[Global NK Commentary] North Korea’s ‘Strategic Deterrence’ and South Korea and the US’s Self-Deterrence

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Summary and Introduction

North Korea’s nuclear strategy can be considered an application of the Russian concept of ‘strategic deterrence.’ The current two pillars of North Korea’s nuclear strategy are the 2022 Law on Nuclear Force and the 2023 formalized doctrine of hostile inter-state relations. These two are inseparably linked, and their integration reveals a strategic design aimed at North Korea dominating the Korean Peninsula’s security situation and becoming its master through preemptive nuclear attack and nuclear war initiation. This strategic design is underpinned by North Korea’s strategic position reaching its highest point in decades. In response to this North Korea, South Korea and the United States are pursuing a policy of avoiding conflict and crisis with North Korea. This demonstrates that South Korea and the United States are responding with self-deterrence by internalizing North Korea’s increasing capabilities and threats.

North Korea’s Nuclear Strategy of Victory: Winning Without Fighting Through Coercion

North Korea’s nuclear strategy can be summarized in three stages. First, North Korea vividly and realistically exaggerates the level of its nuclear capabilities and its willingness to actually use them. Second, it psychologically and cognitively influences the decision-making of the adversary’s leadership. Third, it compels the adversary’s leadership to act cautiously towards North Korea, act as North Korea desires, or accept North Korea’s demands.

North Korea’s nuclear strategy is not a policy intended to actually initiate a nuclear war, but rather a policy that uses the threat of initiating nuclear war through preemptive nuclear use as a means of coercion. If North Korea were to actually decide to initiate nuclear war through preemptive nuclear use, it would ultimately mean North Korea choosing self-destruction. Therefore, this is not a rational decision for North Korea. However, if the adversary perceives North Korea’s capabilities and willingness regarding the provocation of nuclear war through preemptive nuclear weapon use as bluster, North Korea’s nuclear strategy collapses. To prevent the collapse of its nuclear strategy, North Korea must further exaggerate its nuclear capabilities and its willingness to use them in a more vivid and realistic manner. However, if North Korea overstates and overacts its willingness to use preemptive nuclear weapons to initiate nuclear war in order to politically subjugate the adversary, tensions may rise and crises may occur due to the adversary’s proportional or excessive counter-response. In such a situation, due to miscalculation by one or both sides, an actual nuclear war could break out accidentally, irrespective of North Korea’s actual intentions or those of the adversary. North Korea’s most effective coercion against its adversary is to make the adversary ‘clearly’ understand that North Korea’s level of risk tolerance in a competition of nuclear war risk acceptance is much higher than that of the adversary. In other words, North Korea seeks to gain an advantage in the competition of nuclear war risk acceptance and escalation control, thereby politically subjugating the adversary and compelling them to accept a favorable deal. Since North Korea would inevitably lose in a competition concerning the performance and quantity of nuclear weapons and delivery systems, it seeks victory by shifting the conflict dynamic to a competition of risk acceptance for the (accidental) outbreak of nuclear war.

In essence, North Korea’s nuclear strategy is to use its enhanced nuclear capabilities as leverage to achieve victory without fighting. That is, North Korea’s nuclear strategy aims to make the adversary’s leadership and/or general populace internalize the fear of nuclear war that would result from conflict with North Korea or be initiated by North Korea, through the threat of initiating nuclear war via preemptive nuclear use. Due to this internalized fear, the adversary’s leadership and/or populace would act cautiously, anticipating North Korea’s intentions, mood, and stance; avoid conflict with North Korea; abandon resistance to North Korea’s threats; and ultimately increase their willingness to voluntarily and preemptively accept North Korea’s demands.

North Korean Application of the Russian Concept of ‘Strategic Deterrence’

The concept of ‘strategic deterrence’ was established by Russia around 2014-2015. North Korea’s public statements do not mention this concept, nor is there any evidence that North Korea utilizes it in its strategic planning. Nevertheless, the reason for applying this concept to the analysis of North Korea’s nuclear strategy is that understanding and analyzing North Korea’s nuclear strategy becomes significantly easier when examining the policy discourse that supports this concept.

Strategic deterrence is defined in the Military Encyclopedia published by the Russian Ministry of Defense as: “A coordinated system of military and (including political, diplomatic, legal, economic, ideological, scientific-technical, and other) non-military measures. These measures are taken sequentially or simultaneously... with the aim of deterring military actions that cause damage to the state... Strategic deterrence aims to stabilize the military-political situation. Its purpose is to influence the adversary within a predetermined framework or to manage escalation/de-escalation of military conflicts... The targets of strategic deterrence can be the military-political leadership and the population of a potential adversary (or bloc of states)... The means of strategic deterrence are continuously employed during both peacetime and wartime.”[1]

