US decision to abandon intervention in the Chinese Civil War and the Acheson Line declaration on January 12, 1950, served as a crucial factor that convinced Kim Il-sung that the United States would not intervene even if North Korea launched an invasion of the South.

This belief solidified his conviction regarding North Korea's invasion of the South.

He showed signs of preparing for war.

Kim Il-sung, who received homework assignments from Stalin of the Soviet Union and Mao Zedong of China,

felt a sense of regret that he could not accomplish it on his own and

continuously sought opportunities to solve the problem, and

prepared for a southward invasion. In June 1949, when U.S. troops completed their withdrawal from South Korea,

Kim Il-sung, seeing this as an opportunity, once again approached Stalin

to seek permission for a southward invasion, but ultimately did not receive approval for a full-scale war

and altered his plan to occupy parts of the Samcheok region in Gangwon Province,

while simultaneously mentioning the possibility of revolution through armed uprisings by partisans in South Korea.

5. Mao Zedong and Kim Il-sung on the Eve of the Korean War_Mao Zedong Memorial Hall

“To expedite unification at this juncture, first, we must support the partisans within South Korea

and establish liberated zones, and successfully resolve the tasks of overthrowing the reactionary regime and achieving North-South unification.

Under this objective, a large-scale armed uprising involving the South Korean people must be planned.

Second, the People's Army must be comprehensively reorganized and

strengthened.” (Archives of the President of the Russian Federation).

Stalin expressed his support for communization through revolution,

which led to frequent skirmishes between North and South Korea in areas around the 38th parallel, such as Kaesong and Ongjin.

However, Stalin, concerned that these small-scale battles might escalate into a larger conflict,

ordered Kim Il-sung in October 1949 to cease the fighting along the 38th parallel.

2. Stalin's Approval for the Southward Invasion

Subsequently, the international situation evolved in favor of the communist bloc.

In August 1949, the Soviet Union successfully conducted a nuclear test, and in October, Mao Zedong

defeated Chiang Kai-shek in the Chinese Civil War, leading to the communization of China.

Furthermore, during the Chinese Civil War, the United States abandoned intervention in the civil war on the side of the democratic bloc, and on January 12, 1950, the U.S. declaration of the Acheson line

led Kim Il-sung to become convinced that the United States would not intervene even if North Korea launched a southward invasion.

became a pivotal moment that solidified this belief.

At that time, Kim Il-sung judged that the flow of international affairs made it the opportune moment for war.

After China's communization in Asia, on January 17, 1950, the North Korean Foreign Minister

Pak Hon-yong held a small luncheon to see off Yi Ju-yeon, who was appointed as the first ambassador to China.

At this event, Kim Il-sung, under the influence of alcohol,

confided his dissatisfaction with Moscow to Terenti Fomitch Stykov,

and once again demanded Stalin's permission for a southward invasion. In response, Stykov

sent a telegram to Stalin, but after a long silence, Stalin abruptly

stated around January 30 that he understood Comrade Kim Il-sung's feelings and was ready to discuss the matter of the southward invasion.

to discuss the matter of the southward invasion.

The reason for Stalin's change of heart remains a heated topic among scholars to this day,

and while numerous arguments have emerged since the Korean War,

the reality is that a clear interpretation has yet to emerge.

Stalin's socialist policies underwent a complete transformation at a certain point due to changes in the international political landscape after World War II.

Regarding this issue, Professor Park Myung-rim cites the explanation of Isaac Deutscher.

According to his research,

Stalin preferred a strategy of consolidating socialism in secured territories rather than expanding it immediately after World War II.

This was the strategy of 'socialism in one zone'.

Stalin faithfully adhered to the demarcation line drawn between capitalism and socialism.

However, Stalin's approach changed significantly following the victory of the Chinese Revolution.

Deutscher stated that 'Stalin received immense support from the Chinese Revolution in the dangerous confrontation between the two camps, which fundamentally altered the balance of power.

In other words, with the Chinese Revolution as a turning point, Stalin deviated from short-term peaceful coexistence and mutual recognition of spheres of influence, i.e., 'socialism in one zone'.

fundamentally altered the balance of power.

That is, with the Chinese Revolution as a turning point, Stalin deviated from short-term peaceful coexistence and mutual recognition of spheres of influence, i.e., 'socialism in one zone'.

i.e., 'socialism in one zone'.

5. Mao Zedong and Kim Il-sung on the Eve of the Korean War_Mao Zedong Memorial Hall

Furthermore, Stalin perceived limited strategic benefits from the Korean War,

and acted from a perspective of potential rivalry with Mao Zedong.

He misjudged the potential of the Chinese Revolution, and thus

to dispel the impression of political timidity he had given, he may have been anxious to prove himself a bold strategist like Mao Zedong.

This psychological factor may have also played a role (Park Myung-rim 1996, 193).

played a role (Park Myung-rim 1996, 193).

Shea Zhihua viewed the conditions for Stalin's decision to intervene in the Korean War as a change in relations with China and consideration of the US policy response.

as a change in relations with China and consideration of the US policy response.

However, the Korean War was part of the process of change in Soviet foreign policy,

and the real factors that triggered the change in Soviet foreign policy began with the expulsion of the French Communist Party and the Italian Communist Party from coalition governments in May 1947

and the US announcement of its support plan for Europe in June 1947, the Marshall Plan.

the Marshall Plan.

The expulsion of communist parties from Europe dealt a severe blow to the Soviet policy of involving communist parties in coalition governments post-war,

and the Marshall Plan was a policy of containment against communism towards the Soviet Union.

