[Global NK Commentary] North Korea's Youth Indoctrination as a Response to Regime Crisis

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I. Regime Crisis and the Youth Generation

Recently, North Korea's cultural policies have been focused on youth indoctrination. The North Korean authorities hold a very negative view of the younger generation. The youth generation knows little about the revolution and has not experienced war. Through the jangmadang (marketplaces) during their formative years, they have had ample exposure to goods and culture from across the border. Indirectly, they have experienced cultures outside of North Korea. It is a natural consequence that their loyalty to the Party or the Leader is lower than that of previous generations. They learned about the anti-Japanese revolutionary struggle, but it is a distant story from their grandfathers' generation, and the revolutionary struggle is merely a tale from textbooks. What influenced the youth more was the harsh reality learned through the jangmadang. They are a generation that has learned through experience that capital is more important than ideology.

The negative perception of the youth generation is confirmed by reports in North Korean media. On January 20, 2018, the Rodong Sinmun published an article titled "We Must Smash the Imperialists' Ideological and Cultural Infiltration Schemes." The article warns that "imperialists are targeting the new, growing generation with their decadent ideological and cultural infiltration schemes." It claims that imperialists target youth because 'new generations' are 'highly receptive and very sensitive to new things,' and are 'cunningly scheming to inject anti-revolutionary ideology and culture into their minds.' Specifically, it asserts that "they are corrupting and creating illusions about them through various propaganda means, including movies, newspapers, magazines, and computer networks that youth frequently watch and use." It further states that "abnormal situations such as regime changes and government overthrows have occurred in various countries, with youth at the forefront, precisely because they have been steeped in the anti-revolutionary ideology and culture of imperialism" (Rodong Sinmun 01/20/2018).

<Photos 1, 2> UCC: "We are Socialist Patriotic Youth"

Kim Jong Un has repeatedly pointed out the need to 'purify the ideology and culture of youth' whenever the opportunity arises, stating that 'the ideology and culture of youth must be sound.' As the negative perception of the youth generation intersects with the regime crisis, the Party's 8th Congress has served as a catalyst for the full-scale promotion of 'human remodeling' projects for youth. Remodeling the younger generation to become 'humans suitable for the new era' has become a key policy of the Workers' Party.

In a situation of maximum crisis, the Workers' Party convenes a series of major meetings. In January 2021, the Workers' Party held its most significant event, the 8th Party Congress. This was followed by a plenary meeting of the Party Central Committee and a training course for city and county Party secretaries. In April 2021, the 6th Party Cell Secretaries' Conference was held. At the 6th Party Cell Secretaries' Conference, Kim Jong Un emphasized that "the issue of youth indoctrination must be recognized as a matter of life and death for the Party, the revolution, the country, and the people, a fateful issue that can no longer be passively observed, and no effort should be spared in this endeavor" (Rodong Sinmun 04/09/2021).

This underscores the role of cell secretaries, who deliver the Workers' Party's policies to the people at the forefront. The call is for cell organizations, responsible for grassroots structures, to eliminate 'negative elements'—ranging from 'anti-socialist and non-socialist' phenomena that hinder youth development and lead them astray, to 'anti-revolutionary ideology and culture.'

Kim Jong Un's demands have materialized in the form of the enactment of the "Law on Banning Anti-Revolutionary Ideology and Culture" (2020), which designates external culture as toxic, followed by the adoption of the "Law on Guaranteeing Youth Indoctrination" (2021), which explicitly mandates the 'guarantee of youth indoctrination.' In a similar vein, the "Law on Protecting Pyongyang Dialect" (2023) was enacted to eradicate 'puppet' culture from linguistic practices.

<Photos 3, 4> North Korean broadcast introducing youth heroes

II. Youth Remodeling Project

Under the Kim Jong Un regime, the project to remodel the minds of youth has proceeded in the following directions.

