NSPR1 North Korea's Nuclear Issue and the Six-Party Talks: Assessment and Prospects

Overview



Since the outbreak of the second North Korean nuclear crisis in October 2002, the Korean Peninsula in the 21st century has once again been held hostage by the North Korean nuclear issue at a decisive crossroads in history. Despite the multilateral cooperation of China as mediator, South Korea as facilitator, and Japan and Russia as supporters, the principle of "complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization (CVID)" advocated by the United States and the principle of "freezing and compensation" advocated by North Korea make it difficult to reach a basic agreement, casting doubt on the possibility of successful negotiations. In this situation, if the nuclear issue is not resolved quickly and the new civilizational standards of the 21st century are not actively addressed, the future of the Korean Peninsula's history in the 21st century is bleak.

South Korea, as a party to the Six-Party Talks during the unfolding of the North Korean nuclear crisis and as a facilitator of North Korea-U.S. negotiations, has been deeply concerned. However, in its desire for a resolution to the crisis, South Korea has been caught in idealistic thinking rather than pragmatic reasoning, failing to accurately perceive the essence of the problem by calculating the interests of each party involved. This is due to an overemphasis on thinking from its own perspective, lacking thoroughness in interest-based reasoning. For South Korea to play a role in resolving the North Korean nuclear crisis, it must demonstrate a pragmatic approach by accurately grasping the interests of each party while clearly defining the scope and limitations of its own role.

Currently, North Korea proposes the cessation of the U.S. hostile policy toward North Korea and a simultaneous package deal for a peaceful resolution as the solution to the nuclear issue. In response to the U.S. demand for CVID, North Korea demands complete, verifiable, and irreversible security assurances, including the verifiable withdrawal of U.S. troops from Korea, the conclusion of a North Korea-U.S. peace treaty, and the normalization of relations. If the nuclear issue is not resolved through the Six-Party Talks, North Korea is considering strengthening its nuclear deterrence for a military resolution. The two alternatives currently demanded by North Korea—the abandonment of the U.S. hostile policy and the continuous pursuit of nuclear deterrence—are both unlikely to be realized at this time and carry a high risk of bringing crisis to the Korean Peninsula.

The United States considers the war on terror as the core of its national security strategy for the 21st century and is pursuing the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the establishment of an anti-terrorism alliance system. In this context, the United States classifies North Korea as a state sponsor of terrorism and is addressing the nuclear issue from the perspective of an anti-terrorism war against WMD proliferation, adhering to a hardline policy of negotiating only with a North Korea transformed into a normal state, not just a nuclear-free one. Against this backdrop, the United States has set complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization (CVID) as the objective for the resolution of the Six-Party Talks, making North Korea's prior actions to guarantee this a prerequisite for the talks' success. The U.S. strategy appears to be pursuing the Six-Party Talks while simultaneously preparing to implement alternatives such as economic sanctions based on the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), regime transformation, and military sanctions.

Meanwhile, South Korea's three principles for resolving the North Korean nuclear issue—non-nuclearization of North Korea, peaceful resolution, and a leading role—are contradictory and thus face difficulties in simultaneous pursuit. South Korea's position differs from that of the United States and Japan, which are based on a dual approach of multilateral talks and the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), particularly concerning pressure on North Korea. The three-stage proposal put forth by South Korea in the first and second rounds of the Six-Party Talks has limitations in bridging the gap between the U.S. CVID principle and North Korea's freezing principle. In this situation, South Korea appears to be focusing on process management, emphasizing the progress of the Six-Party Talks rather than the outcome of resolving the North Korean nuclear issue.

Considering long-term, mid-term, and short-term alternatives for resolving the North Korean nuclear issue, in the long term, South Korea must devise a solution at a higher level—the resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue through international cooperation among the Korean people. The 21st-century resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue is not merely a problem for the Korean Peninsula but a matter concerning the future of the Northeast Asian co-existence stage in the 21st century. A perspective that simultaneously considers the sovereignty and right to survival of others and our own people is necessary. From a mid-term perspective, given the complexity of the North Korean nuclear issue itself, once the relevant parties reach a basic agreement, the current Six-Party Talks should be developed more complexly, actively utilizing bilateral and multilateral approaches depending on the issue. Conversely, if the Six-Party Talks fail to yield results, and the strategies of North Korea and the United States clash, leading to coercive diplomacy and ultimately military conflict, the South Korean government must accurately assess the consequences and make the parties to the Six-Party Talks aware of the dire outcomes.

For a short-term resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue, new leadership within the North Korean leadership pursuing 21st-century methods is necessary. Based on this new leadership, North Korea must practice the reaffirmation of the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and compliance with the norms of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The United States and other parties must promise multilateral legal, economic, and political guarantees to North Korea, enabling it to pursue a 21st-century solution through agreement. Meanwhile, the South Korean government must manage the negotiation process to ensure the continuation of the Six-Party Talks, while accurately assessing strategic changes between North Korea and the United States to develop realistic countermeasures. Currently, South Korea has obtained some response by proposing to the United States a change in the CVID terminology, considering North Korea's position, and by actively considering the three-stage plan previously proposed by South Korea. However, it must be recognized that even if the United States considers changing the CVID terminology and reconsiders its existing position on nuclear disarmament, the U.S. stance on the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the principles for handling the North Korean nuclear issue have not changed.

Author

Ha Young-sun, Professor of International Relations, College of Social Sciences, Seoul National University

Chun Jae-sung, Professor, Seoul National University