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Public Opinion Briefing No. 66-2: Case Study of Conflict - Public Opinion on Sejong City and the Four Major Rivers Project
Public Opinion Briefing No. 66: Regular Public Opinion Barometer Survey
1. Diagnosis of Conflict in Korean Society Through Public Opinion
2. Case Study of Conflict: Sejong City and the Four Major Rivers
Agreement on the Necessity of Revising Sejong City, but Strong Distrust Remains Regarding the Implementation Method
Significant Opposition to the Government's Four Major Rivers Project
Sejong City Conflict: Confusion Amplified by Failure to Understand Complex Public Opinion
The Sejong City issue has emerged as the foremost socio-political conflict, overlapping with conflicts between the pro-Lee Myung-bak faction and the pro-Park Geun-hye faction, the ruling and opposition parties, the Chungcheong region and non-Chungcheong regions, and even progressives versus conservatives. The situation has reached a point where the President has apologized for his past stance and is attempting to persuade the public, but predicting the future direction of public opinion remains difficult.
Following the President's dialogue with the public, both the ruling and opposition parties are confidently asserting public support. The government and the ruling party are accelerating efforts to formulate a revised Sejong City plan, citing the prevailing public opinion favoring revision. Conversely, the opposition party and opposing factions are preparing for offline protests based on public opposition to the government's unilateral actions. While it is premature to predict the outcome of the government's revised Sejong City plan, analyzing public opinion and the responses of the government and political circles thus far offers significant policy implications for future social conflict management.
Amidst a prevailing negative assessment that social conflict has intensified under the current administration, examining the shifts in public opinion regarding Sejong City raises questions as to whether the government has amplified socio-political conflict by pursuing policies in a manner that provokes public anxiety, rather than building consensus based on favorable public opinion for its proposals.
Presidential Dialogue with the Public: Did it Change Public Opinion on Sejong City?
A Structure Where Agreement on the Revised Plan Coexists with Distrust in the Government's Implementation Method
The most prominent characteristic of public opinion on the Sejong City issue revealed in this survey is the high level of agreement on the necessity of revision proposed by the government, coupled with strong distrust in the government's implementation method. A survey conducted on November 28th, the day after the presidential dialogue, asked about the proposed methods for Sejong City. The results showed that 31.4% of respondents believed the original plan should be maintained, while 50.4% favored revising it into an education, science, and business city, which was the highest proportion. However, 18.2% remained undecided or did not answer. This aligns with most other opinion polls released on the same day, which showed support for revision hovering around 50%.
However, as stated in Public Opinion Briefing No. 65, released immediately after the survey, a comprehensive assessment of President Lee Myung-bak's stance and response to Sejong City, rather than the proposed methods and content, revealed that 39.8% agreed and 52.5% disagreed. Thus, while support for the revised plan exceeded a majority, public opinion regarding the President's stance and response was predominantly negative. [Refer to the appendix of this briefing (No. 66) or the previous issue (No. 65) from EAI Public Opinion Briefing].
This suggests that while there is significant agreement on the legitimacy of the revised Sejong City plan, there is considerable distrust and concern regarding the government's method of pursuing it. In this survey, when asked about the actual implementation process, beyond the proposed methods and the overall assessment of the Lee Myung-bak administration's stance and response, only 7.9% responded that it was being handled 'very well' and 34.3% 'generally well,' totaling 34.3% positive responses. Conversely, 36.7% responded 'not very well' and 22.1% 'not well at all,' totaling 58.8% negative responses. 6.9% were undecided.
[Figure 1] Perception Gap (%) Regarding the Government's Sejong City Plan and Implementation Method
Note: The rate of 'don't know/no response' for the implementation plan was 18.2%, and for the evaluation of the government's implementation method was 6.9%.
Modified plan preferred excluding the Chungcheong region; indifference towards the implementation method across all regions.
The 12.5% to 24.0% undecided population regarding the direction of Sejong City development is a variable.
Regionally, in the Chungcheong region, the proportion supporting the original plan was 41.7%, slightly higher than the 37.3% who favored modification. Only in Honam was the opinion gap between the modified and original plans narrow, at 8.7 percentage points. In all other regions, support for the modified plan exceeded support for the original plan by double digits. Support for the modified plan was 56.8% in Gyeonggi/Incheon, 50.6% in Seoul, 50.1% in Busan/Gyeongnam, 48.1% in Gwangju/Jeolla, and 46.7% in Daegu/Gyeongbuk. Support for the original plan was 24.8% in Gyeonggi/Incheon, 33.6% in Daegu/Gyeongbuk, and 29.3% in Busan/Gyeongnam. The undecided response rate, ranging from 12.5% to 24.0%, was significant across all regions, suggesting it could act as a variable influencing future public opinion trends.