Consequently, the Soviet Union fundamentally altered its foreign policy and strengthened its ties with communist parties, a process that began in Europe and gradually spread to Asia, leading to a confrontational policy that became a decisive factor in the Korean War (Shea Zhihua 2010, 52).

Consequently, the Soviet Union fundamentally altered its foreign policy and strengthened its ties with communist parties, a process that began in Europe and gradually spread to Asia, leading to a confrontational policy that became a decisive factor in the Korean War (Shea Zhihua 2010, 52).

This contrasts with Professor Park Myung-rim's view in that Stalin considered the Korean Peninsula to have strategic interests in Soviet Far Eastern policy as one of the motivations for deciding on the Korean War.

leading to a confrontational policy that became a decisive factor in the Korean War (Shea Zhihua 2010, 52).

This contrasts with Professor Park Myung-rim's view in that Stalin considered the Korean Peninsula to have strategic interests in Soviet Far Eastern policy as one of the motivations for deciding on the Korean War.

Stalin considered the Korean Peninsula to have strategic interests in Soviet Far Eastern policy as one of the motivations for deciding on the Korean War.

Stalin considered the Korean Peninsula to have strategic interests in Soviet Far Eastern policy as one of the motivations for deciding on the Korean War.

For Stalin, the Sino-Soviet alliance was a double-edged sword; while it strengthened Soviet political influence in Asia,

Stalin had to return most of the political and economic benefits he had acquired from Chiang Kai-shek in 1945.

Therefore,

securing and maintaining Soviet political and economic interests in Asia, particularly Northeast Asia, was crucial.

To uphold the Yalta Agreement and his previously stated strategic objectives in the Far East,

Stalin needed to occupy territories other than Chinese territory, and above all, the acquisition of a warm-water port was essential.

Stalin's strategic importance placed on securing Korea is evident from a report by the Second Far Eastern Department of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs on June 29, 1945.

Stalin's strategic importance placed on securing Korea is evident from a report by the Second Far Eastern Department of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs on June 29, 1945.

The report stated, "Russia's struggle against Japan's expansion into the Asian continent via Korea is a historically just action."

"Russia's struggle against Japan's expansion into the Asian continent via Korea is a historically just action."

"The independence of Korea must be achieved in a manner that effectively prevents Korea from becoming a forward base for Soviet aggression in the future,

and this aggression could come from Japan or from forces exerting pressure on the Soviet Union in the Far East."

must be in a format that effectively prevents conversion, and such

or from forces exerting pressure on the Soviet Union in the Far East.

is the same as any other attempt by another country.” This particularly

explains very clearly that the Korean Peninsula must not become a foothold

for expansion into the Asian continent, and that it was important territory for the Soviet Union

as evidenced by this (Shenzhihua 2010, 200). Therefore, out of a motive to protect Soviet strategic

interests in the Far East, Stalin decided to take military action on the Korean Peninsula.

At the same time, it had the advantage of avoiding direct armed conflict with the United States in the region,

which became the basic starting point for Stalin's policy decisions on the Korean issue.

5. Mao Zedong and Kim Il-sung on the Eve of the Korean War_Mao Zedong Memorial Hall

5. Mao Zedong and Kim Il Sung on the Eve of the Korean War_Mao Zedong Memorial Hall

Russian scholar Torkunov (Anatoly Vasilyevich Torkunov) cites the victory of the Chinese Revolution

as a reason. Stalin judged that the United States was only interested in Chiang Kai-shek in Taiwan

and did not want to get involved in a conflict on the Korean Peninsula.

He inferred the following through interviews with participants in the meeting at the time.

“China demonstrated the power of Asian revolutionaries to the world,

and revealed the weakened ties between Asian reactionaries and the United States and Western Europe.

With the signing of the treaty of alliance between China and the Soviet Union, the United States was not in a position to provoke Asian communists,

and given that the Soviet Union possessed nuclear weapons, the United States would not intervene on the Korean Peninsula.

Based on this judgment, at this meeting, North Korea's preemptive invasion was finally approved by China.

” he states (Torkunov 1998,

113). Another important factor was that the Soviet Union had broken the US nuclear monopoly,

making it impossible for the United States to threaten the Soviet Union with nuclear weapons.

Another important factor was that the Soviet Union had broken the US nuclear monopoly,

making it impossible for the United States to threaten the Soviet Union with nuclear weapons.

Due to the author's limited insight, it is difficult to ascertain the exact reasons that moved Stalin's heart

due to the accessibility of literature and limited research experience,

and it is significantly insufficient to provide a definitive answer as it is beyond the scope of my abilities.

However, what is noteworthy is that the Soviet policy of adhering to a limited expansion of socialist construction in one country

was increasingly pressured from the outside, including the establishment of NATO after World War II, as mentioned by Shenzhihua,

and this ultimately led to an instinctive policy change to ensure Soviet security,

combined with the psychological factors stemming from the victory of the Chinese Civil War,

the success of Soviet nuclear development, and the belief that the United States would not participate in the war due to the US Acheson Declaration,

these complex changes in the international situation combined to influence territorial expansion on the Korean Peninsula.

May 13-15, 1950: Into the Scene

1. Mao Zedong and Kim Il-sung's Secret Meeting

1. Mao Zedong and Kim Il-sung on the Eve of the Korean War_Mao Zedong Memorial Hall

1. Mao Zedong and Kim Il-sung's Secret Meeting

The first substantive meeting between Kim Il-sung and Mao Zedong as representatives of the North Korean and Chinese Communist Parties

actually took place in China from May 13 to 15, 1950. This meeting ultimately resolved Stalin's task,

secured Mao Zedong's support for the invasion of the South, and with the backing of the Soviet Union and China,

Kim Il-sung received promises of sufficient support to initiate the Korean War, making it a historically significant moment.

