[EAI Japan Commentary] Japan-Korea Cultural Exchange Must Continue: Beyond "Anti-Korea" Sentiment

Author

Kang Tae-woong, Professor at Kwangwoon University. He received his Ph.D. from the University of Tokyo. His research areas include Japanese visual culture theory, representation theory, and Japan's cultural policy. His recent major works include "Japanese Popular Culture Theory" (2014, co-authored), "Eyes on Taiwan" (2013, co-authored), "Binocular Vision" (2012, translated work), "Reading East Asia Through Keywords" (2011, co-authored), "Japan and East Asia" (2011, co-authored), "Intersecting Texts, East Asia" (2010, co-authored), and "Post-War Japanese Conservatism and Representation" (2010, co-authored).

Changes in the Cool Japan Policy

Let us examine the "Cool Japan Policy" report released by Japan's Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) in February. The Cool Japan policy aims to transform the 'attractiveness of Japan,' stemming from content industries such as manga, anime, dramas, and music, as well as unique cultural aspects like food, clothing, and housing, into added value, in order to find a driving force to overcome the economic slowdown caused by declining domestic demand. In our terms, it can be described as a policy to promote economic development through the advancement of cultural content.

The promotion strategy of Cool Japan is structured to first publicize the appeal of Japanese culture abroad, sell related products, and thereby attract tourists to Japan and increase business opportunities. Although the promotion strategy lacks specificity and appears somewhat superficial, an even greater issue is the scope of the 'abroad' to which Cool Japan is being promoted. According to this report, the main target countries for the Cool Japan policy are Southeast Asian nations such as Malaysia, Indonesia, Vietnam, and Thailand, excluding China and South Korea, which are the largest markets in Asia. However, South Korea and China were not excluded from the Cool Japan strategy from the outset. In fact, the impetus for the Japanese government to vigorously pursue the Cool Japan policy was South Korea and China.

This impetus can be divided into two aspects. One is the intention to alleviate diplomatic conflicts between South Korea, China, and Japan through cultural exchange. In 2003, the 'Intellectual Property Strategy Headquarters' was established within the Cabinet, and the term 'Cool Japan' began to be used at the official level. In 2004, a prime ministerial advisory panel released a report promoting cultural exchange titled "Peaceful Nation of Cultural Exchange: Japan's Creation." This series of moves occurred at a time when then-Prime Minister Koizumi was facing strong opposition from South Korea and China over the issue of his visits to the Yasukuni Shrine. Reading the cultural exchange policies announced at that time, one finds arguments for fostering the "Japanese anime generation" across Asia, who are fond of Japanese manga, anime, and games, to promote understanding of Japan and foster goodwill towards it. The intention was to indirectly resolve diplomatic conflicts through Cool Japan.

Another reason for promoting the Cool Japan policy is Japan's heightened awareness of the Hallyu (Korean Wave) and the rise of China. When South Korea opened its market to Japanese popular culture in 1998, contrary to previous concerns that Japanese popular culture would encroach upon the Korean market, it became an opportunity for the Korean Hallyu to enter the Japanese market. Furthermore, China also began constructing 'Dongman Jiji' (動漫基地), a base for animation production under government initiative, and actively promoted its culture through the 'Confucius Institute' (孔子學院), a cultural exchange organization. Japanese popular culture could no longer claim to represent Asia, and Japan was reduced to a position where it could only present itself through two subcultures: manga and anime.

The Cool Japan-related report released by the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry in 2008, when Taro Aso was Prime Minister, encompassed all three perspectives mentioned above: its aspect as a future industry, a means to alleviate diplomatic conflicts, and a heightened awareness of the popular culture industries of South Korea and China. This report viewed Cool Japan as an industry with growth potential and emphasized the need to develop content tailored to other Asian countries. It also acknowledged the growing content industries of South Korea and China and argued that Japan should take the lead in creating an 'Asian Content Community.'

However, as examined earlier, the Cool Japan strategy announced under the Abe administration completely excludes South Korea and China, thus omitting the alleviation of diplomatic conflicts through cultural exchange and the heightened awareness of the popular culture industries of South Korea and China. While the aspect of Cool Japan as a future industry remains in this report, its discussion without South Korea and China raises doubts as to whether Cool Japan can truly secure Japan's future.

It is unclear whether the exclusion of South Korea and China reflects the current tense relations or a judgment that the policy's effectiveness is lacking. Ultimately, this represents a return to the period before the mid-1990s when cultural exchange in Asia primarily targeted Southeast Asia. In other words, the Cool Japan policy of the Abe administration has not changed but rather 'regressed' to the period before the Hallyu in South Korea and before the opening of the cultural market due to China's WTO accession.