Indeed, while there was high support for the modified plan for Sejong City in most regions except Chungcheong, the implementation method received largely negative evaluations across all regions. In the Honam region, positive evaluations of the implementation method were 16.4% and negative evaluations were 78.1%. In the Busan/Gyeongnam region, positive evaluations were 32.8% and negative evaluations were 61.7%. Even in Seoul and Gyeonggi, which showed strong support for the modified plan, positive evaluations of the government's implementation method for Sejong City were only 37.9% and 36.7%, respectively, while negative evaluations reached 58.6% and 55.3%. In the Chungcheong region, positive evaluations of the government's implementation method were 28.0%, and negative evaluations were 56.7%. There were also many undecided respondents. Even in the Daegu/Gyeongbuk region, which had the highest positive evaluation for the implementation method, positive responses were only 44.5%, while negative responses were the highest at 51.2%.
[Figure 2] Preference for Sejong City Implementation Plan by Region (%) [Figure 3] Evaluation of Government's Implementation Method (%)
Note: The blank space in the middle represents the 'don't know/no response' rate.
Undecided voters show a majority favoring the modified Sejong City plan.
While there were clear differences in opinion between supporters of the ruling and opposition parties, the high support for the modified Sejong City plan among undecided voters, who do not align with any political party, was a favorable condition for broadening consensus on the modified plan. Among supporters of the Grand National Party, 70.3% favored the modified plan and 16.9% favored the original plan. However, among supporters of the Democratic Party, support for the modified plan was 39.1% and support for the original plan was 44.3%. Conversely, among undecided voters, 47.3% supported the modified plan, while only 28.2% supported the original plan. The 24.2% undecided rate among undecided voters, who are less politically engaged, is expected to act as a factor in the overall public opinion shift concerning Sejong City, depending on the outcome of the public opinion battle between the government/ruling party and the opposition party.
[Figure 4] Preference for Sejong City Development Direction by Supporters of Both Parties and Undecided Voters
Sejong City: A Case of Amplifying Conflict Without Leveraging Favorable Public Opinion Conditions
The Blue House and the Grand National Party leadership, emboldened by the surge in positive public opinion towards the modified plan and strong public empathy for the President's apology immediately after the 'Dialogue with the People,' appear poised to accelerate the implementation of the modified plan. There are also voices within the government and ruling party acknowledging a lack of public outreach thus far. While self-reflection within the government and ruling party is welcome, the content of this reflection is crucial.
In reality, the strong support for the government's modified plan did not emerge only after the 'Dialogue with the People.' Previous regular opinion polls by EAI in September and surveys by some media outlets and polling organizations in October showed considerable support for the modified plan from the time it became a contentious issue. The EAI and Hankook Research survey on September 26th, in particular, indicated the modified plan received the highest support. At that time, only 33.3% responded in favor of proceeding with the original plan, while 41.2% favored reducing or modifying the original plan, receiving the most support. Even the 14.2% who advocated for halting the project meant that opposition to the original plan, which centered on the relocation of administrative agencies, exceeded a majority.
The issue is not a lack of publicity or will, but rather the failure to utilize the considerable consensus forming around the modification of Sejong City and the prevailing support among undecided voters for the necessity of modification as a force to mitigate social conflict and converge public opinion. It is necessary to reconsider the aspects where the government's distrustful policy implementation process has amplified public concerns, particularly the backlash from the Chungcheong region.
Most importantly, the process by which the Sejong City modification issue became an agenda appears to have stimulated anxiety among the public, especially in the Chungcheong region. If the modification of Sejong City was truly a national agenda affecting the nation's future, it was not an issue to be abruptly raised in the confirmation hearing of a new Prime Minister with no prior experience in state affairs, as initiated by the President himself.