Mao Zedong had not been informed in advance of Stalin's and Kim Il-sung's decision to go to war,

and it was shortly after the end of the Chinese Civil War,

so despite feeling burdened by this, he promised support for the Korean War.

Kim Il-sung stated that since the Soviet Union and China had formed an alliance, the United States would not intervene in the war,

and that Mao had repeatedly promised to support North Korea through various means, including military forces, as soon as the Chinese Revolution was achieved (Park Myung-lim 1996, 96).

This mutual understanding between Kim Il-sung and Stalin regarding the international situation, based on the various reasons explained earlier,

was the decisive reason why they could make the decision to invade the South.

After concluding his meeting with Kim Il-sung, Stalin instructed him to visit China

and discuss the specific details with Mao Zedong. The reason Stalin sought China's approval before the invasion of the South can be understood from the meeting between Stalin and Kim Il-sung on April 10.

5. Mao Zedong and Kim Il-sung on the Eve of the Korean War_Mao Zedong Memorial Hall

At that time, Stalin clearly considered the possibility that North Korea might not be able to withstand an intervention by the United States.

He feared that the United States would occupy North Korea and threaten the Soviet Far East more than North Korea failing to occupy South Korea.

Therefore, he strongly requested Mao Zedong's permission to defend against this.

At that time, Kim Il-sung had no intention of requesting support from China.

The reason given earlier for obtaining China's permission is evident from the Stalin-Kim Il Sung meeting on April 10th.

At that time, Stalin clearly considered the possibility that North Korea might not be able to withstand an intervention by the United States.

Kim Il Sung was concerned not with failing to occupy South Korea,

but rather with the United States occupying North Korea and threatening the Soviet Far East.

Therefore, to defend China, he strongly requested Mao Zedong's permission.

At that time, Kim Il Sung had no intention of requesting assistance from China.

There were none. This was because all demands were met in Moscow and whatever was needed

would be supported from Moscow (Torkunov 1998, 128). However,

as per Stalin's request, Kim Il-sung visited Beijing with Pak Hon-yong on May 13th

and held talks with Mao Zedong.

On May 13th, Kim Il-sung and his delegation arrived in Beijing and began talks with Chinese

leaders that same day. No documents detailing the specific content of the talks have

been discovered to date. However, according to a report sent to Moscow by Soviet Ambassador Nikolai

Vasilievich Rosin, Mao Zedong questioned Stalin's opinion conveyed by Kim Il-sung during the initial

phase of the talks. At 11:30 PM on the 13th, Zhou Enlai visited the Soviet Embassy and requested that the following

be immediately reported to Stalin: "The Korean comrades

informed Comrade Stalin of the following instructions: 'The current situation is different

from the past, and North Korea can now take action. However, this matter must

be discussed with the Chinese comrades and Mao Zedong himself.' Therefore, Comrade Mao Zedong

hopes that Comrade Stalin himself will explain this matter directly."(Torkunov 1998, 293).

Stalin's reply was as follows:

"During the meeting with the Korean comrades, Comrade Stalin and his friends, considering the changes in the international situation,

agreed to the proposal regarding the realization of Korean unification. Additionally,

it should be supplemented that this matter must ultimately be resolved jointly by the Chinese and Korean comrades,

and if the Chinese comrades do not agree, it must be discussed again how to resolve it. The detailed meeting content

will be explained to you by the Korean comrades."(Torkunov 1998, 293).

Ultimately, through the statement, 'if the Chinese comrades do not agree, it must be discussed again how to resolve it,'

Stalin effectively transferred the decision regarding the invasion of the South to China, deliberately involving China

to thoroughly conceal his own involvement. In other words, while he held the ultimate decision-making power and set the overall direction through agreement,

he stepped back to a secondary position by transferring the decision, thereby assigning a role to Mao Zedong and acting as the 'hidden boss'.

Stalin intended to conceal the Soviet Union's participation and actions, using China to pursue Soviet interests on the Korean Peninsula.

5. Mao Zedong and Kim Il-sung on the Eve of the Korean War_Mao Zedong Memorial Hall

2. Mao Zedong's Inner Thoughts

On May 3rd, Stalin sent a telegram to Mao Zedong to inform him of Kim Il-sung's visit to Moscow and the results of their consultations.

"The Korean comrades have visited us. The results of our talks with them will be communicated to you in the near future."(Archives of the President of the Russian Federation).

However, no communication arrived for several days. Subsequently, on May 12th,

Kim Il-sung secretly entered Beijing to meet with Mao Zedong, and the talks proceeded. At that time, Mao Zedong had not received prior notification

of Stalin's approval for the invasion of the South, and Kim Il-sung, having obtained Stalin's permission, informed Mao Zedong about the content

of the approval for the invasion of the South.

Before supporting North Korea's invasion of the South, Mao Zedong had wanted to unify Taiwan first.

However, he was in no position to oppose Stalin's decision, so

he agreed to support Kim Il-sung. Mao Zedong desperately needed Soviet support, such as economic or military aid,

to resolve domestic issues like economic reforms in China, and thus had no choice but to agree.

Furthermore, since the matter had already been discussed and agreed upon by the Soviet Union and North Korea in advance,

Mao Zedong had no choice but to express his agreement with Moscow's view after receiving the reply. Although Mao Zedong was displeased,

he had no other recourse (Shen Zhihua 2017, 136).