Changes in Perception of South Korea

If the Japanese government's cultural exchange policy represents a regression rather than a change, then the Japanese perception of South Korea can also be interpreted as a regression. According to a Cabinet public opinion survey released at the end of 2014, only 31.5% of Japanese respondents felt friendly towards South Korea, while 66.4% did not. The percentage of those who did not feel friendly increased by 8.4% compared to the previous year. The proportion of Japanese who felt friendly towards South Korea, which remained in the 30-40% range in the 1990s, exceeded 50% after 2000, largely due to the influence of the Hallyu. This demonstrates the significant power of popular culture. The proportion of those who felt friendly peaked at 63.1% in 2009, with only 34.2% expressing no friendliness. Five years later, in last year's survey, this figure was reversed. It has 'regressed' to the pre-Hallyu era.

One of the phenomena that well reflects the change in the perception of South Korea among the Japanese public can be seen in the Korean-related books displayed in bookstores. Let us list some titles: "Akkanron" (Theory of Evil Korea), "Chikanron" (Theory of Shameful Korea), "Taekanron" (Theory of Foolish Korea), "Chinkanron" (Theory of Infiltration by Korea), "The Great Era of Anti-Korea," "The Logic of Anti-Korea," "Guhan Shinron" (New Theory of Foolish Korea), "Heukansa" (Black History of Korea), and so on. Books with such low-quality neologisms, which one might question if they could even be formed, are dominating bookstores. While books offering an understanding of Korea once sold well, the era has now shifted to one where books that unconditionally portray Korea negatively are popular. However, these books do not convey new knowledge about Korea to the Japanese people. They merely confirm the preconceived notions that the Japanese already hold about Korea. This is likely a 'counterattack' by some Japanese who disliked the influence of the Hallyu and the previously good Japan-Korea relations.

What Should Be Done?

In the context of the increasingly strained Japan-Korea relations, which seem to be heading towards an endless darkness, what can be done in terms of cultural exchange? Although some fields are giving up, believing that any effort will only result in criticism and be of little significance, it is crucial at this juncture not to sever the ties of cultural exchange, which form the foundation of all relationships, even if relations between the authorities of Japan and South Korea are strained. Perhaps cultural exchange becomes even more important in times like these? This is because people's voices in private exchanges can rise and provide a clue to resolving the strained situation between Japan and South Korea, and cultural exchange provides a platform to mutually reaffirm the fundamental stance of pursuing peace and prosperity.

Let us ask again what should be done from the perspective of cultural exchange. First, we must provide maximum support for ongoing cultural exchanges. The "East Asian Cultural Cities" festival, which began on March 9th in Cheongju, Chungcheongbuk-do, has received almost no attention. The "East Asian Cultural Cities" initiative was decided at a meeting of the culture ministers of South Korea, China, and Japan, and it is an exchange event aimed at identifying cities with commonalities among the three countries and confirming their shared characteristics through festivals and academic conferences. This year, Cheongju in South Korea, Qingdao in China, and Niigata in Japan were selected. These three cities, famous for their 'good water' – Cheongju for its Chujeongri mineral water, Qingdao for its Tsingtao beer, and Niigata for its numerous famous Nihonshu (Japanese sake) – were chosen. Each city is holding its opening festival and own events, and in the summer, rotating events will take place in the three cities. In the fall, an exhibition and academic conference themed around chopsticks, a cultural item common to South Korea, China, and Japan, are also planned. We must pay more attention to such ongoing cultural exchanges and provide them with unreserved participation and support.

Second, we need to prepare for the future in terms of cultural exchange. The strained relations between Japan and South Korea will not continue indefinitely. If the Japanese government offers a sincere and earnest apology for its past actions, and corresponding measures are established, Japan-Korea relations will be restored. Preparing for the future means preparing for that time.

In particular, we need to prepare for the decline in the influence of the Hallyu in Japan, which is currently significant. Although there were no regulations on Korean popular culture in Japan, there was strong resistance to Korean culture. It is a well-known fact that when South Korea implemented a policy to open its market to Japanese popular culture, a social atmosphere was created that allowed for the acceptance of the Hallyu in Japan. However, there are many in Japan who criticize the Hallyu as 'unfair' cultural exchange, using the pretext that South Korea has not yet lifted its regulations on Japanese popular culture. These criticisms gain more traction in the current climate of strained Japan-Korea relations. The regulations we have not yet lifted include the ban on broadcasting Japanese dramas on terrestrial television and the prohibition of broadcasting Japanese songs on the radio.

If there are signs of a thaw in the strained relations between Japan and South Korea, we must also devise measures for the future. This involves lifting the remaining regulations on Japanese popular culture. Of course, public opinion and the judgment of officials are important, but merely discussing these issues is likely sufficient to reawaken public opinion in Japan to accept the Hallyu once again. Let us not forget that the future belongs to those who prepare for it. ■

EAI Japan Commentary is planned and published by experts participating in the Japan Studies Center at the East Asia Institute (EAI). It provides balanced perspectives and analyses on key issues concerning Japan and offers opinions for the development of desirable policies. Please cite the source when quoting.

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