[Public Opinion Briefing Vol. 46-3] May 2009 Presidential Approval Ratings and Party Support Ratings

[EAIㆍKorea Research] May Public Opinion Barometer

[Theme] Analysis of Political Mood and Party Ideological Basis of Ruling and Opposition Parties through Public Opinion

[Current Issues] Dignified Death, Illegal/Violent Protests, Kaesong Industrial Complex, Private Education

[Tracking] May 2009 Presidential Approval Ratings and Party Support Ratings

Tracking: Signs of Political Change Following the Death of Former President Roh Moo-hyun

1. Changes in Presidential Approval Ratings

President Lee's approval rating trend: 38.5% (Feb) → 34.7% (Mar) → 34.0% (Apr) → 32.4% (May)

MB approval ratings higher among traditional conservative supporters

- 50s and older (47.7%), monthly income below 1 million KRW (49.1%), middle school graduate (40.6%) / high school graduate (38.7%)

- Ideologically conservative (41.9%), Daegu/Gyeongbuk (51.2%) significantly above average

Sharp decline in MB approval ratings in Busan/Gyeongnam region to 27.3%, down 8.7%p from 36.0% last month (▼)

In this survey, regarding President Lee Myung-bak's approval ratings for state affairs and party support, the President's approval rating showed a gradual downward trend, while the Grand National Party's support rating declined more significantly, and a rebound in the Democratic Party's support rating was confirmed. This survey should be considered in the context of the ruling party's shocking 0:5 defeat in the April by-elections, followed by political changes including leadership changes in both parties. In particular, as the survey was conducted immediately after the death of President Roh Moo-hyun, which is a potential trigger for future political developments, it offers a preview of the future political landscape.

President Lee's approval rating for state affairs, which recorded 38.5% in the first regular survey in February, was 34.7% in March, 34.0% in April, and 32.4% in this survey. Overall, it shows a gradual downward trend. However, considering the recent series of political setbacks, it is noteworthy that approval ratings have consistently been maintained around the 30% mark. As the political deadlock between the ruling and opposition parties intensifies, the consolidated conservative base appears to be acting as a support base for the President and the current administration, offsetting a sharp decline in approval ratings. Furthermore, the ongoing economic crisis, which continues to cause significant public concern, seems to be a situational factor preventing additional support for the President and the government.

[Figure 1] Changes in President Lee Myung-bak's Approval Ratings for State Affairs (%)

Indeed, as in the April survey results, this survey confirms that traditional conservatives have become the support base for President Lee Myung-bak. Support is significantly above average among older demographics (50s and older, 47.7%), low-income groups (monthly income below 1 million KRW, 49.1%), those with a middle school (40.6%) / high school (38.7%) education, self-identified conservatives (41.9%), and in the Daegu/Gyeongbuk region (51.2%).

Notably, there is a significant decline in approval ratings among voters in the Busan/Gyeongnam region, who recorded 36.0% in the April survey, at the average level for President Lee's state affairs approval. In this May survey, it dropped to 27.3%, a decrease of 8.7%p compared to the previous month. This is presumed to be the result of accelerated defection of pro-Roh Moo-hyun supporters in the Busan/Gyeongnam region following the re-emergence of conflict between pro-Lee and pro-Roh factions around the by-elections, especially as the pro-Roh faction's candidate for floor leader, Kim Moo-sung, failed to secure the position.

[Figure 2] President Lee Myung-bak's Approval Ratings for State Affairs by Age/Monthly Income/Education Level/Ideological Orientation/Region (%)

2. Grand National Party and Democratic Party Support Gap Widens to 8%p; Shift in Support Ratings Begins

Grand National Party support rating decline: 34.9% (Feb) → 35.8% (Mar) → 34.5% (Apr) → 29.8% (May)

Democratic Party enters 20% range for the first time since the MB administration's launch: 16.4% → 18.6% → 14.7% → 21.8%

Meanwhile, significant changes are occurring in party support ratings. The Grand National Party's support rating, which had remained stable at 34.9% in February, 35.8% in March, and 34.5% in April, decreased to 29.8% in the May survey. In contrast, the Democratic Party's support rating surpassed 20% for the first time since the launch of the Lee Myung-bak administration, narrowing the gap between the two parties to 8%p as of May 23rd. According to a Hankyoreh newspaper survey conducted on May 30th, after the funeral of former President Roh Moo-hyun, the Grand National Party's support rating was 18.7% and the Democratic Party's was 27.1%, indicating a reversal in support ratings.

[Figure 1] Changes in Grand National Party - Democratic Party Support Ratings (February-May 2009) (%)

Restoration of the Democratic Party's traditional support base is evident compared to April

- In the April survey, the Grand National Party led even among the Democratic Party's traditional supporters (progressives, 20s-30s)

- In the May survey, the Democratic Party regained its support base, leading among progressives and those in their 20s-30s

- Among those who disapprove of MB, Democratic Party support is 27.4%, an increase of 7.3%p from 20.1% last month

This appears to be the result of a re-mobilization of traditional Democratic Party supporters who had previously defected, following the formation of a mourning sentiment and favorable public opinion towards former President Roh after his death. Furthermore, while the Grand National Party experienced intensified internal conflict between pro-Lee and pro-Roh factions immediately after the by-elections, the Democratic Party is assessed to have laid the groundwork for consolidating its support base by successfully navigating the by-elections and the race for floor leader.

Even in the April survey, only among those who disapproved of President Lee Myung-bak's state affairs did the Democratic Party have a slight lead in support (20.1% vs. Grand National Party 17.1%). However, even among traditional Democratic Party supporters, such as progressives (Grand National Party 22.4%, Democratic Party 20.8%) and younger generations (20s: Grand National Party 26.5%, Democratic Party 19.0%; 30s: Grand National Party 21.9%, Democratic Party 17.9%), the Grand National Party's support was stronger than the Democratic Party's.

However, in this survey, among progressives, the Grand National Party garnered 20.1% support while the Democratic Party received 26.4%. Among those in their 20s, the Grand National Party had 19.6% support and the Democratic Party had 28.6%. Among those in their 30s, the Grand National Party also had 19.6% support, while the Democratic Party had 25.3%, indicating a reversal in support ratings.

Whether this reversal in support ratings will be a temporary phenomenon or solidify into the end of the Grand National Party's dominance remains to be seen by observing future political developments. However, given that the current rise in the Democratic Party's support is primarily driven by the consolidation of its traditional support base rather than attracting new supporters, and that the Grand National Party is also consolidating its traditional support base, it is highly probable that the situation will lead to a balanced outcome after a period of adjustment.

However, the variable lies with the unaffiliated voters who currently maintain a distance from both the ruling and opposition parties. Considering the widespread public criticism of the current administration, as confirmed in the analysis of the April survey results, the unaffiliated voters do not appear to be apathetic but rather a significant portion are drifting due to their inability to find an alternative while maintaining a critical stance towards the current government. If the government or ruling party makes a sudden misstep, the possibility of unaffiliated voters rapidly shifting to support the opposition party cannot be ruled out.

The Grand National Party and the government should be mindful of reacting sensitively to political changes while avoiding provocation of public sentiment. The Democratic Party needs to humbly accept that the current rise in its support is based on anti-Grand National Party sentiment formed by the death of President Roh and primarily represents the return of supporters who had previously defected. Efforts for party innovation to re-emerge as an alternative party must be undertaken concurrently for the current rise in support to translate into an expansion and consolidation of its support base.