In the meeting with Kim Il-sung on May 15th, Mao Zedong explained that his original plan was to first attack and occupy Taiwan,

and then North Korea would attack South Korea, at which time China could provide sufficient support to North Korea.

However, North Korea had already decided to attack now, and this

was also a joint Sino-North Korean undertaking, so he agreed and promised to provide necessary cooperation.

Mao Zedong predicted that direct Soviet intervention would be impossible,

and he understood that the Soviet Union was concerned about a Third World War that could arise from a direct conflict with the United States (Ilyazova 2014). Therefore,

Mao Zedong stated that if the United States intervened, China would send troops to assist North Korea.

there was no other option. Moreover, as it had already been discussed and agreed upon by the Soviet Union and North Korea in advance,

Mao Zedong had no choice but to express his agreement with Moscow's views upon receiving the reply.

Mao Zedong was displeased but could do nothing about it (Shen Zhihua 2017, 136).

In a meeting with Kim Il-sung on May 15, Mao Zedong explained that his original plan was to first attack and capture Taiwan, and then have North Korea attack South Korea.

He stated that China would be able to provide sufficient support to North Korea at that time.

However, North Korea had already decided to attack now, and stated that since this was also a common task for China and North Korea, he agreed and promised to provide the necessary cooperation.

Mao Zedong predicted that direct Soviet intervention would be impossible.

He understood that the Soviet Union was concerned about a potential World War III that could arise from direct conflict with the United States (Ilyazova 2014).

Therefore, Mao Zedong stated that if the United States intervened, China would send a contingent to assist North Korea.

and predicted that the Soviet Union, understanding that it feared World War III, which could result from a direct conflict with the United States (Ilyazova 2014).

Therefore, Mao Zedong stated that if the United States were to intervene, China would send troops to aid North Korea.

would send troops to help North Korea.

saying that some Chinese troops would be deployed to the North Korean border and asking about the necessity of providing weapons and ammunition. Kim Il-sung expressed gratitude for the offer but declined. Regarding Mao Zedong's decision, Shen Zhihua

Mao Zedong followed the decisions of Stalin, the elder brother of the communist bloc, and his own

position. Shen Zhihua argues that Mao Zedong's decision was made to establish his position and also because he had received assistance from North Korea during the Chinese Civil War.

Mao Zedong followed the decisions of Stalin, the elder brother of the communist bloc, and his own

position. Shen Zhihua argues that Mao Zedong's decision was made to establish his position and also because he had received assistance from North Korea during the Chinese Civil War.

to support Kim Il-sung, he made a decision to support the communization of the Korean Peninsula

plan.

However, Mao Zedong could not shake off his lukewarm feelings. First, by supporting the Korean

War, he had to give up the unification of Taiwan. Furthermore,

to bring Asia under his control, he wanted to bring North Korea into his fold and make it his

ally, promising support. However, he was displeased that Kim Il-sung seemed to rely solely on Stalin's

support rather than his own. This can be understood from Stalin's letter to Rozin.

This can be understood from Stalin's letter to Rozin.

“Please tell Mao Zedong that he is complaining about the absence of Chinese representatives in North Korea.

It would be best for Mao Zedong to send representatives as soon as possible to resolve the Korean issue quickly.”

(Archives of the President of the Russian Federation).

5. Mao Zedong and Kim Il-sung on the Eve of the Korean War_Mao Zedong Memorial Hall

Even after the meeting, Kim Il-sung did not discuss the specific details of the invasion of the South.

On June 25, Mao Zedong only learned of the North Korean army's invasion of the South through the French

news agency in the afternoon. Kim Il-sung's formal notification came

three days later, and it was through the North Korean military attaché in Beijing. Mao Zedong was very angry with North Korea for initiating the war without consultation and said to the interpreter, Sa Cheol, “They are

our neighbors, and they informed us of the outbreak of war only now, without any discussion with us.”

our neighbors, and they informed us of the outbreak of war only now, without any discussion with us.” (Park Myung-lim 1996). Hu Yaobang, the General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party, recorded Mao Zedong's shock at the time in his memoirs.

(Park Myung-lim 1996). Hu Yaobang, the General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party, recorded Mao Zedong's shock at the time in his memoirs.

“The Chairman did not speak for a while and did not even shave. It was only after a week

“The Chairman did not speak for a while and did not even shave. It was only after a week

that he finally shaved.” (Kim Myung-ho 2011).

3. Kim Il-sung's Inner Thoughts

Upon arriving in Moscow on March 30, 1950, Kim Il-sung told Stalin that the US military would

not intervene, that the attack would result in victory within three days, and that an uprising led by 200,000 members of the Southern Labor Party in South Korea would occur if he invaded the South.

not intervene, that the attack would result in victory within three days, and that an uprising led by 200,000 members of the Southern Labor Party in South Korea would occur if he invaded the South.

(Weathersby 1993, 433). Stalin agreed, stating that China, having signed the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, would hesitate to challenge the US in Asia, and that the Soviet Union's possession of nuclear weapons would deter the US.

China, having signed the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, would hesitate to challenge the US in Asia, and that the Soviet Union's possession of nuclear weapons would deter the US.

would hesitate to challenge communism, and that the Soviet possession of nuclear weapons would

Stalin also reminded him to request China's assistance during the meeting. In response, Kim Il-sung repeatedly emphasized that Mao Zedong could help North Korea after the completion of the Chinese Revolution and even provide troops if necessary.

Stalin also reminded him to request China's assistance during the meeting. In response, Kim Il-sung repeatedly emphasized that Mao Zedong could help North Korea after the completion of the Chinese Revolution and even provide troops if necessary.

