NSPR2 Deployment to Iraq and National Interest

Overview

Following the U.S. request for additional troop deployment, we faced several critical questions during a painful debate that lasted nearly a year. First, was the Iraq War an unjust war lacking historical justification? Second, what national interests was South Korea seeking to pursue through its deployment to Iraq? Third, what should the ROK-U.S. relationship look like after the deployment to Iraq?

After massacring 5,000 of its own Kurdish citizens with chemical weapons and committing numerous human rights abuses, the Saddam Hussein regime persistently refused to comply with UN Security Council resolutions on disarmament from the end of the Gulf War in 1991 until 2002. Although the UN imposed sanctions through diplomatic pressure and economic blockade, Saddam Hussein employed delaying tactics through 'partial' cooperation rather than 'full' cooperation, which was sufficient to arouse the U.S. administration's 'suspicion' about the possibility of Iraq possessing WMDs. Hussein's tyranny, coupled with the WMD suspicions, provided considerable 'substantive legitimacy' to the UN and the international community, even if not 'procedural legitimacy.' However, the U.S. lacked sufficient intelligence regarding WMDs to immediately target Iraq under the 'preemptive strike doctrine' and launch a military attack. Ultimately, the legitimacy of the Iraq War became the core of the controversy, and this controversy emboldened resistance forces within Iraq after the war, leading to an exacerbation of the situation.

Nevertheless, as the international community agrees that the resolution of the situation in Iraq is a crucial factor in determining the future of the entire Middle East (UN Resolution 1546), South Korea's deployment to Iraq must consider a complex combination of maintaining the macro-level Middle East order, in which South Korea has various interests, and contributing to humanitarian efforts in Iraq. As a consensus is forming among the major powers of the international community to the effect that the 'Pandora's Box' opened by the U.S. in Iraq must be closed by any means necessary, if the war on terror is neglected as if it were solely America's problem, the possibility of a world overrun by terrorists and rampant disorder becomes increasingly likely. This point should serve as the starting point for the discussion on South Korea's deployment to Iraq.

In the process of reorganizing the international order after 9/11, the U.S. has been applying participation in the U.S.-led war on terror as the primary criterion for evaluating alliances. During the Cold War, the U.S. demanded that its allies follow its leadership in return for protecting them from the threat of communism; however, in the 21st century, the U.S. concept of alliance involves demanding that allies acknowledge U.S. leadership in exchange for the U.S. providing the 'credit' necessary to navigate a globalized international society. Alliances have now transformed from the 20th-century concept of 'blood alliances' (血盟) to the 21st-century concept of 'credit alliances' (信盟). In this regard, South Korea's deployment to Iraq is an investment, or 'credit utilization' (用信), to establish a credit alliance with the U.S. The U.S. plans to make Baghdad a center of democracy and market economy in the Middle East through Iraq's reconstruction. If Iraq succeeds in reconstruction, South Korea, along with the U.S., will have the opportunity to secure a bridgehead for advancing west of the Caspian Sea, thereby enhancing energy security. Furthermore, there can be no disagreement between South Korea and the U.S. on the need to promote the human security of the Iraqi people through peace and reconstruction in Iraq. Cooperation between South Korea and the U.S. for human security signifies that the ROK-U.S. alliance is transcending its traditional military security character and moving towards universal human values.

As long as both South Korea and the U.S. agree on the necessity of the ROK-U.S. alliance's continuation, it would be beneficial for the development of ROK-U.S. relations to establish a '21st-century vision' for the alliance before adjusting it after the North Korean threat disappears, rather than after. The alliance should aim to share fundamental values of democracy and market economy, lead peace rather than respond to threats, realize a horizontal relationship rather than a vertical one with enhanced flexibility and autonomy, and further expand interoperability to become a 'comprehensive regional security alliance'.

The ROK-U.S. comprehensive alliance relationship should evolve into a 21st-century 'human security alliance' that comprehensively addresses new security threats such as terrorism, drugs, environmental pollution, illegal human migration, and piracy, rather than merely dealing with traditional military threats. Whether it can move in this direction depends on the extent to which trust is restored between South Korea and the U.S. through the deployment of South Korean troops to Iraq. When the U.S. and South Korea can freely engage in credit transactions encompassing political, security, and economic fields based on mutual trust, a true 21st-century alliance, or credit alliance (信盟), will take shape.

If the war on terror is dismissed as solely America's war, and given that the U.S. cannot lead the war on terror to victory alone, the international community will inevitably become a world of disorder and chaos, a world desired by terrorists. As the UN or other major powers cannot substitute for U.S. power, members of the international community must support and advise the U.S. in managing international relations more wisely.

In the harsh reality of international politics, we must be able to distinguish between immediate 'visible deaths' and future 'invisible deaths' to maximize national interests. While we may avoid immediate visible deaths through a momentary strategic misjudgment, we must bear in mind that we could bring about greater, more fatal invisible deaths in the future. We experienced the painful 'IMF crisis' when we lost credit in the globalized international financial community, and it was thanks to the credit accumulated in the security field that we received support from international financial institutions led by the U.S. Even if withdrawing troops can prevent immediate visible deaths, it is uncertain whether we can lay the foundation for recovery through accumulated credit in the security field if we were to face a second financial crisis. The deployment to Iraq is precisely a strategic investment to prevent future invisible deaths.

Author

Kim Sung-han, Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security