[Public Opinion Briefing 35-2] Six Months into the Administration - Changes in Party Support Base

[Public Opinion Briefing 35] Table of Contents

[Topic 1] Is Religious Cleavage Materializing in Korean Politics?

[Topic 2] Six Months of the Lee Myung-bak Administration - Changes in Party Support Coalition

[Topic 2] Six Months of the Lee Myung-bak Administration - Changes in Party Support Coalition

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President Lee Myung-bak's approval rating is showing a gradual but steady increase. President Lee, who recorded an approval rating close to 60% in the March survey early in his term, saw his approval plummet to the 10% range around June 10 due to the impact of the April general elections and the candlelight protests that intensified from May. However, following the additional negotiations on beef imports on June 18, his approval rating has been on a steady recovery path. Since recording 21.5% in the June 20 survey, it rose to 26.9% in the July 14 survey, 31.2% in the August 23 survey, and continued its upward trend to 32.8% in the current survey conducted on August 28-29. Nevertheless, this remains a low level for a president's approval rating early in their term, suggesting that it will be difficult to gain momentum for a political turnaround.



It is a significant burden for the ruling party, which is attempting a political turnaround, to have stagnant support ratings. The Grand National Party (GNP), which had consistently maintained a party support rating of 40-50% since the 2006 local elections, garnered only 28.7% in the current survey. This represents a 15 percentage point drop compared to the 43.7% support recorded in the February EAI-JoongAng Ilbo survey. This is also a 6.5 percentage point decrease from the 35.1% recorded in the Seoul Shinmun-Korea Research survey the previous week (August 23). Considering that party support ratings have remained very stable for the past 2-3 years, unlike the president's approval rating, there is a possibility that the GNP's support rating recovery may not keep pace with President Lee Myung-bak's approval rating recovery.



This suggests that the discord between the party and the government could become a long-term factor. The government is desperately trying to escape the initial policy confusion and transition to a normal state of governance. The President and the Blue House appear to believe that demonstrating tangible policy achievements is paramount. Meanwhile, the ruling GNP is facing significant social pressure to accommodate the grievances of groups excluded from the government's policy drive and to coordinate the positions of various factions. When the GNP's support base is shaken, it becomes difficult to consistently support the government's assertive policies, and instead, the party may begin to demand speed moderation or even checks on the government. This was a consistent pattern observed in the relationship between President Roh Moo-hyun and the Uri Party during the participatory government period.



Of course, during the Roh Moo-hyun administration, the GNP was a strong opposition party, but the current opposition, the United Democratic Party (UDP), is a weak party, garnering less than half of the GNP's support. At that time, the GNP steadily absorbed the disappointment with President Roh and the ruling party into its own support base, exceeding a majority of support. In other words, there was no political focal point to pressure both the government and the GNP. Despite this, the government and the ruling party appear to be under pressure to pursue strong policy drives, as their core support base, the TK region, and the new support base acquired during the previous administration based on anti-Roh sentiment, are rapidly defecting within just six months of the administration's term.

[Figure 1] Changes in President Lee Myung-bak's Approval Rating (March-August)

[Figure 2] Changes in Party Support Over Six Months (%)

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The defection of the Grand National Party's (GNP) support base, which had maintained stable support between 45-55% during the 2007 presidential election, is alarming. Before 2005, a pattern existed where the 'Yeongnam-conservative-50s and older-GNP (and its predecessors) support' was contrasted with 'Honam/Seoul Metropolitan Area-progressive-20s/30s-Uri Party (predecessor of Democratic Party) support.' This party support pattern was significantly disrupted after the 2006 local elections. The Seoul Metropolitan Area, 20s/30s, and centrist/progressive voters significantly contributed to expanding the political base of candidate Lee Myung-bak and the GNP. This resulted in candidate Lee's landslide victory and the GNP securing a majority of seats.



However, after the 2008 general elections and during the candlelight protests, the traditional political base of President Lee Myung-bak and the GNP, the TK region, and the new support base that joined during the participatory government period are rapidly defecting. These are the groups that largely shifted their support to candidate Lee Myung-bak and the GNP out of disappointment with the Roh Moo-hyun administration and the Uri Party during the participatory government era. Geographically, they are concentrated in the Seoul Metropolitan Area; ideologically, they are centrist; and by generation, they are in their 30s and 40s.



Comparing the survey results from February of this year with the August survey, first, regarding TK respondents, 65.8% answered they supported the GNP in the February survey, but this has significantly decreased to 37% in the current survey. Considering that the TK region has been the largest regional support base for the GNP and its predecessors (Democratic Justice Party, New Korea Party), this is a noteworthy result. It indicates that the conflict between President Lee and former party leader Park Geun-hye, which emerged during the last presidential election and the general elections this year, has not yet been resolved.



Let's examine the situation of the new support base's defection. In Seoul, support, which was 42.9% in February, decreased to 24.8% by the end of August. In the Gyeonggi region, support, which was 43.6% in the February survey, also fell to the national average or below, at 28.2%. Calculating the percentage decrease in the GNP's support rate between the February and August surveys, it was a significant 42.7% in TK, 42.3% in Seoul, and 34.1% in the Incheon/Gyeonggi region. By generation, the decrease rates in support were 37.0% for those in their 30s and 36.4% for those in their 40s. Support for the GNP among centrist voters also decreased by 42.5% compared to the February survey.



The defection of the GNP's support base is not immediately leading to a revival of the East-West, generational, or ideological confrontation structure. This is because the groups withdrawing their support from the GNP are not returning to support the United Democratic Party (UDP) but are instead moving to the unaffiliated or undecided voter segments. Despite the rising public criticism of the government and the ruling party, the main opposition party, the UDP, is not gaining even minimal 반사이익 (spillover benefits). While it secured 12.8% support in the February survey, it remained at 12.1% in the current survey, indicating it has not escaped the public's indifferent evaluation. In contrast, the proportion of unaffiliated voters, who stated they do not support any particular party, surged from 29.3% in the February survey to 37.9% in August.



Ultimately, it is difficult for any political force—the government, the ruling party, or the opposition—to lead the current political situation. Due to low approval ratings and discord between the party and the government, the administration and ruling party are unable to exercise effective leadership. Amidst widespread distrust in the ruling power and a listless opposition, there is a possibility that state affairs could drift for a long time. The damage caused by a political vacuum is likely to fall entirely on the nation and its citizens. This is why anyone, regardless of their ideological stance or partisan affiliation, will inevitably find the current political climate uncomfortable.

[Table 1] Party Support by Socio-Demographic Variables (February-August)

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[Table 2] Percentage Change in Support Rates for the Grand National Party, Democratic Party, and Independents, February-August 2008

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[Figure 3] Six-Month Decline Rate of Grand National Party Support by Stratum (%p)