He also claimed that North Korea wished to rely on its own strength and believed it could succeed.

He also claimed that North Korea wished to rely on its own strength and believed it could succeed.

However, Stalin stated that North Korea should not expect direct Soviet involvement in the war, as the Soviet Union was facing challenges in the West, and urged him once again to consult with Mao Zedong. He reiterated that the Soviet Union was not prepared for direct intervention if the US took the risk of sending troops to the Korean Peninsula.

However, Stalin stated that North Korea should not expect direct Soviet involvement in the war, as the Soviet Union was facing challenges in the West, and urged him once again to consult with Mao Zedong. He reiterated that the Soviet Union was not prepared for direct intervention if the US took the risk of sending troops to the Korean Peninsula.

and reiterated that the Soviet Union was not prepared for direct intervention if the US took the risk of sending troops to the Korean Peninsula (Yevgeny 1998, 52). Nevertheless, Kim Il-sung likely felt very satisfied with this meeting, as he received not only permission but also promises of support for the Korean War, even if direct Soviet intervention was difficult.

and reiterated that the Soviet Union was not prepared for direct intervention if the US took the risk of sending troops to the Korean Peninsula (Yevgeny 1998, 52). Nevertheless, Kim Il-sung likely felt very satisfied with this meeting, as he received not only permission but also promises of support for the Korean War, even if direct Soviet intervention was difficult.

and reiterated that the Soviet Union was not prepared for direct intervention if the US took the risk of sending troops to the Korean Peninsula (Yevgeny 1998, 52). Nevertheless, Kim Il-sung likely felt very satisfied with this meeting, as he received not only permission but also promises of support for the Korean War, even if direct Soviet intervention was difficult.

However, Kim Il-sung likely felt very satisfied with this meeting, as he received not only permission but also promises of support for the Korean War, even if direct Soviet intervention was difficult.

However, Kim Il-sung likely felt very satisfied with this meeting, as he received not only permission but also promises of support for the Korean War, even if direct Soviet intervention was difficult.

However, Kim Il-sung likely felt very satisfied with this meeting, as he received not only permission but also promises of support for the Korean War, even if direct Soviet intervention was difficult.

likely felt very satisfied with this meeting, as he received not only permission but also promises of support for the Korean War, even if direct Soviet intervention was difficult.

During Kim Il-sung's secret visit to Beijing on May 12, his objective was

to inform China of their intention to unify the country by force and to communicate the results of the Moscow meeting on this matter. Kim Il-sung

did not wish to meet Mao Zedong, stating to Stalin, “As his demands had already been fully met in Moscow, the Korean Peninsula no longer

did not wish to meet Mao Zedong, stating to Stalin, “As his demands had already been fully met in Moscow, the Korean Peninsula no longer

needed Chinese support.” (Diplomatic Archives of the Russian Federation).

From this, it can be inferred that Kim Il-sung was overflowing with confidence in the victory of the Korean War at the time. The author believes this was due to Moscow's permission and the US withdrawal from the Chinese Civil War, as well as the exclusion of the Korean Peninsula from the US defense line following the Acheson Statement.

From this, it can be inferred that Kim Il-sung was overflowing with confidence in the Korean War at the time. The author believes this was due to Moscow's permission and the US withdrawal from the Chinese Civil War, as well as the exclusion of the Korean Peninsula from the US defense line following the Acheson Statement.

Furthermore, Mao Zedong's victory in the Chinese Civil War created a positive international atmosphere for the communist bloc, at least within Asia, which is believed to have significantly boosted his confidence.

Furthermore, Mao Zedong's victory in the Chinese Civil War created a positive international atmosphere for the communist bloc, at least within Asia, which is believed to have significantly boosted his confidence.

In addition, he believed that with the invasion of the South, hundreds of thousands of communists in South Korea would provide assistance.

the international atmosphere, at least within Asia, was favorable to the communist bloc

had created a favorable wind, it was judged that their confidence would soar.

Furthermore, if an invasion of the South were initiated, with the help of hundreds of thousands of communists in South Korea,

5. Mao Zedong and Kim Il-sung on the Eve of the Korean War_Mao Zedong Memorial Hall

He judged that the war would end quickly. However, this was Kim Il-sung's

miscalculation, and for the United States, which had abandoned Taiwan, the Korean Peninsula was the last line of defense.

This was the case. Immediately after the meeting concluded, Kim Il-sung declared to the Soviet ambassador in front of Mao Zedong that they had reached a complete consensus on all agenda items discussed at the meeting.

He declared to the Soviet ambassador in front of Mao Zedong that they had reached a complete consensus on all agenda items discussed at the meeting (Shen Zhihua 2010). Mao Zedong's awkward position can be inferred from Kim Il-sung's triumphant demeanor.

Mao Zedong's awkward position can be inferred from Kim Il-sung's triumphant demeanor.

There was good reason for Kim Il-sung's dissatisfaction with Mao Zedong.

From Kim Il-sung's perspective, North Korea had made significant contributions to the victory of the Chinese Revolution, yet Mao Zedong did not wholeheartedly assist in the unification and liberation of the Korean Peninsula after achieving victory.

From Kim Il-sung's perspective, North Korea had made significant contributions to the victory of the Chinese Revolution, yet Mao Zedong did not wholeheartedly assist in the unification and liberation of the Korean Peninsula after achieving victory.

Although it was, Mao Zedong, after achieving victory, for the unification and liberation of the Korean Peninsula

In fact, Mao Zedong did not fundamentally oppose North Korea unifying the country by force. This was because the communization of the Korean Peninsula planned by Kim Il-sung was a continuation of the Chinese Revolution.