There are four objectives of strategic deterrence.[2]First, to dissuade aggression or coercive pressure; second, to prevent the creation of threats; third, to manage escalation if a conflict begins; and fourth, to ensure conflict resolution on favorable terms. Strategic deterrence involves cross-domain pressure, with three core elements.[3]First, the core pillar is nuclear capability. A robust nuclear capability provides broader space for the effective utilization of other means. Second, conventional capabilities are important, particularly precision strike, long-range missile systems, and air/missile defense. Third, non-conventional/non-military tools include cyber warfare, information operations, diplomatic/ideological means, and economic leverage. In this regard, manipulating or controlling the adversary’s perceptions to one’s advantage is particularly crucial. Strategic deterrence must blend these three elements to influence the adversary leadership’s perceptions of cost, risk, and escalation, thereby constraining the adversary’s thinking and actions. The advantages of strategic deterrence are as follows:[4]First, by including non-nuclear and non-military means, it reduces reliance on nuclear weapons. Second, it aims to constrain the adversary’s actions or compel desired actions through coercion rather than destruction. Third, it reflects a consistent and integrated logic of coercion across all national domains, including nuclear, non-nuclear, and non-military aspects. However, strategic deterrence can also destabilize the security situation.[5]First, strategic deterrence justifies offensive coercion as defense. Second, it disregards how the adversary perceives one’s own actions. Third, it blurs the distinction between wartime and peacetime by necessitating a series of highly active coercive actions even during peacetime. Fourth, it ignores the possibility of unintended escalation by assuming all adversary actions are intentional.

Connecting the Russian theory of strategic deterrence with North Korea’s aforementioned theory of victory through nuclear strategy, and compressing its content through academic concepts, North Korea pursues victory without fighting—achieved solely through threats—by employing strategic deterrence centered on the threat of initiating nuclear war through preemptive nuclear attack against the adversary. This maximizes the adversary’s psychological fear, inducing self-deterrence, and thereby seeks a renegotiation outcome that reorganizes the Korean Peninsula’s security structure in favor of North Korea, rather than the complete destruction of the adversary. This is the core political substance of North Korea’s recently announced positions on its nuclear strategy. Specifically, it is the core strategic objective embedded in the preemptive nuclear use and nuclear war leadership theory presented in North Korea’s 2022 "On the Policy of the Nuclear Force of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea" and the threat of annihilating and annexing South Korea with nuclear weapons, as articulated in the so-called ‘hostile inter-state relations’ doctrine formalized at the end of 2023. These two elements are carefully crafted political propaganda materials designed to influence the adversary’s perception of the situation and their level of fear.

Integrating the logic of the Law on Nuclear Force and the doctrine of hostile inter-state relations, North Korea intends to initiate nuclear war through preemptive nuclear attack if it perceives an imminent threat to its leadership or regime, thereby annihilating and annexing South Korea with nuclear weapons. This narrative serves to achieve North Korea’s strategic deterrence objectives in two ways. First, the determination of whether a ‘threat is imminent’ is entirely at North Korea’s discretion. North Korea creates room for arbitrary judgment by allowing even routine, regular joint exercises between South Korea and the US, or periodic or ad-hoc deployments of strategic assets, to be interpreted as ‘imminent threats.’ North Korea can arbitrarily judge and announce certain trends in the movements of the ROK-US joint forces as ‘imminent threats’ according to its needs, and declare readiness for preemptive nuclear attack and nuclear war posture. Through this, North Korea seeks to deter military activities by the ROK-US joint forces around the Korean Peninsula.

Second, North Korea seeks to instill, consciously or unconsciously, a fear of nuclear war among the political leadership and/or populace of South Korea, and leverage this to create a favorable situation for achieving its strategic objectives. North Korea will repeatedly create crisis situations related to preemptive nuclear attack and nuclear war outbreak according to its convenience, and in doing so, it aims to increasingly imprint the fear of nuclear war outbreak and the horrors of nuclear destruction onto the perception of policy makers and the general public, ultimately influencing policy decisions. Consequently, South Korean policy and public opinion will be compelled to accept negotiations under conditions structurally favorable to North Korea and to freeze hostility (at the current level, without escalating the conflict), succumbing to North Korea’s threats. In this scenario, North Korea can achieve victory without war or accumulate small victories. This signifies that North Korea will henceforth unilaterally determine and control the stability or instability of security on the Korean Peninsula.

North Korea’s Current Strategic Position and Future Strategic Design

According to the US Defense Intelligence Agency's 2025 report, North Korea has reached its most advantageous position in decades.[6] This is against the backdrop of its increased nuclear/missile capabilities and the strengthening of North Korea-Russia cooperation in the international political environment. The 2022 Law on Nuclear Force and the 2023 doctrine of hostile inter-state relations are strategic documents reflecting North Korea’s advantageous position. As previously hinted, these two strategic elements are inseparably linked. It is necessary to reconsider what these two strategic elements foreshadow for North Korea’s future strategic orientation. First, North Korea’s security is currently guaranteed by its own nuclear force. North Korea has no need to seek security assurances from the United States or any other country. The 2022 North Korean Law on Nuclear Force serves as evidence that North Korea has reached this position. Second, given the expectation that the US-China conflict and the confrontation between the (pro-US) Western bloc and the anti-US authoritarian bloc will remain entrenched for the foreseeable future, it is impossible to improve US-North Korea relations or advance inter-Korean exchanges and cooperation, or establish a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula (regardless of its content), based on a stable resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue (temporarily) that requires easing tensions between the major powers in Northeast Asia. Therefore, North Korea no longer pursues a strategic path aimed at achieving these goals. Third, considering the first and second conditions, North Korea’s options are to forcefully compel recognition as a nuclear state from the Western bloc, including the United States, or to maintain a relationship of permanent hostile conflict. Fourth, within the global solidarity of anti-US authoritarian states, North Korea has emerged as the third major power, following China and Russia. This was symbolically demonstrated by Kim Jong Un standing alongside Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin at the 80th anniversary of China's Victory Day military parade on September 3, 2025. As it stands, North Korea is a strategic asset to China and Russia.