First, the core of the 'human remodeling' project for youth is to establish a 'correct communist cultural framework.' This involves educating youth about the desirable culture that the North Korean regime aspires to, fostering an awareness of the need to protect this correct culture themselves. In other words, it aims to rectify the 'our-style moral ethos' emphasized in North Korea.

The beautiful and sound culture emphasized in North Korea is the culture created by the masses of the people. The narrative is that the traditional national culture, which has a long history, was damaged and on the verge of extinction due to Japanese rule, but was preserved by Leader Kim Il Sung. The Kim Jong Un regime continues to assert that imperialists are persistently engaging in cultural infiltration to undermine socialism (Rodong Sinmun 01/20/2018).

If corrupted by a bad culture, traditional culture cannot be preserved. The mission to preserve our beautiful and sound culture is entrusted to the youth. It is stated that 'the youth must preserve our culture, which has been painstakingly preserved.' The following excerpt from Rodong Sinmun well illustrates this perspective.

Our Republic is a socialist great family where people are mentally and morally sound, and overflowing with virtue and affection. It is clearly demonstrated by the sublime moral integrity of the people who invariably look up to the Great Leader and the Great General, both in life and after death, the atmosphere of respecting revolutionary predecessors, elders, and teachers, and the prevailing spirit of mutual assistance and guidance. Living harmoniously while adhering to pure humaneness and noble moral ethics, despite the prolonged and barbaric blockade by hostile forces, is unimaginable in the capitalist world of the law of the jungle. This is the fruit of the Party's wise leadership, which has energetically pursued the work of establishing moral discipline as a matter crucial to the fate of socialism (Rodong Sinmun, 03/19/2019).

Second, blocking the 'negative environment' into which young people can fall. Since taking power, Kim Jong Un has revised laws targeting reactionary ideology and culture multiple times, eventually enacting new laws such as the 'Law on Rejection of Reactionary Ideology and Culture' and the 'Law on Guaranteeing Youth Education' to strengthen control over reactionary ideology and culture for youth, fundamentally blocking the influx and distribution of external cultures collectively referred to as 'puppet culture.' The provisions of the 'Pyongyang Cultural Language Protection Law,' enacted in 2023, strictly prohibit the use of 'non-standard language (language that is incorrect in grammar, form, or expression),' which is designated as 'puppet.' The phenomenon of the Korean Wave has been confirmed through various channels in North Korea. In particular, Korean culture is not unfamiliar to the younger generation, and their rejection of Korean culture is not significant. The 'Pyongyang Cultural Language Protection Law' is legislation aimed at correcting the language habits of the younger generation and blocking the influence of external culture from daily life.

Third, discovering and promoting exemplary youth cases for emulation. North Korea presents specific examples of the desirable youth culture demanded by the Party and encourages emulation. The primary role models for youth are the 'veterans of victory' (the generation that fought and won the war). The 'veterans of victory' are presented as exemplars of 'resolute defense of the Leader.' In 2019, Kim Jong Un stated, 'Do not deify the Leader.' He stated that 'the Leader is a being who shares joys and sorrows with the people.' The veterans of victory are emphasized as exemplars of 'the generation that was defended by the people voluntarily.' Following the statement 'Do not deify the Leader,' educational programs have been conducted utilizing the veterans of victory as exemplars of the people who defended the Leader. Representative examples include the broadcast program <The Lives of the Veterans of Victory are a Textbook of Revolutionary Outlook on Life> and the art film <A Day and a Night> (2022). Since 2023, June 25th has been designated as the 'Day of Struggle Against US Imperialism on June 25th,' and meetings have been held between war veterans and the younger generation. Since then, meetings between 'war veterans' and the younger generation have become a staple of major holiday events.

Another example is the 'youth heroes.' Student Han Hyun-kyung, who died in 2012 holding the Leader's portrait during a major flood, became a model of 'dedicating one's youth to the path of resolute defense of the Leader.' Also, students Ri Jeong-deok, Seo Ryeo-myung, and Choi Hyun-il, who died fighting a wildfire to prevent it from spreading to the 'Cemetery of Revolutionary Martyrs' on April 4, 2019, fall into this category. North Korea introduces them as models of 'resolute defense of the Leader' and utilizes them as educational material.