However, according to Mao Zedong's plan, the issue of the Korean Peninsula was a matter to be resolved after the completion of China's great cause of unification. But the impatient Kim Il-sung had no choice but to seek help from Moscow, and when Stalin revised his policy on the Korean Peninsula in January 1950, the leadership of the Asian revolution was entrusted to China.

However, according to Mao Zedong's plan, the issue of the Korean Peninsula was a matter to be resolved after the completion of China's great cause of unification. But the impatient Kim Il-sung had no choice but to seek help from Moscow, and when Stalin revised his policy on the Korean Peninsula in January 1950, the leadership of the Asian revolution was entrusted to China.

Mao Zedong's stance led Kim Il-sung to harbor distrust and dissatisfaction towards China, and upon his return, he no longer consulted Mao Zedong on specific information related to war preparations or the outbreak of war.

Mao Zedong's stance led Kim Il-sung to harbor distrust and dissatisfaction towards China, and upon his return, he no longer consulted Mao Zedong on specific information related to war preparations or the outbreak of war.

According to the recollections of a former high-ranking North Korean military logistics official, Soviet weapons were not transported to North Korea via Chinese railways before the outbreak of the war; they all arrived by sea. This special measure was intended to prevent China from knowing about the war preparations on the Korean Peninsula (Shen Zhihua 2017, 295).

According to the recollections of a former high-ranking North Korean military logistics official, Soviet weapons were not transported to North Korea via Chinese railways before the outbreak of the war; they all arrived by sea. This special measure was intended to prevent China from knowing about the war preparations on the Korean Peninsula (Shen Zhihua 2017, 295).

After the war began on June 25, 1950, and North Korean forces captured Seoul on June 28, Mao Zedong worried that if Kim Il-sung advanced south without a solid base, the US forces would land on the west coast, cutting off the North Korean army's flank.

After the war began on June 25, 1950, and North Korean forces captured Seoul on June 28, Mao Zedong worried that if Kim Il-sung advanced south without a solid base, the US forces would land on the west coast, cutting off the North Korean army's flank.

Mao Zedong advised Kim Il-sung, "Based on our experience, it is wise to pause and then attack again," suggesting he take a breather.

Mao Zedong advised Kim Il-sung, "Based on our experience, it is wise to pause and then attack again," suggesting he take a breather.

Although Kim Il-sung seemed to heed Mao Zedong's advice, he ultimately ignored it. As the North Korean army continued to push south, Mao Zedong gradually began preparations for intervention (Kim Myung-ho 2011).

Although Kim Il-sung seemed to heed Mao Zedong's advice, he ultimately ignored it. As the North Korean army continued to push south, Mao Zedong gradually began preparations for intervention (Kim Myung-ho 2011).

Conclusion

Conclusion

The triple meeting between Stalin, Mao Zedong, and Kim Il-sung on the eve of the Korean War laid the foundation for their preparations for the outbreak of war. Kim Il-sung's visits to Moscow in March and April 1950 and to Beijing from May 13-15, 1950, were the final gateway and key to the war.

The triple meeting between Stalin, Mao Zedong, and Kim Il-sung on the eve of the Korean War laid the foundation for their preparations for the outbreak of war. Kim Il-sung's visits to Moscow in March and April 1950 and to Beijing from May 13-15, 1950, were the final gateway and key to the war.

While there are no 'what ifs' in history, the time of 4:30 AM on June 25, 1950, could have passed meaninglessly without Mao Zedong's permission at the time. Therefore, returning to the purpose of this report, we will summarize the significance and outcomes of the meeting held over three days from May 13 to May 15.

While there are no 'what ifs' in history, the time of 4:30 AM on June 25, 1950, could have passed meaninglessly without Mao Zedong's permission at the time. Therefore, returning to the purpose of this report, we will summarize the significance and outcomes of the meeting held over three days from May 13 to May 15.

First, through this meeting, the Soviet Union sought to shift responsibility for the Korean War to China while simultaneously pursuing its strategic interests. This can also be seen as a concessionary attempt by Stalin, who was extremely cautious about direct conflict with the United States, to avoid responsibility, entrusting the communization of Asia to China as part of China's successful communist revolution.

First, through this meeting, the Soviet Union sought to shift responsibility for the Korean War to China while simultaneously pursuing its strategic interests. This can also be seen as a concessionary attempt by Stalin, who was extremely cautious about direct conflict with the United States, to avoid responsibility, entrusting the communization of Asia to China as part of China's successful communist revolution.

In other words, by assigning China the mission of expanding the influence of the communist bloc within Asia, the Soviet Union laid the groundwork for a division of labor in power expansion, allowing it to lead the ideological alignment on the international stage and focus more on the communization of Europe and other regions.

In other words, by assigning China the mission of expanding the influence of the communist bloc within Asia, the Soviet Union laid the groundwork for a division of labor in power expansion, allowing it to lead the ideological alignment on the international stage and focus more on the communization of Europe and other regions.

Second, the reason this dialogue was important for Kim Il-sung is Mao Zedong's statement to Li Zuyuan that the unification of Korea was possible only by force and that the United States would not intervene (Park Myung-lim 1996, 154).

Second, the reason this dialogue was important for Kim Il-sung is Mao Zedong's statement to Li Zuyuan that the unification of Korea was possible only by force and that the United States would not intervene (Park Myung-lim 1996, 154).

This was a double-layered message reported to Moscow via Kim Il-sung. Mao Zedong's low assessment of the possibility of US intervention would have further bolstered Kim Il-sung's own belief in the possibility of US non-participation in the war, which would have acted as a psychological factor leading directly to the execution of the war.