The future strategic vision of North Korea, synthesized from these four conditions, is the doctrine of ‘hostile inter-state relations.’ North Korea is engaged in an arms race with South Korea, Japan, and the United States, who seek to offset or overwhelm North Korea’s capabilities. This arms race is absolutely disadvantageous for North Korea, given its weaker national strength. However, to the extent that North Korea alleviates the burden on China and Russia from South Korea, Japan, and the United States in Northeast Asia, and supports Russia’s efforts in the war against Ukraine, it receives military, economic, and political support from China and Russia. North Korea must continuously maintain a level of capability and performance that allows it to be treated as an asset by China and Russia. To achieve this, North Korea must use arms build-up and adventurous foreign policy to ensure that the capabilities and attention of South Korea, Japan, and the United States in Northeast Asia are dispersed and weakened through North Korea. The doctrine of hostile inter-state relations justifies internally within North Korea the necessity of permanent arms build-up, maintaining a quasi-wartime system indefinitely, enduring economic hardship, and political control. Furthermore, the doctrine of hostile inter-state relations completely rejects the South Korean paradigm of denuclearization-exchange and cooperation for inter-Korean relations and declares and enforces the North Korean paradigm of ‘two states in a state of belligerence’ as the paradigm for inter-Korean relations. Together with the Law on Nuclear Force, the doctrine of hostile inter-state relations provides a means to control the ROK-US combined forces through the threat of preemptive nuclear attack and nuclear war outbreak, and to instantly neutralize the overall superiority of South Korea’s national strength. The Law on Nuclear Force and the doctrine of hostile inter-state relations enable North Korea to ascend to the same level as China and Russia, and open a channel for North Korea to engage in direct dealings with the United States, excluding South Korea from discussions on Korean Peninsula security issues.

Conclusion: Self-Deterrence by South Korea and the US

The current North Korea policies of South Korea and the United States reflect North Korea’s rising strategic status and strategic orientation. This signifies a shift in the internal perception framework of the United States and South Korea from the past framework—adherence to the principle of North Korean denuclearization and, if necessary, acceptance of conflict/crisis and imposition of punishment—to a new framework focused on avoiding conflict/crisis through appeasing North Korea. Already during Trump’s first term, the issue of preventing North Korean nuclear attacks on the United States and the formation of a new relationship with North Korea as a de facto nuclear state emerged as important considerations within the US perception framework regarding North Korea. Particularly during Trump’s second term, President Trump appears to have set the de facto objective of North Korea policy as avoiding crisis with North Korea based on appeasement. The current South Korean government is pursuing improved inter-Korean relations and the resumption of exchanges and cooperation through the avoidance of conflict and crisis with North Korea. Based on the logic that ‘any peace, however costly, is better than war,’ South Korea has set the highest goal as avoiding conflict and maintaining peace between the two Koreas, with an added emphasis, if possible, on resuming reconciliation and cooperation. Denuclearization is positioned as a subsequent step to exchanges and cooperation and (relationship) normalization. The attitudes of South Korea and the United States towards North Korea are partially accepting what North Korea has long demanded. This implies that North Korea’s nuclear coercion has infiltrated the perception structures of the United States and South Korea, partially altering the fundamental framework of policy decisions. This can be termed self-deterrence by South Korea and the United States regarding North Korea. ■

[1]Re-quoted from Kristin Ven Bruusgaard, "Russian Strategic Deterrence and European Security," Survival, Global Politics and Strategy, Volume 58, 2016 - Issue 4, pp. 10-11.

[2]Samuel Charap, "Strategic Sderzhivanie: Understanding Contemporary Russian Approaches to ‘Deterrence’" (Security Insights No. 62, George C. Marshall Center, 2020), p. 5.

[3]Bruusgaard, "Russian Strategic Deterrence and European Security," pp. 11-15.

[4]Charap, "Strategic Sderzhivanie,“ pp. 5-6.

[5]Charap, "Strategic Sderzhivanie,“ p. 6.

[6]Defense Intelligence Agency, 2025 Worldwide Threat Assessment, p. 20.

■ Park Hyung-jung_Independent North Korea Researcher.

■ Editor: Lee Sang-jun_EAI Research Fellow

    Contact: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 211) | leesj@eai.or.kr