Furthermore, although the President appealed for patience until the government's plan was finalized, the government bears significant responsibility for causing public opinion to fluctuate by releasing immature measures and rhetoric before the government's plan was even formulated. When public opinion in the Chungcheong region and among the pro-Park faction within the ruling party soured due to the hints of Sejong City modification during the Prime Minister nominee's confirmation process, the government intensified efforts to promote consideration of other regions' opinions and comprehensive support measures for regional development, only to face backlash from the 'reverse discrimination' argument.
The President's 'Dialogue with the People' did not fundamentally alter the public's concerns and distrust regarding Sejong City. However, it achieved partial success in eliciting a favorable attitude towards the President's stance and response from those who encountered his position on Sejong City modification through television or news. The strategy of adopting a communication format of 'dialogue' rather than unilateral promotion, and preceding the explanation of the necessity of modification with an 'apology' for the change in stance, appears to have been effective. Nevertheless, even before the Sejong City plan was released, discussions of a '2nd capital + alpha' plan were already circulating in the media among government and ruling party members. This is why concerns persist.
Meanwhile, the opposition and critical factions also need a more accurate and objective understanding of current public opinion. The public's indifferent response to the government's implementation method should not be mistaken for support for maintaining the original Sejong City plan. Although public support for maintaining the original Sejong City plan is relatively high in the Chungcheong region, it did not reach 50% in this survey, and support for the modified plan was not insignificant.
In particular, the nearly 20% undecided response rate regarding the Sejong City implementation plan in this survey must also be considered. While there is a caveat that the current public opinion in the Chungcheong region may not persist if the government and ruling party subsequently present compensation measures and plans for the Chungcheong region while refraining from actions that induce distrust, there is no guarantee that current public opinion in the Chungcheong region will continue.
Four Major Rivers Project: Solidifying Opposition Opinion
Negative public opinion has persisted since September and is unlikely to change significantly.
Opposition to the project was 54.7% in September; 'doing poorly' was 58.6% in November.
This survey asked about the Four Major Rivers Project, which officially began with the groundbreaking ceremony for the Yeongsan River section in November. The results showed that 12.1% responded 'doing very well' and 23.6% responded 'generally doing well,' for a total of 35.7% positive responses. Responses of 'not doing very well' were 28.7%, and 'not doing well at all' were 29.8%, resulting in 58.6% negative responses. 'Don't know/no response' accounted for 5.7%.
This contrasts with the results of the September regular survey, where 11.0% responded 'strongly support' and 30.6% responded 'tend to support' for the government's planned Four Major Rivers Project, totaling 41.6% positive responses. Conversely, 28.3% responded 'tend to oppose' and 26.4% responded 'strongly oppose,' totaling 54.7% negative responses. Negative public opinion regarding the Four Major Rivers Project has not decreased over the past two months.
[Figure 1] Preference for the Government's Four Major Rivers Project (%)
Similar to the Sejong City issue, public opinion on the Four Major Rivers Project is characterized by significant divergence based on political orientation. Among supporters of the Grand National Party, 67.6% evaluated the Four Major Rivers Project positively and 28.2% negatively. Among supporters of the Democratic Party, positive evaluations were 15.9% and negative evaluations were 82.1%. However, while the Sejong City issue presented a mix of conflicting opinions within public opinion, with strong consensus on the modified plan but relatively high negative responses regarding the implementation method, the Four Major Rivers Project faces negative public opinion regarding the direction of the project itself. Furthermore, given the significant opposition among undecided voters, who are less politically aligned, it is unlikely that public opinion will improve in the direction the government desires. Even among undecided voters, favorable opinions were only 28.9%, while negative evaluations exceeded a majority at 57.0%. From the government's perspective, this makes it difficult to be optimistic about public opinion improvement.
[Figure 2] Evaluation of the Four Major Rivers Project by Supporters of Both Parties and Undecided Voters (%)
Appears more favorable for accelerating the project than Sejong City.
However, unlike the Sejong City issue, the Four Major Rivers Project does not carry the political burden of overturning agreements between parties, nor does it require legislative amendments for implementation, which facilitates the government's policy execution. Specifically, while the Chungcheong region serves as a strong source of opposition for Sejong City as a stakeholder, the opposition to the Four Major Rivers Project is not widely organized beyond a few environmental civic groups. Moreover, within the opposition, local residents have diverse interests in regional development, leading to a weak political center for consolidating opposition opinion. This also appears to be a factor enabling the government to accelerate the project's implementation.
*This text is an AI translation of an original written in Korean. Some translations or nuances may be inaccurate.