This was a double-layered message reported to Moscow via Kim Il-sung. Mao Zedong's low assessment of the possibility of US intervention would have further bolstered Kim Il-sung's own belief in the possibility of US non-participation in the war, which would have acted as a psychological factor leading directly to the execution of the war.

Kim Il-sung raised the issue of US non-intervention, but Mao Zedong stated, "We, their

Kim Il-sung raised the issue of US non-intervention, but Mao Zedong stated, "We, their

Kim Il-sung raised the issue of US non-intervention, but Mao Zedong stated, "We, their

Kim Il-sung raised the issue of US non-intervention, but Mao Zedong stated, "We, their

Kim Il-sung raised the issue of US non-intervention, but Mao Zedong stated, "We, their

5. Mao Zedong and Kim Il-sung on the Eve of the Korean War_Mao Zedong Memorial Hall

First, through this meeting, the Soviet Union sought to shift responsibility for the Korean War to China while simultaneously pursuing its strategic interests. This can also be seen as a concessionary attempt by Stalin, who was extremely cautious about direct conflict with the United States, to avoid responsibility, entrusting the communization of Asia to China as part of China's successful communist revolution.

First, through this meeting, the Soviet Union sought to shift responsibility for the Korean War to China while simultaneously pursuing its strategic interests. This can also be seen as a concessionary attempt by Stalin, who was extremely cautious about direct conflict with the United States, to avoid responsibility, entrusting the communization of Asia to China as part of China's successful communist revolution.

In other words, by assigning China the mission of expanding the influence of the communist bloc within Asia, the Soviet Union laid the groundwork for a division of labor in power expansion, allowing it to lead the ideological alignment on the international stage and focus more on the communization of Europe and other regions.

In other words, by assigning China the mission of expanding the influence of the communist bloc within Asia, the Soviet Union laid the groundwork for a division of labor in power expansion, allowing it to lead the ideological alignment on the international stage and focus more on the communization of Europe and other regions.

Second, the reason this dialogue was important for Kim Il-sung is Mao Zedong's statement to Li Zuyuan that the unification of Korea was possible only by force and that the United States would not intervene (Park Myung-lim 1996, 154).

Second, the reason this dialogue was important for Kim Il-sung is Mao Zedong's statement to Li Zuyuan that the unification of Korea was possible only by force and that the United States would not intervene (Park Myung-lim 1996, 154).

This was a double-layered message reported to Moscow via Kim Il-sung. Mao Zedong's low assessment of the possibility of US intervention would have further bolstered Kim Il-sung's own belief in the possibility of US non-participation in the war, which would have acted as a psychological factor leading directly to the execution of the war.

This was a double-layered message reported to Moscow via Kim Il-sung. Mao Zedong's low assessment of the possibility of US intervention would have further bolstered Kim Il-sung's own belief in the possibility of US non-participation in the war, which would have acted as a psychological factor leading directly to the execution of the war.

Kim Il-sung raised the issue of US non-intervention, but Mao Zedong stated, "We, their

Kim Il-sung raised the issue of US non-intervention, but Mao Zedong stated, "We, their

Kim Il-sung raised the issue of US non-intervention, but Mao Zedong stated, "We, their

Kim Il-sung raised the issue of US non-intervention, but Mao Zedong stated, "We, their

Kim Il-sung raised the issue of US non-intervention, but Mao Zedong stated, "We, their

Kim Il-sung raised the issue of US non-intervention, but Mao Zedong stated, "We, their

Kim Il-sung raised the issue of US non-intervention, but Mao Zedong stated, "We, their

Kim Il-sung raised the issue of US non-intervention, but Mao Zedong stated, "We, their

Kim Il-sung raised the issue of US non-intervention, but Mao Zedong stated, "We, their

not the chief of staff. How can we know their minds?” he emphasized the need for preparation. “The United States retreated from China without a proper fight, and it will maintain such a cautious stance in Korea as well”

(Park Myung-rim 1996, 158). Such a misjudgment of the era at the time greatly influenced the outbreak of the war.

The third point is that before the war, Kim Il-sung had perfectly resolved the homework of mutual cooperation and support promises between the most important allies. During the meeting,

Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai, along with other Chinese leaders, interrupted their meeting with Kim Il-sung and sought out the Soviet ambassador to China, Rosin, to immediately send a telegram to Stalin to confirm Kim Il-sung's statement. Rosin immediately requested Stalin to send a clarifying telegram on May 13.

In response, Stalin confirmed the decision made during the meeting with Kim Il-sung, which was the decisive moment when final confirmation was received from China and Russia regarding North Korea's armed invasion. The telegram Rosin sent to Moscow that day emphasized that Mao Zedong supported resolving the Korean issue through swift military means and was confident of victory.

The fourth point is that although Mao Zedong did not prioritize the Korean War,

he did not fundamentally oppose it; rather, he viewed the communization of the Korean Peninsula as a continuation of the Chinese revolution. In the Korean War, when Mao Zedong inquired whether additional Chinese troops or weapons and ammunition were needed,

Kim Il-sung expressed his gratitude but declined the offer. Of course, Kim Il-sung declined because he had received all the support from Stalin, but this shows Mao Zedong's active enthusiasm for the Korean War. "If the US military intervenes, China will send troops to help North Korea."

he added, "The Soviet Union is uncomfortable participating in combat operations due to its agreement with the US regarding the 38th parallel, but China has no such obligation and can therefore help North Korea" (Park Myung-rim 1996, 158). Already,

Stalin and Kim Il-sung had agreed to the war, and although Mao Zedong had some dissatisfaction,

5. Mao Zedong and Kim Il-sung on the Eve of the Korean War_Mao Zedong Memorial Hall

given that the war was to proceed, Mao Zedong inwardly hoped for a concise and swift progression of the Korean Peninsula war to create a perfect communist state. This contradicts the claims of some Chinese scholars, including Shen Zhihua, that Mao Zedong was forced to participate in the Korean War due to the agreement between Kim Il-sung and Stalin. Rather, China's participation in the Korean War can be seen as having been decided based on Mao Zedong's proposals during the meeting from May 13 to 15.