Photo 5. [Sprockets/Editing] The lives of the generation of transmission are a textbook of revolutionary views on life.

III. The Practice of 'Patriotism'

Since the 2019 Hanoi Summit, North Korea has been facing a sustained crisis. Kim Jong Un's leadership was critically hit, and the economy also stagnated, compounded by a public health crisis. There were no alternatives to break through the crisis.

In the midst of the crisis, Kim Jong Un attributed the cause of the crisis to external factors. He amplified external threats and used them as a tool for internal control. Moving away from personal leadership as the Supreme Leader, he brought 'the state' to the forefront. 'Our State First,' emphasizing that 'our country is the best,' and 'The People and the Masses First,' asserting that all policies of the Workers' Party prioritize the people, were presented. 'Our State First' and 'The People and the Masses First' became not only policies of the Workers' Party but also beliefs that North Korean residents must hold. The ideological indoctrination targeting the populace is a near-compulsive imposition, aiming to make all North Korean residents believe that the Workers' Party's policies are 'the best policies for the masses' and to foster the belief that their country, led by Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un, who implements such policies, is the best.

Along with ideological education centered on 'patriotism,' North Korea demands that its people practice patriotism. In North Korea, the populace cannot reject the Party's policies. When patriotism becomes a crucial national policy, the people must constantly practice it. To practice 'patriotism' set as a standard for maintaining 'beautiful and noble our-style culture' and 'morality,' they must use 'Pyongyang dialect,' the 'Korean language,' when speaking, wear 'our clothes' when dressing, and sing 'our songs' when singing. North Korean residents are urged to 'resolutely maintain subjectivity and national identity in all aspects of social life, including language use, with pride and self-esteem in our things,' and to 'always maintain vigilance against the ideological and cultural infiltration tactics of the imperialists and resolutely struggle against all unhealthy and exotic lifestyles' (Rodong Sinmun, 05/22/2020).

'Patriotism' is related to the economy. The way to practice patriotism in the economy is to use domestic products. The local development strategy, which began in earnest in 2024, is also based on patriotism. Factories to be established under the local economic development strategy primarily include consumer goods factories such as food, clothing, stationery, daily necessities, and shoe factories. Wearing pine nut backpacks, dandelion notebooks, and uniforms with the national flag produced in these factories is precisely the practice of patriotism.

IV. Conclusion

As mentioned, considering that the younger generation in North Korea has been indirectly exposed to information from outside North Korea and has not directly experienced war, it remains uncertain how effectively the Kim Jong Un regime's youth education policy will achieve its objectives. However, if the youth education policy can indeed influence the younger generation, it can be inferred that the domestic legitimacy of the Kim Jong Un regime, which was damaged after the failure of the 2019 Hanoi Summit, might be somewhat alleviated. It is worth paying attention in the future to whether the Kim Jong Un regime's youth education policy, which may not seem immediately impactful, can form some consensus. ■

References

Kim Yong-il. 2019. 'Making Beautiful and Noble Moral Customs Our National Customs is a Demand of Realistic Development.' Rodong Sinmun, March 19.

Rodong Sinmun. 2018. 'We Must Smash the Ideological and Cultural Infiltration Tactics of Imperialism.' January 20.

Rodong Sinmun. 2020. 'Let Us Solidly Prepare the Youth as Vanguard Fighters Boundlessly Loyal to the Party's Ideology and Cause.' May 22.

Rodong Sinmun. 2021. 'Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un Delivered a Speech Titled "Important Tasks Facing the Strengthening of Party Cells at the Present Time" at the 6th Congress of Party Cell Secretaries of the Workers' Party of Korea.' April 9.

■ Jeon Young-sun, HK Professor, Institute for Humanities and Unification Studies, Konkuk University

■ Editor:Kim Chae-rin, EAI Research Assistant

    Inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 208) | crkim@eai.or.kr