The fifth point is that this meeting became the starting point for the failure to achieve the unification of Taiwan. At the meeting, China's plan for the liberation of Taiwan was disrupted because they promised to support Kim Il-sung's Korean War, and thus, no further progress was made. This provided Chiang Kai-shek in Taiwan with a good opportunity to address the internal situation, which was exhausted from the civil war, and to this day, China continues to suffer from the issue of Taiwan, which remains its biggest problem. The decision by Mao Zedong at the time to support the Korean War played a significant role in this. According to the reform-oriented Chinese magazine 'Yanhuang Chunqiu' (炎黃春秋), Issue 12, 2013, Mao, in a meeting with Soviet Deputy Premier Anastas Ivanovich Mikoyan on September 24, 1956, Beijing, said, "The Korean War was fundamentally wrong. Stalin should be held responsible."

He also stated, "In my view, China also bears responsibility" (Yonhap News 2015), acknowledging China's responsibility for failing to prevent the Korean War. Because of this,

Mao Zedong's misguided support for the war not only led to severe chaos in China during the early stages of the war, which shook the Communist Party regime, but also played a decisive role in China's inability to achieve the unification of China with Taiwan, which had become a lifelong aspiration.

The Korean War was conceived from Kim Il-sung's persistent pursuit and his will to unify North and South Korea by mobilizing military force. He proposed this to Stalin, obtained his consent, and through Mao Zedong's approval in China, reached the final decision. This is the conclusion reached by the author in this report. The most crucial aspect of the process at the time was that Kim Il-sung advocated for unification by force, was excessively radical in his pursuit of unification, and was confident of victory. His ambition led the Korean Peninsula once again to the catastrophic outcome of war, and it was a misjudgment that failed to properly read the international situation at the time. This

The fifth point is that this meeting became the starting point for the failure to achieve the unification of Taiwan. At the meeting, China's plan for the liberation of Taiwan was disrupted because they promised to support Kim Il-sung's Korean War, and thus, no further progress was made. This provided Chiang Kai-shek in Taiwan with a good opportunity to address the internal situation, which was exhausted from the civil war, and to this day, China continues to suffer from the issue of Taiwan, which remains its biggest problem. The decision by Mao Zedong at the time to support the Korean War played a significant role in this. According to the reform-oriented Chinese magazine 'Yanhuang Chunqiu' (炎黃春秋) Issue 12, 2013, Mao, in a meeting with Soviet Deputy Premier Anastas Ivanovich Mikoyan on September 24, 1956, Beijing, said, "The Korean War was fundamentally wrong. Stalin should be held responsible." He also stated, "In my view, China also bears responsibility" (Yonhap News 2015), acknowledging China's responsibility for failing to prevent the Korean War. Because of this, Mao Zedong's misguided support for the war not only led to severe chaos in China during the early stages of the war, which shook the Communist Party regime, but also played a decisive role in China's inability to achieve the unification of China with Taiwan, which had become a lifelong aspiration.

The Korean War was conceived from Kim Il-sung's persistent pursuit and his will to unify North and South Korea by mobilizing military force. He proposed this to Stalin, obtained his consent, and through Mao Zedong's approval in China, reached the final decision. This is the conclusion reached by the author in this report. The most crucial aspect of the process at the time was that Kim Il-sung advocated for unification by force, was excessively radical in his pursuit of unification, and was confident of victory. His ambition led the Korean Peninsula once again to the catastrophic outcome of war, and it was a misjudgment that failed to properly read the international situation at the time. This

This applies equally to Stalin and Mao Zedong. Stalin commanded the Korean War

while presenting a facade of withdrawal, but ultimately

he was the one who permitted Kim Il-sung's invasion of the South. Furthermore, by entrusting Mao Zedong with the great cause of communizing Asia,

he considered Mao Zedong's permission important for the Korean War,

and we can see that Mao Zedong's decision was deferred to. Structurally,

Kim Il-sung was in a situation where he had to obtain Mao Zedong's permission, and Mao Zedong's decision at the time

was influenced by the optimistic atmosphere following China's civil war victory and the misjudgment

that the United States would not intervene in the Korean Peninsula, as well as the desire to proceed with the Korean War

as an extension of the revolution. Ultimately, the meeting between Kim Il-sung and Mao Zedong,

which was the final agreement meeting for this war, was a decisive factor.

Regrettably, although this report attempted to accurately understand the historical context of the parties involved in the meeting from May 13 to 15,

due to the absence of documentary records of the meeting,

5. Mao Zedong and Kim Il-sung on the Eve of the Korean War_Mao Zedong Memorial Hall

we have endeavored to reconstruct the events as much as possible through interviews with surrounding figures and secret Soviet documents.

If the meeting records held by Russia, China, and North Korea were to be disclosed,

it would be worthy of further research with reference to them.

However, based solely on the currently disclosed documents,

this meeting, which we have examined, was structurally inevitable due to the efforts of the main protagonists in the outbreak of the Korean War,

and it can be seen as having considerable implications simply by being the final agreement for the Korean War.

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